| United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1123 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for two drug-trafficking offenses and two money-laundering offenses, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. The district court sentenced Defendant to 324 months' imprisonment for the drug-trafficking counts of 240 months' imprisonment for the money-laundering counts, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural errors in calculating his Guidelines sentencing range and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6), which warns against disparate sentences for similarly situated codefendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in applying the various enhancements to which Defendant had objected below; (2) any error in initially finding that Defendant's drug-trafficking offenses involved 200 kilograms of cocaine was harmless; and (3) in light of certain differences between Defendant and his codefendants, Defendant's disparity challenge is rejected. |
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| United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1091 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Torruella Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of reentry after deportation and to dismiss the indictment, holding that the immigration court did not lack jurisdiction. In moving to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, Appellant argued that the removal order underlying his conviction had been rendered null and void. Specifically, Appellant argued that because his notice to appear did not specify the date or time of the removal hearing the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to issue the removal order. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant did not satisfy the prerequisites set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) for collaterally attacking the removal order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) controlled, and Appellant's jurisdictional argument failed. |
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| United States v. Mattis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 20-1713 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Peter W. Hall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting Defendants Mattis and Rahman's release on bail pending trial. Amidst city and nationwide protests against police brutality, defendants were arrested after an incident in which Rahman allegedly threw a Molotov cocktail into an unoccupied police vehicle and Mattis allegedly acted as the getaway driver. The court cannot say that it is left with a "definite and firm conviction" that the district court erred in determining that the conditions imposed are adequate to reasonably assure that defendants do not constitute a danger to the community. The court noted that defendants' actions were undertaken during a massive public protest, in which emotions ran high. Furthermore, there is no indication that defendants are likely to engage in similar acts outside of the context of that particular night. In this case, neither defendant had a prior criminal record, both had engaged in responsible careers and are dedicated to caring for their families, both demonstrated they had deep ties to the community, and both had friends and family explain that they were willing to post $250,000 bonds as bail. The court held that the conditions of release contain provisions that impede defendants' ability to engage in criminal activity, and the evidence to which the government points the court and which the court has otherwise gleaned from the record is inadequate to leave it with a firm conviction that the district court erred in finding those conditions sufficient to assure public safety. Accordingly, the court vacated the stay previously entered in this matter. |
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| Vega v. Semple |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3176 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Jose A. Cabranes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiffs, current and former inmates of the DOC incarcerated within Garner Correctional Institution, filed a putative class action alleging that they were exposed involuntarily to indoor radon gas, a recognized human carcinogen, far in excess of any published safe level while incarcerated at Garner. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment to the extent that it determined that defendants violated clearly established law as of the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 29 (1993). In Helling, the Supreme Court held that an inmate can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison officials have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of environmental tobacco smoke that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health. Therefore, as of the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Helling, the court held that reasonable officials would recognize that a failure to take any reasonable steps to abate the risk of excessive radon exposure, of which risk they were actually aware, would constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need that violated inmates' clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. The court affirmed in part to the extent that the judgment denied defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' federal claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; reversed in part to the extent that the judgment denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state-law claims for prospective relief against the official-capacity defendants; and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Jackson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Dockets: 19-2499, 19-2517 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006, Harris pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base and stipulated to the quantity he possessed—33.6 grams. In 2019, Harris sought a reduction of his 210-month sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5222. The district court assumed that Harris was eligible but denied relief, stating that “neither the statutory penalties nor the advisory guidelines range would be affected if [he] were sentenced today given the stipulated drug quantity.” Jackson was convicted in 2004 of the same crime. His indictment charged him with possession with the intent to distribute approximately 48 grams of crack. The jury convicted Jackson of possessing five grams or more, without any specific finding that he possessed 48 grams. In 2019, Jackson moved under section 404 for a reduction of his 300-month sentence. The district court denied relief, determining that he was ineligible. The Third Circuit vacated as to Harris and reversed as to Jackson. Section 404 eligibility turns on a defendant’s statute of conviction, not on his possession of a certain quantity of drugs. Although Harris and Jackson each possessed more than 28 grams of crack, Harris pleaded guilty to and Jackson was convicted of possession of five grams or more; both can seek discretionary reductions of their sentences. |
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| United States v. Dodge |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4507 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Niemeyer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court was bound by its prior decision in United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014), holding that the North Carolina breaking and entering statute "sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of burglary" and therefore its violation qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal Act predicate conviction. Therefore, defendant's previous conviction for breaking and entering, in violation of North Carolina General Statutes 14-54, qualifies as an ACCA predicate conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). |
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| United States v. Gutierrez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Dockets: 18-4656, 18-4665, 18-4855 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: G. Steven Agee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants Gutierrez, Baxton, and Gilmore's convictions and sentences for various charges related to their membership in the United Blood Nation (UBN) gang. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal; the district court did not abuse its discretion in regard to jury selection; the district court properly denied Gilmore's motion to suppress; the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue a special jury verdict form; and the district court properly instructed the jury. The court upheld the district court's denial of Gilmore's motion for a new trial; held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's civil forfeiture findings; and held that defendants' respective sentences were not procedurally and substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Mitchell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4654 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Allison J. Rushing Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm after defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he stopped and frisked defendant. In this case, a bystander called 911 to report a large fight and assault, with a victim knocked out laying on the ground; the area was known to be a problem area; and officers could reasonably infer from the report that the person with the gun was involved in the fight. The court rejected defendant's contention that the tip from the bystander was unreliable and that the tip insufficiently alleged illegal conduct. |
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| United States v. Aparicio-Leon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50813 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 165 month sentence for possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not err in applying USSG 2D1.1(a)(5),(c)(3) of the Drug Quantity Table to calculate defendant's sentencing guideline range based on the purity of the methamphetamine he had in his possession. According to the factual basis and PSR, the methamphetamine seized was identified as d-methamphetamine hydrochloride with a net weight of 989 grams and a purity level of 97%. Therefore, the court concluded that it was appropriately classified as "ice" methamphetamine. The court also held that defendant failed to show that the district court clearly or obviously erred by failing to adjust his sentence to account for time he spent in custody prior to sentencing that he claims will not be credited. Even if the district court erred, defendant failed to show that the district court's purported error affected his substantial rights. |
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| United States v. Burden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30394 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendants Burden and Scott's convictions and sentences for unlawfully possessing firearms as felons. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scott's motion for severance where Scott failed to overcome the presumption that the jury would follow the district court's limiting instruction; defendants cannot meet their burden to show that Rehaif error affected their substantial rights; regardless of the standard of review, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; the district court did not err, much less plainly so, in ordering the attorneys to seek approval before mentioning or eliciting testimony concerning defendants' statements that they had just been robbed of their clothing; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying a cross-reference to attempted first degree murder at sentencing. |
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| United States v. Gratkowski |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50492 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Catharina Haynes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search warrant. In this case, federal agents used an outside service to analyze the publicly viewable Bitcoin blockchain and identify a cluster of Bitcoin addresses controlled by a child pornography website that defendant used to download material. The court held that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his information on the Bitcoin Blockchain where the nature of the information on the Bitcoin blockchain and the voluntariness of the exposure weigh heavily against finding a privacy interest in an individual's information on the Bitcoin blockchain. The court also held that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Bitcoin transactions on Coinbase where the nature of the information and the voluntariness of the exposure weigh heavily against finding a privacy interest in Coinbase records. |
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| United States v. Reyes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10291 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc, withdrew the prior opinion, and substituted the following opinion. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop because the officer knew that the location where defendant was pulled over is a known drug-trafficking corridor; defendant drove a truck registered in someone else's name; defendant was unusually protective of the truck and initially refused to exit; defendant offered inconsistent and implausible stories about the purpose of her travel; defendant had a conviction for possession of meth; and when asked about anything illegal in the truck, defendant's facial expressions changed dramatically. The court also held that defendant offered no persuasive reason why Miranda demands the suppression of her statements during a routine traffic stop. |
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| Davenport v. MacLaren |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-2267 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Davenport, convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial in Michigan state court. He was visibly shackled at the waist, wrist, and ankles during trial. Davenport’s right hand was uncuffed and there was a privacy curtain around the defense table. The court did not justify the shackling on the record. During an evidentiary hearing on direct appeal, several jurors recalled that they had thought Davenport might be dangerous when they saw him in shackles. The jurors testified that Davenport’s shackling was not discussed during deliberations and did not affect their verdict. After exhausting his state remedies, Davenport challenged his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court found that the shackling was harmless error and denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed and granted a conditional writ. Because “shackling is 'inherently prejudicial,’” and the evidence of premeditation and deliberation necessary to a first-degree murder conviction was not overwhelming, the state has not met its burden to show the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” |
