| Chum v. Coyne-Fague |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2028 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Kermit Victor Lipez Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the district court decision denying Appellant's petition for habeas corpus relief, holding that the state court's evaluation of Appellant's constitutional claim was not contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, federal law. Appellant was convicted in Rhode Island state court on felony assault and firearms charges. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant then applied for postconviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial justice denied relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court concluded that Appellant's counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient but that the state Supreme Court's conclusion that Appellant had failed to satisfy the prejudice prong was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Rhode Island Supreme Court's use of the incurable prejudice standard did not lead to a decision "contrary to" federal law; and (2) the Supreme Court's application of Strickland was not unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Bregu |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1643 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Kermit Victor Lipez Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute oxycodone, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The motion to suppress centered around a series of five search warrants federal law enforcement officers executed as part of an investigation into an oxycodone-distribution conspiracy involving Defendant. The officers obtained location data for Defendant's cell phones and recovered a significant amount of cash stored in a hidden compartment in Defendant's vehicle. This information led to charges that Defendant was the New York-based oxycodone supplier for his co-conspirators' Massachusetts operation. Defendant filed, without success, a motion to suppress, arguing that the first warrant for cellular location data, which served as the foundation for the subsequent warrants, was not supported by probable cause. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the warrant for Defendant's vehicle was properly issued, and therefore, the evidence seized from the vehicle was properly admitted at trial. |
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| United States v. Veloz |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 17-2136 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201(c), for which Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, holding that Defendant's challenges to his conviction were unavailing. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence that law enforcement authorities seized from Defendant's apartment; (2) Defendant's challenges to the validity of the search warrant were without merit; (3) the district court did not err in barring a certain witness from testifying due to the "irrelevant, cumulative, or confusing" nature of the testimony that he would provide; (4) the district court did not reversibly err in admitting into evidence a transcript of a recording of statements by one of Defendant's co-conspirators; (5) the district court's challenged statement in an instruction to the jury was not sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error; and (6) the remainder of Defendant's challenged were either without merit or waived. |
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| Rosa v. Attorney General United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-1765 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Julio M. Fuentes Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Rosa, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1992, as a child. In 2004, he pled guilty to possession and sale of a controlled substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet of school property under the New Jersey School Zone Statute. Eleven years later, Rosa was charged as removable for the conviction of a controlled substances offense and of an “aggravated felony” for a “drug trafficking crime.” Rosa denied removability for the aggravated felony, which would have precluded him from being eligible for cancellation of removal. The IJ applied the “categorical approach” and compared the New Jersey School Zone Statute with the federal statute for distribution “in or near schools and colleges” and concluded that the state statute swept more broadly than its federal counterpart in both proscribed conduct and its definition of “school property,” so that Rosa’s state conviction was not an “aggravated felony” under federal law. The IJ granted cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that Rosa’s state conviction could be compared to the federal statute generally prohibiting the distribution of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense of the Federal School Zone Statute and ordered Rosa removed. The Third Circuit remanded. The categorical approach, which compares the elements of prior convictions with the elements of crimes under federal law, does not permit comparison with any federal crime but only with the “most similar” one. |
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| United States v. Fishoff |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-3549 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Roth Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime |
| Fishoff began trading securities in the 1990s. By 2009, he had earned enough money to establish his own firm, with one full-time employee and several independent contractors. Fishoff had no formal training in securities markets, regulations, or compliance. Nor did he hold any professional license. He operated without expert advice. Fishoff engaged in short-selling stock in anticipation of the issuer making a secondary offering. Secondary offerings are confidential but a company, through its underwriter, may contact potential buyers to assess interest. When a salesperson provides confidential information, such as the issuer's name, the recipient is barred by SEC Rule 10b-5-2, from trading the issuer’s securities or disclosing the information before the offering is publicly announced. Fishoff’s associates opened accounts at investment banking firms in order to receive solicitations to invest in secondary offerings. They agreed to keep the information confidential but shared it with Fishoff, who would short-sell the company’s shares. Fishoff pled guilty to securities fraud (15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78ff; 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5); 18 U.S.C. 2), stipulating that he and his associates made $1.5 to $3.5 million by short-selling Synergy stock based on confidential information. Fishoff unsuccessfully claimed that he had no knowledge of Rule 10b5-2 and was entitled to the affirmative defense against imprisonment under Securities Exchange Act Section 32, as a person who violated a Rule having “no knowledge of such rule or regulation”. The Third Circuit affirmed his 30-month sentence. Fishoff adequately presented his defense. The court’s ruling was sufficient; the government never agreed that the non-imprisonment defense applied. Fishoff did not establish a lack of knowledge. His attempts to conceal his scheme suggests that he was aware that it was wrong. |
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| United States v. Johnman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-2048 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Matey Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Johnman signed a plea agreement admitting to: use of an interstate facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); distribution of child pornography, section 2252(a)(2); and possession of child pornography, section 2252(a)(4). Each count and the corresponding maximum penalty appeared in an individual subparagraph and stated, “and a $5,000 special victims assessment.” A separate subparagraph aggregates all the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties in the three counts, including “an additional $15,000 special victims assessment.” Another provision stipulates that “[Johnman] agrees to pay the special victims and court assessments in the amount of $15,300 before the time of sentencing or at a time directed by this Court.” The court explained the $15,000 assessment at Johnman’s plea hearing. Johnman offered no objections. Johnman was sentenced to 368 months of incarceration, a lifetime of supervised release, $1,000 restitution, and $15,300 in special assessments. The plea agreement waived Johnson’s right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions or sentence but permitted an appeal if “the defendant’s sentence on any count of conviction exceeds the statutory maximum for that count.” The Third Circuit affirmed. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014, applies to each conviction, not to the case as a whole. The text and context indicate that where a defendant is nonindigent, a separate $5,000 assessment applies to every qualifying count of conviction |
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| United States v. Bryant |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 17-6719 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's prior conviction for assaulting with intent to rob, steal, or purloin a postal employee and placing their life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2114(a), constitutes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)'s force clause. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that the aggravated offense contained in the second clause of section 2114(a) may apply to any of the basic offenses listed in the first clause of the statute, including assault with intent to rob, steal, or purloin. The court also held that the aggravated offense contained in section 2114(a), which requires that the defendant wound or put the victim's life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon during the commission of the basic offense, is categorically a crime of violence under the force clause of section 924(c)(3)(A). |
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| United States v. Fowler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4755 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence of 40 years imprisonment for his sexual abuse of two young girls. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court erred regarding good-time credits, and held that the district court's mention of good-time credits was tied to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, such as the need to protect the public, that he was required to consider during sentencing. The court also held that the district court carefully weighed many relevant factors and the sentence was substantively reasonable. |
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| United States v. Chambliss |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50741 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a part of the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that the district court sufficiently articulated its reasons for denying defendant's request for compassionate release. In this case, the district court acknowledged that defendant's terminal disease constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction and that he does not present a danger upon release. However, the district court noted that compassionate release is discretionary, and applied the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, considering defendant's severe conduct, his serious drug crime, and his criminal history. |
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| Hernandez v. Boles |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6281 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| At 11:53, Tennessee Highway Troopers stopped Hernandez for speeding and ran a warrant-check Hernandez and Betancourt, the front seat passenger and the car's owner. The check came back negative at 11:59. Troopers were denied consent to search the car. At 12:13, Troopers searched the names of all four occupants of the car through a more comprehensive database. A K-9 unit arrived at 12:17. The dog sniffed the outside of the car, alerting to the odor of drugs. The dog did not alert again when allowed into the car. After checking with their supervisor, Troopers manually searched the car and found re-encoded gift cards and suspected amphetamines. The car's occupants were arrested and held for months before all charges were dropped. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the Troopers qualified immunity on the car search based on caselaw existing at that time. A jury found that the car stop was not impermissibly prolonged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs have not met the high burden of showing that the verdict was unreasonable as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the dog's first search was not sufficiently thorough, it did not dissipate the probable cause justifying a second search. At the time, a reasonable officer would not have been on notice that the dog’s failure to alert again to the car's interior was the kind of new information that dissipated the probable cause provided by its initial alert. |
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| United States v. Demma |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-4143 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| FBI agents seized a computer server that hosted a child-pornography website and observed that one user, accessed 107 “threads” in five days. The FBI traced the IP address to Demma’s residence, executed a search warrant and seized electronic devices, finding more than 3,600 images and 230 videos; many depicted adult men raping prepubescent girls. Demma pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B); (b)(2). The probation officer computed a Guidelines range of 78-97 months. Demma's sentencing memorandum described Demma’s lack of criminal history and that Demma served honorably in the Army for over five years and was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. One forensic psychologist asserted that Demma’s use of child pornography “is directly resultant from experiencing the ravages of war as this impacts children.” The court sentenced Demma to one day, with 10 years of supervised release and payment of $45,000 in restitution. The court’s cited Demma’s PTSD diagnosis, his decision to voluntarily seek treatment after his arrest, his low risk of reoffending, the potentially detrimental effect of imprisonment on Demma’s treatment, and Demma’s low risk for committing a “contact offense.” The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Any policy disagreement with the Guidelines based on the similarity of the enhancements does not justify the extent of this downward variance. In focusing on the role of Demma’s military service, the district court cast Demma as the victim. The court also unreasonably concluded that Demma’s sophisticated and extensive access to child pornography somehow made him less culpable than “someone who simply allowed his curiosity to get the better of him.” |
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| United States v. Hollon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5277 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Law enforcement executed a search warrant to gather evidence of the possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography. The subject stated that he received and distributed child pornography through his Kik Messenger account and consented to the officers assuming his online identity. The operation led to a Kik user with an IP address registered Randall Hollon of Corbin, Kentucky. FBI agents executed a search warrant for Hollon’s residence and found pornographic images of prepubescent boys on Hollon’s electronic devices. Hollon was charged with distributing, possession of, and receiving child pornography each in violation of different provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and with engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)--the enterprise consisting of section 2252(a)(2) violations. Hollon pled guilty to engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, admitting that he was an administrator of a group, the purpose of which was the distribution and receipt of child pornography. The government then disclosed that Hollon’s nephew, “J.H.”, had reported that, years earlier, he discovered child pornography on Hollon’s electronic devices and that Hollon engaged in sexual behavior with J.H., then a child. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hollon’s sentence of 270 months of incarceration, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in applying the covered sex crime enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b). Engaging in a child exploitation enterprise is a “covered sex crime” for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b) sentencing enhancement. |
