| Kelly v. United States |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-1059 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Elena Kagan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime |
| During former New Jersey Governor Christie’s 2013 reelection campaign, Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse Christie. Kelly, Christie's Deputy Chief of Staff, Port Authority Deputy Executive Director, Baroni, and another official decided to reduce from three to one the number of lanes reserved at the George Washington Bridge’s toll plaza for Fort Lee’s commuters. To disguise the political retribution, the lane realignment was said to be for a traffic study. Port Authority traffic engineers were asked to collect some numbers. An extra toll collector was paid overtime. The lane realignment caused four days of gridlock, ending only when the Port Authority’s Executive Director learned of the scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of Baroni and Kelly for wire fraud, fraud on a federally funded program, and conspiracy to commit those crimes. The Supreme Court reversed. The scheme did not aim to obtain money or property. The wire fraud statute refers to “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,” 18 U.S.C. 1343. The federal-program fraud statute bars “obtain[ing] by fraud” the “property” (including money) of a federally funded program or entity, section 666(a)(1)(A). The statutes are limited to the protection of property rights and do not authorize federal prosecutors to set standards of good government. The Court rejected arguments that the defendants sought to take control of the Bridge’s physical lanes or to deprive the Port Authority of the costs of compensating employees. Their realignment of the access lanes was an exercise of regulatory power; a scheme to alter a regulatory choice is not one to take government property. The time and labor of the employees were an incidental byproduct of that regulatory object. Neither defendant sought to obtain the services that the employees provided. |
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| Gomes v. Silva |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1656 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Stahl Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that, under the highly deferential standard prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for federal habeas review of state criminal convictions, Appellant's claims to habeas relief failed. Appellant was convicted in a Massachusetts superior court of murder in the first degree and related crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the convictions. Appellant subsequently petitioned the District Court for the District of Massachusetts for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported Appellant's conviction for first-degree murder as a joint venturer, and the SJC's sufficiency determination was not unreasonable; and (2) the SJC reasonably determined that the trial court's admission into evidence of certain items did not constitute error. |
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| United States v. Perez-Couvertier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 16-2186 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances in a protected area and conspiring to distribute controlled substances in a protected area, holding that the district court did not plainly err with respect to any of Defendant's challenges. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not commit plain error in admitting evidence of the conspiracy's activities occurring after he withdrew from the conspiracy or, alternatively, in not instructing the jury to ignore such evidence; (2) the district court did not plainly err in admitting evidence of a drug trafficking organization's violent acts; and (3) the delay between Defendant's indictment and arrest did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. |
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| United States v. Haverkamp |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3735 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Barrington D. Parker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 121 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and imposed a $200 mandatory special assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3013, as well as a $10,000 assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3014. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and his sentence was substantively reasonable. The court held that the text of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. 3014, taken as a whole and in its context, is straightforwardly meant to be applied on a per-offender, not a per-count, basis. In this case, the district court erroneously applied the special assessment on a per-count, rather than per-offender, basis. Finally, the court held that the computer monitoring condition in question was reasonably related to the nature of defendant's offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Mladen |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-0616 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Amalya Lyle Kearse Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Trusts & Estates |
| After defendant died while his appeal was pending, counsel moved for abatement of all incidents of the prosecution, requesting that the appeal be dismissed without a decision on the merits, that defendant's conviction be vacated, and that the matter be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment and order repayment to defendant's estate of the $20,000 fine and $100 special assessment. Because defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty, and he neither did nor was permitted to challenge on appeal the merits of his conviction, the Second Circuit denied as without merit so much of the motion as seeks (1) vacatur of his conviction, (2) dismissal of the count of the indictment on which he was convicted, and (3) repayment of the mandatory $100 special assessment. The court granted so much of the motion as requests dismissal of this appeal and a remand to the district court for vacatur of the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release and for an order requiring that the paid fine of $20,000 be repaid to defendant's estate. |
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| United States v. Richardson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-412 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Menashi Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err by applying the career offender sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.1 because defendant's prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in USSG 4B1.2(b). The court also held that the district court did not substantively err in sentencing defendant, because it properly considered his criminal history and accounted for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment. |
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| United States v. Rosemond |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3561 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Chin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder through use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during a murder-for-hire conspiracy. Defendant owned Czar Entertainment, a music management company that represented hip-hop, rap and R&B artists such as Jayceon Taylor, also known as "The Game." Taylor was a member of G-Unit, a rap group run by Curtis Jackson, also known as "50 Cent." Defendant's crimes stemmed from a rivalry with Violator Records, the company that managed G-Unit. The court rejected defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective because he conceded that defendant paid for the victim to be shot, even though he told counsel not to make this concession. The court held that defendant failed to show that this was objectively unreasonable or that he would have been found not guilty had a different argument been advanced. In this case, there was ample evidence supporting counsel's strategy to concede that defendant ordered a shooting where, among other things, the government's key witness, who participated in the conspiracy and lured the victim to be shot, testified that defendant agreed to pay the shooter. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion by admitting prior bad-act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). |
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| United States v. Lacerda |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 15-2812 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Porter Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| VOG billed itself as an advocacy group helping victims of timeshare fraud get out of their timeshare debts. A jury determined that VOG had actually defrauded its customers and that three individual defendants (including Lacerda) were each knowing participants in that fraud. Lacerda was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment for his leading role in the fraudulent enterprise. The Third Circuit affirmed the respective convictions and sentences. The court rejected a claim of impermissible “overview testimony” by an FBI agent; an officer who is familiar with an investigation or was personally involved may tell the story of that investigation—how the investigation began, who was involved, and what techniques were used, and, with a proper foundation, may offer lay opinion testimony and testify about matters within his personal knowledge. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified defense counsel based on a conflict of interest; when it denied replacement counsel’s motion for a continuance; when it excluded from evidence, as hearsay, an email sent by Lacerda to VOG’s former CFO; in exercising its sentencing discretion; or by ordering the forfeiture of all VOG’s gross proceeds. |
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| Cucalon v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Dockets: 18-1292, 18-2206 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Fourth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's final order of removal. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court held that defendant's prior conviction for distribution of cocaine under Virginia Code 18.2-248, including distribution of that substance as an accommodation under Virginia Code 18.2-248(D), satisfies the federal definitions of an "aggravated felony" and of a crime "relating to a controlled substance" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reconsider. |
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| United States v. Doctor |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4874 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Roger L. Gregory Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release and resulting sentence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding the government proved he committed the assault underlying the supervised release violation; the district court did not commit plain error by adopting the violation report when announcing defendant committed Violation One; and, even if the district court erred in sentencing defendant for a Grade A violation, the error was harmless. |
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| United States v. Lewis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4028 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted for possessing a firearm as a felon and sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment and a three-year period of supervised release. The district court additionally recommended, without explanation, that defendant receive addiction treatment while incarcerated and ordered, as a special condition of his supervised release, that defendant participate in an addiction treatment program. The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation for imposing as a special condition of supervised release the requirement of addiction treatment. The court also held that the district court failed to address defendant's nonfrivolous mitigation arguments. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Jordan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40499 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion for a new trial on the basis of prejudicial outside influence on the jury. The court held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in granting the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. To the extent there is a bright-line rule applicable to allegations of outside influence on the jury, the court held that it was not applicable to this case. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its prerogative, within broadly defined parameters, to handle the allegation of outside influence in the least disruptive manner possible in this unusual case. Finally, the district court permissibly concluded that the evidence showed a sufficient likelihood of prejudice to shift the burden to the Government, and that the Government did not (and could not) show "no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was influenced by" the CSO's comments. |
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| United States v. Longoria |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-20201 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Gregg Costa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit held that the base offense level of 20 was proper for defendant's felon-in-possession crime involving a semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. In this case, defendant failed to show that the district court clearly erred in relying on the FBI's agent statement about what was found in the apartment. The court clarified any confusion and held that the 2013 amendment to the commentary on the acceptance-of-responsibility Guideline does not clearly overrule its caselaw allowing the government to withhold the third point for acceptance of responsibility when it must litigate a suppression motion. The court held that Amendment 775 does not contain the unequivocal override needed to get past the court's precedent. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. |
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| United States v. McNabb |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50265 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Costa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a gun after having been convicted of a felony. The court held that defendant is not entitled to relief on his claim that the government breached the plea deal, and thus his appellate waiver remains enforceable. Accordingly, defendant's challenges to his sentence must be dismissed. |
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| Andrews v. Wayne County |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1992 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Suhrheinrich Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Canton Police received a 911 call from Andrews, who stated that his fiance, White, had physically attacked him. Officers arrested White. Andrews later took White's medications to the jail; a “KOP” policy allows inmates to keep certain drugs for self-administration. During an intake interview, White admitted to attempting to harm herself or commit suicide in the past but said she was not thinking of harming herself or having suicidal thoughts. An R.N. later evaluated White for nearly two hours, reported White’s chief complaints were “anxiety and depression,” and contacted a pharmacy to verify White’s prescriptions. The R.N. claims White did not exhibit any psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, or psychiatric distress but ordered further evaluation. The next day, White was found on the floor with vomit on her face. She stated repeatedly that she took too many pills. The next day, White died in the hospital. The cause of death was Verapamil toxicity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. A pretrial detainee does not have an automatic right to a suicide screening. The court rejected an argument that the KOP Policy was deficient because it allows inmates in need of a psychological evaluation to participate before a psychiatrist’s assessment of proper housing. The County had no history of suicides relative to the program, so any purported failure to train its employees in suicide risk assessment did not cause White’s death. |
