Latest 12 Cases This Week: Jackson v. ING Bank, FSB (1st Cir.), Moore v. Hiram Township (6th Cir.), Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC (9th Cir.)

Death Penalty Opponents Should Rethink Their Support for Life Without Parole Sentences

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—argues that life sentences without the possibility of parole (LWOP) are as problematic and damaging as the death penalty. For this reason, Professor Sarat calls upon death penalty opponents to reconsider their support for LWOP sentences.

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Jackson v. ING Bank, FSB

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 17-9002

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Real Estate & Property Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court declaring a foreclosure void and awarding Appellant damages but denying relief on her remaining claims, holding that Appellant's challenges on appeal were either waived or otherwise unavailing. After two attempts to foreclose the mortgage on a condominium that Appellant purchased she filed a six-count adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court naming five defendants, the financial institutions and law firms connected with the foreclosure. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment as to one count in favor of Appellant, voiding one of the foreclosures, but denied the remaining claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant's challenges were either waived or baseless.

Moore v. Hiram Township

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-3259

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Moore family, individually or in trust, has owned and maintained the 108-acre Hiram, Ohio property since 1813. They have operated a small airport on the Property since 1948. Around 1951, the Township enacted a zoning resolution that zoned the Property as Rural-Residential and classified the airport as a nonconforming use, permitted to continue so long as the use is not abandoned for two years. The airport remained active in varying degrees but its use for ultralight aircraft and hang gliders started recently, and prompted nuisance complaints from neighbors. In 2016, Township officials told Moore that he needed a certificate of nonconforming use to continue the airport’s operations. The Board of Zoning Appeals voted to grant Moore a certificate but imposed several conditions. The Portage County Common Pleas Court modified the conditions. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. While his state court appeal was pending, Moore filed a federal suit, alleging violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights and his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the suit was barred by principles of claim preclusion. There was a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; this action involves the same parties; this action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the Ohio action; and this suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the Ohio action.

Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-55923

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff and his family under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). Plaintiff and his family sought to extend their tenancy in defendants' property based on plaintiff's medical condition. The panel agreed with the district court that, under 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B), making "accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services" was not necessary to afford plaintiff and his family "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." The panel held that, absent an accommodation, the plaintiff's disability must cause the plaintiffs to lose an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. In this case, defendants offered plaintiff and his family, who were on a month-to-month tenancy, terminable at will, a new lease for one year at an increased rent. However, plaintiff and his family turned down the new lease, and never credibly argued that they turned down the lease for any reason related to plaintiff's disability. Upon termination of the lease, plaintiff and his family were in the same position as a family with no disability that had had its lease terminated. The panel explained that it could not find a connection between plaintiff's disability and his request to remain in the home until January 22, 2018. Therefore, defendants were under no obligation to extend the tenancy-termination date. Finally, the panel agreed with the Third and Sixth Circuits and held that there is no standalone liability under the FHAA for a landlord’s failure to engage in an interactive process.

PBT Real Estate, LLC v. Town of Palm Beach

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-13920

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: Tjoflat

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

PBT, on behalf of itself and the owners of the other condominiums, sought an injunction in state court barring the Town from levying a special assessment against their properties. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Town's motion for summary judgment on the owners' substantive due process and equal protection claims. In regard to the substantive due process claim, the court concluded that PBT failed to provide evidence showing that the Town lacked a rational basis in enacting the Resolution as a whole. In regard to the equal protection claim, given the relevant differences between the Comparators and the PB Towers, the court concluded that all that PBT has shown is that the Town Council treated dissimilar properties differently. The court concluded that such treatment does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, even if they were similar, PBT fails to identify any evidence that an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker would consider the similarity it proffers. The court also affirmed the Town's motion to dismiss the owners' state law claims. The court explained that the district court was correct to dismiss the state law takings claims asserted in Count III, but erred in dismissing the state law claim alleging an unconstitutional tax. However, the unconstitutional tax claim was properly before the district court only based on supplemental jurisdiction. Because the federal claims were properly dismissed, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim on remand. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider.

Guastello v. AIG Specialty Insurance Company

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G057714(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

A subcontractor built a retaining wall that collapsed years later, causing damage to a nearby residential lot. The homeowner sued the subcontractor, obtained a default judgment, and then sued the subcontractor’s insurance company to enforce the default judgment. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing the homeowner’s damages occurred long after the insurance policy had expired, and therefore the insurance company had no duty to cover the default judgment. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. On appeal, the homeowner alleged “continuous and progressive” damage began to occur shortly after the subcontractor built the retaining wall during the coverage period of the insurance policy. The insurance company disagreed. The Court of Appeal determined that was a triable issue of material fact, thus reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Board

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A153583(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Siggins