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| Hugueley v. Mays |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-6024 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Danny Julian Boggs Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2002, Hugueley stabbed correctional counselor Steed 36 times, stopping only after his homemade weapon broke off. Hugueley testified that he had planned the attack because Steed “had a smart ass mouth.” The jury convicted Hugueley of first-degree murder. Hugueley waived the presentation of any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The jury considered several aggravating factors. In 1986, Hugueley was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his mother. In 1992, he was convicted of first-degree murder after killing another inmate. In 1998, Hugueley was convicted of attempted first-degree murder after stabbing another inmate, The jury sentenced Hugueley to death. Tennessee law requires an automatic appeal from a death sentence. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. Hugueley originally raised ineffective assistance of counsel in his state post-conviction proceedings, but he waived the claim when he voluntarily withdrew his petition. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hugueley’s argument that he should have been declared incompetent to withdraw that petition, and that the state-court procedures that determined that he was competent were procedurally deficient or, alternatively, that his state post-conviction counsel was ineffective and caused his default. |
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| Small v. Officer Brock |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1841 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Small, a Michigan prisoner, pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, alleging that, without provocation, Officer Brock several times brandished a knife, threatened to kill Small, and motioned in a manner suggesting how Brock would use the knife to kill Small. On initial screening, the district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal. Small plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment violation. While verbal abuse and nonphysical harassment of prisoners do not alone give rise to a constitutional claim, the combination of multiple, unprovoked verbal threats to immediately end a prisoner’s life and the aggressive brandishing of a deadly weapon can violate the Eighth Amendment. Based on the allegations in Small’s complaint, Brock had no legitimate penological reason for repeatedly placing Small in fear of his life; it is reasonable to infer that Brock knew that his conduct would cause Small psychological harm. Unprovoked and repeated threats to a prisoner’s life, combined with a demonstrated means to immediately carry out such threats, constitutes conduct so objectively serious as to be “antithetical to human dignity.” Neither the force threatened by Brock (death) nor the resulting injury to Small (fearing for his life to the point of paranoia and psychological distress necessitating mental health treatment) was de minimis. |
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| United States v. Igboba |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1116 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Eric L. Clay Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime |
| Igboba was convicted on 18 counts under 18 U.S.C. 286, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 18 U.S.C. 287, and 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (b), and (c)(5), based on his participation in a conspiracy to defraud the government by preparing and filing false federal income tax returns using others’ identities. He was sentenced to 162 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and required to pay restitution, special assessment, and forfeiture sums. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that when the district court increased his base offense level based on the total amount of loss his offense caused, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), it failed to distinguish between the loss caused by his individual conduct and that caused by the entire conspiracy and that the district court erred in applying a two-level sophisticated-means enhancement, section 2B1.1(b)(10). the district court could rightly attribute $4.1 million in losses to “acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by” Igboba. The court noted his “sophisticated” use of technology and multiple aliases. |
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| United States v. Ware |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6180 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: R[ansey] Guy Cole, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Ware was convicted in 1997 of several federal drug offenses and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. At the time, adherence to the federal sentencing guidelines was mandatory; the jury did not make any drug amount finding. The court did not specify the particular sentence for each count nor specify under which provisions of section 841(b)(1) Ware was sentenced. In 2003, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ware’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for relief under Apprendi. In 2019, Ware moved for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act. The district court concluded that Ware was eligible for relief but denied Ware’s motion as a matter of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ware’s argument that the court abused its discretion by insufficiently considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), putting undue weight on the legislative purpose of the First Step Act, and inadequately considering that Ware’s statutory sentencing range would be lower under current law. The district court assessed at length three of the section 3553(a) factors that it deemed most relevant. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that, under Apprendi, Ware’s statutory maximum would have been lower because specified drug amounts were not found by the jury or charged in the indictment but that this factor did not weigh heavily in favor of granting relief, due to concerns regarding disparities with other similarly situated defendants. |
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| Alkhalidi v. Neal |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1378 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Alkhalidi was convicted of murder, robbery, and theft. He appealed, claiming that his attorney failed to advise him of a plea offer. The Indiana state court denied relief, holding Alkhalidi’s innocence claim strongly indicated he would not have accepted the plea deal. The state court also held that Indiana requires a defendant to admit a plea deal’s factual basis otherwise the trial court would be prevented from entering the plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Alkhalidi’s petition for habeas corpus relief. Alkhalidi is unable to show prejudice; he failed to show the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or that the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). |
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| Balsewicz v. Pawlyk |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3062 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Wisconsin Department of Corrections policy requires that transgender prisoners taking cross-gender hormones, like Balsewicz, shower separately from inmates who are not transgender or intersex. Balsewicz complained that inmates who were not transgender or intersex were allowed to shower with those who were and identified Rivers as one of those inmates, believing Rivers falsely claimed to be transgender to receive single-cell housing. Rivers and Balsewicz were in a shower house with other inmates. Rivers made threats. Balsewicz reported the incident to Sergeant Pawlyk and repeatedly asked Pawlyk to report her concerns for her personal safety. Other inmates witnessed this interaction. Pawlyk took no action. Two days later, when Rivers and Balsewicz were leaving a dining hall, Rivers without any provocation or warning, punched Balsewicz multiple times in the head. Balsewicz collapsed, lost consciousness, and experienced dizziness and numbness in her face. Balsewicz filed suit against Pawlyk under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment favoring Pawlyk. When a prison official knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm, the Eighth Amendment requires that official to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. A reasonable juror could conclude that the threat Balsewicz reported would not expire once the inmates left the shower and that Pawlyk knew Balsewicz faced an ongoing risk of serious harm. Pawlyk is not entitled to qualified immunity. |
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| Crawford v. Littlejohn |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1949 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| An Indiana prison disciplinary board concluded that Crawford had participated in an “unauthorized financial transaction” by telling Wolf, a fellow inmate, to send $400 to his mother. Wolf sent the check, which Crawford’s mother cashed. Wolf told prison officials that the payment covered the cost of drugs that Crawford had supplied. The prison’s Code B-220 bans possessing materials for, or engaging in, “unauthorized financial transactions”. Section IX of the Inmate Trust Fund Policy supplies this definition of unauthorized financial transactions: “attempting or completing financial transactions, including the sending of monies from one offender to another or the sending of monies from the family/friends of one offender to another.” Crawford claimed that the payment was for a car that Wolf’s aunt and Wolf’s daughter were buying. The prison penalized Crawford by the loss of 30 days’ good-time credit. The district judge directed Indiana to restore the 30-day credit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The phrase “financial transactions” is broad, but broad differs from inscrutable. The rule is sweeping, not vague. |
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| Purkey v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3318 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1998, Long, age 16, got into Purkey’s truck. Purkey, 46, threatened her with a knife and drove her across the state line to his home, where he raped her and ultimately killed her. Purkey dismembered Long’s body and burned the pieces. He dumped the remains into a septic lagoon. Later in 1998, he killed 80-year-old Bales. He was caught. While awaiting trial, Purkey contacted Detective Howard about Long and insisted that an FBI agent come along because he thought that if he were convicted on federal charges, he could serve a life sentence in a federal facility. Purkey confessed to killing Long, took them to the crime scene, and gave handwritten confessions. Howard and Tarpley denied that any deal was on the table. After Purkey pleaded guilty to the Bales murder, he was indicted for Long's kidnapping, rape, and murder. Purkey had repeatedly confessed to kidnapping Long; his defense was that he thought she was a prostitute who willingly accompanied him and that he had fabricated the kidnapping claim to be prosecuted in federal court. Defense counsel did not object to the use of his confessions to refute that story. A jury voted for a death sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and several alleged violations of his due process rights--government misconduct during the trial, insufficient evidence to find kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, and error in the jury’s failure to address the question of mitigating evidence. |
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| United States v. Kennedy-Robey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2421 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Barrett Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Kennedy-Robey was charged with fraud for operating a scheme to defraud the IRS and an unemployment insurance scheme. While awaiting trial, Kennedy-Robey was released on bond. She resumed her fraudulent activities. The government obtained an arrest warrant. Instead of appearing at the bond revocation hearing, Kennedy-Robey remained a fugitive for a few months. When they arrested Kennedy-Robey, officers found her to-do list, which read like a “how-to” guide for fugitives. Kennedy-Robey eventually pleaded guilty. Although the guidelines range was 210-262 months, the court sentenced her to 72 months’ imprisonment and ordered her to pay over $4.8 million in restitution. In 2017, Kennedy-Robey was released to a halfway house. Within weeks, Kenney-Robey filed a fraudulent automobile loan application and obtained a loan exceeding $30,000, which she used to purchase a Mercedes-Benz, and filed a fraudulent credit card application. Months later, she and another defendant purchased another car with funds obtained from another fraudulent loan application. Kennedy-Robey pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The government sought an 18-month sentence, based on a guidelines range of 12-18 months. After considering Kennedy-Robey’s long history of unrepentant criminal conduct, the court imposed a 36-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court failed to consider either her mental health condition or the more lenient sentences received by defendants convicted of similar crimes and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Triggs |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1704 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Triggs was indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The predicate conviction was more than 10 years old. Triggs brought an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the indictment. When that argument failed, he conditionally pleaded guilty,. After he filed his notice of appeal, the Supreme Court issued its 2019 “Rehaif” decision, holding that in a section 922(g) prosecution, the government must prove that the defendant “knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” The second knowledge element is new. Triggs raised a Rehaif claim, seeking to withdraw his plea. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Triggs has made the required showing to withdraw his plea. Triggs must establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known the government had to prove the Rehaif knowledge element. That element depends on whether Triggs can plausibly argue that he did not know he belonged to the relevant category of persons disqualified from firearm possession. In contrast to some other categories of prohibited persons listed in section 922(g)—notably, felons—the statutory definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is quite complicated, giving Triggs a plausible defense. |
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| United States v. Wade |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2061 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| To impress a woman he wanted to date (Bishop), Wade wore a badge and a holstered gun, discussed investigating a suspect, and left a business card that claimed Wade was a DEA special agent. The card had a hand-written note indicating that Bishop should go out with Wade. She reported Wade’s interactions. The police opened a stalking investigation. Wade was indicted for impersonating a federal employee and acting as such, 18 U.S.C. 912. The government successfully moved to preclude Wade from claiming his romantic motivation negated his culpability. During closing argument, defense counsel nonetheless stated: “Although [Wade] might be a hopeless romantic, he’s not a criminal.” The judge also ruled against Wade’s proposed jury instructions that would have required the jury to find Wade acted to cause Bishop to follow some course she would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct. The instruction actually given required the jury to find that Wade falsely assumed or pretended to be a DEA officer or employee and as such committed some overt act involving an assertion of claimed authority derived from that office. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Wade’s conviction. Wade’s alleged romantic intent does not negate the scienter requirement; his motivation has no bearing on whether he knew he was not a DEA agent. The only effect the romantic-motivation argument could have had was to cause the jury to conclude Wade’s crime was not serious or harmful, leading to jury nullification. |