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| Hicks v. Scott |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3410 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Cincinnati officers Scott and Moore responded to a reported incident of menacing. Two people alleged that Quandavier had driven by their home that night and threatened to kill them and that Quandavier carried guns. Officer Loreaux identified a vehicle fitting the description. Officers Scott, Moore, Schneider, and Loreaux, standing where the vehicle was parked, heard a voice. Thinking that it was likely Quandavier, they knocked on the exterior door of the residence. It swung open. Three officers entered without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Loreaux remained outside. Neither Scott nor Moore recall announcing their presence or identifying themselves. Inside and upstairs, Scott knocked on a closed door. As it opened, Scott “saw the barrel of a rifle pointed at [her] face.” Moore and Schneider also saw Quandavier “nonchalantly” panning the rifle from left to right. Moore reached for its barrel as Scott fired her weapon. Moore did not instruct Quandavier to drop his rifle nor did Scott issue any commands before firing. Quandavier collapsed. The officers immediately radioed for paramedics. Before the officers applied handcuffs or provided first aid, they heard another voice and conducted a sweep. Quandavier died at the scene without receiving medical attention. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, plus state claims, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Scott, Moore, and Schneider on the unlawful entry claim. The court affirmed as to the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and state-law battery claims, and remanded for evaluation of municipal liability and wrongful death claims. |
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| Moody v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5015 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Thapar Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| At Moody’s trial, the government produced a video of Moody cooking crack on his stove and waving a handgun while he mused about life in “the game” (drug trafficking). The court ruled that most of the video was admissible. Moody then tried to persuade the jury that the video was filmed more than five years before his indictment, putting it outside the statute of limitations. The jury convicted Moody. Due to prior felony drug convictions, Moody received enhanced, mandatory-minimum life sentences on several counts. He appealed on evidentiary grounds relating to the video. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Later, Moody raised new claims on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court found each claim meritless; most were also procedurally defaulted. The court authorized Moody to appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that none of the claims should have been certified. Reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief on Moody’s claims that he was deprived of his statute-of-limitations defense (violating due process); that the past convictions for his sentencing enhancements were not charged in the indictment or found by the jury; and that his previous lawyers failed to raise the first two claims sooner, violating his right to effective assistance of counsel. |
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| United States v. Foreman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1827 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006, Foreman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine powder, and possession of a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Foreman admitted that he was responsible for approximately 135 grams of crack cocaine and 250 grams of cocaine powder. Foreman had a final Guidelines range of 322-387 months; he was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment with respect to each drug conviction, to run concurrently, and 60 months’ imprisonment for the firearms conviction, to run consecutively. When the First Step Act of 2018 made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Foreman sought relief. The district court held that Foreman was not entitled to a plenary resentencing and declined to revisit his career offender status or hold an in-person hearing, then weighed the new statutory range applicable to Foreman’s drug offenses, his recalculated Guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and reduced Foreman’s total sentence to 172 months on each drug offense, to run concurrently, plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months on the firearms offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the First Step Act entitles a defendant to a plenary resentencing. First Step Act resentencings are not shielded from review for reasonableness; the district court thoroughly explained its rationale, carefully examining Foreman’s circumstances, the amended penalty provisions, and the resulting changes to Foreman’s Guidelines range. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1724 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006, Smith was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of powder or 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine powder; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court imposed a mandatory minimum life sentence. The Fair Sentencing Act subsequently lowered the penalty for cocaine-base offenses, made retroactive through the First Step Act. Smith moved for relief and received a reduced sentence of 360 months, the bottom of the new Guideline range for the counts impacted by the Fair Sentencing Act, to run concurrent to his existing 360-month sentence for his powder cocaine count that was not affected by the Fair Sentencing Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have imposed a below-Guideline sentence for all counts. The First Step Act is a limited grant of authority to impose a reduced sentence for certain offenses and does not require a plenary resentencing proceeding. Even assuming the court’s obligation to explain its reasons for imposing the modified sentence was akin to that which applies in initial sentencing, the court's use of a modified AO 247 form order to explain its decision was not procedurally unreasonable. |
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| Kirkman v. Thompson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1904 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Following a 1992 fight that involved Johnson, Herron, and Walker, two shooters shot the three men. Johnson survived. In the hospital, Johnson described a shooter by the street name “Duke,” where Duke lived, and Duke's car. Johnson identified Duke and his accomplice from a photo array. Police pulled over a vehicle matching Johnson’s description and arrested the driver, Kirkman, and the passenger, who matched the general description of the second shooter. Kirkman had a tattoo of Duke on his arm. Police took additional photos and presented a second photo array to Johnson, who identified them as the shooters. At trial, Johnson identified Kirkman and his passenger as the shooters. There was disputed testimony about the cause of the fight. Convicted of murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, Kirkman was sentenced to life in prison. Johnson had a change of heart and submitted an affidavit, identifying Ford and an unknown man as the shooters. At Kirkman’s post-conviction hearing, Johnson testified that he and his family had been threatened. Other testimony was inconsistent with Johnson’s. Illinois courts denied post-conviction relief, finding that Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. Johnson later pleaded guilty for perjury but failed to specify which statement was false. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Illinois courts found Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. An evidentiary hearing satisfied Kirkman’s due process rights. The Illinois trial court’s determination defeated Kirkman’s innocence and perjured testimony claims. |
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| Tuduj v. Newbold |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1699 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Illinois prisoner Tuduj, having received extensive dental treatment, filed a “deliberate indifference” suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his dentists and prison officials. The court recruited counsel to assist Tuduj in filing an amended complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel defended against two summary judgment motions, one arguing that Tuduj had not exhausted his administrative remedies and another on the merits While the motions were pending, Tuduj moved “for leave to represent himself,” stating that he was “concerned that his counsel has filed a structurally, technically and legally insufficient response doomed to be denied.” He asked to file his own brief, except “in the event this Honorable Court deems counsel’s response … legally sufficient and Grants same[,] Plaintiff would be open to continued effective representation.” A magistrate denied Tuduj’s motion, stating that Tuduj “varie[d] between saying he would like to" represent himself and "indicating that he is happy with counselʹs representation as long as he prevails.” The district judge granted the motions for summary judgment, citing professional judgment and finding “no competent evidence” of any policy that unlawfully influenced dental‐treatment decisions. The Seventh Circuit rejected Tuduj’s argument that the court wrongly denied his “unqualified” right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. 1654, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the Seventh Amendment. The district court permissibly denied his equivocal request. |
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| United States v. Gibson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1402 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Officer Garrison encountered Gibson, a suspected drug trafficker, walking with a companion. Although initially a consensual encounter, Garrison questioned Gibson and his companion and briefly detained Gibson. After Gibson and his companion departed, Garrison spotted a methamphetamine pipe under his patrol vehicle. Local law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of Gibson’s vehicle in the curtilage of his driveway. A drug detection dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in the vehicle, though nothing was found. Earlier that day, Gibson’s wife had met with DEA agents to tell them about methamphetamine inside the home. Police used information Mrs. Gibson had provided to obtain a search warrant. The search of the home uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, currency, and AK-47 rifles, which led to Gibson’s arrest. Gibson moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search, alleging he was detained without reasonable suspicion, unlawfully frisked, arrested without probable cause, stopped without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop exceeded a permissible scope. Upon learning of his wife’s cooperation, Gibson also argued her statement was insufficiently attenuated to justify the search warrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Mrs. Gibson’s voluntary statement with DEA agents was independently sufficient to sustain findings of probable cause and sufficiently attenuated from subsequent events to preclude suppression. |
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| United States v. Howell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3157 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In December 2012, Chicago Police officers responded to an anonymous call reporting a Hispanic man in a black sweater and black hat, carrying a bag, and climbing under a warehouse fence. They found someone who matched the description. After stopping and frisking him, they determined he was not engaged in any crime. Howell, walking toward the police, was white and wearing a black jacket and dark hat. When an officer approached to speak to him, Howell did not answer, looked panicked, and put his hands in his pockets. The officer patted Howell down and found a gun in his jacket. A federal gun charge followed. Howell unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of his suppression motion and vacated his conviction for possessing that gun. The court noted that the facts in the pretrial record differed significantly from those presented at trial, where the arresting officer testified that he decided to proceed with the pat-down only after Howell ignored a directive to remove his hands from his pockets. Viewing the pretrial record as a whole, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Howell. The court did not reverse Howell’s conviction on a second gun charge that resulted from the execution of a warrant to search Howell’s apartment three months after the initial stop and the ensuing discovery of more guns and ammunition. |
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| United States v. Lewis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-1911, 19‐1262 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2016-2018, Draheim managed a conspiracy, responsible for at least 38 packages of methamphetamine sent from California to La Crosse, Wisconsin. Draheim supervised at least 11 associates who accepted shipments on her behalf, sent money transfers to California, distributed the meth, rented storage lockers, and collected money owed to her. Draheim provided vehicles. After agents placed a wiretap on her phone and seized several packages of meth en route to Draheim, her California supplier forced Draheim to find a new source. Draheim contacted Lewis, recently out of jail but still involved in the “meth scene.” Lewis agreed to purchase meth from a new supplier. During the planned transaction, agents seized the package, which contained 28.6 grams of nearly pure meth. Police subsequently arrested Draheim after they found her daughter dead at home from an overdose; they took Lewis into custody for violating the terms of his state supervision. Both pleaded guilty to meth distribution offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. Draheim, facing a mandatory‐minimum 10-year sentence, unsuccessfully argued that she qualified for “safety‐valve relief.” The court reasoned that she was the leader of her enterprise. Lewis unsuccessfully contended that he should be sentenced based only on his conviction, not other “relevant conduct.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Draheim’s sentence but vacated as to Lewis. The fact that the defendant has engaged in other drug transactions is not, alone, sufficient to justify treating those transactions as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. |
