| Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance Co. |
| Docket: A147481(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Miller Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law |
| Eghtesad’s pro se complaint claimed that he leased property to Martinez; State Farm issued Martinez a fire and liability insurance policy; Eghtesad was named on the policy as an additional insured; Eghtesad sought coverage for property damage; and State Farm told Eghtesad he was covered only for claims of slander. Eghtesad did not file an opposition to State Farm’s demurrer but asked for 60 days to try to settle and get counsel. The court continued the hearing. On the day his opposition was due, Eghtesad sought a further continuance of 90 days, informing the court that he had been involved in an auto accident. He attached a note from his doctor. The court granted Eghtesad “one final continuance” and set the hearing out for two additional weeks. Three days before the new hearing date, without having filed a response to the demurrer, Eghtesad sought another continuance, again providing a doctor’s note. The court did not grant a further continuance and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed, finding that Eghtesad should have been given an opportunity to amend his complaint. For an original complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff has requested leave to amend, a trial court’s denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint “shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” |
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| Estes v. Eaton Corp. |
| Docket: A152847(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Stewart Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability |
| Estes worked as an electrician in two Bay Area naval shipyards and was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured or supplied to the Navy by approximately 50 companies. Later, he developed asbestos-related mesothelioma. In Estes’ personal injury lawsuit, a jury returned a defense verdict for an electrical component manufacturer, Eaton. The trial court granted Estes a new trial. The court of appeal reversed that order; the explanation of reasons for granting a new trial was not sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. The court overturned the verdict because “plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that he worked with arc chutes manufactured and supplied by [Eaton’s predecessor]; the arc chutes contained asbestos; asbestos fibers from the arc chutes were released during plaintiff’s work with them; and the levels of fibers released posed a hazard to plaintiff, and may have been a substantial factor in causing injury to him” whereas “[t]he evidence submitted by Eaton was not sufficient to rebut this evidence submitted by plaintiff.” This reasoning is little more than a conclusion that the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the arc chutes released hazardous levels of asbestos during Estes’s encounter with them in the workplace. The explanation is too vague to enable meaningful review. The court also rejected Estes’s substantial evidence challenge to the verdict exonerating Eaton of liability. |
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| Hill RHF Housing Partners, LP v. City of Los Angeles |
| Dockets: B295181(Second Appellate District) , B295315(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law |
| Hill, Olive, and Mesa, appealed the trial court's denial of petitions for writ of mandate and related declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the City of Los Angeles's June 2017 establishment of the Downtown Center Business Improvement District (DCBID) and the San Pedro Historic Waterfront Business Improvement District (SPBID) (collectively, the BIDs). Because the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and the BIDs that Hill, Olive, and Mesa were required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention and that they failed to do so, the court affirmed the trial court's judgments on that ground and declined to reach Hill, Olive, and Mesa's arguments on the merits. |
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| Wittenberg v. Bornstein |
| Docket: A154994(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Fujisaki Areas of Law: Civil Procedure |
| In 2016-2018 several actions and cross-actions were filed by substantially the same parties concerning a law partnership and other businesses Wittenberg filed one lawsuit, asserting individual and derivative causes of action against Daniel and others which related to claims previously brought by Daniel in a separately filed action. The trial court sustained Daniel’s demurrer to Wittenberg’s first amended complaint without leave to amend, finding it barred by the compulsory cross-complaint statute. (Code Civ. Procedure 426.10). The court of appeal affirmed. Wittenberg forfeited several legal arguments that she failed to present to the trial court below. The court rejected Wittenberg’s contention that an appellate court is required to consider all arguments challenging an order sustaining a demurrer based on the compulsory cross-complaint statute when such arguments purport to raise purely legal issues that are belatedly raised for the first time on appeal. The claims in Wittenberg’s first amended complaint below were barred on their face by the compulsory cross-complaint statute because they were logically related to Daniel’s cross-complaint in the previously filed action. |
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| California v. Campbell |
| Docket: C088348(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: M. Kathleen Butz Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Isiah Campbell was convicted by jury on three counts of pimping and 11 counts of pandering. On appeal, he argued his convictions should have been reversed for a variety of reasons, including improper venue, insufficient evidence, the pandering statute is void for vagueness, instructional error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and improper conviction on multiple counts of pimping. The Court of Appeal rejected each of defendant’s contentions and affirmed judgment. |
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| People v. Lopez |
| Docket: B300787(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Penal Code section 1170.95 as enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. Section 1170.95 is a new legislative statute that allows certain eligible defendants convicted of murder to petition for dismissal of their murder convictions and be resentenced on any remaining counts of conviction. Because Senate Bill No. 1437's changes to the felony-murder rule and elimination of the natural and probable consequences doctrine do not unconstitutionally amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115, the Court of Appeal held that defendant was entitled to have his petition considered on the merits. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The court stated that, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature acted within its Constitutional authority to amend legislative statutes and enact new laws. The court held that Senate Bill No. 1437 did not amend any initiative statute. |
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| Marriage of Mullonkal & Kodiyamplakkil |
| Docket: C085825(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Murray Areas of Law: Family Law |