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| United States v. Wilson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2503 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Police dispatch reported three black males armed with guns selling drugs in front of a residence in Chicago’s Lawndale neighborhood, a high-crime area; one of the men was wearing a white shirt, another wearing a red shirt, and the third wearing a boot-style leg cast. Officers Mukite and Collins responded. Passing Douglas Park, about one block from the reported address, they saw multiple black males wearing red and white shirts. The officers approached the group. Collins saw Wilson grab a bulge in the front pocket of his athletic/mesh shorts and sit down facing away from them, on the fringe of the group. Wilson wore a blue shirt. Collins walked around to see if Wilson was wearing a cast (he was not). Collins asked Wilson to stand up and made a corresponding hand gesture. Wilson rose and sprinted away instantly. Mukite chased and tackled him. While on the ground, Wilson indicated that he had a gun on his person. The officers searched him and found a loaded revolver. Wilson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of his motion to suppress the gun. Considering the totality of the circumstances—and Wilson’s flight especially—Wilson’s seizure was supported by the officers’ reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. |
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| Rinehart v. Weitzell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3263 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff's in forma pauperis complaint as failing to state a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff is currently serving a prison sentence and has a diagnosis of diverticulitis, a chronic colon condition that causes diarrhea and constipation. The court held that plaintiff has stated a Title II claim by sufficiently alleging that he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA and that he was denied the benefit of the prison's privilege system by reason of his disability. The court also held that plaintiff has stated a claim under Title VI and that defendants retaliated against him for his filing of ADA grievances by taking the adverse action of rescinding his medical classification without providing a medical reevaluation or rationale. Finally, because plaintiff's complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court necessarily reversed the district court's assignment of a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. |
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| Stephen v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1259 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief challenging petitioner's three Iowa methamphetamine-related convictions. The court held that petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that the Iowa court's application of the Jackson sufficiency of the evidence standard was both incorrect and unreasonable; petitioner's challenges to the state court's factual findings also fail; and petitioner procedurally defaulted on his argument regarding his conviction for lithium with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The court rejected petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claim. Finally, the court held that petitioner's sentence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because Iowa courts have held the enhancements were to apply in tandem, and petitioner's Eighth Amendment argument was procedurally defaulted. |
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| United States v. Delorme |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2374 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual abuse. The court held that the trial judge did not plainly err by not recusing himself sua sponte. Even if it considered defendant's recusal arguments despite the fact that he untimely raises them for the first time on appeal, the court held that he has not shown that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In this case, the statements to which defendant cites do not show that the judge's disposition was so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. The court also rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to allow an agent to testify as a lay witness about his experience in forensic interviews under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, and to not allow defendant to question the agent about an incident involving a white pick up trick. Finally, defendant failed to show plain error in the judge's decision to allow the agent to testify about his opinion that defendant was guilty based on the agent's interview with defendant. |
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| United States v. Kidd |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 18-3327, 18-3328, 18-3558 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendants Burke, Ibrahim, and Kidd's convictions of mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion to strike references to the Minnesota anti-runner statute as surplusage; defendants' proposed jury instructions regarding the runner payments misstated the law and thus the district court properly declined to use it; the district court did not err by giving the final instruction that defined a scheme to defraud and, even assuming that the reference to omitting material facts was error, the error was harmless; and defendants' claims of prosecutor misconduct are rejected. Finally, the court affirmed Burke's sentence, holding that the district court did not err in calculating his advisory guideline range; the district court did not err by applying a two-level increase for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1; and the district court did not erroneously make a finding that encompassed all elements of perjury. |
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| United States v. Cox |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10416 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Gwin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for child pornography-related charges, including one count of making a notice offering child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A). In this case, defendant used an online instant messaging platform to exchange child pornography with one other individual. The panel held that one-to-one communications can satisfy the "notice" requirement in section 2251(d)(1), and that a rational fact-finder could find that defendant made a notice offering child pornography when she sent a one-to-one electronic message linking to a Dropbox account that contained child pornography. The panel also held that the district court did not err by admitting a Kik messenger exchange under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove defendant's identity and absence of mistake. |
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| Jenkins v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-12524 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Branch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following option. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to petitioner, rejecting petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty. The court held that the state court did not unreasonably determine that petitioner failed to establish objectively incompetent performance by his counsel during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to present mitigation evidence. Even if petitioner had demonstrated that counsel's performance was deficient, he failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court also held that the state court did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), with respect to the intellectual component of intellectual disability; the record supports the state court's conclusion that petitioner does not have substantial deficits in adaptive behaviors; and the ample record of petitioner's childhood does not point to intellectual disability before age 18. |
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| United States v. Clotaire |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15287 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit access device fraud, access device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement, with his brother, in fraudulently using identities to collect unemployment benefits and to intercept preloaded debit cards he and his brother had requested while posing as residents on his brother's mail delivery route. Defendant raised numerous claims of error on appeal. The court rejected defendant's challenges to the admissibility of the images derived from surveillance video taken by PNC Bank ATMs on three fronts; the district court did not abuse its discretion by improperly limiting defendant's ability to present a full and fair defense; there was no error in admitting the lay identification testimony; there was no error in admitting defendant's booking photograph; and there was no cumulative error. |
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| United States v. Eulogio Ramiro Yoza Tigua |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 19-10177, 19-10213 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In these separate appeals, the Eleventh Circuit held that defendants adjudicated guilty before but sentenced after the effective date of the First Step Act of 2018 may not qualify for relief under the amended statutory safety-valve provision. The court explained that the First Step Act states that its amendment of the statutory safety-valve provision "shall apply only to a conviction entered on or after the date of [its] enactment" on December 21, 2018. In this case, defendants had their convictions entered when the district court accepted their pleas of guilty before December 21, 2018, and thus they are ineligible for relief from the statutory mandatory-minimum sentence under the amended statutory safety-valve provision. The court also held that any error in the district court's denial of Defendant Castro's sentence for his minor role was harmless. |
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| United States v. Harris |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-15055 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 92 month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the district court's imposition of a higher penalty was not outside its significant discretion. The court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court adequately explained its chosen sentence by taking into account defendant's extensive record and emphasizing that defendant started a violent confrontation that led to death. Furthermore, the district court acknowledged that it had considered defendant's salutary post-offense conduct. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, giving greater weight to defendant's criminal history and the seriousness of the offense conduct while giving relatively less weight to his post-offense conduct. |
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| United States v. Ming Pon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-11455 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Edward Earl Carnes Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of twenty counts of health care fraud. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a fraud scheme conducted through his ophthalmology office that resulted in a loss of nearly $7 million. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing defendant's expert to testify, under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, about the use of subthreshold micropulse photostimulation as a treatment for wet age-related macular degeneration. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting rebuttal evidence showing that defendant billed Medicare for performing services on a patient's blind left eye. Even if the district court erred in partially limiting defendant's surrebuttal evidence, and that error violated the Sixth Amendment, the court held that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the court vacated defendant's sentence on each count and remanded the case for the limited purpose of letting the district court modify defendant's sentence structure to bring it in line with USSG 5G1.2(d). |
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| United States v. Rodriguez Cuya |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 15-10491, 18-12198, 18-14380 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motions for preliminary discovery in anticipation of an as-yet unfiled 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition. The court held that a defendant who has not yet filed a section 2255 motion to vacate a conviction or sentence is not entitled to discovery. The court wrote that its case law has long established that there is no legal basis for defendant to seek discovery from the district court before filing his motion to vacate his conviction. |
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| United States v. Singer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-14294 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Rosenbaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempting to export 303 Ubiquiti NanoStation M2 Network Modems to Cuba without a license. Although the court agreed with defendant that the government was required to prove he knew of the facts that made the NanoStations subject to prohibitions on export to Cuba without a license, the court held that the jury instructions the district court gave correctly explained the level of knowledge required to convict, and the evidence admitted at trial established defendant's knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant took a substantial step towards exporting the NanoStations in violation of the law. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in applying the two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. |
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| United States v. Bowser |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-3055 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Thomas Beall Griffith Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The DC Circuit affirmed Defendant David G. Bowser's conviction for charges related his obstruction of an investigation by the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) into his work as chief of staff to a Member of Congress, Paul Broun. Bowser hired Brett O'Donnell as a communications and messaging consultant for official duties, but O'Donnell's job included increasingly more work on the Congressman's re-election campaign. The court explained that nothing prevented O'Donnell from assisting the campaign as a volunteer or campaign employee, but House Rules forbade the Congressman's office from paying O'Donnell out of the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA). The court affirmed the judgment of acquittal on the obstruction-of-Congress charge and held that the House has structured its internal procedures such that the Office's reviews precede any investigation by the House or the Ethics Committee; affirmed the concealment conviction because defendant had fair notice that he could be criminally prosecuted by failing to disclose particular information; affirmed the two false-statement charges because the charges are justiciable, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that his statements to the OCE investigators were false, and the court declined to adopt defendant's proposed jury instruction; because any error was harmless, the court need not address the merits of defendant's Rostenkowski argument; and affirmed three of defendant's false-statement convictions because any failure to instruct the jury to ignore evidence presented for other counts was harmless. |