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| Bakor v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3011 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that defendant committed two crimes involving moral turpitude. The court held that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner's conviction for the Minnesota crimes of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fifth Degree and knowing failure to comply with Minnesota's sex offender registration statute were crimes involving moral turpitude. The court also held that petitioner failed to exhaust his remaining arguments and therefore declined to consider them. |
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| Smith v. Titus |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2915 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner based on his claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it briefly closed the courtroom to spectators. The district court denied relief based on the ground that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court agreed and held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Minnesota Supreme Court to deem it constitutional under the Sixth Amendment for the trial court to explain the parameters of an earlier public order on evidentiary issues in a brief nonpublic proceeding before the jury was sworn. |
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| United States v. Becerra |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2777 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Stras Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that there was more than enough evidence for defendant's probation officer and other officers to believe defendant had a firearm on him. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to arrest him without a warrant. The court also held that defendant was in custody when he made both statements at issue. In this case, the "request for clarification" of defendant's statement that he had "something" in his car did not require Miranda warnings. Furthermore, because the bulge in defendant's pocket could have been a gun or other weapon that would have posed a danger to the officers and others, they could ask about it without the formality of Miranda warnings. The court joined its sister circuits in declining to recognize the innocent-possessor defense. The court held that the district court did not err in excluding defendant's proposed testimony that he had found the handgun in his car earlier in the day and was about to hand it over to his probation officer. The court reasoned that, even if defendant intended to turn over the gun (or the ammunition) to his probation officer, it is still a crime to knowingly possess it in the first place. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility; the district court considered defendant's mitigation arguments at sentencing; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. |
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| United States v. Haynes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1607 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the government did not violate the Speedy Trial Act, and defendant failed to offer any evidence showing that Iowa and federal prosecutors colluded. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the existence of collusion. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress where defendant was not unlawfully seized. In this case, prior to producing the marijuana cigarette, the officer did not ask defendant any questions but merely ordered him off the bus, particularly as the smell of marijuana alerted the officer that evidence of a more serious crime than failure to use a turn signal might be uncovered during the stop. Finally, the court held that defendant was not unlawfully searched when the officer conducted a pat-down search incident to arrest; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; defendant's Rehaif claim failed because there was sufficient evidence that he knew of his prohibited status; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable nor an abuse of the district court's discretion. |
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| United States v. Roberts |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1176 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The court held that, although the district court properly applied a four-level increase for possession of a firearm "in connection with another felony offense" under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), but that a two-level increase for "using a minor to commit a crime" under USSG 3B1.4 should not have applied. In this case, the evidence showed only that defendant engaged in an arm's-length transaction with a minor. The court held that this mere joint participation in an offense as a partner, does not amount to "use" of a minor "to commit the offense" of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Wright |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1081 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's restitution order and certain special conditions of defendant's supervised release imposed after he pleaded guilty to sex trafficking of a child. The court found no error in the district court's restitution amount of $20,000, holding that the evidence supported the amount in light of the aggregate harm to the victim. The court also held that the special conditions -- including a requirement that defendant participate in sex offender treatment including psychological testing and polygraph examinations, a prohibition against contact with any minors without pre-approval, and a requirement that defendant seek prior approval before using temporary commercial lodging, such as a hotel or motel -- where reasonably related to both the offense of conviction and to defendant's history of sexual contact with minor females. |
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| Benson v. Chappell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 13-99004 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction and death sentence for murder and other crimes. Petitioner raised two certified claims and two uncertified claims. The panel held that petitioner failed to show that the California Supreme Court's denials of his claims were unreasonable determinations of the facts or contrary to clearly established federal law. In this case, the California Supreme Court reasonably determined that an officer's misstatement during petitioner's interrogation that there was no death penalty in California did not prompt petitioner's confessions. Furthermore, petitioner failed to show that his statements were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Even if petitioner were able to show that trial counsel was ineffective in not fully investigating his abuse as a child or his alleged organic brain injury, the panel held that the state court could reasonably have determined that any shortcoming in trial counsel's investigation was not prejudicial. Finally, the panel granted a certificate of appealability on petitioner's two uncertified claims and held that the state court reasonably rejected the claims that his trial counsel should have impeached the government's case and the prosecutor withheld material, exculpatory evidence. |
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| Mero v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-70929 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Paul Jeffrey Watford Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit granted in part a petition for review of the BIA's finding that petitioner was removable based on his conviction for possession of visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under 16 years of age, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes (N.R.S.) 200.730. Applying the categorical approach, the panel compared the elements of N.R.S. 200.730 with the applicable definition of "sexual abuse of a minor," which requires proof of three elements. The panel held that N.R.S. 200.730 punishes a broader range of conduct because the Nevada statute does not require proof that the offender participated in sexual conduct with a minor. Therefore, petitioner's conviction did not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor. The panel explained that, with a possession-only offense such as N.R.S. 200.730, the minor depicted in the image is not the direct object of the offender's conduct, which is a necessary predicate for the offense to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor. |
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| Romero-Millan v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 16-73915, 17-72893, 18-71555 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the Arizona Supreme Court: 1. Is Arizona's possession of drug paraphernalia statute, A.R.S. 13-3415, divisible as to drug type? 2. Is Arizona's drug possession statute, A.R.S. 13-3408, divisible as to drug type? 3. Put another way, is jury unanimity (or concurrence) required as to which drug or drugs listed in A.R.S. 13-3401(6), (19), (20), or (23) was involved in an offense under either statute? |
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| United States v. Yang |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10341 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Piersol Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress after he pleaded guilty to receipt of stolen mail and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his residence and the statements he made to law enforcement on the basis that the search warrant obtained by the Postal Inspection Service relied on evidence that was obtained illegally. The panel declined to address the potential Fourth Amendment privacy interests that may be implicated by the warrantless use of this Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology, and held that defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical location data of the Yukon under the facts of this case. The panel found no evidence in the record that Prestige Motors had a policy or practice of allowing lessees to keep cars beyond the rental period and Prestige had made affirmative attempts to repossess the vehicle by activating the GPS unit to locate and disable the vehicle. Therefore, defendant lacked standing to challenge the warrantless search of the database. |
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| United States v. Neugin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-7043 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jack Neugin pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition on the condition that he could appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the ammunition and firearm police found in the bed of his pickup truck. Officers responded to a reported verbal altercation between Neugin and his girlfriend. One of the officers saw ammunition in the back of the truck after he lifted the truck's camper lit do allow the girlfriend to retrieve her belongings. Neugin argued the officers discovered the evidence during an unconstitutional search; the district court concluded the officer was acting "in a lawful position" as "community caretaker," and found no Fourth Amendment violation. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that : (1) the officer conducted the without a warrant or probable cause, (2) the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and (3) the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. The evidence seized should have been suppressed. |
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| United States v. Ramon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-1221 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2016, after serving a federal prison sentence for having possessed a firearm after a felony conviction, Charles Ramon III began serving a mandatory term of supervised release. Before Ramon completed the term, his probation officer filed a petition, soon followed by two superseding petitions, to revoke Ramon’s supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the district court found three violations—two for possessing a controlled substance and one for again illegally possessing a firearm. Of these, the most serious was Ramon’s illegal possession of a firearm—a Grade B violation. For this, the court imposed the statutory maximum sentence of twenty-four months in prison. During the revocation hearing, the government mentioned that it might seek to indict Ramon for illegally possessing a firearm (the conduct in part underlying the revocation). Mindful of this, the district court ordered that Ramon’s twenty-four-month sentence run “consecutively to any sentences imposed previously or prospectively in federal or state court.” At the hearing, Ramon did not object to the district court’s running his sentence consecutively to future federal sentences. On appeal, Ramon argued that the district court exceeded its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C. 3584(a) by ordering that Ramon’s sentence run consecutively to future federal sentences. By the terms of 18 U.S.C. 3584(a), the Tenth Circuit determined the district court did err. But Ramon failed to object to this at trial, and on appeal, failed to show that the error was plain, thus, judgment was affirmed. |
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| United States v. Richards |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-8044 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Baldock Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2018, the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) obtained a search warrant to review the contents of Defendant–Appellant Joshua Richards' Tumblr account. During the search and subsequent investigation, DCI agents discovered Defendant had re-blogged videos and images of child pornography to his private Tumblr so he could later access and view the materials. Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of accessing with intent to view child pornography. He was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The district court imposed several special conditions of supervised release, which, as relevant here, related to drugs and alcohol and required Defendant to submit to polygraph testing. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court erred in imposing these special conditions. He also challenged the length of his prison sentence as substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit determined the alcohol and drug conditions did not directly conflict with the relevant policy statement in the sentencing guidelines, so the district court's decision to impose the conditions was not manifestly unreasonable. And given the circumstances of the case, the Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant's twenty-four month sentence. |
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| Andrews v. Warden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-12443 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Plaintiff alleged that President Obama commuted his "total sentence" of imprisonment, which included the 37 months of imprisonment that he served as part of his 2003 sentence. Based on the terms of the commutation order, the Constitution, and Supreme Court precedent, the court could not say that the Bureau erred in excluding the 37-month term of imprisonment from its recalculation. |