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Sweeney bought the 39-acre Point Buckler Site, located in Suisun Marsh in the San Francisco Bay's Grizzly Bay, which apparently was previously operated as a managed wetland for duck hunting. Sweeney undertook unpermitted construction and development, including restoring an exterior levee and opening a private recreational area for kiteboarding. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) inspected the Site, noting the unauthorized work and multiple violations; the levee construction work had removed tidal flow to the Site’s interior and dried out tidal marsh areas. BCDC concluded the Site never functioned as a managed wetland and had long reverted to a tidal marsh. Sweeney was directed to stop work and informed that a marsh development permit was required to develop the Site; BCDC indicated that any work that could not be retroactively approved would need to be removed. The Regional Water Quality Control Board commenced separate proceedings, citing violations of the federal Clean Water Act and the California Water Code. BCDC staff observed that additional work had been performed since the earlier inspection. The Board issued a cleanup and abatement order (CAO), imposed administrative civil liabilities and required payment of approximately $2.8 million in penalties. The superior court set aside those orders. The court of appeal reversed. In issuing the CAO, the Board did not violate the requirements of Water Code section 13627; the CAO satisfied the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act criteria for enforcement actions and did not conflict with the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act. The court rejected arguments that the definition of waste cannot include earthen material, that the activities did not constitute “discharges,” and that any discharges were not into “waters of the state.”

City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals v. UJ-Eighty Corp.

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 21S-PL-00077

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Mark S. Massa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court reversing the order of the City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirming the decision of the City of Bloomington citing UJ-Eighty Corporation for a zoning violation, holding that there were not constitutional violations in this case. UJ-Eighty owned a fraternity house at Indiana University (IU) in Bloomington that was located within a district zoned by the City to permit limited residential uses. UJ-Eighty leased its house to an IU-sanctioned fraternity, but before the lease ended, IU revoked its recognition and approval of the fraternity, which meant that no one could live there. Bloomington cited UJ-Eighty for a zoning violation when two residents remained in the house. The BZA affirmed. UJ-Eighty appealed, arguing that the City impermissibly delegated its zoning authority to IJ by allowing it unilaterally to define fraternities and sororities. The trial court agreed and struck down the ordinance's definition of fraternities and sororities under the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bloomington did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not an impermissible delegation of power or a denial of due process.

Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Clifford

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2021 ME 11

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Joseph Jabar

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Deutsche Bank on Deutsche Bank's foreclosure complaint, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. On appeal, Stephen Clifford argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting several documents under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay and erred in finding that Deutsche Bank satisfied the elements of proof to support the judgment of foreclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the documents under the business records exception; and (2) Deutsche Bank proved all the required elements to foreclose by a preponderance of the evidence.

House v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 MT 45

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Banking, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting various mortgage lenders and trustees summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for negligence and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding that genuine issues of material fact did not preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an action asserting negligent loan supervision/administration, breach of the implied contract covenant of good faith and fair dealing, anticipatory declaratory judgment, and quiet title to mortgaged property. The district court granted summary judgment to Bank of America, N.A. (BOA) on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting BOA summary judgment on Plaintiff's asserted negligence and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.

Butler v. Gavek

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 19-124

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

In this partition action, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court ruling that Plaintiff's death terminated her interest in a joint tenancy, holding that R.I. Gen. Laws 34-15-12 abrogates the common law right of survivorship in a joint tenancy when an action for partition is pending. Plaintiff filed a partition action requesting that the superior court partition property she owned in a joint tenancy with Defendants. Defendants asserted counterclaims for unjust enrichment and breach of agreement. While the litigation was pending, Plaintiff died. Defendants moved to dismiss the partition action, asserting that Plaintiff's property interest had passed to the remaining joint tenants by operation of law upon Plaintiff's demise. The hearing justice granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that Plaintiff's decease did not abate her action for partition, and therefore, the litigation remained pending.

Premier Home Restoration, LLC v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 19-24

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this foreclosure action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court, holding that questions of disputed material facts existed regarding Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants, as mortgagees, caused a foreclosure sale to be conducted for certain property. Plaintiff was the successful bidder. Defendants were prepared to convey title to Plaintiff but when Defendants asserted that Plaintiff was liable for all costs that had accrued with respect to the property, but Plaintiff disputed this liability. Defendants then caused a foreclosure-of-bid letter to be sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action alleging four counts. The superior court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to the claim under the Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act and otherwise vacated the judgment, holding that the district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining counts.

Smith v. Chestnut Ridge Storage, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 19-1076

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: Armstead

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment, holding that Petitioners were immune from Respondent's lawsuit pursuant to the litigation privilege and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Petitioners executed an oil and gas lease to a company that assigned 2,300 acres of Petitioners' tract to Respondent for a storage project. Respondent then applied to FERC for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a storage field. Petitioners intervened in the FERC proceeding. FERC eventually granted Respondent's request. When Respondent did not complete construction of the storage facility within the required amount of time it sought a three-year extension. Petitioners opposed the extension, and FERC denied Respondent's request to extend the timeframe. Thereafter, Petitioners filed suit against Respondent alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment. Respondent filed a counterclaim alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were immune from suit pursuant to the litigation privilege and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the litigation privilege and Noerr-Pennington doctrine provided Petitioners with immunity from all of Respondent's counterclaims.