| Sparre v. State |
| Dockets: SC18-1192, SC19-389 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Sparre's postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Sparre was not entitled to relief. As to Sparre's appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion, the Supreme Court held (1) trial counsel was not ineffective, despite two instances in which counsel was deficient; (2) the trial court properly denied Sparre's claim that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors entitled him to relief; and (3) Sparre's claims that the postconviction court erred in three other respects were without merit. As to Sparre's habeas petition, the Court held that Sparre was not entitled to relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. |
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| Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re Raising Florida's Minimum Wage |
| Dockets: SC19-548, SC19-736 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law |
| The Supreme Court approved a proposed amendment titled "Raising Florida's Minimum Wage" for placement on the ballot but refused to review a financial impact statement prepared by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference (FIEC), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to do so. The Attorney General of Florida petitioned the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on the validity of a proposed citizen initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution requesting review of the compliance of the proposed amendment with constitutional and statutory requirements. The Attorney General further requested an opinion addressing the compliance of the corresponding financial impact statement with Fla. Stat. 100.371. The Supreme Court held (1) the initiative petition and proposed ballot title and summary for the proposed amendment met the legal requirements of Fla. Const. art. XI, 3 and Fla. Stat. 101.161(1); and (2) this Court does not have original jurisdiction to review financial impact statements. |
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| Bogle v. State |
| Docket: SC17-2151 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief, holding that summary denial of the successive postconviction motion was appropriate in this case. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In his successive postconviction motion, Appellant claimed that he had newly discovered evidence of Brady and Giglio violations and that he was entitled to relief under Hurst v. State. 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) and under changes to Florida's capital sentencing statute enacted after Hurst. The circuit court summarily denied the successive postconviction motion, concluding that the newly discovered evidence claim was procedurally barred and that the Hurst-related claims lacked merit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record conclusively refuted Appellant's newly discovered evidence claim; and (2) Hurst relief was not available to Appellant. |
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| Davis v. State |
| Docket: SC18-1627 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Lawson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for discharge for expiration of speedy trial, holding that the Fifth District properly applied Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954), and that an investigatory detention does not constitute an arrest for purposes of starting the speedy trial period in Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191. At issue was how the term "arrest" should be defined for purposes of starting the speedy trial period set forth in Rule 3.191, Florida's procedural speedy trial rule. The Supreme Court adhered to Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1985), which adopted the definition of arrest from Melton for purposes of determining when the speedy trial period begins, and held that the Fifth District did not err in determining that there was no speedy trial violation in this case. |
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| Hooks v. State |
| Docket: SC18-1106 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Charles T. Canady Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the First District Court of Appeal by holding that an inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is not invalid if the court does not explicitly inquire as to the defendant's age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure. Petitioner was charged with drug-related offenses and allegedly violated his probation. Petitioner sought to waive his right to counsel. The trial judge discharged Petitioner's attorney, and Petitioner was found guilty of both charges. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court conducted an insufficient Faretta colloquy because the court failed to ask questions about, inter alia, his age, health, and education. The First District held that the Faretta inquiry was adequate. The Supreme Court approved the holding below, holding that a Faretta colloquy is not rendered inadequate by the trial court's failure to inquire as to the defendant's age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure. |
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| Knight v. State |
| Docket: SC18-309 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court approved the result of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal affirming Defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder with a weapon where the jury was given an erroneous jury instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter with a weapon, holding that the trial court's unobjected-to, erroneous jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error. On appeal, the First District concluded that the erroneous jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error because the Supreme Court abrogated the jury pardon doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that fundamental error did not occur in this case because there was no error in the jury instruction on the offense of conviction, the evidence supported that offense, and Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated even if Defendant was deprived of an opportunity for partial jury nullification. |
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| Love v. State |
| Docket: SC18-747 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Charles T. Canady Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal concluding that Fla. Stat. 776.032(4) was a substantive change in the law and therefore did not apply retroactively, holding that section 776.032(4) is a procedural change in the law and applies to all Florida "Stand Your Ground" immunity hearings conducted on or after the statute's effective date. Section 776.032(4), which effective in June 2017 altered the burden of proof at pretrial immunity hearings under Stand Your Ground law, applies to pending cases involving criminal conduct committed prior to the effective date of the statute. In the instant case, Defendant's immunity hearing took place after the statute went into effect. The Third District concluded that section 776.032(4) did not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute was inapplicable in this case. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding (1) section 776.032(4) is a procedural change in the law and not categorically barred by Fla. Const. art. X, 9 from applying in pending cases; (2) the determination of whether a new procedure applies in a pending case generally depends on the posture of the case; and (3) applying section 776.032(4) in a pending case does not entail a retroactive application of the statute. |
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| American Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Lentini |
| Docket: SC18-320 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Ricky Polston Areas of Law: Insurance Law |
| The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in this insurance dispute, holding that an insurer that issues a reduced premium collector vehicle policy may not limit uninsured motorist coverage under the specialty policy to accidents involving the occupancy or use of the collector vehicle. The Estate of Michael Lentini, who was operating his motorcycle when he was involved in a fatal accident, sought uninsured motorist benefits under a policy issued on a collector vehicle. The policy limited uninsured motorist coverage to accidents involving the covered collector vehicle. The Insurer denied coverage, and the Estate sued. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Insurer. The Fifth District reversed, concluding that the collector vehicle policy must and did not comply with the statutory requirements of Fla. Stat. 627.727. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the requirements of section 627.727 prohibited the limitations placed on uninsured motorist coverage in the collector vehicle policy at issue in this case. |
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| Lieupo v. Simon's Trucking, Inc. |
| Docket: SC18-657 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Ricky Polston Areas of Law: Personal Injury |
| The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the First District Court of Appeal by holding that the private cause of action contained in Fla. Stat. 376.373(3) permits recovery for personal injury, thus receding from precedent. Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that Defendant was strictly liable for injuries he suffered after one of Defendant's tractor-trailers spilled battery acid onto the highway. Plaintiff filed his complaint under section 376.373(e), which imposes strict liability for the discharge of certain types of pollutants. The jury found the battery acid caused Plaintiff's injuries and awarded him more than $5 million in damages. The First District reversed, concluding that Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010), required it to apply the 1970 Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act's definition of damages, which precluded Plaintiff's cause of action for personal injuries. The Supreme Court quashed the First District's decision, holding (1) Curd incorrectly applied the 1970 Act's definition of "damage" to a claim brought under the 1983 Act; and (2) the plain meaning of "all damages" in section 376.313(3) of the 1983 Act includes personal injury damages. |
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| Sanchez v. Miami-Dade County |
| Docket: SC18-793 Opinion Date: December 19, 2019 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Personal Injury |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal concluding that Petitioner's "negligent security" claim against Miami-Dade County was barred by sovereign immunity, holding that the conflict issue in this case was a dead issue that has been resolved by this Court in previous opinions. Petitioner was shot and injured at a birthday party hosted at one of the County's public parks. The Third District concluded that Petitioner's personal injury claim was predicated on the County's alleged failure to allocate off-duty police officers to the party and that sovereign immunity protects the County's policy and planning decisions about where to allocate its limited police resources. The Third District reached its holding irrespective of any duty owed to Petitioner by the County. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that the existence of duty rendered sovereign immunity inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for review without reaching the merits, holding that the merging of duty and sovereign immunity has already been resolved by this Court in opinions making clear that duty and sovereign immunity are not to be conflated. |
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