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| Hollis v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-11323 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court held that petitioner cannot prove that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance, because petitioner's prior convictions in Alabama categorically qualify as predicate offenses under both the Armed Career Criminal Act and the career-offender provision of the Guidelines, and his prior conviction in Georgia qualifies as a predicate offense under the Act. Therefore, counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to raise a meritless objection. |
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| Knight v. Florida Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-12488 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Newsom Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner alleged that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his capital-murder trial. The court held that, even assuming that counsel performed deficiently in failing to investigate and present the mitigation evidence that petitioner now raises—thus satisfying the first prong of the two-part Strickland standard that governs ineffective-assistance claims—petitioner failed to carry his burden of demonstrating resulting prejudice. |
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| United States v. Evans |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15323 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that, given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for officers, mistaking a dog's whimper for a person in distress, to enter defendant's home without a warrant. Therefore, defendant's challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence failed. The court upheld the district court's imposition of a 22 offense level finding because defendant possessed a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine under USSG 2K2.1(a)(3)(A)(i) (2016). The court also upheld defendant's sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) for possessing a rifle that had an obliterated serial number. |
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| United States v. McLellan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-13289 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting one of his arresting officers to offer testimony at trial on the correlation between guns and drug activity and to suggest that defendant was selling drugs; the court declined to evaluate the applicability of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether the mandatory minimum applied; and the court rejected defendant's claim under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), and held that there was no plain error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury of the knowledge-of-status element and any error from the lack of a knowledge-of-status element in defendant's plea colloquy did not affect his substantial rights. Finally, the court remanded for clarification of the judgment to reflect the sentence the district court said it would have imposed if the Armed Career Criminal Act did not apply. |
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| United States v. Russell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-11202 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Charles R. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as an immigrant illegally or unlawfully in the United States. After defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which reversed a decision from this court and held that under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), the government must prove that a defendant knew "his status as a person barred from possessing a firearm" when he knowingly possessed a firearm. The Eleventh Circuit held that defendant established the necessary prejudice under plain error review and vacated defendant's section 922(g) conviction, remanding for further proceedings. In this case, the district court committed an error that was made plain by the Supreme Court in Rehaif. Furthermore, defendant has sufficiently shown a reasonable probability that but for the error, the outcome of his trial would have been different. |
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| Welch v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 14-15733 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. The court held that defendant's prior 1996 Florida convictions for robbery qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) elements clause, and rejected his contention that the court's decision in his direct appeal carved out a narrow exception to pre-1997 Florida robbery convictions obtained in Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal. The court also held that petitioner's prior Florida felony battery conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA in light of the court's holding in United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018). |
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| State v. Trujillo |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-18-0531-PR Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Gould Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of imposing mandatory sex offender registration under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3821(A)(3), a judge has the authority to make the necessary factual finding that the victim is under the age of eighteen and that Arizona's sex offender registration statutes are civil regulatory statutes, not criminal penalties. Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of sexual abuse. In reaching its verdict the jury determined that the victim was "fifteen or more years of age." At sentencing, the trial court ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender. Defendant objected, arguing that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a jury was required to find whether Defendant was under eighteen pursuant to section 13-3821(A)(3). The trial court denied the objection. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Apprendi does not apply to factual findings that are necessary to impose registration because sex offender registration is a civil regulatory requirement, not a criminal penalty; and (2) the trial judge did not violate Apprendi by determining that the victim was under eighteen. |
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| Barnett v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 181 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's "motion for credit for time spent in custody," holding that the circuit court's findings were not clearly erroneous. In his motion, Appellant alleged that he was entitled to 312 days of jail-time credit and that the circuit court should enter a new sentencing order nunc pro tunc that reflected the correct amount of jail-time credit. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's denial of Appellant's motion was not clearly erroneous because Appellant failed to demonstrate a clerical error subject to correction. |
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| Mason v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 182 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant stated no ground on which the writ could issue. Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, theft of property, and second-degree battery and sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of 660 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant later petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the trial court misapplied Arkansas's habitual-offender statutes. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the issues Appellant raised in his petition for the writ should have been raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a petition for postconviction relief. |
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| Ray v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 184 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from an order denying his pro se petition for permission to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to consider the petition. Appellant entered negotiated guilty pleas to rape and other offenses. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Chicot County Circuit Court, the court where he was incarcerated, setting out two grounds for coram nobis relief. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that jurisdiction lay in the trial court where Appellant was convicted, which in this case was the Ashley County Circuit Court. Therefore, the Chicot County Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to address Appellant's coram nobis petition. |
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| Walker v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 183 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for declaratory judgment, holding that Appellant could not use a declaratory-judgment action to collaterally attack his criminal conviction. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. Years later, Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that he was denied due process in his criminal trial when the court admitted the prior testimony of an unavailable witness and that this admission violated the Confrontation Clause. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a declaratory judgment action provided no relief on these grounds. |
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| People v. Flores |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S116307 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of three counts of first degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that the three or four minor errors at Defendant's trial were harmless and did not interfere with his due process right to a fair trial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) no error occurred during jury selection; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by any misstatements by the prosecutor; (3) assuming certain evidence was inadmissible, the court's admonition to the jury and the court's instruction cured the resultant harm; (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the victim was afraid of Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (5) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were without merit. |
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| California v. Law |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072845(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Slough Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2001, appellant Terrell Law and his codefendant Brett May committed a home invasion robbery, during which one of them shot and killed one of the residents. They were tried jointly in 2006 before two separately empaneled juries who found them both guilty of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance described in Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17(A) and (d). Though Law's jury found he was not the shooter, they nonetheless concluded he was a "major participant" in the underlying robbery and acted "with reckless indifference to human life." In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of felony murder in Penal Code section 189. The legislation also added Penal Code section 1170.95, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment that could not be sustained under the new definition of felony murder. Law challenged the trial court’s summary denial of his section 1170.95 petition to vacate his murder conviction, arguing the trial court erred by reviewing his record of conviction and determining the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance rendered him ineligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded it was proper for a trial court to review the record of conviction when determining whether a section 1170.95 petitioner had stated a prima facie claim for relief. Additionally, the Court concluded Law "undoubtedly qualifies" as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, a conclusion that rendered him ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. The Court therefore affirmed the order denying his petition. |
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| California v. Sanchez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072647(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Menetrez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Victor Sanchez was charged with first degree murder, but pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. He filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate that conviction. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Sanchez was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder. After review, the Court of Appeal joined other courts that held section 1170.95 did not apply to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Court also rejected Sanchez’s argument that section 1170.95 violated equal protection. |
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| Galeotti v. International Union of Operating Engineers |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157785(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Henry E. Needham, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Labor & Employment Law, White Collar Crime |
| Galeotti, a former Union Local 3 employee, filed a complaint against Local 3 and three of individual union leaders, alleging that the individual defendants required union employees to pay them money to keep their jobs, lied about the reason for collecting the money, and caused Local 3 to terminate Galeotti’s employment when he failed to pay the full amount demanded. The trial court dismissed his second amended complaint without leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed in part, reasoning that a threat to terminate employment can provide a basis for an extortion claim and that the allegations of the second amended complaint stated a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy underlying the extortion statutes. The complaint stated a cause of action for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18 U.S.C. 1961), based on the predicate acts of extortion, but did not state a cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage. |
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| In re I.A. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296549(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Tangeman Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Where a juvenile court vacates its true finding on a generic murder allegation and redesignates it as a finding on an uncharged target offense, and does so before a minor has had the opportunity to contest the court's findings or orders, the minor may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the redesignated offense on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's decision sustaining the allegations that I.A. possessed a concealable firearm and committed vandalism. Therefore, the court reversed the juvenile court's findings, vacating the jurisdiction and disposition order and dismissing the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. |