| Wife Carolyn Mullonkal and husband Sithaj Kodiyamplakkil were married for three years and five months. Husband appealed the judgment of dissolution and some post judgment orders, contending: (1) the community was entitled to reimbursement, under Family Code section 2641, for community funds spent repaying wife’s educational loans; (2) reimbursement was also required for community funds used to pay wife’s non-educational loans; (3) wife breached her fiduciary duty by transferring community property to family members; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only $10,000 of the over $108,000 in attorney’s fees he incurred; (5) the court also abused its discretion in denying a new trial; and (6) the trial court erred in finding a bank account of husband’s was community property. The Court of Appeal agreed with husband as to every contention except the fifth. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Yost v. Forestiere |
| Docket: F078580(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr. Areas of Law: Family Law |
| Subdivision (j)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides that civil harassment restraining orders are subject to modification or termination on the motion of a party, but does not specify the grounds for modification. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed and resolved several legal questions involving section 527.6, subdivision (j)(1) that have not been explicitly decided in a published decision. First, the court held that the determination whether to modify or terminate a civil harassment restraining order is committed to "the discretion of the court;" second, the trial court's discretionary authority to modify or terminate a civil harassment restraining order includes, but is not limited to, the three grounds for modifying ordinary injunctions set forth in section 533; third, a trial court has the discretion to modify a restraining order when, after considering the relevant evidence presented, it determines there is no reasonable probability of future harassment; and fourth, the restrained party seeking modification on the ground that there is no longer a reasonable probability of a future harm has the burden of proving this ground by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, the court reversed the trial court's order denying Grandfather's request to modify a civil harassment restraining order and directed the trial court to vacate the order. |
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| Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. Bay Area Toll Authority |
| Docket: A157598(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: J. Anthony Kline Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law |
| A toll increase for seven Bay Area bridges that was submitted to the voters as Regional Measure 3 in 2018, and approved by a 55 percent majority. Revenue from the toll increase is to be applied toward various designated highway and public transit improvement projects and programs. Opponents contend that most of the revenue will not be used for the benefit of those who use the bridges and pay the toll but rather for the benefit of those who use other means of transportation; they argue the toll increase is a tax for which the California Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote, and therefore is invalid.The court of appeal affirmed judgment on the pleadings, upholding the fee increase. The Legislature, not the Bay Area Toll Authority, imposed the toll increase in Senate Bill 595, which required imposition of a toll increase of up to $3, subject to approval by the voters, and specified in great detail the uses to which the resulting revenue would be put. |
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| Doe v. The Regents of the University of California |
| Docket: B293153(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Legal Ethics |
| Plaintiff filed suit against Regents after UCSB placed him on interim suspension pending its investigation into an allegation of dating-relationship violence and then delayed completion of the investigation, in violation of its own written policies. The superior court preliminarily enjoined the interim suspension pending completion of the administrative proceedings. Plaintiff was ultimately exonerated in the administrative proceedings. The Superior Court then dismissed plaintiff's action as moot and denied attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order of dismissal, but held that plaintiff satisfied the criteria for an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. The court agreed with plaintiff that the superior court misinterpreted section 1021.5 by focusing primarily on his personal interest in bringing the litigation, as opposed to the significance of the constitutional due process rights that were enforced, and that this misinterpretation "drove the denial of fees." Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the fee motion and remanded for a determination of the amount to be awarded. |
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| Steuer v. Franchise Tax Board |
| Docket: A154691(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Frank Y. Jackson Areas of Law: Tax Law, Trusts & Estates |
| The Paula Trust, established for the sole benefit of Medeiros, a California resident, has two cotrustees—a California resident and a Maryland resident. Paula Trust held a limited partnership interest in Syufy, which in 2007 sold stock. Some of the capital gain income from the stock sale was allocated to Paula Trust. Paula Trust’s 2007 tax return reported $2,831,336 of capital gain including the stock sale. The trust paid California income tax of $223,425 and later filed an amended 2007 California fiduciary income tax return, requesting a refund, arguing that the capital gain was incorrectly reported as California-source income. The trustees declared they were “required to apportion the stock gain as California source and non-California-source income . . . according to the number of trustees resident in California” based on Rev. & Tax. Code 17743, which provides: “Where the taxability of income under this chapter depends on the residence of the fiduciary and there are two or more fiduciaries for the trust, the income taxable . . . shall be apportioned according to the number of fiduciaries resident in this state.” The court of appeal reversed a judgment ordering a refund in the amount of $150,655 of tax, plus interest of $68,955.70. The Revenue and Taxation Code imposes taxes on the entire amount of trust income derived from California sources, regardless of the residency of the trust’s fiduciaries. |
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| Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde |
| Docket: B293952(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates |
| Plaintiff, the beneficiary of a living trust established by John W. Martin on February 11, 2009, appealed from an order finding that the trust was properly revoked and is therefore invalid. In this case, Martin revoked the February Trust just a few months after he signed it after he had a falling out with plaintiff and then established a new trust in May 2009. The Court of Appeal applied the holding in Masry v. Masry (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 738, and held that a trust revocation procedure is not exclusive unless the trust document explicitly says that it is. The court held that the February Trust did not state that its revocation procedure was exclusive, and the alternative revocation procedure under Probate Code section 15401 was therefore available to Martin. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that section 15401 applies only to the method of revoking a trust and not the persons who may do so. The court explained that the distinction between method and authority is artificial; a "method" can include the persons with authority to accomplish a task. The court held that section 15401 in fact addresses who may revoke a trust. |
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