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| United States v. Richardson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 17-2157, 17-2183 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Richardson participated in a series of Detroit-area armed robberies in 2010. In 2013, Richardson was convicted of five counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, five counts of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g). The district court sentenced Richardson to 1,494 months in prison. Richardson twice successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to vacate Sixth Circuit judgments affirming his conviction and sentence. The Court remanded for consideration of whether an intervening the Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause was invalid or the First Step Act of 2018 affected his section 924(c) conviction. The Sixth Circuit again affirmed Richardson’s conviction. Johnson had no effect on Richardson’s conviction for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery; that conviction satisfies ACCA’s elements clause, so the residual clause is irrelevant. The court also affirmed his sentence. Richardson cannot benefit from the First Step Act because the district court resentenced him more than one year before the Act became law. |
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| United States v. Sands |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-2420 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Richard Allen Griffin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Sands pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Sands claimed to have found the gun and denied defacing the serial number. The district court applied a four-level sentence enhancement for possessing a firearm with an “altered or obliterated serial number” pursuant to USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) because the firearm’s serial number was, although readable, defaced with scratches in three separate locations. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, agreeing with several other circuits “that a firearm’s serial number is 'altered or obliterated’ when it is materially changed in a way that makes accurate information less accessible.” A serial number that has been defaced but is still visible to the naked eye is not “altered or obliterated” under section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). |
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| United States v. Tolliver |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6034 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Tolliver was charged with participating in a marijuana distribution ring that funneled money and drugs between a California supplier and a large-scale Memphis dealer. A jury acquitted him on the marijuana conspiracy but convicted Toliver of money laundering conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). A defendant can only complain about a speedy trial violation after the violation has occurred; Tolliver’s objection was premature. A rational trier of fact could have found Tolliver guilty. Payment for drugs can constitute promotional money laundering. The prosecution presented the right type of evidence to prove promotional money laundering and showed that Tolliver made financial transactions with money from illegal marijuana sales. There was compelling circumstantial evidence showing he knew what he was doing. In ordering forfeiture of the money laundered and of property traceable to the crime, 21 U.S.C. 853(a), the district court properly included some of Tolliver’s gambling winnings. Tolliver gambled hundreds of thousands of dollars but apparently had no source of income besides the cuts he got from money-laundering. Tolliver filed no tax return for two years. He was a long-time gambler, but the amount of money he gambled skyrocketed once he joined the conspiracy. |
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| Cook v. Foster |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-2214 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After a 2005 home invasion, Cook and Egerson were charged with armed robbery, armed burglary, false imprisonment, battery, theft, and mistreatment of an animal causing death. Cook claimed that Hall, not Cook, was Egerson’s accomplice. He was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted Cook habeas relief. Applying the “Strickland” standard, Cook demonstrated that Wisconsin’s court of appeals unreasonably assessed his contention that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. In a trial that the presiding judge later characterized as unworthy of confidence, Cook’s attorney failed to locate or produce Hall, a long‐time friend of Egerson, friends with two women accomplices, and ex‐boyfriend of the victims’ daughter. Hall resembles Cook in appearance. The court also noted counsel’s failure to object to hearsay testimony, unsupported by a proper foundation, about cell phone records; failure to bring out the de facto immunity given the women accomplices in exchange for their testimony; failure to object to a victim’s unanticipated in‐court identification of Cook; withdrawal of question to an accomplice about Hall’s possession of a gun immediately before the crimes; and failure to object to testimony that Cook temporarily discontinued his police interrogation. To establish prejudice, Cook did not need to prove “that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case” but only had to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. |
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| Labrec v. Walker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1682 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| LaBrec, an inmate at a maximum-security institution, with a history that included prior assaults on inmates and staff, was transferred to the Restricted Housing Unit and was placed in a cell with McNeely, who was in the Unit following an assault on his prior cellmate. LaBrec was designated a “pair with care” inmate; Psychological Services were supposed to be consulted prior to assigning a cellmate. LaBrec informed the staff repeatedly of that status and was allowed to see Dr. Persike in Psychological Services. LaBrec informed Persike that McNeely was talking about beating up his last cellmate and that LaBrec did not feel safe with McNeely. LaBrec continued to ask to be moved, complaining did not feel safe. At one point he had an anxiety attack and began crying and asking for help. LaBrec was not reassigned. Three days after the cell assignment, McNeely stabbed LaBrec with a pen behind his ear, in the back, and in his shoulder. The district court rejected LaBrec’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to some defendants who were unaware of surrounding circumstances that could render plausible LaBrec’s claim of a threat to his safety. The court reversed with respect to others; a jury could reasonably infer that those defendants possessed a subjective awareness of a serious risk to LaBrec and failed to take the minimal, reasonable action of inquiring further and investigating the situation. |
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| United States v. Anderson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1870 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The defendants each pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and supervised release. Before their hearings, both received PSRs that proposed a supervised release condition providing that they “not patronize any taverns, bars, liquor stores, nightclubs or other establishments where the primary item of sale is alcohol.” Both objected in writing to certain supervised release conditions, one contending that an alcohol condition was unnecessary; neither raised a concern that the alcohol condition was unconstitutionally vague. At their sentencings, both defendants confirmed that they had read their PSRs, reviewed the reports with their counsel, and waived an oral reading of the proposed conditions. Neither challenged the alcohol condition as vague. The Seventh Circuit upheld the condition, finding the argument waived. A defendant waives an objection to a condition of supervised release when he has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and asserts (through counsel or directly) that he does not object to the proposed conditions, waives reading of those conditions and their justifications, challenges certain conditions but not those challenged on appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic decision not to object. This is not the “rare and limited instance” when a court may overlook a waiver because the challenged condition concerns activity protected by the First Amendment. |
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| United States v. Caviedes-Zuniga |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1104 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| Caviedes-Zuniga pleaded guilty to distributing 140 grams of heroin. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He was sentenced to 111 months’ imprisonment, 77 months below the 188 -235 months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. After filing a notice of appeal, he told his lawyer that he wants a trial. He also told his attorney that he does not wish to contest his sentence if the conviction remains in place. Counsel asked to withdraw, representing that he deems the appeal frivolous; he argued that a successful appeal could upset the sentence and harm the defendant. The Seventh Circuit agreed and dismissed the appeal as frivolous, allowing counsel to withdraw. A judge might well reconsider the sentencing discount for acceptance of responsibility on learning that on appeal Caviedes-Zuniga tried to have the plea vacated, even if the attempt failed. |
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| United States v. Helding |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3270 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Police seized 143.7 kilograms of marijuana from Helding’s car and apartment. Harding pleaded guilty to possessing over 100 kilograms. At sentencing, the court held him responsible for the equivalent of 4,679.7 kilograms, based solely on the Presentence Investigation Report’s account that confidential informants told law enforcement Helding was dealing significant quantities of methamphetamine during the relevant period. The drug quantity determination resulted in his ultimate sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment; the quantity of 143.7 kilograms carries a sentencing range of 120-150 months. The quantity determined by the court carried a sentencing range to 210-262 months (plus five years for a firearm offense). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing. A sentencing court acts within its discretion when it credits confidential informants’ statements about drug quantity, but when a defendant objects, the evidence supporting that quantity must be found to be reliable. The statements here fell short of that threshold. There was no description of the informants’ past work with law enforcement, their criminal history, the reliability of the accounts they had provided before, or whether and why officers believed the information provided to the probation office was reliable. |
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| United States v. Karst |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3675 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Leaving an untouched pizza on the table, Karst exited a restaurant with two men who wore Mesticas motorcycle club vests. The three drove off on their bikes. Minutes later, one of the men with Karst pulled the trigger in a drive‐by shooting. Karst was on supervised release. A magistrate judge vacated a petition to revoke supervised release. A district judge reinstated the proceedings. After a final hearing, Karst received 30 more months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Karst did not show that the lack of a preliminary hearing affected his substantial rights. At the final revocation hearing, Karst had a full opportunity to contest the facts; his counsel cross‐examined the only adverse witness, and Karst testified. Karst remained free for three months between the dismissal of the petition and its resolution at the final hearing. Karst admitted the written revocation petition provided him adequate notice; the district court’s statement that Karst “conspired as a party to a crime to conduct this drive‐by shooting or the shooting of another person” was sufficient to notify him of the violative crime. On remand, the district court should consider Karst’s arguments in mitigation: that he had a minimal role in the crime, that he had adjusted to supervision and stayed out of “trouble” for years since his release, that he “did not know this was going to happen,” and that he tried to cooperate with the police. |
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| United States v. Melvin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1409 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Melvin pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) and filed it with the court electronically. Melvin’s crime carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. The probation office mailed Melvin’s attorney a letter, stating that the PSR had been electronically filed and that, “Pursuant to Judge Myerscough’s directive, a copy of the report has not been provided to the defendant and you should not provide a copy to them. You are responsible for reviewing the report with Mr. Melvin.” Melvin’s attorney reviewed the PSR with Melvin without giving the PSR to Melvin. Melvin’s attorney's objections to the PSR were resolved. At his sentencing hearing, Melvin asked if he could get a copy of the PSR. Judge Myerscough denied Melvin’s request, explaining that “[t]here is confidential information ... that would be harmful” to Melvin and his family. The district court sentenced Melvin to 15 years in prison and 10 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. 3552(d), which only requires “disclosure,” but did violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(2) by denying Melvin a copy of his PSR but the error was harmless. Melvin’s sentence could not be lower if he were resentenced. |
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| United States v. Perkins |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2872 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for crossing a state line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor under the age of twelve. The court held that a defendant has the requisite intent under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) if engaging in sexual activity with the minor was one of the purposes motivating the defendant to cross state lines, even if the sexual activity is not the sole or dominant purpose for the trip, so long as it is more than incidental. In this case, the admission of text messages defendant had made to a friend allowed a reasonable factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of crossing state lines with the intent to engage in sexual activities with the victim, a child less than twelve years of age. The court explained that the sexual encounters with the child were a motivating factor for defendant's trips across state lines and were not merely incidental. |