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| People v. Edwards |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158055(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Petrou Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006, Edwards fired an assault weapon into an apartment, killing the victim. Edwards pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon and was convicted of second-degree murder and shooting into an inhabited dwelling. Following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, Edwards filed a Penal Code 1170.95 resentencing petition, checking form boxes indicating that he was convicted under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and that he could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd-degree murder because of changes to Penal Code 188 and 189. Edwards submitted the jury instructions and the transcript of the prosecutor’s closing remarks that Edwards acted with “both express malice, specific intent to kill, as well as implied malice,” described as “an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and at the time that the individual acted, they knew of the danger, and they deliberately acted with conscious disregard.” The court denied the petition, finding that Edwards was convicted on a valid theory of murder that survived the statutory changes. The court of appeal affirmed. The superior court did not err in considering the record of conviction. Edwards could not meet the statutory prerequisites for even filing a section 1170.95 petition because he was not charged or convicted of second-degree felony murder or murder under the natural or probable consequences doctrine directed at accomplice liability. |
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| People v. Thomkins |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A141375(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Streeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On Easter night in 2011, gunfire erupted at an Oakland bar-restaurant, leaving two people dead and five wounded. Thompkins and Fox were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang, with firearm discharge enhancements, a multiple-murder special circumstance, and five counts of attempted murder with great bodily injury findings, gang enhancements, and firearm discharge enhancements. Thompkins was convicted as the shooter and Fox as an accomplice. Both were sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole, plus 224 years to life. After Thompkins was sentenced, Fox stated under oath he was the actual shooter and Thompkins knew nothing about Fox’s intentions. Thompkins claimed this new testimony, and his attorney’s incompetent reaction entitled him to a new trial and submitted a declaration by another gang member who was present that night. The court of appeal concluded that Thompkins’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to bring a motion to recall the sentence followed by a new trial motion because Thompkins failed to show prejudice. The attempted murder convictions and related enhancements must be reversed for both defendants based on the flawed kill zone instruction. Introducing evidence that defendants admitted their gang affiliation at jail intake violated the defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination but was harmless. There was some evidentiary error that was harmless due to the wealth of admissible evidence establishing the gang enhancements. Arguments based on the statutory amendments to Penal Code 188 and 189 must be raised in the trial court (section 1170.95). The case must be remanded so the judge may exercise his discretion whether to impose or strike the firearm enhancements on under Penal Code 12022.53. |
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| People v. Torres |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295043(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Wiley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After the trial court admitted a witness's former testimony, the Court of Appeal applied People v. Roldan (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 969, 975–985, and reversed. Roldan held that, before invoking the former testimony exception, prosecutors should react appropriately to the impending deportation risk by following four steps: alert the defense to the risk; videotape the preliminary hearing testimony; use judicial measures to try to delay deportation; and consider an array of other specific measures. In this case, the prosecution conceded that prosecutors were simply unaware of Roldan and did not comply with it. The court held that Roldan controls the court's analysis because the facts about prosecutorial diligence are weaker here than they were in Roldan, where the appellate court held for the defense. In this case, the record before deportation is of prosecutorial inaction where the prosecution's brief in this court admits the investigating officer did not do anything to ensure that the witness would not be deported, nor is there other evidence of prosecutorial efforts to delay the witness's departure or to videotape his testimony at the preliminary hearing. |
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| People v. Triplett |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B298914(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Frances Rothschild Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, carjacking, and attempted murder. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's request to inform the jurors that they could have testimony of certain witnesses read back to them. The court also held that, under the circumstances in this case, the error was harmless. |
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| Colorado In Interest of G.S.S. |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 32 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Brian D. Boatright Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| After being charged, fourteen-year-old G.S.S. was detained for more than three months without bail, even though he had not entered a plea and had not been tried on the charges against him. At that point, G.S.S.’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that G.S.S.’s “right to a speedy trial” had been violated under section 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S. (2019). The trial court agreed and dismissed the case against G.S.S. with prejudice, and the court of appeals affirmed in Colorado in Interest of G.S.S., 2019 COA 4M, __ P.3d __. The Colorado Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine the proper remedy for a violation of the sixty-day limit in section 19-2-509(4)(b). The Supreme Court determined the remedy for a section 19-2-509(4)(b) violation was for the trial court to immediately hold a bail hearing and order the juvenile's release. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed. |
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| Barringer v. Halkitis |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1071 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that Jay Barringer's quo warranto petition filed in this case was a frivolous proceeding brought before the Supreme Court by a state prisoner and sanctioned Barringer by barring him from filing any further pro se requests for relief related to his criminal case. Barringer was convicted of one count of attempted sexual battery of a victim less than twelve years old and sentenced to twenty-five-years' imprisonment. In 2011, Barringer began filing petitions in the Supreme Court. The Court did not grant the relief sought in any of Barringer's filings. In the instant quo warranto petition Barringer challenged his conviction on the ground that the information was defective, a claim Barringer previously raised by way of a habeas petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition and found that Barringer abused the Court's limited judicial resources. The Court sanctioned Barringer by directing the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Barringer that are related to his criminal case, unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar in good standing. |
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| Franqui v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-203 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's claim of intellectual disability, raised in successive motions for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying relief. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in two separate cases. After the United States Supreme Court decided Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), Appellant filed successive motions for postconviction relief in both of his capital cases, asserting that the circuit court's denials of his previous claims of intellectual disability were based on the court's improper interpretation of Florida's intellectual disability statute. The circuit court summarily denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of intellectual disability. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's intellectual disability claim; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), or Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). |
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| Hicks v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1978 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied the instant mandamus petition filed by Hicks and sanctioned Hicks by barring him from filing any further pro se requests for relief related to his criminal case. Hicks was convicted of one count of lewd and lascivious conduct by a person over eighteen years of age on a victim under sixteen years of age. Since 2016, Hicks filed thirteen pro se requests for relief in the Supreme Court related to his criminal case. The Court did not grant the relief sought in any of Hicks' filings. In the instant petition, Hicks sought a writ of mandamus compelling the circuit court to comply with the requirements of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 by filing a copy of an order denying his second postconviction motion with the clerk of court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and found that Hicks abused this Court's limited judicial resources. The Court directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Hicks that are related to his criminal case, unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar in good standing. |
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| Burley v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0356 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1992, Douglas Burley pled guilty to malice murder. He moved for an out-of-time appeal in 2019, claiming that his right to appeal was frustrated by his plea counsel’s erroneous advice that he could not appeal his conviction because it was the product of a guilty plea. The trial court denied Burley’s motion. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to hold a hearing to determine whether ineffective assistance of counsel frustrated Burley’s right to appeal. |
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| Carter v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0022 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Construction Law, Criminal Law |
| Brandon Carter was convicted by jury of malice murder and two firearm offenses in connection with the shooting death of Terrance Baker. On appeal, Carter contended the trial court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements into evidence and by violating his constitutional right to be present during his trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Clarke v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0258 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Rupert Clark was convicted by jury for the malice murder of his wife, Rosemarie Lebert-Clark. He was also convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, he argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, violated the continuing witness rule by sending out with the deliberating jury printouts of text messages, and by failing to instruct the jury that a defendant’s uncorroborated confession was not alone sufficient to warrant a conviction. Finding no reversible error after reviewing the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Collins v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0195 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Renita Collins was tried for murder along with co-defendant Michael Stallworth. Collins appealed her convictions for murder and possession of a firearm while in commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Keith Jacobs. On appeal. Collins contended she was denied a fair trial due to juror misconduct, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing her to subpoena juror testimony to show that misconduct had occurred, and the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to excuse a prospective juror for cause. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Dawson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0217 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lavaris Dawson was convicted by jury of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Mamadou Camara. On appeal, Dawson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and argued the trial court erred in admitting Dawson’s statements to a detective during an interview because those statements were impermissibly induced by a hope of benefit, and that Dawson was denied his due process right to a timely appeal. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Dawson’s convictions. |
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| Evans v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0007 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: McMillan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jimmy Evans was convicted by jury for murder and other crimes relating to the 2006 deaths of Tavoris Calhoun and Dezmon Thomas. On appeal, Evans argued that because he was visibly intoxicated at the time he made statements to law enforcement and consented to a search of his home and person, the statements and consent were involuntarily given and the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial on this ground. Furthermore, Evans argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress at trial on the same basis. Because Evans failed to show error or ineffective assistance of counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. |
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| Hill v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0285 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Esco Hill was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes relating to the stabbing death of Alford Morris in 2014. On appeal, Hill argued the trial court committed reversible error by requiring him to be visibly shackled for the duration of his six-day trial. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court concurred this was reversible error, consequently, reversed judgment of conviction. Because the Court concluded the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain Hill's conviction, the State could re-try him. The Court did not address Hill's remaining enumerations of error, "as they are not likely to recur in the event of a retrial." |