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| United States v. Lieu |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-3026 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Katsas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of distributing child pornography and traveling across state lines to engage in sexual conduct with a nine-year-old girl. The DC Circuit held that a defendant violates 18 U.S.C. 2423(b) by traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a child, even if the defendant is mistaken in believing that an actual child is involved. Therefore, the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charged travel offense. The court also held that the district court permissibly admitted evidence that defendant had molested his own stepdaughter several years earlier, when she was between six and eight years old. |
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| Odom v. Helms et al. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1180749 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Tom Parker Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury |
| Bernadine Odom appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of several supervisory officers in the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol Division, in a lawsuit based on the misconduct of a state trooper. In 2015, Odom was involved in an automobile accident. State Trooper Samuel Houston McHenry II responded to the scene. Odom's vehicle was inoperable, so after McHenry investigated the accident, he gave her a ride, ostensibly to a safe location. At 12:12 a.m., he radioed his post dispatcher that he was en route with Odom to an exit about 10 miles from the accident scene. He did not mention his vehicle's mileage as of the time he left the accident scene. Instead of taking Odom directly to the exit, McHenry took her to a wooded area and sexually assaulted her. At 12:21 a.m., he radioed that he was dropping Odom off at the exit, and at 12:25 he radioed that he had completed the drop-off. Within two days, McHenry's employment was terminated based on his misconduct. McHenry was charged with first-degree rape, and he pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct. Odom then filed this civil lawsuit against McHenry and law enforcement officials alleging violations of various law-enforcement policies and procedures, and well as failing to properly train and supervise McHenry. Because Odom could not demonstrate the supervisory defendants were not entitled to State-agent immunity, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment in their favor. |
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| Alaska v. Pulusila |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17124 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Craig F. Stowers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Falealo Pulusila was charged with fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (methamphetamine), misconduct involving weapons in the fifth degree, failure to carry proof of auto insurance, and failure to carry vehicle liability insurance. He entered into a plea agreement in July 2013, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to the fourth-degree misconduct charge and the State dismissed the other charges; the court sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment with 42 months suspended and three years’ probation. In July 2014 Pulusila’s probation officer petitioned to revoke his probation for five alleged violations. The court found that he violated his probation and ordered him to serve 25 days of his suspended jail time. Over the next two years the probation officer petitioned the court four more times to revoke Pulusila’s probation, and the court ordered him to serve various amounts of his suspended jail time in connection with each. This appeal involved the probation officer’s fifth petition to revoke probation. The probation officer alleged that Pulusila was in possession of certain prohibited items after he was found in a truck with those items. Pulusila argued that the State had to show that he knew the items were in the borrowed truck for there to be a violation. The superior court disagreed and imposed all of the remaining time in the probationer’s suspended sentence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was a mens rea requirement for possession as a condition of probation. The State petitioned for hearing, arguing that the court of appeals significantly modified the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Trumbly v. State, which outlined the proper analytical framework for probation revocation hearings; the State also argued that the court of appeals erred in holding that the probation condition included a mens rea requirement. After review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Trumbly holding and Trumbly's two-stage probation revocation hearing process. Further, the Court held that the appropriate mens rea requirement for possession of items prohibited by a condition of probation was a negligence standard, not an actual knowledge standard: the State must prove the probationer knew or should have known he was in possession of items prohibited by a condition of probation. The Court thus reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded to the superior court to determine whether Pulusila knew or should have known that he was in possession of the prohibited items. |
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| California v. Campbell |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C088348(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: M. Kathleen Butz Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Isiah Campbell was convicted by jury on three counts of pimping and 11 counts of pandering. On appeal, he argued his convictions should have been reversed for a variety of reasons, including improper venue, insufficient evidence, the pandering statute is void for vagueness, instructional error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and improper conviction on multiple counts of pimping. The Court of Appeal rejected each of defendant’s contentions and affirmed judgment. |
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| California v. Duffy |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C089670(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Ronald B. Robie Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Sean Duffy was convicted by jury of numerous counts related to his possession of a stolen firearm. The trial court found true three prior prison term enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years, which included three consecutive one-year terms for each of the prior prison term enhancements. On appeal, defendant contended the Court of Appeal should have stricken the one-year prior prison term enhancements in light of newly enacted Senate Bill No. 136, which amended Penal Code section 667.5 (b) by limiting the offenses that qualify for the enhancement. Defendant also contended three of the counts described alternate ways of committing the same offense -- possession of a concealed firearm in a vehicle -- and, thus, were not separate offenses. Therefore two of those three convictions should have been stricken. The State conceded the three prior prison term enhancements should have been stricken. The Court of Appeal agreed the three counts were duplicative. Accordingly, the Court struck the prior prison term enhancements and convictions on counts 4 and 6. As modified, judgment was affirmed, and the matter was remanded for resentencing. |
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| In re Chavez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H046921(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Franklin D. Elia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 1994, Chavez was convicted by plea of assault with intent to commit rape, a sex offense requiring sex offender registration under Penal Code section 290 He was sentenced to nine years in state prison. In 1999, Chavez pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender and admitted five strike allegations. Chavez was sentenced to a Three Strikes term of 25 years to life. In 2018, Chavez’s request to be granted early parole consideration under Proposition 57 was denied. Proposition 57 added to the state constitution a provision that any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his primary offense. Chavez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) refusal to grant him early parole consideration. The superior court granted Chavez’s petition, and ordered the CDCR to “provide Chavez with early parole consideration within 60 days.” The court of appeal affirmed. A CDCR regulation, which excluded from eligibility for early parole consideration under Proposition 57 any inmate who had a prior conviction for a sexual offense that required sex offender registration was inconsistent with Proposition 57. |
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| People v. Castellanos |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H045792(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Danner Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Castellanos was charged with transporting a controlled substance from one county to another noncontiguous county and possession of a controlled substance for sale. Castellanos pleaded no contest to count 1 in exchange for a three-year term of probation and the dismissal of count 2. Castellanos signed a plea form including preprinted waiver language, covering “the right to appeal [his] conviction, the judgment, or any other orders previously issued by this court.” In the plea colloquy, Castellanos stated that he gave up his rights to appeal and to collateral attack. The court found that Castellanos knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, granted a three-year term of probation, and imposed an electronic search probation condition requiring Castellanos to provide law enforcement with access to any electronic device, including all passwords to any social media accounts and applications. The California Supreme Court subsequently struck down a similar electronic search condition as overbroad. The court of appeal rejected Castellanos’ challenge to the condition. Castellanos’s claim relied on a post-waiver change in the law, so Castellanos did not enter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal from the challenged probation condition but the search condition is not overbroad, as it was related to the offense for which Castellanos was convicted. |
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| People v. Lopez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B300787(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Penal Code section 1170.95 as enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. Section 1170.95 is a new legislative statute that allows certain eligible defendants convicted of murder to petition for dismissal of their murder convictions and be resentenced on any remaining counts of conviction. Because Senate Bill No. 1437's changes to the felony-murder rule and elimination of the natural and probable consequences doctrine do not unconstitutionally amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115, the Court of Appeal held that defendant was entitled to have his petition considered on the merits. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The court stated that, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature acted within its Constitutional authority to amend legislative statutes and enact new laws. The court held that Senate Bill No. 1437 did not amend any initiative statute. |
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| People v. Ruiz |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A153135(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Ruiz was convicted of three counts of sex crimes he committed against his minor daughter and was sentenced to 44 years to life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14, Penal Code 288.5, and forcible rape of a child under 14, section 261(a)(1)). The trial court did not violate Ruiz’s confrontation clause rights by admitting the minor’s statements to a social worker, whose primary purpose in interviewing the minor was to assess the child’s safety; the minor’s primary purpose in responding was to stop the abuse she was experiencing. The court reversed the conviction for oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 or younger, section 288.7; the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, which requires, when a defendant makes extrajudicial incriminating statements, there must also be independent evidence of the corpus delicti, the body of the crime itself, in order to convict. Neither the minor’s testimony nor any other evidence independent of Ruiz’s confession indicates that Ruiz engaged in any sex act with the minor before her 11th birthday |
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| Walker v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A159563(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Tucher Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| As Walker neared the end of a state prison commitment, the People filed a petition to commit him civilly as a sexually violent predator (SVP), supported by two psychologists' evaluations. The evaluations noted Walker’s 1990 conviction for rape and described offenses charged against Walker that did not result in a conviction. In each instance, he was convicted of a different crime against the same victim. The experts obtained details of the conduct underlying these two alleged offenses from a probation report and a police inspector’s affidavit. At a probable cause hearing, Walker objected to the admission of the evaluations, stating they contained inadmissible hearsay. .Walker’s attorney cross-examined the psychologists at length. Walker also testified on his own behalf and called several witnesses, including a third psychologist. After several efforts to have the trial court reverse its finding of probable cause to commit him as an SVP, Walker sought a writ of mandate. The court of appeal denied his petition. The SVP statute, which requires the psychological evaluations as the basis for an SVP petition, also requires the court to consider the evaluations in deciding whether there is probable cause to proceed to an SVP trial. In reviewing the evaluations, the court may consider hearsay contained within them. |
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| Webster v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E074397(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Fields Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Jacquelyn Webster, was convicted by jury of two misdemeanor offenses. She was placed on summary probation for two years and ordered not to violate any laws, complete 200 hours of community service, and pay a $235 fine. Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal and requested court-appointed counsel to represent her on appeal. Respondent San Bernardino Superior Court’s Appellate Division, denied her request for appointed counsel on appeal. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate to direct the superior court’s appellate division to: (1) vacate its order denying her request for appointment of appellate counsel; and (2) enter a new order granting her request. Finding that because incarceration could be ordered if petitioner violated probation, the Court of Appeal concluded petitioner fell within the definition of “subject to incarceration” under clear language of California Rules of Court Rule 8.851. Petitioner was therefore entitled to appointment of appellate counsel under the Rule. The writ was issued and the superior court was direct to vacate its prior order. |
