| Mayle v. Illinois |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1691 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Mayle, a self-proclaimed Satanist, is a follower of The Law of Thelema, a set of beliefs developed in the early 1900s by Aleister Crowley. As part of this religion, Mayle participates in what he calls “sex magick rituals” that he believes violate Illinois laws forbidding adultery and fornication. He claims that he reasonably fears prosecution for practicing his beliefs. He also says that he wants to marry more than one person at the same time and that if he were to do so, he would violate an Illinois law against bigamy. Mayle’s first challenge to the laws was dismissed. Mayle did not appeal, but the next year he filed another suit challenging the same statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the second suit, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s grant of a two-day extension to allow Mayle to file a notice of appeal. Mayle’s bigamy claim was precluded by the 2017 final judgment on the merits. Mayle lacked standing to challenge the state’s adultery and fornication laws because he still showed no reasonable fear of prosecution; those laws are no longer enforced. |
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| Roman v. Karren |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17310 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Daniel E. Winfree Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law |
| Cleveland Karren and Jayda Roman had a daughter, born March 2012 in Washington, D.C. Jayda and the daughter moved in July to Mount Vernon, Washington, to live with Jayda’s parents. The family moved to Anchorage in April 2013. Cleveland later took a job at Joint Base Lewis-McChord; he moved to Washington in April 2014, and Jayda remained in Anchorage with the daughter. In May 2015 Cleveland took a different job and moved to Washington, D.C. Jayda filed the parties’ marital dissolution petition in Anchorage in May 2015. Jayda and Cleveland testified that they both had “live[d] in Alaska six continuous months out of the past six years.” Jayda appealed the Alaska superior court’s child custody order, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) or that it abused its discretion by failing to decline UCCJEA jurisdiction on inconvenient forum grounds. She also contended the court gave disproportionate weight to the custody investigator’s trial testimony and, under the statutory custody factors, to maintaining the father-daughter relationship. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the superior court had UCCJEA jurisdiction because Alaska was the child’s home state when the proceeding commenced; the Court also concluded that the court properly weighed the statutory inconvenient forum factors and did not abuse its discretion when it determined that deciding custody in Alaska was most practical. And because the court had broad discretion in making a custody determination — including the weight to give a custody investigator’s testimony — the Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion when weighing either testimony or statutory custody factors. |
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| Safarian v. Govgassian |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B291387(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Moor Areas of Law: Family Law |
| A transmutation that does not meet the requirements of Family Code section 852 is voidable, rather than void. After a married couple filed a fraud action against multiple defendants, husband filed for divorce and entered into a written marital property agreement with wife, characterizing any recovery in the fraud action as the separate property of each spouse. The judgment was entered against defendants in the fraud action, but husband filed for bankruptcy prior to enforcement of the judgment. The fraud defendants entered into a settlement with the bankruptcy trustee, and moved to stay collection proceedings brought by wife in the fraud action. The trial court granted the protective order. The Court of Appeal held that defendants were not parties to the marital property agreement, and thus they cannot rely on section 852 to invalidate the agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine the effect of the marital property agreement under ordinary rules of contract interpretation. |
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| DL v. CL |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000211 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's challenged rulings concerning child custody and relocation and disqualification of counsel in a divorce proceeding, holding that the ICA did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the ICA did not err by (1) (a) considering the family court’s April 26, 2018 amended findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding child custody despite its entry of some findings of fact regarding child custody before the March 26, 2018 notice of appeal because the notice of appeal was premature; and (b) rejecting Petitioner’s arguments that the April 26, 2018 findings and conclusions should be rejected because the family court adopted Respondent's submissions verbatim; (2) affirming the family court’s denial of its motion to disqualify Respondent’s counsel and law firm; and (3) affirming the family court’s grant of sole physical custody of the parties’ minor children to Respondent and allowing Respondent to relocate the children to Arizona. |
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| Bridges v. Caouette |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 50 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Andrew M. Mead Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Marla Bridges's motion to correct a clerical error in the parties' divorce judgment and denying Christopher Caouette's motion to terminate spousal support, holding that the district court did not err. On appeal, Caouette argued that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the inclusion of the phrase "or remarries" in a provision of the divorce judgment was a clerical error and by denying his motion to terminate spousal support based substantively on Bridges's remarriage. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) although the court erred in identifying its decision as a clerical correct, it was clear that the court was interpreting the original divorce judgment and in so doing was acting to grant Bridges's motion to enforce; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Caouette's motion to terminate spousal support due to Bridges's remarriage based on its findings regarding the financial situations of both parties. |