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| Oliver v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0489 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: McMillan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jacquan Oliver entered a negotiated plea of guilty to felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Alexander Mixon. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a factual basis for his plea, and in determining the plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Rosser v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0103 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Larry Rosser was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Alexis Vereen. On appeal, Rosser challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and argued the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a mistrial, and by allowing the State to introduce a portion of Rosser's custodial statement to law enforcement. In addition, he argued he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error after reviewing the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Spencer v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0871 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Christopher Spencer was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shootings of Sylvia Watson and Samuel White. Spencer appealed, claiming only that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error after reviewing the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Styles v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0236 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Derrick Styles was convicted by jury of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Alberto Lumens and the armed robbery fo Juan Lumens Garcia. On appeal, Styles contended the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a recording of an inculpatory telephone conversation between himself and a witness. He also argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an allegedly improper comment by the prosecutor during closing argument. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Whitehead v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0171 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Javis Whitehead was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Dominique Larry. On appeal, Whitehead challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented to rebut his claim of self-defense and to convict him for murder beyond a reasonable doubt. He also argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial statement, and in refusing to excuse for cause the District Attorney from the panel of prospective jurors prior to the conclusion of voir dire. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Idaho v. Blythe |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46992 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Nicholas Blythe appealed after he was convicted of possessing a controlled substance. He conditionally pled guilty, reserving the right to challenge his sentence. On appeal, he argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence found because the evidence presented at trial was found in violation of Blythe's Fourth Amendment rights. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the search at issue took place before an arrest occurred, and because no rationale justifying a search incident to arrest was sufficiently present here, the search of Blythe’s shoes was not a valid search incident to arrest. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Blythe's conviction was vacated, the district court order denying Blythe's motion to suppress was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Idaho v. Glodowski |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47131 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| David Glodowski appealed after he was convicted for failing to update his sex-offender registration in violation of Idaho Code section 18-8309. He argued the district court erred by ruling that his prior conviction under a Wisconsin statute was “substantially equivalent” to Idaho statutes that required sex-offender registration in Idaho. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court improperly allowed the State to seek a redetermination of the “substantially equivalent” element given that the Idaho Bureau of Criminal Identification made a final determination on that element. However, because the State put forth sufficient evidence to prove that element, and the district court’s jury instruction accomplished the same purpose, the Supreme Court concluded the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court found no reversible error in the district court’s decision to grant the State’s motion and provide the jury instruction. Therefore, judgment of conviction was affirmed. |
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| Idaho v. Jones |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 45905 Opinion Date: May 4, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Timothy Jones was convicted by jury of trafficking heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence regarding his probation status, a knife found in the initial police search of his person, and that the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at his sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Jones' conviction and sentence. |
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| State v. Gordon |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1099 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Brent R. Appel Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for assault on a peace officer with a dangerous weapon, a felony, and several misdemeanors, holding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. After Defendant pleaded guilty, he absconded. He was later returned to custody. On appeal, Defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the plea bargain contained an unlawful term. Specifically, Defendant argued that the plea bargain's provision that he would be released from jail for a forty-eight-hour furlough after pleading guilty was illegal and that his trial counsel committed ineffective assistance in obtaining the illegal benefit for him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where Defendant entered into the plea agreement with the illegally lenient sentence, he could not benefit from that sentence and then attack the plea bargain. |
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| State v. Craig |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119660 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for first-degree felony murder, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. A jury found Defendant guilty of both first-degree felony murder and second-degree intentional murder. At sentencing, Defendant moved for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the jury must have had reasonable doubt on the first-degree felony murder theory because it convicted him of second-degree murder for the same killing. The district court dismissed the second-degree murder conviction and sentenced Defendant for the felony murder over his objection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it sentenced Defendant on felony murder instead of declaring a mistrial because Defendant did not establish that the jury failed to find each element of the felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt or that the jury's first- and second-degree murder verdicts were so irreconcilable as to require a new trial; and (2) the district court did not err in declining to give an instruction on voluntary intoxication. |
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| State v. Lemmie |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119439 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, criminal possession of a firearm, fleeing and eluding, and interference with law enforcement, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal failed. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) any possible violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment right in the admission of a witness's testimony about Defendant giving the witness phone passcodes was undoubtedly harmless; (2) the district court did not err by admitting hearsay statements as statements of a coconspirator and contemporaneous statements; (3) the State introduced sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of first-degree murder; and (4) the district judge did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony that Defendant was upset over a meth pipe that went missing. |
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| State v. Mullen |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 56 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Connors Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for reckless conduct and aggravated criminal mischief, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by offering Defendant a continuance of the trial in lieu of excluding his medical records. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress his personal medical records as a sanction for the State's late seizure of the records. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the State's conduct undermined the purpose of Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 18(b) but that the court's offer of a continuance in lieu of the exclusion of the evidence constituted an appropriate response to the State's conduct. |
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| Commonwealth v. Billingslea |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12715 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Cypher Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and the decision of the Appeals Court denying Defendant's motion to vacate the entry of his appeal from his convictions in that court and to have the case entered directly in the Supreme Judicial Court, holding that a direct appeal from the third conviction of a habitual offender pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, 25(b) may be entered in the Appeals Court. Defendant was indicted for serious felonies arising from a brutal attack and rape. In addition to charging the specific felony, each indictment also alleged that the sentence for that felony should be enhanced pursuant to the habitual criminal provision Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, 25(a) or the habitual offender provision of section 25(b), or both. After he was convicted, Defendant moved to have the case entered directly in the Supreme Judicial Court. The Appeals Court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) this direct appeal was entitled to the unique review prescribed by Mass Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, and the Appeals Court may conduct such section 33E review; (2) Defendant was not impermissibly allowed to waive his right to a jury trial on the sentencing enhancement provisions of the indictments; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his convictions on any other ground. |
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| Commonwealth v. Martin |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-08768 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Ralph D. Gants Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and the denial of his motion for a new trial and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278E to reduce Defendant's conviction to murder in the second degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's motion for a new trial was correctly denied because Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's ineffective assistance; (2) this Court declines to extend the reach of the Court's holding in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017), to Defendant's case; and (3) trial judge erred when he declined Defendant's request that the jury be instructed on the elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but the error was not prejudicial in the context of the judge's other instructions. |
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| Commonwealth v. Tavares |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12631 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and declined to exercise its power pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the conviction to manslaughter, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err by denying Defendant's requests for a jury instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Croft, 345 Mass. 143 (1962); (2) the trial judge did not err by denying Defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty under Croft because a rational jury could have found that Defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree on both the theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty; and (3) there was no basis for reducing Defendant's sentence or ordering a new trial. |
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| State v. Branch |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1055 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentences for drive-by shooting at an occupied vehicle and second-degree assault, holding that Minn. Stat. 609.035 did not prohibit the sentences for both offenses when the crimes arose from a single behavioral incident. The district court sentenced Defendant to forty-eight months for drive-by shooting at an occupied vehicle and thirty-six months for second-degree assault and imposed the two sentences to run concurrently. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under this Court's analysis in State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. 2012), the district court properly imposed multiple sentences in this case. |
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| Galloway v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-CA-01427-SCT Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Beam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Leslie Galloway appealed the denial of his 2015 petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) pertaining to his 2007 guilty plea to carjacking, a conviction that was used as an aggravating circumstance in Galloway’s 2010 capital-murder trial at which Galloway received a death sentence. Galloway claimed in the petition that his defense counsel Wendy Martin had an actual conflict of interest because, before becoming his defense counsel, Martin had served as an assistant district attorney in the same case, unbeknownst to Galloway. The trial court ruled that Galloway’s PCR claim was time barred under Mississippi’s Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), having been filed more than seven years after Galloway’s conviction for carjacking. The trial court alternatively found no merit to Galloway’s PCR claim, time bar notwithstanding. Accordingly, the trial court denied Galloway’s PCR petition. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Galloway’s PCR claim was time barred under the UPCCRA. The Court also agreed there was no merit to Galloway's PCR claim. |
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| City of Missoula v. Zerbst |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 108 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault, holding that the municipal court erred when it instructed the jury on a definition of "consent" from the 2017 sexual assault statute and not the applicable 2015 statute, and the erroneous jury instruction prejudicially affected Defendant's substantial rights. At trial, the court instructed the jury, over Defendant's objection, on the definition of consent contained in recent amendments to the sexual assault statute. On appeal, Defendant argued that the municipal court failed to apply the correct law when instructing the jury on the elements of the claimed offense. The district court denied the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the instructions, as a whole, did not fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case; and (2) Defendant's substantial due process right was prejudiced by the erroneous jury instruction. |