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| Colorado v. Monroe |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 67 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: William W. Hood, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Colorado has long followed the no-duty-to-retreat rule in self-defense cases. During the closing arguments of Shiela Monroe’s trial, the prosecution repeatedly argued that Monroe didn’t act reasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat. Although the trial court admonished the jury that Monroe didn’t have a duty to retreat, it instructed the jury that it could consider Monroe’s failure to retreat as relevant to whether she actually believed that she faced an imminent use of unlawful force. The jury found Monroe guilty of first degree assault and attempted first degree murder. Monroe appealed, arguing that because she had no duty to retreat the trial court should not have permitted any argument regarding her failure to do so, even if it was ostensibly directed at undermining the reasonableness of her claim of self- defense. A division of the court of appeals reversed Monroe's convictions. The appellate court abstained from deciding whether it was ever proper to argue that a defendant's failure to retreat undermines the reasonableness of a defendant's self-defense claim, but it concluded the prosecution's arguments impermissibly imposed on Monroe a duty to retreat and remanded for a new trial. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held the prosecution could not argue a defendant acted unreasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat from an encounter. Thus, the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution’s arguments regarding Monroe’s failure to retreat. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on different grounds. Monroe’s conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| In re Lucy & Meresa |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 68 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Colorado Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause in two cases out of Gilpin County, hoping to provide guidance on whether a trial court could grant the prosecution’s contested request for a continuance with a tolling of the statutory speedy trial period based on a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. In "Lucy," the prosecution has charged Maurice Lucy with criminal mischief, a class 2 misdemeanor. Lucy pled not guilty on June 12, 2019, but subsequently requested a continuance of his trial on October 9, 2019. As a result, his six-month speedy trial period was set to expire April 9, 2020. The county court scheduled his jury trial to commence on March 17, 2020, within the speedy trial deadline. In Meresa, the prosecution charged Desta Meresa with violation of a criminal protection order and unlawful sexual contact, both class 1 misdemeanors. Meresa pled not guilty on October 9, 2019, which meant that his six-month speedy trial period was set to expire on April 9, 2020. The county court scheduled Meresa’s jury trial to commence on March 17, the same day Lucy’s case was scheduled for trial. On March 16, 2020, the day before both cases were scheduled for trial, the Chief Judge of the First Judicial District issued an administrative order requiring that all jury trials set in the district through May 1, 2020, be vacated unless there were exigent circumstances presented or speedy trial constraints. The administrative order explained that this drastic measure was necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the Chief Judge’s order, the county court vacated the trials in the two cases at issue. The prosecution immediately filed a motion to continue and requested a tolling of the speedy trial period in each case. It relied on section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) C.R.S. (2019), which required the tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months under certain circumstances when the court grants a continuance at the prosecution’s request without the defendant’s consent. The Supreme Court held that, absent the defendant’s consent, section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) authorized a trial court to grant the prosecution a continuance with a tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months if the prosecution established that: (1) as a result of a public health crisis, evidence material to its case is unavailable; (2) it has exercised due diligence to obtain that evidence; and (3) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the unavailable evidence will be available on the new trial date. Because the county court erred in these two cases, the decisions reversed and matters remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Poole v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-2024 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the postconviction court properly denied relief. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief based on his intellectual disability claim because Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), does not apply retroactively; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) because, during Appellant's trial, the requirement that a jury unanimously find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt was satisfied. |
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| Barboza v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0404 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Isadore Barboza was convicted of malice murder and other crimes after he, Renee Harris, and Quondre Bentley committed an armed robbery of Ebone Driskell and Exzavious Brooks in a restaurant parking lot that resulted in the deaths of Bentley and Driskell. In this appeal, Barboza argued the trial court erred: (1) by commenting on Harris’s testimony; (2) admitting an exhibit used to prove Barboza's prior armed robbery conviction; and (3) sentencing Barboza as a recidivist. He also argued his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise these claims at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Burney v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0216 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Charles J. Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Terrence Burney was tried by jury and found guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the death of Joseph Kitchens. Burney appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented against him was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the malice murder charge; (2) the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from the medical examiner as to the cause of the victim’s death; (4) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and (5) he should be granted a new trial because a juror conducted internet research relevant to the case during deliberations. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Calmer v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0441 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Christopher Calmer shot two Monroe County Georgia sheriff’s deputies, Michael Norris and Jeffrey Wilson, after they opened the door to his residence in response to a 911 call. Wilson recovered, but Norris died of his injuries. Following a jury trial, Calmer was convicted of malice murder and other offenses arising out of the shooting. Calmer contended on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on justification and on the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. He also contended the court erred in denying his motion for immunity from prosecution. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Davenport v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0035 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Brian Davenport appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Debora Abney. Davenport contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; and (2) that the trial court erred by admitting improper character evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b) and certain hearsay evidence. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed because the evidence was legally sufficient to support Davenport’s convictions, any error in the admission of the Rule 404 (b) evidence was harmless, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence. However, by this opinion, the Court also announced it would end its practice of sua sponte review of the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions in appeals of non-death penalty murder cases, beginning with cases that docket to the term of court that begins December 2020. The Court stated it would begin assigning cases to the December Term on August 3, 2020. |
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| Dunbar v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0167 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Shanika Dunbar was convicted by jury for the murder of Theron Robbins, and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, she contended the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict, the trial court erred by admitting an irrelevant AK-47 rifle into evidence, and the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding the withdrawal of consent to search Dunbar’s home. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Frazier v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0088 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Damon Frazier was convicted of malice murder and related offenses arising out of the 2015 shooting death of Corey Echols. On appeal, Frazier contended the evidence against him was insufficient, the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b), and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on a justification defense. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Lofton v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0196 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Reginald Lofton challenged his 2016 conviction for being a party to felony murder predicated on the armed robbery and shooting death of pizza delivery driver Shane Varnadore. Appellant claimed on appeal that the trial court made a number of evidentiary errors and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in two respects. Finding no errors, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Middleton v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19G0852 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Derrick Middleton was convicted by jury of one count of hijacking a motor vehicle, one count of theft by receiving by retaining the stolen vehicle, and several other crimes relating to a 2014 armed robbery and carjacking. Middleton filed a motion for new trial, which was subsequently amended, contending, among other things, that the verdicts for hijacking a motor vehicle and theft by receiving that vehicle were mutually exclusive and, consequently, that any judgment entered on these verdicts was void. The trial court denied Middleton’s motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial in part, holding that Middleton had waived the issue of mutually exclusive verdicts as to hijacking a motor vehicle and theft by receiving the same motor vehicle by failing to object to the verdicts at the time they were rendered. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, responding to two questions: (1) whether a defendant must object to the form of the verdicts at the time they are rendered in order to assert on appeal that convictions are mutually exclusive; and (2) whether convictions for hijacking and theft by receiving the same vehicle were mutually exclusive. The parties suggested, to which the Court agreed, that the answer to the first question was "no." With respect to the second question, the Supreme Court concluded that convictions for hijacking and theft by receiving the same vehicle were mutually exclusive. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. |
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| Nelson v. Wilkey |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0013 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Charles J. Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Warden Dennis Nelson challenged the habeas court’s order setting aside Morocco Jacobi Wilkey’s conviction for one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, to which he pled guilty. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the habeas court’s findings of fact regarding Wilkey’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, namely, that Wilkey desired to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing but was not informed by counsel of his absolute statutory right to do so under OCGA 17- 7-93 (b) and that trial counsel failed to give him the benefit of new advice stemming from information learned between the entry of the plea and the sentencing hearing, were supported by the record. The Court also determined that such findings supported the conclusion that Wilkey was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the habeas court’s determination that Wilkey was entitled to habeas relief on this basis. |
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| Pounds v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0470 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Sarah H. Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2017, William Pounds III was convicted of malice murder. Pounds filed a motion for new trial, but did so after the statutory filing deadline for motions for new trial had expired; the motion was therefore untimely. However, the trial court did not dismiss Pounds’s motion for new trial as untimely; instead, it denied the motion on the merits. Then, three weeks later, and almost two years after Pounds was convicted, the trial court granted Pounds an out-of-time appeal. But because the trial court’s merits ruling on Pounds’s late-filed and untimely motion for new trial was invalid, Pounds never obtained a valid ruling on the motion for new trial that preceded his request for an out-of-time-appeal and that ripened upon the granting of the out-of-time appeal. As a result, when Pounds filed a notice of appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, his prior motion for new trial was still pending, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on it. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that because trial court retained jurisdiction on the merits of Pounds' new trial motion, the notice of appeal that Pounds filed pursuant to the grant of out-of-time appeal had not ripened, thus the attempted appeal to the Supreme Court had to be dismissed. |
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| Priester v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20X0445, S20A0444 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Vernon Priester was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 fatal shooting of Akhil Heyward and the wounding of Heyward’s parents. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of two witnesses who commented on Priester dealing drugs. The State cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in merging two counts of attempted murder into two counts of aggravated battery involving the same victims. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction in Priester's appeal, and concurred with the State that the trial court erred in merging the counts. Judgment on the State's cross-appeal was reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing. |