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| In re Marriage of Elder & Mahlum |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 91 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Sandefur Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dissolving Sam Mahlum's marriage to Terri Elder and equitably apportioning the parties' marital estate, holding that the district court erroneously characterized and divided Sam's early disability retirement benefit as a divisible marital estate asset rather than the equivalent of post-dissolution employment income. Before the district court, the only significant matter in dispute was the status of Sam's disability retirement benefits from the Montana Sheriff's Retirement System (SRS) and whether the benefits were a divisible marital asset or the indivisible equivalent of future earnings. The district court concluded that Sam's SRS disability benefits were a divisible marital asset. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in characterizing Sam's post-dissolution SRS disability retirement benefits as a marital estate under Mont. Code Ann. 40-3-202(1). |
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| In re Marriage of Ruis |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 90 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the post-judgment order of the district court requiring David Ruis to pay his ex-wife, Twila Ruis, a cash equalization payment plus interest in accordance with the court's earlier dissolution decree, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in awarding Twila the cash equalization payment originally determined in the decree, together with judgment interest. David appealed, arguing that the eventual sale of the parties' marital home rendered the cash equalization payment inequitable, which made the award of post-judgment interest on that payment amount an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not act arbitrarily or exceed the bounds of reason when it awarded Twila the cash equalization payment originally contemplated in the decree even though David did not refinance and retain the property; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Twila judgment interest or err in its calculation of judgment interest. |
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| Jones v. Jones |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 615 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals finding sufficient evidence to support modifying legal custody of the minor child in this case but not physical custody, holding that the court of appeals erred in finding that Father did not prove a material change in circumstances justifying modification of physical custody. Upon their divorce, Mother was awarded legal and physical custody of the child. The court later entered a modified decree awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody. Father then filed the instant complaint to modify, alleging that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a change in the joint custody arrangement. After a trial, the court gave Father physical custody subject to Mother's parenting time and found it unnecessary to modify the parties' joint legal custody. The court of appeals found insufficient evidence to warrant modifying physical custody but sufficient evidence to modify legal custody. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Mother's continuous unemployment and chronic housing instability was a material change in circumstances that affected the child's best interests, and the district court's custody arrangement was in the child's best interests. |
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| In the Interest of: J.M.G. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 18 MAP 2019 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Mundy Areas of Law: Family Law, Juvenile Law |
| Appellant, J.M.G., was born in August 1996. From an early age, J.M.G. experienced chronic mental health issues and a series of resultant hospitalizations. Following an incident in 2013, during which he attempted to choke his adoptive mother (Mother), J.M.G. consented to a voluntary admission into Philhaven, a behavioral health facility treating children and adolescents. Thereafter, J.M.G. agreed to a voluntary admission into Bradley Center, a residential treatment facility. While at Bradley Center, J.M.G. made revelations to Mother that he had been sexually inappropriate with his adoptive sister. Mother referred the matter to Childline. A subsequent investigation resulted in J.M.G. being adjudicated delinquent for one count of misdemeanor indecent assault. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to decide whether the harmless error doctrine was applicable to determinations made by the trial court under Act 211 when the materials provided to the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB), and considered by the Commonwealth’s expert in preparing his report and rendering his opinion, erroneously contained privileged communications under 42 Pa.C.S. section 5944 of the Judicial Code, establishing psychologist-patient privilege. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the harmless error doctrine did not apply. |
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| Kimzey v. Kimzey |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 52 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court increasing Father's child support obligation, denying Father's petition to modify custody, and refusing to modify visitation, holding that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that there was a material change of circumstances to reopen the child support order in this case and by refusing to modify visitation. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) abused its discretion by reopening the stipulated child support order without requiring Mother to show a change in circumstances regarding child support other than a twenty percent change in the presumptive support amount; (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Father's request for primary custody of the children but did abuse its discretion by refusing to modify visitation; and (3) did not err by failing to explain its reasons for not following the guardian ad litem's recommendation regarding custody. |
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