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| United States v. Robertson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3375 Opinion Date: January 23, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury; and discharge of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings where the district court's admission of the challenged 911 call did not violate defendant's confrontation right because the call was not testimonial in nature; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the call over defendant's Federal Rule of Evidence 403 objection; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the probative value of the challenged 911 call was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Furthermore, any prejudice stemming from the reference to the victim owing defendant money for marijuana did not substantially outweigh the value of the testimony as part of the res gestae of the crime. The court also held that there was no error in denying defendant's proposed limiting instruction, and there was no error in imposing two of the supervised release conditions. However, the court vacated the district court's condition prohibiting defendant from consuming alcohol or visiting establishments that primarily serve alcohol. In this case, the court failed to explain its basis for the condition, defendant's offense did not involve alcohol, and the record did not show that he was alcohol or drug dependent. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
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| Lopez-Aquilar v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-73153 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Marsha Siegel Berzon Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner removable based on his robbery conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395. The panel held that section 164.395 is not a categorical theft offense and therefore not an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The panel agreed with petitioner that section 164.395 exceeds the generic definition of a theft offense because it incorporates consensual takings via theft by deception, and the force elements do not impose a requirement that the defendant engage in a nonconsensual taking. Because the panel held that the statute was overbroad, the panel moved to the next step of the analysis: determining whether the statute is divisible, such that application of the modified categorical approach is appropriate. The panel held that Oregon's third-degree robbery statute is indivisible. |
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| Morales v. Sherman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-56304 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of a habeas corpus petition as an unauthorized "second or successive" petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). The panel held that petitioner's successful effort to obtain relief under Proposition 47 resulted in the issuance of the amended abstract of judgment and thus represented the issuance of a new, intervening judgment for purposes of section 2244(b). Because petitioner's 2017 federal habeas petition was the first petition challenging that new judgment, the district court erred by holding that it was an unauthorized second or successive petition. |
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| Parsons v. Ryan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 18-16358, 18-16365, 18-16368, 18-16424 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Wallace Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| These consolidated appeals arose from a class action brought by prisoners in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) against senior ADC officials, challenging ADC's provision of healthcare. At issue on appeal are eleven district court orders imposing contempt sanctions, awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs, appointing expert witnesses, and otherwise enforcing the settlement agreement between the parties. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Contempt Order, the Termination Order, and the HNR-Box Order. The panel vacated the Attorneys' Fees Order and Judgment, remanding with instructions to (a) recalculate the fee award by determining the correct hourly rates for each year, (b) exclude from any fee award the 11 hours erroneously included; (c) modify the costs award down by $1,285.79 in light of the district court's failure to reflect the downward adjustments in its prior order; and (d) reweigh whether a fee enhancement was appropriate without double-counting the Kerr factors. The panel dismissed the remainder of the Medical Needs Appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
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| United States v. Rubbo |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-1342 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Carson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| This case arose out of a fraudulent business scheme involving the sale of the “Scrubbieglove” cleaning product. Defendant Pasquale Rubbo and other co-conspirators lied to investors to solicit money, ultimately defrauding them of more than six million dollars. The conspirators lured potential investors to the “Scrubbieglove” by lying about high returns on investment, potential and ongoing business deals, and how they would use and invest funds. They also misrepresented the Scrubbieglove’s production demand, telling told investors that the Scrubbieglove required substantial financing because of deals with QVC, Wal-Mart, Walgreens, and other major retailers. In reality, beyond producing a few samples, the conspirators never manufactured any Scrubbiegloves. Instead, the conspirators transferred investor funds to their own personal bank accounts. Defendant’s primary role in the scheme involved intimidating and threatening investors to ensure their silence. Defendant pleaded guilty to two fraud-related charges, and was sentenced to 106 months’ imprisonment. He appealed his sentence, alleging the government breached the Plea Agreement. Finding no breach, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. |
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| United States v. Tony |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-2182 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Brian Tony was convicted of first-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Pat Garcia during a fight. Before trial, Tony sought to introduce evidence that Garcia had used methamphetamine before the fight. The district court excluded the evidence, and Tony argued that the evidence should have been allowed into evidence. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court excluded the evidence for a reason unsupported by the record. Thus, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. |
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| In Re: James Dailey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-15145 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Edward Earl Carnes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit denied petitioner authorization to file another federal habeas petition so that he could raise an actual innocence claim, a Brady claim, and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court held that its authority to grant the application was restricted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that the claims in his application met the requirements under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). In this case, petitioner could not raise an actual innocence claim in his successive petition because he has already raised the claim, he has not identified a "but for" constitutional violation, and he has not met the demanding actual innocence standard in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Furthermore, petitioner's Brady claim failed because he could not show that he could not have discovered the information at issue with due diligence or, assuming the State failed to disclose the information, petitioner failed to show a "but for" constitutional violation. Finally, petitioner failed to show that the factual predicate for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not have been discovered previously. |
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| United States v. Bane |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 18-10232, 18-11086 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants may not use a writ of error coram nobis to challenge a forfeiture judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief after determining that defendants had standing to bring their challenge. The court held that, even assuming that Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1630 (2017), -- which held that a different forfeiture statute does not permit joint-and-several liability -- applies retroactively and that coram nobis may be used, defendants were not entitled to relief because their failure to challenge their forfeiture judgments on direct appeal means they cannot challenge them now. As a non-jurisdictional error, the court stated that defendants needed to raise their Honeycutt claims on direct appeal to avoid procedural default. In this case, defendants failed to establish cause for not raising their claims on direct appeal, and defendants also failed to establish prejudice. |
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| United States v. Cabezas-Montano |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-14294 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Hull Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The court rejected defendants' constitutional challenges to the MDLEA where the court has previously held that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Felonies Clause as applied to drug trafficking crimes without a "nexus" to the United States; the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not prohibit the trial and conviction of aliens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking because the MDLEA provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas; and because the MDLEA's jurisdictional requirement goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts and is not an essential element of the MDLEA substantive offense, it does not have to be submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendants and their offenses under the MDLEA. The court rejected Defendant Guagua-Alarcon's challenges to his presentment for a probable cause hearing; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant Palacios-Solis's motion in limine; sufficient evidence supported defendants' convictions; and because Palacios-Solis failed to show a Brady violation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. Finally, the court also rejected defendants' claims of sentencing errors. |
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| C.D., a Minor v. State of Alaska |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17447 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Daniel E. Winfree Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Before the Alaska Supreme Court in this case was a constitutional claim arising from the application of a juvenile jurisdiction waiver statute. A minor subject to the statutory provision did not testify at his waiver hearing and did not overcome the presumption enumerated in the statute; the superior court granted the State’s waiver petition. The minor appealed, contending the statutory rebuttable presumption and shifted burden of proof violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his constitutional due process rights. The Supreme Court explained that fundamental fairness required adopting an exclusionary rule when a minor bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of being unamenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system: the minor’s testimonial evidence at the waiver hearing cannot be used as substantive evidence over the minor’s objection at any subsequent juvenile adjudication or adult criminal proceedings. |
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| State v. Reed |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-19-0059-PR Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Ann Timmer Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Trusts & Estates |
| The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals dismissing Richard Allen Reed's appeal from a criminal restitution order, holding that the legislature lacked authority to require the court to dismiss a pending appeal upon a convicted defendant's death but possessed authority to prohibit abatement of the defendant's conviction and sentence. Reed was convicted of voyeurism and required to pay $17,949.50 as restitution to the victim. Reed appealed, challenging the restitution amount. Reed appealed, but pending a decision, Reed died. Reed's wife moved to intervene or substitute as a party in the appeal. The court of appeals denied the motion because the wife did not cite authority permitting intervention or substitution in a criminal case. The court then dismissed the appeal pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-106(A). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the court of appeals, holding (1) the legislature lacked authority to require the court to dismiss a pending appeal upon a convicted defendant's death under section 13-106(A); but (2) the legislature possessed authority to prohibit abatement of that defendant's conviction and sentence under section 13-106(B). |
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| Grubbs v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 42 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court refusing to instruct the jury on two instructions proffered by Defendant at a resentencing hearing, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the offense, pled guilty to capital murder. After Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, it was determined that Defendant should be resentenced by a jury. After a resentencing hearing, the jury imposed a sentence of life in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's rejection of two jury forms proffered by Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the requested jury instructions. |
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| Millsap v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 38 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition and amended petition to correct an illegal sentence under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, holding that Appellant did not establish that his sentence was illegal. Appellant plead guilty to capital murder, first-degree terroristic threatening, and second-degree battery. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. In this petition, Appellant argued that his sentence of life without parole was (1) illegal on its face because Ark. Code Ann. 16-89-108(b) provides that in cases in which the death penalty has been waived punishment could not be fixed at more than life imprisonment, and (2) was facially illegal because he signed the plea agreement before he entered his guilty plea but he did not initial each item on the agreement. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's sentence was a legal sentence. |
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| Muhammad v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 47 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant stated no basis for the writ. Appellant pleaded guilty to capital murder, attempted capital murder, and unlawful discharge of a firearm. Appellant later filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the State lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offenses because they were referred to as "international terrorism" committed by a "foreign terrorist organization" and that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that Appellant's conduct could have been charged as a crime under a federal statute did not prohibit the State from trying him in state court; and (2) Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not cognizable as a ground for the writ. |
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| Rayfield v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 40 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Defendant's petition for scientific testing of evidence, holding that the circuit court's decision denying the petition was not clearly erroneous. Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated assault, and related convictions. Defendant later filed a petition under Ark. Code. Ann. 16-112-201 through 208 seeking further scientific testing of the vaginal swab collected from the victim. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where Ark. Code. Ann. 16-112-201 through 208 is the codification of Act 1780 of 2001 the circuit court did not err in applying Act 1780; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's petition on the merits; and (3) the circuit court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. |