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| State v. Degarmo |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 680 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of driving under the influence, holding that Defendant consented to a chemical test of his urine and, therefore, the results of the urine test were admissible. A law enforcement officer stopped Defendant for an expired registration. Based on his observations, the officer, a certified drug recognition evaluation expert, administered field sobriety tests. The officer concluded that Defendant was under the influence of marijuana arrested Defendant for driving under the influence and then took him to a detoxification center. Thereafter, a chemical test of Defendant's urine confirmed the presence of marijuana. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admission of the results of the urine test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of his urine, and therefore, the search fell within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. |
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| People v. Holz |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 02682 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Fahey Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals held that N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 710.70(2) grants a defendant the right to review of a suppression decision when the order related exclusively to a count that was satisfied by a guilty plea but was not one to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant was charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree. The first count related to a laptop computer, and the second count related to jewelry. Defendant moved to suppress the jewelry, but Supreme Court denied the motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree as charged in the count pertaining to the theft of the laptop computer, in satisfaction of the count charging the burglary of jewelry. On appeal, Defendant argued that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the jewelry. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that it was jurisdictionally precluded from reviewing the suppression order. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant's right to appellate review of Supreme Court's suppression order was secured by CPL 710.70(2); and (2) because the Appellate Division did not reach the underlying suppression question the case must be remitted to the Appellate Division for further proceedings. |
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| People v. Maffei |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 02680 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: DiFiore Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division concluding on direct appeal that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that Defendant, on this record, did not sustain his burden to establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel's failure to challenge a prospective juror constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the record was inadequate to review Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (2) the appropriate procedure for the litigation of Defendant's challenge to his counsel's performance was a N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10 motion. |
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| State v. Bailey |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 360A19 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant, holding that the warrant supported by probable cause. Defendant pled guilty to the offense of trafficking in cocaine while preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the facts contained in the affidavit were insufficient to establish probable cause to search his residence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the affidavit contained facts that were sufficient to provide a nexus between the residence and suspected criminal activity, and therefore, the warrant was supported by probable cause. |
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| State v. Ellis |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 340A19 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, holding that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the law enforcement officer's stop when Defendant signaled with his middle finger from the passenger side window of a moving vehicle. While assisting a stranded motorist, the officer turned his attention to another car traveling on the roadway, a white SUV. Defendant had his arm outside the passenger window and gestured with his middle finger, making an up-and-down motion. Believing that Defendant was committing the crime of disorderly conduct, the officer pursued and then stopped the SUV. At trial, Defendant moved to suppress the officer's testimony, arguing that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty to resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the specific, articulable facts did not establish reasonable suspicion of the crime of disorderly conduct. |
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| State v. Hobbs |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 263PA18 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court clearly erred in ruling that Defendant failed to prove purposeful discrimination with respect to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike three jurors without considering all of the evidence presented by Defendant. Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to grant three objections that he made under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its analysis of Defendant's Batson claims with respect to the three jurors; and (2) as to all three jurors, remand was required for reconsideration of whether Defendant proved purposeful discrimination in each case. |
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| State v. Mylett |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 6A19 Opinion Date: May 1, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment convicting Defendant for conspiracy to commit harassment of a juror, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge for insufficient evidence. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit harassment of a juror because of his actions at a courthouse following his twin brother's conviction for assault on a government official. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence in Defendant's trial was insufficient to raise anything more than mere conjecture that he had made an agreement with another person to threaten or intimidate a juror. |
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| Dodge v. North Dakota |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 100 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Richard Dodge appealed from a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. Dodge was charged with five felonies and a misdemeanor in December 2015. Dodge was appointed counsel. In April 2016, Dodge’s counsel moved the court to withdraw because the attorney-client relationship was “irreparably broken and rendered unreasonably difficult.” The court granted the motion, and Dodge was appointed substitute counsel in May 2016. In July 2016, Dodge himself filed a “motion to dismiss counsel.” The court denied Dodge’s motion. Five months after the deadline for motions and plea agreements, Dodge's counsel sought to have Dodge submit to a psychiatric examination. This request was denied, the trial court found no evidence, and the the court itself made no observations, that Dodge was incompetent to stand trial. After this denial, Dodge himself again moved to dismiss his trial counsel, and due to the allegations Dodge made in his motion, counsel moved to withdraw. The trial court denied both motions, and instead, required the attorney to appear as standby counsel and assist Dodge during trial if requested, but relieved him of any further obligations to consult with Dodge. The case proceeded to trial. At the beginning of trial, the court gave Dodge the option of representing himself or having his attorney represent him. Dodge chose to have his attorney represent him. Because his attorney had not prepared for trial and had no communication with Dodge since he moved to withdraw, Dodge’s attorney asked for a brief recess to consult with Dodge. During the recess, a settlement was reached. Dodge agreed to enter Alford pleas on all counts, waived a presentence investigation, and agreed to be sentenced immediately after entering his pleas. Dodge was immediately sentenced following his guilty pleas, and thereafter sought post-conviction relief on grounds he was not competent to enter his pleas, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s finding that Dodge was competent when he entered his pleas was not clearly erroneous, and disposed of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. |
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| Hewitt v. NDDOT |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 102 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Larry Hewitt appealed a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s revocation of his driving privileges. Hewitt claimed the Department’s hearing file was improperly admitted at the administrative hearing. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the hearing file was properly admitted as a self-authenticating copy of an official record. |
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| Kastet v. NDDOT |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 91 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) appealed the district court's reversing a hearing officer’s decision suspending Holden Kastet’s driving privileges for 365 days. The Department argued the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in admitting the chemical breath test, and State Highway Patrol Trooper King scrupulously complied with the approved method for testing Kastet’s breath on the Intoxilyzer 8000. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred with the Department and reversed the district court judgment. The matter was remanded with instructions to reinstate the hearing officer’s decision. |
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| North Dakota v. Dahl |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 87 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State of North Dakota appealed a district court order denying its motion to resume prosecution against Matthew Dahl and dismissing the case. In December 2014, the State charged Dahl with two counts of theft. Dahl did not appear on the charges until he was arrested on a bench warrant in February 2017. In mid-April 2017, the State mailed Dahl a pretrial diversion agreement. Dahl signed and returned the notarized agreement dated May 3, 2017. On May 9, 2017, the state’s attorney signed and filed the agreement with the district court, and the court approved the agreement the same day. Under the agreement, the State agreed to suspend prosecution for “two years from the date of execution” conditioned on Dahl’s timely payment of restitution. Dahl failed to make minimum monthly restitution payments. On June 6, 2019, the State moved to resume prosecution, alleging Dahl violated the pretrial diversion agreement by his non-payment. The district court held a hearing on the State’s motion in August 2019. The court concluded the pretrial agreement was executed when Dahl signed it on May 3, 2017. The court then denied the State’s motion to resume prosecution as untimely under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d)(2), and dismissed the complaint against Dahl. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred in determining the State’s motion was untimely, and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| North Dakota v. Foster |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 85 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Akeem Foster was convicted by jury of Terrorizing and Carrying a Concealed Weapon. Foster contended on appeal he was denied a fair trial because he was asked during cross-examination if other witnesses were lying and because the prosecutor expressed personal beliefs about the evidence during closing arguments. Foster also argued there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either charge. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Foster’s conviction for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, but reversed his conviction for Terrorizing. The Court found Foster was improperly asked to provide an opinion on the veracity and credibility of the State’s witnesses. The improper questioning was prejudicial and denied Foster a fair trial on the terrorizing charge. |
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| North Dakota v. Kolstad |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 97 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In December 2018, Officer Nelson of the University of North Dakota Police Department conducted a traffic stop of Stanley Kolstad for suspicion of driving under the influence. Kolstad performed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test (PBT). Prior to performing the PBT, Kolstad informed Nelson that he had asthma. Nelson testified he was unable to obtain a PBT result because Kolstad was filling his cheeks with air while performing the test. Kolstad was arrested for DUI and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Kolstad was transported to the UND police station to be given an Intoxilyzer breath test. Prior to the Intoxilyzer test, Nelson read Kolstad the implied consent advisory. But, because Nelson was not a certified operator of the Intoxilyzer machine, Officer Waltz conducted the test. Prior to the test, Kolstad informed Waltz he had asthma. The Intoxilyzer test results were deficient. Waltz testified Kolstad was not providing enough air for the test machine to provide a valid result. Kolstad was charged with driving under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Kolstad’s counsel made a discovery request to the State seeking copies of any audio or video recordings taken by police officers. Kolstad’s counsel also requested the State inform him whether any sound or video recordings taken of Kolstad were subsequently “altered, edited, destroyed, or discarded.” The State provided Kolstad’s counsel with dash camera footage from Nelson’s police car that had been taken at the scene of the arrest, but the State did not provide any body camera footage from either Nelson or Waltz. Upon learning that Waltz’s body camera footage was successfully uploaded to UND servers, Kolstad’s counsel moved to dismiss the case because the State did not provide any body camera footage in discovery as requested. The district court ultimately dismissed the refusal to submit to a chemical breath test charge as a sanction for failing to provide the body camera footage. The State appealed, arguing the alleged discovery violation did not rise to a constitutional violation of Kolstad’s due process rights, and the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the refusal charge. Kolstad argued the district court’s order dismissing the refusal charge was not appealable, and if it was, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was nothing in the record to indicate the district court adequately considered an alternative or less severe sanction to dismissal, and by not considering a less severe sanction, the trial court erred. The district court’s order dismissing the refusal charge was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| North Dakota v. Michel |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 101 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kevin Michel was convicted by jury of knowingly receiving stolen property. Jamestown Police began investigating theft of tires from Northwest Tire in October 2017. About ten months later, Thomas Melland and Andrew Heckelsmiller became suspects in the investigation. Heckelsmiller told police he had sold stolen tires to Michel. In August 2018, Detective LeRoy Gross spoke with Michel about the stolen tires. Michel acknowledged he had bought tires from Heckelsmiller and Melland. Michel also told Detective Gross he stopped buying tires from Heckelsmiller and Melland after seeing a Facebook post from Northwest Tire offering a $500 reward for information regarding stolen tires. Detective Gross told Michel, “There’s going to be a lot of restitution these two boys are going to have to come up with unless we can get some tires back.” Michel said he had sold several of the tires but still had some of them. Michel turned over seven new tires to Detective Gross. Representatives from Northwest Tire and J&L Service identified the tires as some of those stolen from their shops. During the jury’s deliberations, the jury submitted a note with written questions to the court. Michel argued on appeal the district court erred by not specifically answering the jury’s questions and instead referring them to the existing jury instructions. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment, except as to the award of restitution. The award was reversed because the district court awarded more than what was required to make the victims whole. The matter was remanded for a redetermination of restitution. |
