Far-right fragmentation on EU foreign policy While EU foreign policy might not be the main topic on Europeans’ minds as they head to the polls this Sunday, the next five years could see that change. In the current term, the far-right parties’ – European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) – impact on the European Parliament’s foreign policy positions have remained rather modest. Mainstream parties, in general, have worked well to ‘make the centre hold’ on the most crucial issues, such as Ukraine support. Because, let’s face it, foreign policy is usually not a strong suit and most certainly not a uniting factor of the majority of those far-right parties. While they have closely followed the bloc’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, EU foreign policymakers have drawn comfort that they were mostly sharply divided on the issue. Positions were largely linked to geography rather than group affiliation, with Eastern far-right parties deeply mistrusting Russia compared to their Western counterparts’ close alignment with the Kremlin’s propaganda. ‘Russiagate’ was an interesting symptom of this divide. According to current polling, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the left-leaning Socialists and Democrats (S&D) are again expected to finish in first and second place, losing some seats, give or take. But both ECR and ID can expect considerable gains, and even the emergence of a far-right supergroup is not unthinkable anymore. Far-right parties will likely come out on top in nine countries, including Austria, the Netherlands, France, Hungary, Poland, and Italy. In nine others, including Spain and Germany, they could emerge in strong second or third place. Ultimately, the two far-right groups together might cover around 25% of MEPs in the new parliament. A significant rightward turn of the house is likely to result in a clear majority of MEPs supporting more restrictive immigration policies and their attempts to leverage development aid to obtain reductions in migration flows. And it certainly will become even more polarised in its resolutions on critical foreign policy issues, such as Ukraine’s military support against Russia and the bloc’s position on the Israel-Hamas war. However, let’s forget the European Parliament for a second, which does not carry much weight regarding the bloc’s foreign policy course. A surge in far-right representation in the European Parliament would not happen in isolation but could be a precursor of what’s to come in the next five years on a national level across Europe. Far-right parties participating in a growing number of national governments would have a much more significant impact on member states’ impact on the bloc’s foreign policy, particularly in the European Council, where decisions on EU foreign policy are taken unanimously. The worry is that if certain EU member states regularly exercise their vetoes, others will be increasingly tempted to do the same. Just look at Hungary, which is responsible for the largest number of blockages in EU foreign policy-making, and that only in the past two years. Slovakia, under Prime Minister Robert Fico, to some extent, has been on a similar trajectory. The Netherlands could be the latest country to join those ranks once it manages to form a government. Italy, with pro-Ukraine, pro-NATO and pro-EU Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, has been the notable exception. Poland, under the Law and Justice government, at least when it comes to foreign policy decisions related to Russia and security, has been the same. But several parties, including Austria’s FPÖ, Hungary’s Fidesz, Bulgaria’s Revival, the Slovak National Party, and the German AfD view Russia favourably and favour a sovereignist turn over EU consensus. A return of former US President Donald Trump to the White House could lead to new divisions on the EU and national levels, especially as some member states are likely to align with Washington at any cost. Mix that with the far-right’s anti-NATO and anti-US sentiments, which are usually tied to broader antiglobalist or sovereigntist ideologies. The only one not in the mix yet is China, which has so far not managed to develop deeper ties with the European radical right. And then there’s EU enlargement, which has the chance to become the most important component of EU foreign policy in the next cycle. While radical-right parties remain sceptical towards enlargement, some support particular EU candidate countries for their very own reasons. Poland’s PiS considers Ukraine’s accession a matter of national security; Romania’s AUR looks at Moldova as part of Romanian territory; and Hungary’s Fidesz hopes like-minded Western Balkan countries would up Budapest’s own position inside the bloc. It will be one of the big challenges for the next EU institutional cycle to address the overall trend. | 