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| Roberts v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 45 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's amended petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's order denying Rule 37 relief. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Numerous proceedings followed. This appeal concerned Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. The circuit court entered an order denying Defendant relief on every claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no deficient performance by trial counsel under the Strickland standard; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying relief on the issue of Defendant's competency to stand trial; (3) Defendant's claim of juror misconduct was not cognizable in this postconviction proceeding; and (4) Defendant's remaining claims did not warrant reversal of his convictions. |
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| People v. Hoyt |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S113653 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and kidnapping and sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief. Specifically, the Court held (1) the superior court did not err in exercising its jurisdiction in this matter; (2) the trial court did not err in the voir dire proceedings; (3) Defendant's argument that there was a material variance between the kidnap alleged in the indictment and the prosecutor's argument regarding his actual offense was unavailing; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting Defendant's custodial confession; (5) the trial court did not err by compelling Defendant to testify as a foundation for testimony by Defendant's expert that his confession was false; (6) the trial court did not err by limiting expert witness testimony; (7) the trial court did not err by compelling Defendant to undergo a prosecution-conducted psychiatric examination; (8) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the guilt phase closing argument; (9) there was no instructional error; (10) there was sufficient evidence to support the kidnap-murder special circumstance; (11) Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase closing argument lacked merit; and (12) Defendant's remaining penalty phase claims were unavailing. |
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| California v. Cota |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G056850(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Raymond J. Ikola Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Emmanuel Cota was convicted by jury of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1)1 and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2). As to both counts, the jury also found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a total term of six years, comprised of three years for assault with a deadly weapon in count 1 and a consecutive three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement attached to that count. The court imposed a concurrent sentence on count 2 but stayed the term under Penal Code section 654. On appeal, defendant argued his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in count 1 and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in count 2 were different statements of the same offense and his dual convictions violated Penal Code section 954. He requested the Court of Appeal either vacate his count 2 conviction or remand his case to the trial court with directions to strike one of his duplicative convictions and its attending great bodily injury enhancement. The Attorney General contended defendant’s dual assault convictions should be affirmed because they were legally and factually separate offenses. After review, the Court concluded assault with a deadly weapon and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury were the same offense, stated differently, and based on the record in this case, defendant’s dual assault convictions violated section 954 because both convictions were based on the same conduct. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant’s conviction for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in count 2 and the great bodily injury enhancement attached to this count. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. |
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| In re Howerton |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076546(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Brad R. Hill Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting habeas relief to respondent under Penal Code section 3051. The People argued that the trial court wrongly found section 3051 applicable because respondent had already been granted parole on his indeterminate-term youth offense. The court held that, by the plain language of the statute, respondent was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing at the time the statute became effective and thus was not entitled to the additional benefits afforded by the case law requiring immediate release upon parole under that statutory scheme. |
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| People v. Adams |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H045718(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Adrienne M. Grover Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Adams pleaded no contest to inflicting corporal injury and was placed on formal probation. Defense counsel argued Adams did not have the ability to pay fines or fees; he was homeless and did not have a job. The court did not impose a $330 restitution fund fine or a probation revocation fine but imposed $40 court operations and $30 court facilities funding assessments, a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and a $25-per-month probation fee. Later, Adams pleaded no contest in another case for failing to register as a sex offender. Adams again received formal probation. The court imposed a $300 restitution fine plus $30 for administrative costs (Pen. Code 1202.4(b)(1), (l)); imposed but suspended a $300 probation revocation fine (Pen. Code 1202.44); imposed $40 court operations (Pen. Code 1465.8) and $30 court facilities funding assessments (Gov. Code 70373) but did not impose the criminal justice administration fee based on inability to pay. Later, the court revoked probation in both cases and sentenced Adams to prison. The previously-suspended probation revocation fine was ordered to be paid; two $300 parole revocation fines were imposed but suspended. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court violated Adams’s federal due process rights by imposing fines and fees without assessing his ability to pay. The court reasoned that the 2019 decision, People v. Dueñas, was wrongly decided and factually distinguishable. |
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| People v. Cervantes |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B298077(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Arthur Gilbert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Penal Code section 1170.95 applies only to murder convictions. Defendant argued that the failure to include voluntary manslaughter convictions in section 1170.95 violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the section 1170.95 petition, holding that defendant's exclusion from section 1170.95 does not violate his right to equal protection. The court held that the decision not to include manslaughter in section 1170.95 falls within the Legislature's "line-drawing" authority as a rational choice that is not constitutionally prohibited. The court also rejected defendant's claim that he was denied substantive due process where there was a rational relationship between the objectives of the legislative enactment and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives. In this case, the legislative goal was to eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the felony murder rule, and that goal was properly achieved by the section 1170.95 petition procedure to vacate those murder convictions. |
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| People v. Kerbs |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155126(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Kline Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kerbs was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault with a deadly weapon and was committed to the state hospital system for a maximum of four years. Other than two limited periods of conditional release, his commitment was extended over 20 years. The state sought to again extend the commitment. Dr. Mancusi testified as an expert in violence risk assessment, psychodiagnostic assessment, and psychological treatment. She had been Kerbs’s unit psychologist for about four and one-half years. She testified that Kerbs, then 61 years old, suffered from schizophrenia, and that “lacking engagement in treatment and lacking insight into his mental disorder,” Kerbs did “continue to pose a significant risk for violence without sufficient support and supervision.” Kerbs had made statements that concerned her and had expressed an intention to continue his medication. Mancusi believed that his risk in the community without supervision was in the high range. On cross-examination, Mancusi acknowledged that she had never seen Kerbs “place his hands on anyone,” but she had “witnessed him act in an intimidating manner.” The court extended his civil commitment under Penal Code section 1026.51 for two years. The court of appeal reversed. The expert testimony did not show either that Kerbs ever physically harmed another while confined or that he has difficulty controlling “dangerous behavior,” so the court’s finding of dangerousness was not supported by substantial evidence. |
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| People v. Vasquez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295698(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Moor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On appeal, defendant claimed that his sentence for mayhem in count 2 must be stayed under Penal Code section 654, because it was part of a continuous course of conduct and committed with the same criminal intent as the attempted murder in count 1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence and agreed with the People that, although the offenses occurred in close proximity, substantial evidence supported the finding that defendant had a separate intent when he stabbed the victim than he did when he bit her. |
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| People v. Winn |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H045157A(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Greenwood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Winn was convicted of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of Derrington after Derrington had Winn and his wife evicted from their home. The jury found true a deadly weapon enhancement. Winn admitted he had previously served five prior prison terms. The court imposed a total term of 31 years to life in prison, including five one-year terms for the prior prison term enhancements. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim taken before the offense; that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the photograph; and that the court erred during a post-verdict Marsden hearing by failing to inquire into Winn’s claim that his counsel deprived him of the opportunity to testify in his defense. The Supreme Court transferred the matter back for reconsideration in light of Senate Bill No. 136, amending Penal Code section 667.5(b) to allow the imposition of a one-year enhancement for a prison prior term only if the prior conviction is for a sexually violent offense. The Attorney General conceded that because Winn’s conviction is not yet final, he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of the amendment. The court of appeal struck the prior prison term enhancements and modified the sentence. Admission of the photograph was harmless error; there was no reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable outcome had it been excluded. |
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| Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20141 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Ecker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the habeas court dismissing, sua sponte, Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus without first acting on Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel and providing him with notice and an opportunity to be heard, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that Petitioner was not entitled to the appointment of counsel, notice or a hearing under the circumstances but used the incorrect analysis to arrive at that conclusion. The habeas court dismissed Petitioner's petition pursuant to Practice Book 23-29(1) for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that it was apparent, on the face of the petition, that Petitioner was not in custody for the conviction being challenged. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case with direction to decline to issue the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court should have declined to issue the writ pursuant to Practice Book 23-24(a)(1) rather than dismissing the case pursuant to Practice Book 23-29(1). |
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| State v. Lebrick |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20083 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Ecker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the admission of certain testimony during trial violated Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. Defendant was convicted of felony murder and related crimes. Defendant appealed, arguing that the testimony of two witnesses was improperly admitted under the Connecticut Code of Evidence and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the former testimony of one of the witnesses was improperly admitted because the State failed to demonstrate that Defendant was unavailable within the meaning of the confrontation clause because the State failed to establish that it undertook a reasonable, diligent, and good faith effort to locate the witness prior to Defendant's trial; and (2) the admission of the testimony of the other witness was constitutional. |
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| Allen v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1266 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Johnny Allen appealed his felony murder and aggravated assault convictions for killing Robert Patton. On appeal, Allen argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence of events that occurred after the shooting, and by admitting photographs of the autopsy performed on Patton. Allen also argued the trial court erred and invaded the province of the jury by instructing the jury that a firearm was a deadly weapon as a matter of law. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the sentence for aggravated assault, which merged with felony murder by operation of law, but otherwise affirmed, because the Court determined Allen did not show no reversible error by the trial court in admitting evidence or instructing the jury. |
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| Davis v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1432 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2012, Sylvester Davis, Jr. was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 2011 shooting death of Marquis Wadley. Davis apppealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony by a Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) agent and in denying his motion for a mistrial, and that, to the extent that the Georgia Supreme Court concludes that he waived certain evidentiary objections by failing to raise them at trial, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Davis’ conviction. |