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| Raines v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0181 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Sarah H. Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| In 2013 when he was 17 years old, Dantazias Raines was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for malice murder. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Raines' convictions and sentences in part, reversed Raines' convictions for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer, and vacated his sentence in part. On remand, Raines filed a motion for a jury to make the requisite determination under Veal v. Georgia, 784 SE2d 403 (2016). The trial court denied his motion and certified its order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Raines' request for interlocutory review to consider whether a defendant facing a sentence of life without parole for an offense committed when he was a juvenile had a constitutional right to have a jury (as opposed to a judge) make the requisite determination of whether he was “irreparably corrupt” or “permanently incorrigible.” Raines argued in favor of having a jury make the determination prior to imposition of a LWOP sentence; the State argued a defendant did not have a right under the Sixth Amendment for the jury to make the "specific determination" outlined in Veal. The Supreme Court held a defendant convicted of committing murder as a juvenile did not have a federal constitutional right to have a jury determine, in accordance with Veal and the Sixth Amendment, whether he was irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible such that he may be sentenced to LWOP, thereby affirming the trial court. |
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| Smith v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0119 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Olivia Smith appealed her 2017 convictions for felony murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her husband, Cory Smith. Appellant argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow her expert witness to testify to out-of-court statements made by some of Appellant’s family members and in excluding documents reflecting Cory’s prior domestic violence against her. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed conviction. |
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| Stepp-McCommons v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0254 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Contevious Stepp-McCommons appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Clarence Gardenhire. On appeal, Stepp-McCommons McCommons alleged the trial court erred in failing to give certain jury charges and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err on the grounds raised by Stepp-McCommons and that he failed to establish his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, judgment was affirmed. |
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| Strong v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0270 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Aaron Strong was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses based on the fatal stabbing of his wife’s son, Maurice Arnold, and the stabbing of her grandson, Deandre Arnold. At his trial, Appellant claimed that he acted in self-defense. His main contention on appeal was that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted under OCGA 24-4- 404 (b) voluminous evidence of multiple other acts of violence that he allegedly committed. While the Georgia Supreme Court agreed the trial court did abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence, and because those evidentiary errors were not harmless, the Court reversed Appellant’s convictions. "[A]lthough the jury could have found Appellant guilty if it believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved Appellant, we cannot say that it is highly probable that the trial court’s erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that Appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury retuned." |
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| Williams v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0078 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Rickey Williams was convicted by jury in 2017 for felony murder for the shooting death of Lynett Karim. Williams contended the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on mutual combat and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction. |
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| State v. Conroy |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-12-0000537 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Michael D. Wilson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals and the circuit court's judgment convicting Defendant of assault in the second degree, holding that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case violated Defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree in connection with an incident involving Defendant's wife (CW). The only witnesses to the incident at the time the injury were Defendant and CW. During trial, the prosecutor made at least eight improper statements during closing argument, and the misconduct affected the central issue to Defendant's self-defense claim of whether he acted with the intent to protect himself. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the strength of the evidence in support of self-defense, the protracted nature of the prosecutorial misconduct, and the court's ineffective curative instructions led to the conclusion that the misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| State v. Glenn |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000604 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held prospectively that once the court receives notice pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 407.5(1) that a defendant's penal responsibility is an issue in the case, the circuit court must advise a defendant of the penal-responsibility defense and obtain a knowing waiver of the defense. During the criminal proceedings in this case, two of the three examiners concluded that Defendant lacked penal responsibility. Defendant insisted that he was not mentally ill and that he did not want to assert a defense based on lack of penal responsibility. The circuit court eventually found Defendant was fit to stand trial, and Defendant was found guilty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court should have either sua sponte instructed the jury about the defense of criminal responsibility or conduct a colloquy to ensure that he knowingly and voluntarily decided not to raise the defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) going forward, courts have a duty to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of a penal-responsibility defense; and (2) the trial court followed the rules in place at the time of Defendant's conviction and had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on lack of penal responsibility. |
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| State v. Jones |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000345 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the district court's judgment convicting Defendant of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), holding that the ICA gravely erred as a matter of law in finding that even if the district court erroneously allowed a police officer to opine that Defendant failed standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs), the error was harmless. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred by permitting Officer Joshua Wong to express an expert opinion that Defendant "failed" the SFSTs, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the district court erred in permitting expert opinion testimony that Defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or above; (3) the district court did not err in permitting expert opinion testimony that Defendant was intoxicated, but, prospectively, police officers may no longer testify, whether in a lay or expert capacity, that a driver appeared "intoxicated"; and (4) Defendant's conviction was supported by substantial evidence. |
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| State v. Means |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000810 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Michael D. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence for theft in the second degree by shoplifting, holding that, pursuant to State v. Auld, 361 P.3d 471 (Haw. 2015), Defendant's sentence violated his right to a jury determination as to whether he qualified to be sentenced as a repeat offender pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-606.5. The circuit court sentenced Defendant as a repeat offender to a mandatory minimum of five years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The circuit court, however, did not require a jury to find that Defendant qualified as a repeat offender beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Auld. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to the protections of Auld; and (2) the State was required to, but did not, prove Defendant's predicate prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt prior to imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence as a repeat offender. |
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| Gammons v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-CR-22 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Mark S. Massa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted murder and carrying a handgun without a license, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense, and the instructional error was not harmless. During trial, Defendant asserted that he shot Derek Gilbert, who was intoxicated and aggressive, to protect his and his son's lives. The court instructed the jury that Defendant could not assert self-defense if he committed a crime that was "directly and immediately related" to his confrontation with Gilbert. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) the jury instruction diluted the standard set forth in Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 2001), that "there must be an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation"; and (2) this instructional error was not harmless. |
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| McCain v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-CR-281 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Mark S. Massa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for voluntary manslaughter, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence and that the sentence was not inappropriate given the nature of the offense and Defendant's character. Defendant was charged with murder. The State later added an enhancement for knowingly or intentionally using a firearm in commission of the offense. The defense petitioned the trial court to include a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court granted the petition, and the jury found Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter but not murder. During a bench trial on the firearm enhancement's applicability to Defendant's manslaughter conviction, the judge made multiple comments indicating he believed Defendant should have been convicted of murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge impermissibly increased his sentence based on the judge's beliefs about the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge's comments disagreeing with the jury's verdict were insufficient to taint the sentencing decision; and (2) the sentence was not inappropriate in light of Defendant's character and the nature of the crime. |
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| State v. Ryder |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-CR-435 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Mark S. Massa Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court suppressing blood test results obtained the morning of a vehicle collision, holding that the blood-draw search warrant application satisfied the filing requirement under Ind. Code 35-33-5-2(a). Defendant caused a head-on collision when he drove the wrong way on a freeway. Defendant filed a motion to suppress blood test results obtained the morning of the accident, arguing that Ind. Code 35-33-5-2 and his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated when the arresting state trooper failed properly to file a probable cause affidavit to obtain a blood-test search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a copy of the probable cause affidavit was not properly "filed" until a few hours after it had been presented to the warrant-authorizing judge and swiftly executed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the blood-draw search warrant application satisfied the filing requirement under section 35-33-5-2(a) because (1) the warrant-authorizing judge certified that the affidavit had been properly filed with her when the search warrant was issued; and (2) even if the affidavit was filed a few hours late it was still valid under Indiana's substantial compliance filing doctrine. |
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| State v. Bradford |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120683 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's grid-sentence, holding that, under two of this Court's recent opinions, Defendant failed to establish that the district court imposed an illegal sentence for purposes of Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504. In 1999, Defendant was convicted of capital murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two counts of felony theft. The district court imposed a hard forty sentence for Defendant's capital murder conviction, an off-grid crime, and to upward departure sentences on the grid crimes. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's upward durational departure sentences for his grid crimes under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and resentenced Defendant. Defendant later filed a motion to correct na illegal sentence challenging his hard forty sentence. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State v. Murdock, 439 P.3d 307 (Kan. 2019), and State v. Weber, 442 P.3d 1044 (Kan. 2019), foreclosed Defendant's challenge. |
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| State v. George |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120190 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, attempted distribution of a controlled substance, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm, holding that any error resulting from the district court's exclusion of certain testimony was harmless. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's convictions were not multiplicitous; (2) Defendant's argument that the State committed prosecutorial error when it made certain comments during its cross-examination of a certain witness was in essence an evidentiary question not properly preserved for appeal; (3) the district court's error in upholding a witness's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege and excluding his testimony, if any, was harmless; and (4) the cumulative doctrine did not apply. |
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| State v. Gibson |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119993 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of child abuse and felony murder with the underlying felony of child abuse but vacated the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the trial court did not err in convicting Defendant but erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence provided sufficient proof to show that Defendant's action was knowingly done and cruel as required by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5602(a)(3); (2) the court did not err in instructing the jury "If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims required to be proved by the State, you should find the defendant guilty"; and (3) the court improperly ordered lifetime postrelease supervision. |
