Latest 13 Cases This Week: Ex parte Sean Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc., & FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (Ala.), Resurrection of Life, ...

How the EEOC’s Maintenance of an “Alleged Offenders” Log Can Help Prevent the Next Harvey Weinstein

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, JOSEPH SCOPELITIS

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and recent graduate Joseph A. Scopelitis argue that the EEOC should maintain a log of “alleged offenders” to help prevent the next Harvey Weinstein. Estreicher and Scopelitis explain why such a log would effectively balance the interests of the alleged offender and victim, the employer, and the public.

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Ex parte Sean Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc., & FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190276

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Tom Parker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Following an automobile accident in Lee County, Alabama between Dionne Drisker and Sean Michael Allen, Drisker sued Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc. ("Bonehead"), and FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. ("FedEx"), in Macon County, where Drisker resided. The defendants sought a writ of mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to transfer this case to the Lee Circuit Court under the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Because the defendants demonstrated that the connection between this case and Macon County was weak and that the connection between this case and Lee County was strong, the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying the defendants' motion to transfer the case to Lee County. The Alabama Supreme Court therefore directed the trial court to transfer this case to Lee County.

Resurrection of Life, Inc. v. Dailey

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180154

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Christian Dailey, a minor, suffered a catastrophic personal injury at a day-care facility run by Resurrection of Life, Inc., d/b/a Perfect Place Christian Academy ("Resurrection of Life"). Christian's parents, Mark and Valerie Dailey, sued Resurrection of Life and its employee Latoya Mitchell Dawkins (hereinafter "the day-care defendants") on his behalf and, following a jury trial, obtained a sizable compensatory-damages award. The day-care defendants did not challenge the size of that award, but they did challenge the trial court’s refusal to grant them a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. Because the day-care defendants were not entitled to a new trial, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

Walters v. De'Andrea

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190062

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Mendheim

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Clint Walters appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of Montgomery Police Department ("MPD") patrol officer Jessica De'Andrea and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company ("Progressive"). Walters was driving his motorcycle when he came to a complete stop at a red light. De'Andrea was traveling in her MPD police vehicle when she came to a stop directly behind Walters's motorcycle at the intersection of the Eastern Boulevard and Monticello Drive. De'Andrea testified in her deposition that she had completed her patrol shift and that she was on her way to the MPD South Central Headquarters on the Eastern Boulevard to end her shift. When the light turned green, De'Andrea saw that other vehicles were moving. She wasn't sure if Walters' brake light was intact; the officer assumed Walters was moving and proceeded to go, hitting Walters from behind. Walters alleged he suffered multiple injuries as a result of the accident, and filed an action against De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Walters asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against De'Andrea in her individual capacity; he asserted claims for uninsured-motorist benefits against Progressive and State Farm. State Farm moved for summary judgment, attesting Walters did not have any insurance policies with State Farm in force at the time of the accident. De'Andrea moved for summary judgment, arguing she was entitled to state-agent immunity; Progressive and State Farm also moved for summary judgment, arguing that if De'Andrea was entitled to be dismissed, they too should be dismissed because Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover damages" from De'Andrea. The circuit court entered summary judgments in favor of De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm. The summary-judgment order did not detail the circuit court's reasons for its decision. Walters filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the circuit court alter, amend, or vacate its summary-judgment order. The postjudgment motion was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding De'Andrea failed to demonstrate that Walters's claims arose from a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity. Therefore, the summary judgment in De'Andrea's favor was due to be reversed. Because Progressive's summary-judgment motion was predicated solely on the ground that Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover" uninsured-motorist benefits if De'Andrea was entitled to State-agent immunity, the summary judgment in its favor was also reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Weaver v. ASRC Federal Holding Co.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17406

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Joel H. Bolger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Gregory Weaver worked at remote sites for ARCTEC Alaska1 off and on for several years as a relief station mechanic. His job involved heavy labor, and he filed several reports of injury during the times he worked for ARCTEC. He reported in December 2010 that he had “pulled something in the lower spinal area” while adjusting tire chains on a dump truck. He filed another injury report related to his back in early 2012, after he experienced back pain while installing garage door panels. Weaver passed “fit for duty” physical examinations after both of these injuries. In 2013, however, he woke up one morning with back pain that made it hard for him to walk. He said his back pain “had been building up for several months,” but he could not identify a specific task related to the onset of pain. He said “the majority of the heavy lifting” he did that summer had been at Indian Mountain, but he described work at Barter Island as including significant shoveling and pushing wheelbarrows of rocks over difficult surfaces. He thought the camp bed provided inadequate back support. He asked to be flown out because of his back pain and has not worked since. Weaver began receiving About six months later his employer controverted all benefits based on a medical opinion that the work caused only workers’ compensation benefits after experiencing severe low back pain at a remote job site. About six months later his employer controverted all benefits based on a medical opinion that the work caused only a temporary aggravation of a preexisting condition. Weaver the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board to join a prior back injury claim against the same employer. Following a lengthy and complex administrative process, the Board denied the worker’s claim for additional benefits, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Board's and Commission's decisions.