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| Davis v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19G0394 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Georgia Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in this case to address whether a detainee who had not yet been indicted could seek to bar his prosecution through a plea in bar on the basis that the statute of limitation for prosecution has expired. The Supreme Court held that a plea in bar was not proper until an indictment has been filed. Therefore, the Court concurred with the Court of Appeals which held Davis’s plea in bar was improper prior to indictment. “Although various mechanisms may exist to challenge one’s pre-indictment detention, including preliminary hearings, motions for bond and, in some cases, writs of habeas corpus, we express no opinion as to the propriety of these remedies in Davis’s case. Here, with regard to the only trial court order before us, Davis sought only to bar his prosecution in the trial court with a plea in bar, not to challenge his detention with a writ of habeas corpus.” |
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| Jackson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1570 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jonathan Jackson was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of DeAngelo Head. On appeal, Jackson argued only that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding the evidence to support his conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s convictions. |
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| Mann v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1256 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| David Mann Jr. was convicted of malice murder and two counts of first degree cruelty to children in connection with the death of seven-year-old Ethan Martinez. Ethan was Mann’s girlfriend’s son. Mann told first responders that two days earlier, Ethan had fallen from a playset and hit his head. A CT scan showed bleeding along the side of Ethan’s brain, as well as brain swelling. Ethan was transported to Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta, where he was admitted with a traumatic brain injury. His other injuries included a circumferential bruise to his penis and scrotum, a bruised back, elevated liver enzymes, and retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes. Doctors eventually confirmed brain death, and Ethan was taken off life support. In his motion for a new trial, Mann argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court committed reversible error in multiple instances; and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Because it concluded his claims are meritless, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| McCluskey v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1397 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Clarence McCluskey was convicted of murder and related crimes arising out of the shooting death of his wife, Lisa. He appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for cruelty to children in the third degree, and the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested charges on reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was insufficient to allow a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that McCluskey committed the offense of cruelty to children in the third degree and reversed his conviction as to those charges. However, the Court did determined the evidence sufficient as to all other charges and affirmed. |
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| Morgan v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1261 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jokeera Morgan was convicted by jury of murdering by drowning her two infant daughters. Morgan drowned her daughters in her Chatham County, Georgia home. She immediately called 911 to report what she had done. The responding officers found the children’s bodies where Morgan had told the dispatcher they would be. Morgan confessed to the homicides in a police interview, telling the officers that “while she was [drowning her daughters], she was thinking that she couldn’t believe that she was doing it.” The medical examiner confirmed that the children had drowned and that their manner of death was consistent with Morgan’s description of how she had killed them. In support of her special plea of insanity, Morgan introduced evidence of her history of mental illness, which included severe bipolar-I disorder, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse. Morgan’s experts concluded that her symptoms were consistent with those of mothers who had committed “altruistic filicide,” a homicide that results from a belief that a child is better off dead. Morgan appealed the order denying her motion for a new trial, contending that the trial court erred by: (1) excluding expert opinion testimony concerning her ability to discern right from wrong; (2) admitting police body-camera video recordings of her children’s bodies; and (3) giving an incorrect charge on whether the jury could consider punishment during its deliberations on the issue of her guilt. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Mosley v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1301 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Rashard Mosley appealed his convictions for numerous offenses, including the 2014 murder of Ivory Carter and the attempted murder and attempted armed robbery of Frederick Knight. On appeal, Mosley contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court erroneously permitted the State to elicit various inadmissible hearsay statements, that the trial court erroneously permitted the State to adduce “intrinsic evidence,” and that trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Rammage v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1518 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Johnny Rammage was convicted of malice murder and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Chris Johnson. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred: (1) by not allowing him to introduce evidence of Johnson’s prior acts of violence; (2) by declining to give jury instructions on justification and accident; and (3) by admitting evidence of his prior conviction. Appellant also contended his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the court’s failure to give the jury instructions. After review of the record and the briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. |
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| Redding v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1302 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Kerri Redding was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Christopher Kenyatta. Appellant contended his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise the possible biases of two witnesses and by failing to object to certain testimony from the lead detective. Appellant also claimed the trial court erred by not allowing him to impeach an out-of-court declarant with a certified copy of the declarant’s conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Rich v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1492 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2016, Deonta Rich was convicted of murdering Sylvester Downs and kidnapping Taquoya Rogers. Rich: (1) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions; (2) argued the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial while sitting as the thirteenth juror; and (3) contended his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object after the State, during its closing argument, inappropriately commented on his prior juvenile adjudication. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Smith v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1148 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Mary Katherine Smith was convicted of felony murder based on cruelty to children in connection with the death of her two-year-old son Mason “Tucker” Smith. Tucker did not wake following what was described as one of his breath-holding temper tantrums (where he would hold his breath until he passed out). Investigators would later determine Tucker suffered rotational force injuries, blunt force trauma. The child had nine healing rib fractures which may have been inflicted weeks earlier—injuries consistent with being hit, spanked and forceful squeezing. Smith contended on appeal of her conviction that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, and that the trial court erred by excusing a juror and by declining to give a jury instruction on her good character. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Stephens v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S19A1345, S19A1346 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lloyd Stephens and Demetrius Brewer were convicted after a joint jury trial for the murder of Eric Kemp. Both argued the trial court made multiple evidentiary errors. Additionally, Stephens argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible errors, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed both convictions. |
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| Taylor v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1476 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Sylvester Taylor was convicted by jury for malice murder and criminal attempt to commit rape, amongst other crimes, stemming from the beating death of Linda Madison. This appeal stemmed from an exchange between Taylor and the judge presiding over his pre-trial proceedings, specifically, at a 2014 preliminary hearing, wherein Taylor proclaimed “I ain’t killed that b*tch; that b*tch killed herself.” The trial court then cautioned, “Wait a minute.” Taylor, however, immediately launched into an uninterrupted (albeit brief), profanity-laced tirade in which he denied killing Madison. The tirade culminated in him saying, “Y’all can kiss my black a**.” The trial court found Taylor guilty of 13 instances of criminal contempt, one for each of the obscene words that he used during the outburst, and sentenced him to a total of 230 days in jail, not to be served until Taylor became eligible for release pursuant to bond or “by final disposition of the charges upon which [Taylor] is currently being held.” Taylor appealed, contending (among other things) that the trial court erred by finding him guilty of multiple instances of contempt. The State agreed with Taylor, and so did the Georgia Supreme Court. Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Wells v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1592 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tyrecquiss Wells appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of David Scott. Wells argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial statements on the ground that he did not knowingly waive his rights; (2) his confrontation right was violated when the trial court admitted an accomplice’s inculpatory statements; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever his trial from those of his co-defendants. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed because: (1) the record showed that Wells knowingly waived his rights when he voluntarily agreed to speak with the police; (2) there was no confrontation violation because the accomplice testified at trial and Wells was able to cross-examine him; and (3) trial counsel’s reason for not filing a motion to sever was not objectively unreasonable. |
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| Williams v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19G0125 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A grand jury indicted Keith Williams on 48 counts of sexual exploitation of children after police searched and seized his computer and several disc drives wherein they found the offending images. All counts in the indictment alleged that, on the day of the search, Williams “did knowingly possess and control a photographic image depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” Each count separately described a different image possessed by Williams. Before trial, Williams filed a “Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 through 48 of the Indictment” on the ground that these counts were “multiplicitous” because they all arose from a single criminal act. According to Williams, the simultaneous possession of multiple illicit images in a single location constituted only one offense under OCGA 16-12-100 (b) (8). Thus, Williams argued, the indictment subjected him to multiple punishments for the same offense, thereby exposing him to double jeopardy in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution, and statutory law. After a hearing, the trial court agreed with Williams, granted his motion to dismiss, and ordered the State to consolidate all 48 counts in the indictment into a single count. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that, regardless of the merit of Williams’s multiplicity claim, the trial court was not authorized to dismiss Counts 2 through 48 of his indictment at the pretrial stage of the proceedings. |
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| Williams v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1250 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Following his conviction for the murder of Barry Bullard, acting pro se, Allen Williams appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial. Williams argued numerous errors, including: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that he received ineffective assistance from post-trial counsel; (3) the trial court ruled on his motion for a new trial without being prompted to do so; and (4) that several errors arose from an alleged “conflict of interest” involving Williams’ former counsel. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Carroll |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000593 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge for cause of Juror 48, an error that required that Defendant's conviction be vacated, but that double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial. Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft and one count of criminal property damage. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the circuit court erred by denying his challenge to two prospective jurors for cause, thereby violating his right to peremptory challenges. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court held that Defendant's conviction must be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the circuit court improperly denied Defendant's challenge for cause of Juror 48, which required him to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to excuse that juror and caused him to exhaust his peremptory challenge, which impaired his right to exercise a peremptory challenge on a different juror. But because there was substantial evidence to support Defendant's convictions, double jeopardy principles did not preclude a retrial. |
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| Johnson v. Department of State Police |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2019 IL 124213 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Mary Jane Theis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Department of State Police revoked Johnson’s Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/8(n) due to her conviction for a misdemeanor involving domestic violence. That conviction prohibited her from possessing firearms under federal law. Johnson sought judicial relief. The circuit court held that section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), and several provisions of the FOID Card Act, which incorporate that federal statute, were unconstitutional as applied to Johnson. The court ordered the Department to reissue Johnson’s FOID card. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on different grounds, vacating the circuit court’s findings that the state and federal statutes are unconstitutional as applied to Johnson. Under the federal Act, “civil rights” include firearm rights and Johnson fits an exemption for those who have had their “civil rights restored” following a conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence. Illinois’s regulatory scheme (430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3), which affirmatively provides for a “status-altering dispensation” under section 10 of the FOID Card Act sufficiently fulfills Congress’s intent to “defer to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Granting Johnson relief is not contrary to federal law. |