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| North Dakota v. Wayland |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 106 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joey Wayland appealed after he was convicted by jury of Theft of Property and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Wayland contended his case should have been dismissed because his right to a speedy trial was violated by a continuance of his trial from March 11, 2019 to April 8, 2019. Wayland also contended the district court violated his right to remain silent by ordering him to submit to a mental health evaluation. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Schwindt v. Sorel |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 92 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Gregory Schwindt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s revocation of his driving privileges for 180 days. Schwindt argued North Dakota’s implied consent and refusal laws were unconstitutional, the hearing officer erred by considering the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and the hearing officer erred in finding he refused to take a chemical test. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the hearing officer’s findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the conclusions of law were sustained by the findings of fact, and the decision to revoke Schwindt’s driving privileges was in accordance with the law. |
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| State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-2782 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relator to compel Respondent, the public-records custodian at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), to provide Relator with three public records and to pay Relator statutory damages and court costs associated with this litigation, holding that Relator was not entitled to either a writ of mandamus nor statutory damages. When Relator was an inmate at SOCF he submitted a public-records request to Respondent seeking three documents. Respondent provided one of the three documents. Relator then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Respondent to provide the two documents and to pay statutory damages and court costs associated with this litigation. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus on the merits, holding that Respondent's response to Relator fully satisfied Respondent's obligations under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, and therefore, Relator was not entitled a writ of mandamus, and there was no basis to award statutory damages. |
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| State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-2766 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts to produce various court records and denying the clerk's request that Appellant be declared a vexatious litigator, holding that the court of appeals erred in denying Appellant's complaint on the grounds that he did not invoke the Rules of Superintendence as the basis for his request. Appellant sought copies of journal entries from his criminal case and a copy of the clerk of courts' records-retention schedule. The clerk largely denied the request. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied Appellant's request for mandamus relief, concluding that the clerk had no clear legal duty to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this action to compel the production of journal entries from a 1995 case was properly brought under the Public Records Act; and (2) this Court declines to impose sanctions on Appellant or to declare him a vexatious litigator. |
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| State v. Dangler |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-2765 Opinion Date: May 5, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's conviction and sentence and reinstated the trial court's acceptance of Defendant's plea of no contest to sexual battery, holding that the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a), and there was nothing in the record to support a conclusion that Defendant would not have entered his plea had the trial court been more detailed in its explanation. On appeal, Defendant sought to vacate his plea of no contest, arguing that his plea was invalid because the trial court erred by not explaining more fully the obligations and restrictions that went with his status as a sex offender, in violation of Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court of appeals vacated the conviction without requiring Defendant to show prejudice, concluding that the trial court had completely failed to comply with Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not completely failed to comply with Crim R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s maximum-penalty-advisement requirement; and (2) because Defendant did not establish prejudice, he was not entitled to have his no-contest plea vacated for a failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C). |
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| Oregon v. Haji |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066254 Opinion Date: May 7, 2020 Judge: Nakamoto Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After a grand jury issued an indictment charging defendant Hanad Ali Haji with multiple offenses, the district attorney determined that the indictment could be challenged by demurrer because the basis for joining those offenses was not expressly alleged. Instead of seeking another indictment from the grand jury, the district attorney obtained leave from the trial court to amend the indictment by adding allegations specifying the statutory basis for joinder, without adding factual allegations about the crimes. Defendant was convicted on some of the charges at trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether the district attorney could add allegations specifying the statutory basis for joinder of multiple offenses to an indictment instead of resubmitting the case to the grand jury. The Supreme Court determined that neither the statute permitting joinder of multiple offenses in a single indictment nor Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of the Oregon Constitution precluded a district attorney, with approval of the trial court, from amending an indictment to add allegations specifying the statutory basis for joinder of multiple offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, based in part on different reasoning, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. |
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| South Carolina v. Durant |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27964 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Larry Durant was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) for sexually abusing a teenage girl in his church office where he served as the pastor. Durant contended the trial court improperly permitted the State to introduce evidence of prior sexual abuse allegations as evidence of a common scheme or plan under Rule 404(b), SCRE, and that the State committed a "Brady" violation by failing to accurately disclose the criminal history of its witness. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility of the girls' testimony. "[W]hile the State failed to disclose the criminal background information of its witness, we find this information was not material." The Court found Durant exercised his position of trust, authority, and spiritual leadership to hold private prayer meetings with teen girls who had grown up in his church. He told them he was praying for their health and good fortune, and represented that part of this process was touching them sexually and having intercourse. Durant then warned the girls of misfortune if they refused or told anyone. Moreover, he used scripture as a means of grooming the children into performing sex acts. "These facts demonstrate the requisite logical connection between the prior acts of sexual abuse and the one forming the basis of the crime charged." The Court therefore affirmed Durant's conviction. |
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| South Carolina v. Perry |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27963 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Few Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Wallace Perry was convicted on two counts of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the first degree and two counts of CSC with a minor in the second degree for sexually assaulting two of his biological daughters. Prior to Perry's trial, the State made a motion to admit the testimony of Perry's stepdaughter from an earlier marriage that Perry sexually assaulted her twenty-two to twenty-seven years earlier. The State argued the trial court should not exclude the stepdaughter's testimony under Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence because it fit the "common scheme or plan" exception. Perry objected to this testimony. The trial court initially reserved ruling on the issue, but later indicated it was inclined to allow the stepdaughter to testify. The jury convicted Perry on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined it was not enough to meet the "logical connection" standard for admission of other crimes under the common scheme or plan exception to Rule 404(b) that the defendant previously committed the same crime. "When evidence of other crimes is admitted based solely on the similarity of a previous crime, the evidence serves only the purpose prohibited by Rule 404(b), and allows the jury to convict the defendant on the improper inference of propensity that because he did it before, he must have done it again. ...The common scheme or plan exception demands more." The Supreme Court held State must show a logical connection between the other crime and the crime charged such that the evidence of other crimes "reasonably tends to prove a material fact in issue." The State must also convince the trial court that the probative force of the evidence when used for this legitimate purpose is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice from the inherent tendency of the evidence to show the defendant's propensity to commit similar crimes. In this case, the State did not meet its burden. Conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| South Carolina v. Quinn |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27966 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Respondent Rick Quinn, Jr. was a former member of the South Carolina House of Representatives, representing constituents in Richland and Lexington counties from 1989-2004 and 2010-2017 and serving as House Majority Leader from 1999- 2004. He owned and operated a mail business called Mail Marketing Strategies (MMS) in Columbia, while his father owned and operated a political consulting firm, Richard Quinn & Associates (RQ&A). In 2014, Attorney General Alan Wilson designated First Circuit Solicitor David Pascoe as special prosecutor to conduct a State grand jury investigation into alleged public corruption committed by current and former members of the South Carolina General Assembly. This case arose from a prior state grand jury investigation of former House Speaker Bobby Harrell, which resulted in six counts of misusing campaign funds, to which he pleaded guilty. During the course of the investigation into Speaker Harrell, SLED uncovered potentially criminal conduct by Representative Jimmy Merrill and Representative Rick Quinn, and a second grand jury investigation was initiated to investigate the conduct of these individuals. The investigation focused on Quinn's practice of using his office as House Majority Leader and leader of the House Republican Caucus to direct mailing and political services to his family's businesses. Quinn only admitted to a limited set of facts supporting the indictment. Believing the plea lacked a sufficient basis, the State moved to vacate Quinn's guilty plea, reconsider the sentence, and for the trial court's recusal. The State appealed the order denying its motions. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the State could not appeal the guilty plea, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, and there was no evidence of judicial bias or prejudice requiring the court to recuse itself. Therefore, the Court dismissed the State's appeal of the guilty plea, and affirmed as to all other issues. |
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| Texas v. Arellano |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0287-19 Opinion Date: May 6, 2020 Judge: Slaughter Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After Appellee Cesar Ramiro Arellano was arrested for driving while intoxicated, the arresting officer, Phillip Garcia, prepared a probable cause affidavit to support a search warrant for a blood draw. Officer Garcia submitted his sworn affidavit to the on-duty magistrate. Using a cursive signature, the magistrate signed the blank signature line of a form search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of Appellee’s blood. Below the signature line appeared the words, “Magistrate, Victoria County, Texas.” Aside from the cursive signature, the magistrate’s name was not typed or handwritten anywhere on the warrant. Upon execution of the search warrant, Appellee was charged with DWI. In the trial court, Appellee filed a motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the blood draw. At the pretrial suppression hearing, Appellee argued that the search warrant to obtain the blood specimen was facially invalid because the magistrate’s signature was illegible in violation of the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.04(5). The trial court agreed, the court of appeals concurred, and the evidence was suppressed because of the illegible signature. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with both lower courts, finding the court of appeals erred in holding that reliance on the statutory good-faith exception was automatically precluded based on an illegible magistrate’s signature in violation of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.04(5). Because the remaining issues in the case were not properly addressed by the court of appeals, judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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