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| State v. Kornelson |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118091 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for driving under the influence and illegal transportation of liquor, holding that "manifest necessity" is the correct measure for declaring a jury deadlocked under the United States Supreme Court's double jeopardy caselaw when the defendant does not object or consent to the mistrial. Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial without Defendant's consent because of a jury deadlock. After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his second trial violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy, and (2) the jury instruction on the State's burden of proof improperly discouraged the jury from exercising its nullification power. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a trial sua sponte declares a jury deadlocked and orders a mistrial when the defendant does not object or consent to the mistrial, retrial should be permitted only when there was a manifest necessity for the court's action, and the holding in State v. Graham, 83 P.3d 143 (Kan. 2004), to the contrary is overruled; (2) the district court properly declared a mistrial under the circumstances of this case based on the manifest necessity standard; and (3) Defendant's jury instruction challenge is rejected. |
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| State v. Satchell |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116151 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Leben Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of several sex offenses involving two children but vacated the district court's order of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court erred in ordering two different forms of supervision once Defendant finishes serving his prison sentence. Defendant was convicted of five counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, one count of rape, and other sexual offenses. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and to two supervision terms - lifetime parole for Defendant's off-grid offenses and lifetime postrelease supervision for his on-grid crime. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to hear evidence that he had sexually abused three other children. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence; and (2) the district court's imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision must be vacated. |
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| Aleman v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 60/19 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Robert N. McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Maryland lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner to commit him to the Department of Health and that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) required Petitioner's return to Ohio to serve the remainder of his sentence there. After commencing a sentence in Ohio for felony assault, Petitioner requested a transfer under the IAD to Maryland where a murder charge was pending against him. Petitioner pled guilty in Maryland to second degree murder. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of "not criminally responsible." The State asserted that the IAD required that Petitioner first return to Ohio to finish his sentence. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to remain in Maryland, but the circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the the plain language of the IAD, Maryland had custody of Petitioner only for the purpose of resolving the pending murder charge and thus did not have jurisdiction to commit him to the Department; and (2) article VI(b) of the IAD did not prevent Petitioner's return to Ohio. |
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| Funes v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 65/19 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Getty Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this criminal case in which Defendant was charged with various drunk driving offenses the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trail court denying Defendant's motions in limine to exclude field sobriety tests and a breath test from the evidence, holding that, in giving advice of rights, law enforcement officers must use methods that reasonably convey the warnings and rights in the implied consent statute. Police officers found Defendant asleep at the wheel of his truck and brought him to the station after he failed several field sobriety tests. An officer read in English an "Advice of Rights" form, commonly referred to as a DR-15 form, to Defendant, who spoke Spanish. Defendant signed the DR-15, agreeing to take a breath test, and failed the test. Defendant moved to exclude the tests, arguing that he did not understand the field sobriety test instructions or the advice of rights because he did not understand English. The trial court denied the motions, and Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial at which the breath test evidence must be suppressed, holding that the officer in this case did not use methods that reasonably conveyed the warnings and rights in the implied consent statute. |
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| Hemming v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 48/19 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Clayton Greene, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals held that the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure split between two factfinders is not permitted under Maryland Rule 4-253(c) and is inconsistent with this Court's holding in Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123 (Md. 2003). Petitioner filed a motion to bifurcate counts of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and ammunition counts from the remaining counts in an indictment. Petitioner suggested that some counts be decided by a jury and that the trial judge determine his guilt as to other counts in a singular hybrid judge/jury trial. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a hybrid judge/jury trial in which the judge determines the defendant's guilt with respect to the charge of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and the jury determines guilt as to the remaining charges is not permitted under Rule 4-253(c); but (2) Rule 4-253(c) permits a Joshua-style bifurcated criminal jury trial, under which the bifurcation of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts from other charges is allowed if a defendant's guilt as to all of the charges is determined by the same factfinder. See United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992). |
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| Commonwealth v. Hall |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11952 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction for kidnapping but affirmed all other convictions, holding that the verdicts of murder in the first degree were consonant with justice but that Defendant's kidnapping conviction must be vacated because it was based on an inveiglement theory previously dismissed by the motion judge. Defendant was found guilty of three counts of murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and witness intimidation. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his conviction of kidnapping based on a 2010 incident must be vacated because the theory of kidnapping was invalid or foreclosed by the superior court judge's ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) Defendant's 2010 kidnapping conviction must be reversed, as the theory on which the prosecution proceeded at trial had previously been dismissed by the court; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error; and (3) there is no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or direct the entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of guilt. |
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| State ex rel. Jonas v. Minor |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97674 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Mary R. Russell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner should have been discharged from probation before the State attempted to revoke probation and the circuit court suspended and revoked his probation. In his petition, Petitioner alleged that his due process rights were violated when, rather than discharging him from probation, the circuit court revoked his probation and ordered his sentence executed despite his having sufficient earned compliance credits (ECCs) and having paid restitution in full. The Supreme Court granted habeas relief and ordered that Petitioner be discharged from the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections, holding that the circuit court no longer had authority to revoke Petitioner's probation after he paid restitution because the combination of his time served on probation and accrued ECCs would have entitled him to discharge under Mo. Rev. Stat. 217.703.7. |
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| State v. Brandolese |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97697 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Powell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of second-degree domestic assault and armed criminal action, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error entitled Defendant to relief. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court's failure to strike for cause a juror because she was the sister of an assistant prosecuting attorney who participated in Defendant's case did not result in manifest injustice; (2) the circuit court did not commit plain error in instructing the jury on self-defense; (3) the circuit court's response to the jury's question regarding the mental state for domestic assault did not warrant relief under plain error review; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a defense witness about the victim's "reputation" for violence; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief due to the circuit court overruling his objection to certain testimony. |
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| State v. St. Marks |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 170 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: James A. Rice Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Construction Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted deliberate homicide, holding that a challenged jury instruction did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted deliberate homicide. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's "specific purpose" jury instruction warranted review under either the doctrine of plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor's comment warranted plain error review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's instruction did not result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, and the claimed error by trial counsel in failing to object to the instruction did not prejudice Defendant; and (2) the prosecutor's conduct did not warrant plain error review. |
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| State v. Said |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 314 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Consumer Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for second degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony, holding that there was no abuse in the trial proceedings. Specifically, the Court held (1) any error in the admission of statements Defendant made during two interviews was harmless, and the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant's motion to suppress a letter to his sister; (2) the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant's motion to suppress evidence from the search of his cell phone; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited Defendant from presenting evidence regarding the victim’s mental health and use of alcohol and prescription drugs; (4) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant the right to cross-examine a witness on issues the court determined to lack probative value; and (5) the district court did not err when it allowed evidence that results of certain DNA tests were uninterpretable. |
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| State v. Williams |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 261 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Michael G. Heavican Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of negligent child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and sentence of a term of incarceration not less than two years nor more than three years, holding that the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and that there was no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in permitting the State to recall the victim's mother; (2) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to dismiss; (3) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of negligent child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury; (4) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of negligent child abuse; and (5) the district court did not impose an excessive sentence. |
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| New Hampshire v. Turcotte |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Dockets: 2019-0071, 2017-0336 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Daniel Turcotte was convicted by jury on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and five counts of felonious sexual assault, all involving a minor. Defendant directly appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motions for a mistrial based on: (1) testimony about similar, uncharged acts; and (2) prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. In a discretionary appeal which was joined with his direct appeal, defendant argued the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on the trial court’s closure of the courtroom during closing arguments. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. |
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| Grove v. NDDOT |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 146 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing a hearing officer’s decision suspending Jeremy Grove’s driver’s license. Grove was arrested and cited for driving under the influence of alcohol. A chemical test showed Grove had a blood alcohol concentration of .232% by weight. The hearing officer suspended Grove’s driver’s license for 180 days concluding, based on the results of the field sobriety tests, the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest Grove, Grove was tested in accordance with N.D.C.C. 39-20-01, and Intoxilyzer test results showed Grove had an alcohol concentration of at least .08% by weight. Grove appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the district court. Grove argued: (1) the hearing officer erred by admitting the Report and Notice form into evidence when it contained the results of the on-site screening test and probable cause was not challenged; and (2) omission of the phrase “directed by the law enforcement officer” from the implied consent advisory rendered the advisory incorrect under the North Dakota Supreme Court’s then-recently issued opinion City of Bismarck v. Vagts, 932 N.W.2d 523 (2019). Grove did not argue to the district court that adding the words “breath” and “urine” rendered the advisory incorrect as he did at the administrative hearing. The district court reversed the hearing officer’s decision. The court determined, “omission of the phrase 'directed by the law enforcement officer’ was a substantive omission and not in compliance with the statutory requirements for the implied consent advisory” under Vagts. The Department argued the district court erred in reversing the hearing officer’s decision based on an issue Grove failed to preserve for appeal. To this argument, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred: Grove did not raise the same issue on appeal to the district court that he did at the administrative hearing or in his specification of error to the district court, the issue was precluded from review. The district court's judgment was reversed and the administrative hearing officer's decision reinstated. |