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| People v. Ashley |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2019 IL 123989 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Neville Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ashley was convicted of stalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2), (c)(1) and was sentenced to serve 18 months’ imprisonment. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting his arguments that the provisions of the stalking statute under which he was convicted are facially unconstitutional in violation of the first amendment and substantive due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; it does not criminalize protected speech consisting of threats to engage in lawful, nonviolent behavior. The amended statute requires two or more threats that the defendant knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; the legislature intended that the term “threatens” refers to “true threats” of unlawful violence such as bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, and restraint, as set forth in other subsections. The statute that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his speech and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. The term “threatens” is readily susceptible to a limiting construction and does not cover negligent conduct. The statute is not susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. |
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| People v. King |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2019 IL 123926 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Robert R. Thomas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Convicted of the 2014 first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) of his wife, Kathleen, King was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Kathleen’s body was found on railroad tracks near the family’s home. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that King’s motion for substitution of the judge was properly denied after the judge had made a substantive ruling; that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such that retrial would not violate double jeopardy principles; that the testimony of a crime scene analyst (Safarik) was inadmissible in its entirety because the opinions he rendered were either beyond his qualification or involved conclusions that the jurors easily could draw for themselves without any expert assistance; that portions of other testimony were unduly inflammatory; and that the state’s comments in closing argument about the reasonable doubt standard were improper. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. The motion for substitution was untimely, coming after the judge ruled on a motion to obtain cell phone records. Safarik’s inadmissible testimony was not harmless. The trial court should have excluded some brief foundational testimony by a friend about the closeness of her relationship with Kathleen and the state improperly attempted to define and dilute its burden of proof during its closing argument. |
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| People v. Moore |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2019 IL 124538 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Thomas L. Kilbride Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2013, Moore was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) stemming from a traffic stop in Joliet. His prior felony was a 1990 murder conviction. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting an argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate to Moore’s felon status, thereby allowing the jury to consider highly prejudicial evidence that Moore’s prior conviction was for murder. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. This type of prior conviction evidence generally has little probative value and creates a high risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. The jury was faced with two plausible versions of events that depended on witness credibility. The evidence was closely balanced, so informing the jurors that the defendant was previously convicted of murder made Deputy Hannon’s version more plausible and tipped the scales against Moore. There was a reasonable probability of a different result, had defense counsel prevented the jury from being informed of the nature of the prior felony conviction. There was sufficient evidence that the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so double jeopardy does not preclude a new trial. |
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| People v. Roddis |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2019 IL 124352 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Rita B. Garman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Roddis was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and sentenced to six years in prison. The trial court dismissed as untimely Roddis’s pro se motion for reduction of his sentence that also alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence but remanded for a “Krankel” hearing. On remand, the trial court conducted a “pre-inquiry Krankel hearing” to determine if the allegations of ineffective assistance were founded, at which point the court would appoint separate counsel and proceed to a “full-blown” Krankel hearing. The court conducted a hearing with Roddis and his previous counsel, giving Roddis the opportunity to elaborate on his allegations and allowing counsel to respond. The court ruled that the allegations did not establish ineffective assistance. The appellate court, finding that the trial court should not have decided the merits at that initial hearing, remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the trial court judgment. Even in preliminary Krankel inquiries, a trial court must be able to consider the merits in their entirety when determining whether to appoint new counsel on a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This serves both the ends of justice and judicial economy. After scrutinizing the record, the court found that Roddis received effective assistance and was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ performance. The court rightfully exercised its discretion to decline to appoint new counsel to address his pro se posttrial claims. |
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| Jones v. State |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-0745 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: David S. Wiggins Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction relief (PCR) court dismissing Appellant's fourth PCR application, holding that under this Court's holding today in Thongvanh v. State, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), Defendant's claims based on State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2017), failed because Plain is not retroactive. In his PCR application Appellant alleged violations of his rights to equal protection and due process and his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Appellant based his claims on Plain. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that Plain does not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court improperly dismissed Appellant's application based upon a ground neither party raised; and (2) because the new law of criminal procedure announced in Plain does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review Appellant's PCR application was properly dismissed. |
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| State v. Leedom |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1947 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court conditionally affirmed Defendant's convictions but remanded the case for an in camera inspection of the victim's mental health records, holding that the district court erred by failing to conduct the in camera inspection. Defendant was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. During trial, the granddaughter lied about certain facts, and thus the granddaughter's credibility was a key issue. In her deposition, the granddaughter testified that she had disclosed the defendant's abuse to her therapist, a mandatory reporter. Noting that the therapist had not reported the alleged abuse, Defendant filed a motion for the court's in camera inspection arguing that the records likely contained exculpatory impeachment evidence. The district court denied the motion and Defendant's request for an ex parte hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for an ex parte hearing but erred by failing to conduct the in camera inspection of the granddaughter's mental health records. |
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| Thongvanh v. State |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-0885 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: David S. Wiggins Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Appellant's application for postconviction relief (PCR) claiming a violation of his constitutional right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, basing his claim on State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2017), holding that the holding in Plain does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. In 1984, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. In 2017, the Supreme Court decided Plain, which addressed the Duren three-part test for evaluating Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claims and overruled precedent adopting the absolute-disparity method as the exclusive indicator of representativeness under the second prong of Duren. In 2018, Appellant filed the instant PCR application, alleging that he was denied his rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair and impartial trial under the state and federal constitutions. Appellant based his claim on Plain. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that Plain is not retroactive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's Plain claim is time-barred by Iowa Code 822.3; and (2) because Plain's holding is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure, it does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. |
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| State v. Downing |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116629 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a court of appeals panel reversing a conviction of burglary of a dwelling, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The panel reversed Defendant's conviction based on the building owner's testimony that no one lived there when the crime occurred and that the owner had no plans to live there or rent it out. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory definition of "dwelling" requires proof the burgled place was used as human habitation, home, or residence when the crime occurred or proof that someone had a present, subjective intent at the time of the crime to use the burgled place for such a purpose; and (2) because the State's case lacked that proof the evidence could not support the burglary conviction. |
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| State v. Williams |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 115119 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded Defendant's case for resentencing, holding that the court of appeals properly rejected Defendant's speedy trial claim but that Defendant's sentence was erroneous. Defendant was convicted of unintentional second-degree murder. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. On remand, Defendant was again convicted of unintentional second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that his statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated at his first trial, thereby invalidating his second trial, that the district court imposed a vindictive sentence, and that his sentence was illegal because the district court improperly scored an out-of-state conviction as a person crime. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant's last argument and otherwise affirmed, holding that Defendant's out-of-state conviction was improperly scored as a person crime. |
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| Louisiana v. Alexander |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-KK-00645 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Jefferson D. Hughes, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the district court judgment that granted defendant Donovan Alexander's motion to suppress an uncounseled statement. Defendant was charged by bill of information with possession with intent to distribute heroin, and possessing a firearm while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance. He pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress statement. A DEA Special Agent testified that defendant was read his rights and waived them at the scene of his arrest and also prior to being interviewed at Police Headquarters. Specifically, defendant signed a DEA advice of rights form. While defendant was detained at Police Headquarters, police informed him of the search and recovery from an Orleans Parish residence. Defendant told officers that the drugs and gun were his and that he did not want the woman who lived there to be charged. This was the statement sought to be suppressed. At some point during the search of the residence, attorney Dwayne Burrell arrived on the scene, identifying himself to officers as defendant’s attorney and attempted to stop further search of the home. Burrell was told by officers that drugs had been found and that the defendant was being detained. Burrell told the officers that he wanted to speak with defendant and that defendant was not going to make any statements. The trial court ultimately granted the motion to suppress, reasoning that where there are allegations of police misconduct in connection to statements given by an accused, the State had to specifically rebut these allegations, and the State failed to specifically rebut the serious allegations made by the defense attorney. After reviewing federal and state authorities, the Supreme Court determined that when the police failed to inform defendant his attorney sought to speak with him and failed to allow his attorney access to defendant when the attorney was on the scene of the arrest and asked to see his client, the statement was inadmissible. Accordingly, the court of appeal was reversed and the district court’s judgment reinstated. |
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| Louisiana v. Holliday |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2017-KA-01921 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Crichton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2007, a grand jury indicated defendant Dacarius Holliday for the first-degree murder of two-year-old Darian Coon. In 2010, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. In March 2010, the jury unanimously determined that defendant be sentenced to death, finding the following aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of second-degree cruelty to juveniles; and (2) the victim was under the age of twelve (12) years. Appeal was made directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which reviewed defendant's 52 assignments of error, variously combined into 29 arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. |
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| Louisiana v. Mayeux |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-K-00369 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of whether the State’s circumstantial case against defendant Charles Mayeux was sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. In the early morning hours of March 21, 2015, defendant called 911 to report a fire at his home in Evergreen. When the fire was extinguished, the charred body of defendant’s wife, Shelly Mayeux, was discovered. It was undisputed that Shelly died before the fire, as neither carbon monoxide nor soot were found in her lungs or airway. But no expert could determine the cause of her death. A fire investigator opined that the fire was intentionally set. Defendant and his wife were the only two people in the home when the fire started. The State indicted defendant for second degree murder, alleging that he killed his wife and set his house on fire to conceal evidence of the crime. A jury found defendant guilty as charged by a 10-2 verdict. The Supreme Court determined the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally conclude that defendant killed his wife when he had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, therefore, affirming conviction. |
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| State v. Asaad |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 11 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of gross sexual assault, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Defendant possessed the requisite mens rea. On appeal, Defendant argued that Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 253(2)(M) must be read to require proof that he knew that the person with whom he was engaging in a sexual act had not expressly or impliedly acquiesced to the sexual act and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he knew the victim had not expressly or impliedly acquiesced to the sexual activity. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant engaged in a sexual act that he knew the victim had not expressly or impliedly acquiesced to. |
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| State v. Conroy |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 22 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's judgment of conviction of gross sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, sexual abuse of a minor, and unlawful sexual touching, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions of gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions for sexual abuse of a minor and unlawful sexual touching; and (2) because the State did not present any evidence that Defendant, a substitute teacher, possessed the requisite authority over the victim, a student, at the time that he committed the sexual act and sexual contact, there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact. |
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| State v. Weddle |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 12 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Joseph Jabar Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court as a result of a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of two counts of manslaughter, two counts of causing a death while operating under the influence, and related charges, holding that the court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw taken at the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident. Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2522(2) directs law enforcement officers to test the blood of all drivers involved in a fatal, or likely fatal, motor vehicle accident without any requirement of probable cause before the blood draw. Defendant argued on appeal that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed but nonetheless affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2522(2) violates the Fourth Amendment because it does not require that law enforcement have consent or probable cause to believe that a driver is impaired before drawing a person's blood; but (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress because the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the search. |
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| State v. Williams |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 17 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's judgment of conviction of two counts of stalking and two counts of harassment entered by the trial court after a jury trial, holding that the court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial; (2) the judgment entered in Defendant's favor in a prior protection from harassment matter was not entitled to res judicator effect in this criminal prosecution; (3) the trial court did not err when it allowed one of the victims to testify that a lawsuit Defendant filed against the victim was dismissed with prejudice; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal; and (5) the trial court committed no obvious error in failing to give three jury instructions. |
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| Kazadi v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 11/19 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Shirley M. Watts Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and other offenses, holding that this Court's holding as to voir dire questions in Twining v. State, 198 A.2d 291 (Md. 1964), is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in the law and is hereby overruled. In this case, Defendant requested, unsuccessfully, that the circuit court ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors were unwilling or unable to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant's right to testify. The Court of Appeals held (1) to the extent the Court of Appeals held in Twining that it is inappropriate to ask on voir dire questions concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant's right to remain silent, the holding in Twining is overruled; (2) on request, during voir dire, a trial court may ask the questions at issue; and (3) absent additional circumstances, the status of a State's witness as an undocumented immigrant, or the existence of a deportation order applicable to the witness, do not show the character of the witness for untruthfulness or demonstrate a motive to testify falsely. |
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| Simms v. Maryland Department of Health |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 20/19 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Barbera J. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law |
| The Court of Appeals held that Md. Code Crim. Proc. (CP) 3-121(e), which sets forth the process for issuing a hospital warrant and recommitment pending a hearing on a petition for revocation or modification, does not violate due process under either the United States Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Upon pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter, Appellant was found not criminally responsible and committed to the Health Department. After Appellant was conditionally released pursuant to court order the State filed a petition for revocation or modification of her conditional release on the basis that she had violated a condition of her release. The circuit court issued a hospital warrant, acting pursuant to CP 3-121. Appellant was subsequently recommitted to a mental health facility in anticipation of a required hearing. Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus arguing that recommitment of a person alleged to have violated conditional release must include a finding that the committed person was currently danger to self or to the person or property of others. The habeas court denied the petition. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that CP 3-121 appropriately balances the interests of society against a committed individual's conditional liberty interest. |
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| Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12725 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Ralph D. Gants Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court answered questions reported by a single justice upon Petitioners' petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4 asserting claims for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief after the superintendent for each petitioner refused to review Petitioners' petitions for medical parole as submitted regardless of the superintendent's view as to the completeness or adequacy of the petition. Specifically, the Court answered that, when a prisoner submits a written petition for medical parole, the superintendent or sheriff of the facility where the prisoner is incarcerated must consider the petition even if the superintendent or sheriff does not consider the petition complete or adequate. Further, the superintendent or sheriff bears the burden of preparing or procuring a medical parole plan and recommendation as to the release of the prisoner. Lastly, the commissioner, on receipt of the petition and recommendation, is required to provide the prisoner with all supporting documents submitted by the superintendent or sheriff with the recommendation. |
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| Commonwealth v. Tejada |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11951 Opinion Date: January 23, 2020 Judge: Barbara A. Lenk Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and declined to exercise its powers under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt, holding that there was no reason to reverse Defendant's conviction. Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's convictions; (2) Defendant's statements to police on the night of his arrest were properly admitted because the statements did not require Miranda warnings and were voluntary; (3) the trial judge did not err by declining to ask a requested question about anti-Hispanic juror bias during voir dire; and (4) there was no basis to grant extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. |
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| Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12697 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the motion judge allowing Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that both the patfrisk of Defendant and the search of Defendant's motor vehicle were improper. Two law enforcement officers approached Defendant's vehicle after observing that the vehicle had a cracked windshield and an expired inspection sticker. Defendant got out of his vehicle without being instructed to do so. The officers placed Defendant in handcuffs and conducted a patfrisk of his person. The officers subsequently seized a firearm from the floor in front of the driver's seat. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the motion judge granted. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was properly stopped for motor vehicle violations; (2) Defendant's actions, without more, did not justify a patfrisk because they did not establish reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous; and (3) because the search of Defendant's motor vehicle was based on the results of the improper patfrisk, the vehicle search was unconstitutional. |
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| Michigan v. Rajput |
| Court: Michigan Supreme Court Docket: 158866 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Nadeem Rajput was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant was driving his vehicle with another man, known only as Haus, as a passenger. The victim was driving a red Malibu with her boyfriend, Dewayne Clay, as a passenger. When the Malibu approached defendant’s vehicle, two individuals in the Malibu fired gunshots at defendant and Haus. No one was injured. Defendant and Haus returned to defendant’s house but soon after went in search of the Malibu. When they found the Malibu, the victim was the sole occupant. Defendant and Haus chased the Malibu, eventually trapping it, and then approached the Malibu on foot. An argument ensued, and multiple gunshots were fired, resulting in the victim’s death. Defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant argued that Haus had shot the victim but that Haus had done so in self-defense when the victim reached for a gun in her vehicle. Defendant requested that a self-defense instruction be read to the jury, but the court denied the request, citing Michigan v Droste, 160 Mich 66 (1910), for the proposition that a defendant who claims that another person committed the homicide was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. Defendant also tried to admit testimony to support his self-defense theory. The trial court refused to admit the testimony, finding it irrelevant. The jury acquitted defendant of first-degree murder and felony-firearm but convicted defendant of second-degree murder. At sentencing, the court noted defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range of 225 to 375 months’ imprisonment but departed upward, sentencing defendant to 46 to 95 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the self-defense instruction and the proffered testimony. Although it disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, the appellate court held that defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because he and Haus were the initial aggressors and could have fled. The Court of Appeals also held the proffered testimony was irrelevant. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that defendant was not entitled to his requested self-defense instruction and that the testimony was irrelevant, “If supported by the evidence, defendant’s theory of the case must be given.” The matter was remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Redmond v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01757-SCT Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Randolph Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Stephen Redmond appealed after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He argued he should have been granted a new trial because the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion, and affirmed. |
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| Ross v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-00029-SCT Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Chamberlin Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Ross was convicted by jury of three counts of sexual battery against two victims under the age of fourteen, and one count of statutory rape. After the verdict, Ross was sentenced to serve three concurrent thirty-year terms in prison for the sexual-battery convictions, and a consecutive terms of thirty years for the statutory-rape conviction, with five years suspended. Ross appealed, arguing: (1) the State failed to prove that the crimes occurred within a reasonable time frame of the dates alleged in the indictment; and (2) his trial was rendered unfair because the jury was informed that his codefendant, Canary Johnson, pled guilty to child neglect mid-trial. Ross alternatively argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for requesting that the jury be informed of Johnson’s guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed convictions and sentences. |
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| State v. Oropeza |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 16 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Mike McGrath Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court revoking Appellant's deferred sentence for criminal possession of illicit drugs, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Appellant's deferred sentence after he failed to report to his probation officer for three months. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant absconded in violation of his probation conditions such that Defendant's probation officer was not required to exhaust Montana Incentives and Interventions Grid for Adult Probation & Parole procedures prior to initiating revocation proceedings against Appellant; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Appellant failed to report for the purpose of avoiding supervision and that the probation office made reasonable efforts to contact Appellant; and (3) therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's deferred sentence. |
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| In re Interest of Zoie H. |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 304 Neb. 868 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the separate juvenile court adjudicating Appellant for the act of attempted theft by unlawful taking, $5,000 or more, holding that Appellant was not entitled to reversal of her convictions. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the juvenile court did not err by (1) overruling Appellant's motion to quash; (2) denying Appellant's demand for jury trial; and (3) finding that Appellant committed the act of attempted theft by unlawful taking, $5,000 or more because the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of property involved was $5,000 or more. |