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| Kremer v. North Dakota |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 132 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Kremer appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. In 2014, FBI agents seized computers, hard drives, and other electronic devices belonging to Kremer. Child pornography was found on some of the devices. The agents interviewed Kremer regarding the devices and the explicit material discovered on the devices. Kremer claimed ownership of the electronic devices and acknowledged the explicit material found on them. In November 2015, Kremer entered into a stipulation with federal prosecutors in which Kremer agreed to plead guilty to charges related to the matter in North Dakota state court. Had Kremer not pleaded guilty in state court, the stipulation stated prosecution of the matter would continue in federal court. Kremer was facing a 15 year minimum mandatory sentence if convicted in federal court. Kremer argued he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and because the district court did not adhere to the procedure set forth in N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| North Dakota v. Harstad |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 151 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Mackenzie Harstad appealed a district court’s judgment ordering restitution for unrecovered personal property. The personal property was in a vehicle at the time the vehicle was stolen, but was not in the vehicle seven days later when Harstad was arrested for, and charged with, possession of the stolen vehicle. Harstad was not charged with the theft of the vehicle. Harstad argued the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution for the unrecovered personal property because there was no immediate and intimate causal connection between the criminal conduct and the loss of the personal property. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred with this, reversed and remanded to the district court for a redetermination of the amount of restitution. |
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| North Dakota v. James |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 136 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2018, Walter James was arrested and charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and fraudulent practices in urine testing. The district court appointed an attorney for James after determining he qualified as indigent. The court subsequently dismissed James’ court appointed attorney after James became employed and no longer qualified as indigent. James represented himself at trial in July 2019, and the jury found James guilty of both charges. The court sentenced James to four years in prison with two years suspended. On appeal, James contended he was deprived of his right to counsel, claimed there was an error in the post-verdict polling of the jury, claimed the district court erred in the issuance of a search warrant because it lacked jurisdiction, and argued there was a violation of his right to confront witnesses against him. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| North Dakota v. Pouliot |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 144 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Austin Pouliot appealed following his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence. Pouliot preserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion seeking to exclude from evidence the results of a chemical test. Pouliot contended the results should have been excluded from evidence pursuant to N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(b) because law enforcement failed to properly administer the chemical test when the arresting officer who read the post-arrest implied consent warning was not the officer who conducted the testing. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. "As a matter of law ... N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(b), does not apply because this is a criminal proceeding and because this case does not involve a refusal to take the chemical test." |
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| Truelove v. North Dakota |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 142 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Truelove appealed dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief. Truelove alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and requests his criminal judgment vacated. Truelove claimed: (1) he did not consent to his counsel’s concession to the jury that he struck the victim; (2) he was coerced into testifying at trial; and (3) there was a lack of effective communication with his trial counsel. Finding no reversible error or constitutionally ineffective performance, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| McIntyre v. Hooks |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3529 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner's allegations did not challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court and were therefore not cognizable in habeas corpus. In 1991, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated burglary and felonious assault. At issue in this case was whether the sentencing statutes in effect in 1991 or the sentencing statutes in effect in 2016 governed Petitioner's sentence. While he was incarcerated, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was not sentenced for his 1991 convictions until 2016 when the trial court issued a new sentencing entry for the 1991 convictions, and that in 2016 the trial court should have sentenced him under the statutes that were in effect on that date. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner's claim of sentencing error was not jurisdictional and was not therefore cognizable in habeas corpus. |
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| State ex rel. Neguse v. McIntosh |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3533 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's action seeking a writ of prohibition for failure to state a claim, holding that Appellant possessed an adequate remedy at law. In 1989 and 1990 Appellant was convicted for murder, drug abuse, and assault. In 1993, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief from his 1989 convictions. In 1994, Judge Dale A. Crawford of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denied the petition. In 1995, Judge Crawford issued a nunc pro tunc entry restating his denial of postconviction relief. In 2018, Appellant filed his complaint seeking a writ of prohibition to invalidate the 1995 nunc pro tunc order. The court of appeals dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant possessed an adequate remedy at law by appeal in 1994 or in 1995 from the judgments denying his petition for postconviction relief. |
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| State v. Taylor |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3514 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to vacate and/or suspend court costs, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court must consider the defendant's present or future ability to pay court costs in making the discretionary determination of whether to waive, suspend or modify court costs. Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and ordered to pay court costs. Defendant later moved to vacate and/or suspend the court costs on the grounds that he was indigent. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed as to court costs, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling Defendant's motion without considering his indigence and ability to pay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court need not consider a defendant's present or future ability to pay when ruling on a motion to vacate, suspend, or modify court costs under Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23(C). |
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| Oregon v. Payne |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066919 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Nakamoto Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| During defendant Isaiah Payne's trial for third-degree sexual abuse, the complainant denied including a racial description of defendant in her statement to police and accused defense counsel of trying to make her look racist. The author of the police report testified that he had included that racial description in quotation marks because it was a direct quote from the complainant. Based on the difference between the officer’s testimony and the complainant’s testimony, defendant requested the uniform witness-false-in-part jury instruction. The trial court denied that request, and the jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, even if the trial court had erred in failing to deliver the requested witness-false-in-part instruction, any error was harmless. The Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address whether a trial court had to give a requested witness-false-in-part jury instruction if there was evidence to support a conclusion that a witness consciously testified falsely. Based on the Supreme Court's statutory construction of the phrase “all proper occasions” in ORS 10.095, the Court concluded the trial court should have given the instruction. The Court concluded it was not a harmless error by the trial court. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Alvarado |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-191 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Francis X. Flaherty Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant on two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements made to the state police, denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial, and denying Defendant's motion to dismiss counts one and two of the indictment pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore, the trial justice properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial justice did not err when she denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on an alleged discovery violation by the State; and (3) the trial justice did not err when she credited the complaining witness's testimony in denying Defendant's Rule 29(b) motion to dismiss the first two counts of the indictment relating to first-degree child molestation sexual assault. |
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| State v. Lamontagne |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-241 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Paul A. Suttell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of first-degree robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling with intent to rob, holding that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding the complaining witness's prior criminal convictions and excluding photographs of bruises on Defendant's torso and supporting testimony from an investigator. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding evidence of the complaining witness's prior convictions for resisting arrest and domestic disorderly conduct; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding the photographs and supporting testimony because, without further evidence connecting the injuries depicted in the photographs to the altercation with the complaining witness that occurred nearly two weeks earlier, the evidence was inadmissible. |
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| South Carolina v. Herndon |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27986 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: John W. Kittredge Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Robin Herndon was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for shooting and killing her live-in boyfriend, Christopher Rowley, allegedly, in self defense. Petitioner was tried for murder; the case against Petitioner was largely circumstantial. Petitioner requested the Logan circumstantial evidence charge, but the trial court refused, opting instead for the pre-Logan circumstantial evidence charge. On appeal, there was no contention that the trial court properly refused to give a "Logan" charge. Instead, the State contended the court's failure to give the Logan charge was a harmless error, for the jury instructions as a whole were substantially correct. The court of appeals summarily accepted the State's argument and affirmed. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that while there may be cases in which a trial court's failure to five the Logan charge is indeed harmless, "this is not such a case." The State's case against Petitioner was almost exclusively circumstantial. The State relied on: (1) eyewitness testimony prior to the shooting to suggest Petitioner was angry; and (2) testimony from the pathologist explaining the pathway of the bullet could have been caused by Petitioner shooting the victim as he walked up the stairs to the house. In urging the Supreme Court to find the error was harmless, "the State entirely disregards the testimony of its own witness that it was plausible the fatal wound could have been caused by the victim charging Petitioner, exactly as Petitioner testified. The competing inferences involved in this circumstantial evidence case illustrate well the need for the Logan charge. Because the failure to provide the Logan circumstantial evidence charge was not harmless and that failure manifestly prejudiced Petitioner, we reverse and remand for a new trial." |
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| Blanke v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 39 Opinion Date: June 24, 2020 Judge: Himonas Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court held that when a Utah prison inmate must register as a sex or kidnap offender the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole need not afford the inmate the due process protections required by Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 416 P.3d 663 (Utah 2017). Kevin Blanke was serving a prison sentence for attempted child kidnapping and kidnapping. Because of his conviction for attempted child kidnapping Blanke was considered a sex offender under Utah's sex offender registration statute. At the time he was sentenced for kidnapping, Blanke further admitted to having sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old, conduct that would place him, if he were convicted, on the sex offender registry. The Parole Board declined to set a parole date for Blanke because he refused to participate in the prison sex offender treatment program. Blanke filed a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d), arguing that the Parole Board had violated due process by conditioning his parole on completion of sex offender treatment even though he had not committed a sex offense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Parole Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the procedural protections in Neese did not apply. |
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