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| North Dakota v. Wickham |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 25 Opinion Date: January 28, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Corey Wickham was working as a rideshare driver when he allegedly stopped a passenger from exiting his automobile, kissed her on the mouth, put his hands down her pants, digitally penetrated her, and touched her breasts. He was charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition. A jury found Wickham guilty on both counts. Wickham appealed his eventual convictions, arguing the district court erred by admitting expert opinion testimony. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State ex rel. Coventry Police Department v. Charlwood |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 17-388 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Paul A. Suttell Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court quashed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to seal his records under R.I. Gen. Laws 12-1-12 on the grounds that because Defendant was charged with a civil violation rather than a criminal violation, he was not entitled to relief under the statute, holding that a person charged with a first violation of driving with a suspended license is entitled to have his records sealed under the provisions of section 12-1-12. In denying Defendant's motion to seal his records, the trial judge looked to the language of the statute, noting that it speaks only to criminal cases and is silent with respect to civil violations, and concluded that the Legislature had provided no mechanism to seal or expunge civil violations. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where Defendant was detained by police but not arrested or charged with an offense, he was entitled to the benefits of section 12-1-12(a) with respect to the destruction and sealing of his records. |
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| Rose v. SC Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27940 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: John W. Kittredge Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| For years, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (DPPPS) improperly denied inmates parole based on an incorrect interpretation of the statute setting forth the number of votes required by the parole board. Because DPPPS had a policy of destroying records of parole hearings, it was difficult to determine which inmates were wrongly denied parole. Nevertheless, in 2013, following the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Barton v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, 745 S.E.2d 110 (2013), DPPPS undertook a process to attempt to identify which inmates were improperly denied parole. Petitioner David Rose was one of the inmates who claimed he was improperly denied parole; in Rose's situation, the parole hearing occurred in 2001. The evidence manifestly established Rose received the requisite number of votes in favor of parole in 2001, but remained in jail. Rose persistently sought relief through the years, often in circuit court, where DPPPS contended that Rose had to pursue relief through the administrative process rather than through the judicial process. At the agency level, DPPPS denied relief to Rose because the agency records did not establish the actual vote count from the 2001 hearing, but DPPPS had destroyed the very records it claimed were necessary for Rose to prevail. Following DPPPS's final agency decision, the administrative law court (ALC) granted Rose relief, finding the only evidence as to the parole board's 2001 vote demonstrated Rose was entitled to parole. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding the ALC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. |
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| South Carolina v. Dial |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27939 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Few Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| John Henry Dial Jr. was charged in magistrates court with three counts of assault and battery in the third degree arising from an incident in which two adults and one minor were sprayed with pepper spray. Dial appeared in court several times before trial, each time without counsel. He pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The record on appeal did not include transcripts of Dial's pre-trial appearances. The magistrate averred he advised Dial on three separate occasions before trial of his right to be represented by an attorney. Each time, Dial requested to represent himself. The return was silent as to whether the magistrate advised Dial of the dangers of representing himself. Dial testified in his defense and denied spraying any of the victims with pepper spray. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on two counts of assault and battery in the third degree but found Dial not guilty on the count for spraying the minor. The magistrates court sentenced Dial to sixty days in jail. Dial retained counsel to appeal his conviction to the circuit court. He argued, among other things, "[Dial] was not represented by counsel and did not waive his right to counsel." At the hearing in the circuit court, Dial's counsel stated, "There is no evidence in the return or in the transcript that the trial judge properly warned [Dial] under Faretta v. California of the dangers of proceeding pro se." The circuit court affirmed Dial's conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the record idid not reflect whether the magistrates court obtained a valid waiver of the right to counsel before proceeding to the trial of this unrepresented defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. |
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| State v. Armstrong |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 6 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Devaney Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and refusing Defendant's requested jury instructions pertaining to the language of "directly" in S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-45 and specific intent, holding that there was no reversible error in this case. After a jury trial, Defendant, an inmate, was found guilty of one count of threatening to commit a sexual offense. The conviction stemmed from Defendant's act of writing and mailing two letters containing threats to rape and murder a mental health therapist at the prison where Defendant was incarcerated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) the circuit court's instructions to the jury pertaining to the language of "directly" in S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-45 and specific intent did not prejudice Defendant. |
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| State v. Harruff |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 4 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Kern Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, holding that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting other acts testimony from three witnesses over Defendant's objection and erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that the admission of the challenged testimony was unfairly prejudicial or that it affected the jury's verdict; and (2) because a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of second-degree murder. |
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| State v. Allen |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: W2017-01118-SC-R11-CD Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Clark Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the criminal court's May 3, 2017 order and confirmed that the criminal court's February 3, 2012 remained intact and final, holding that the criminal court did not have authority to grant motions filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) and to modify an order dismissing criminal prosecutions several years after the order became final. On February 3, 2012, the criminal court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Defendant's indictments for violating certain registration requirements applicable to violent sexual offenders. The criminal court based its determination that Defendant's previous Florida sexual battery conviction required him to comply only with reporting provisions relating to sexual offenders. In December 2014, the TBI filed a motion for relief from the February 3, 2012 order, arguing that the criminal court lacked authority to determine Defendant's offender classification. The criminal court agreed and partially vacated its February 3, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the criminal court had no authority to modify or partially vacate its February 3, 2012 order, except to correct clerical errors, oversights, or omissions in accordance with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36. |
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| Burg v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0527-18 Opinion Date: January 29, 2020 Judge: Newell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant, James Allan Burg, II, was charged with, and convicted of driving while intoxicated with a BAC of 0.15 or more. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Appellant's driver's license be suspended for one year. Appellant did not object despite having an opportunity to do so. For the first time on appeal, he argued the license suspension was not authorized, therefore he could bring his claim as an illegal sentence. The issue his case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether he could complain for the first time on appeal about an unauthorized driver's license suspension if he did not object the suspension at his first opportunity. The Court responded - no: "even an unauthorized license suspension cannot be characterized as an 'illegal sentence.' Under these circumstances we follow ordinary preservation of error requirements. Because Appellant had the opportunity to object and did not do so, he has not preserved his appellate claim for review." |
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| State v. Hatfield |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 1 Opinion Date: January 27, 2020 Judge: Pearce Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of two of four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor but reversed the district court on the remaining two convictions, holding that the second and fourth counts of sexual exploitation of a minor did not meet the Sexual Exploitation Act's definition of simulated sexually explicit conduct. Appellant was charged with four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor after he was discovered in his middle school classroom where he taught with scrapbooks containing pornographic images of adults and images of underage, and sometimes nude, girls. Appellant entered a Sery plea of no contest and then appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's two of the counts of sexual exploitation of a minor but reversed the district court on the remaining two counts, holding that the district court did not err in interpreting the Act but that there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant on counts two and four. |
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| Vermont v. Sarkisian-Kennedy |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 6 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Eaton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Following a jury trial, defendant Venessa Sarkisian-Kennedy was convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, second offense (DUI-2), and criminal refusal of an evidentiary breath test (refusal). She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting, subject to what she contended was an ineffective limiting instruction) the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test offered by the State absent scientific, foundational testimony from an expert witness; and (2) allowing the State to present evidence of her refusal to consent to a preliminary breath test (PBT) on the theory that it was relevant to consciousness of guilt. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concurred with defendant’s first contention, but not the second. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the refusal conviction and affirmed the DUI-2 conviction. |
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| Washington v. Delbosque |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 96709-1 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Yu Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| In 1994, 17-year-old Cristian J. Delbosque was convicted of aggravated first degree murder and received a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release. Because he was a juvenile at the time of his offense, Delbosque was resentenced in 2016 in accordance with the Miller-fix statute and received a minimum term of 48 years without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals concluded that Delbosque could seek review of his sentence only through a personal restraint petition (PRP), rather than direct appeal, but nevertheless reversed his sentence, holding that the trial court's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that the sentencing court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence, thus remanding for resentencing was proper. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that Delbosque was not entitled to a direct appeal. |
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| Washington v. Nickels |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 96943-4 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Susan Owens Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| The State charged David Nickels with first degree murder in 2010 in Grant County, Washington. Though represented by counsel. Nickels acquired additional legal assistance from a local criminal defense attorney, Garth Dano. The parties agreed that Dano's involvement in Nickels' defense created a conflict of interest requiring Dano's personal disqualification, but they disputed the scope of his involvement. The record established that Dano entered a notice of association of counsel and appeared on the record to receive a jury question and to receive the jury's verdict. The record further establishes that after Nickels' conviction in 2012, Dano conducted interviews with jurors and potential exonerating witnesses. Via his counsel's uncontested affidavit, Nickels claimed Dano received privileged work product through his participation in crafting the defense's strategy and theory of the case, and his meeting personally with Nickels. In 2014, while Nickels' appeal was pending, Dano was elected Grant County prosecutor. Subsequently, in 2017, the Court of Appeals reversed Nickels' conviction. On remand, the Grant County Prosecuting Attorney's Office immediately sought to screen now-Prosecutor Dano. Nickels moved to disqualify the entire office, arguing that under “Stenger,” Dano's prior involvement in his defense necessitated the blanket recusal. The trial court denied Nickels' motion; but the Court of Appeals reversed and, applying Stenger, ordered the disqualification of the entire Grant County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. The Washington Supreme Court determined Stenger’s narrowly crafted rule applied only to Washington's 39 elected county prosecutors who, despite adequate screening, retained broad discretionary and administrative powers over their offices and employees. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Stenger remained good law, and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision disqualifying the Grant County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. |
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| Hardman v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 11 Opinion Date: January 24, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-5-233(b)(i) and (b)(iii), holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and that Defendant was not denied due process or an opportunity to conduct an effective cross-examination at trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting his BAC because the State failed to establish that his blood analysis was performed according to methods approved by the Wyoming Department of Health and that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court should have compelled production of a linearity study related to the calibrator for Defendant's blood samples test, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to due process or an opportunity to confront the State's witnesses. |
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