Horne v. Ahern Rentals, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B299605(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Elizabeth A. Grimes

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiffs filed suit against Ahern Rentals after Ruben Dickerson was killed in an accident on Ahern's premises while he was replacing the tires on one of Ahern's forklifts. Dickerson was employed by 24-Hour Tire Service as a tire changer and tire technician. Dickerson's surviving heirs were paid workers' compensation benefits by 24-Hour Tire's workers' compensation insurer. Plaintiffs alleged that Ahern's negligence was a substantial factor in causing Dickerson's death. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs failed to present evidence that Ahern affirmatively contributed to Dickerson's injuries under the retained control exception to the Privette rule under Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202. The court also held that there is no evidence that Ahern affirmatively contributed to Dickerson's injury and death.

Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 51

Opinion Date: June 8, 2020

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

This case arose from the 2015 mass shooting at Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains’ (“PPRM’s”) Colorado Springs facility, which left three people dead and nine seriously injured. The issue narrowed for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Robert Dear’s conduct as the shooter was the “predominant cause” of plaintiffs’ injuries such that PPRM’s conduct, even if it contributed to such injuries, could not be a substantial factor in causing them. Further, the Court was asked to address whether the plaintiffs established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether PPRM’s parent organization, Planned Parenthood Federation of America (“PPFA”), owed them a duty of care. The Court concluded plaintiffs indeed presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dear’s conduct was the predominant cause of their injuries; and as a matter of law, plaintiffs did not establish that PPFA owed them a legal duty. The Court affirmed judgment of the appellate court.

McCandless v. Pease

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46936

Opinion Date: June 11, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Max Pease failed to stop his vehicle before rear-ending Brent Weddle’s vehicle. The force of the collision caused Weddle’s vehicle to cross over into oncoming traffic and collide with a pickup truck owned by Mabel Robin Blackeagle. Dana McCandless was the driver of the pickup truck and Blackeagle was a passenger. A jury found Pease and Weddle negligent and awarded damages as a result. Dissatisfied with the amount of the verdict, McCandless and Blackeagle moved for a new trial on the comparative negligence and damages, and argued there were errors at trial to warrant a new one. The district court granted their motion in part and ordered a new trial unless Pease agreed to an additur of $4,000. Pease accepted the additur. McCandless and Blackeagle appealed the district court’s order on their motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order.

Gries v. Ames Ecumenical Housing, Inc.

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-1306

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to the continuing storm doctrine in this negligence action, holding that because a factual dispute existed as to whether there was a continuing storm the proper course was to instruct the jury on the doctrine and leave the fact-finding to the jury. Plaintiff sued Defendant, her landlord, after she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside her apartment building. The district court held that the district court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, Defendant had no duty at the time Plaintiff fell to remove or ameliorate the accumulation of snow or ice on the sidewalk pursuant to the continuing storm doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court declines Plaintiff's request to abandon the continuing storm doctrine; and (2) Defendant failed to establish the continuing storm doctrine entitled Defendant to judgment as a matter of law.

Whelan v. Armstrong International, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-40-18

Opinion Date: June 3, 2020

Judge: Barry T. Albin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Plaintiff Arthur Whelan filed suit against seven defendants, who allegedly manufactured or distributed products integrated with asbestos-containing components. Whelan claimed he was exposed to asbestos dust while working on those products, including their original asbestos-containing components or asbestos-containing replacement components. Defendants contended that Whelan could not establish that his exposure to asbestos was the result of any product they manufactured or distributed, disclaiming any liability for Whelan’s exposure to asbestos-containing replacement parts that they did not manufacture or distribute, even though the parts were incorporated into their products. Whelan countered that it made no difference whether he was exposed to defendants’ original asbestos-containing components or a third party’s asbestos-containing components -- defendants’ duty to warn and liability attached to both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that defendants had a duty to warn about the dangers of the asbestos-containing replacement components necessary for the continued functioning of their products and that defendants could be held strictly liable for the failure to do so, provided Whelan suffered sufficient exposure to the replacement components to contribute to his disease. After Whelan appealed, the Appellate Division issued Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 435 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 2014), which held that a defendant had a duty to warn, regardless of who manufactured the replacement components, because under the facts of that case, “it was reasonably foreseeable . . . that the gaskets and packing would be replaced regularly with gaskets and packing that contained asbestos.” The Appellate Division found that Whelan had “presented sufficient evidence detailing his exposure to asbestos,” either from defendants’ original or replacement components or from a third party’s replacement components, to withstand summary judgment. Thus, the Whelan panel reversed the summary judgment order and left the disputed issues of fact to be resolved by a jury. Finding no reversible error in the appellate panel's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.

Draughon v. Evening Star Holiness Church of Dunn

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 216A19

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Paul M. Newby

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action, holding that because the alleged defect was open and obvious and thus should have been evident to Plaintiff and because Plaintiff did not take reasonable care, summary judgment was properly granted. Plaintiff visited Defendant's church property for a funeral and helped carry the casket. Plaintiff tripped near the top of the stairs and was injured. The top step was visibly higher than the other steps and made of noticeably different materials. The trial court found that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the condition of the top step was open and obvious, whether the top step caused Plaintiff's fall, and whether Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the top step was an open and obvious condition such that a reasonably prudent person would have recognized it and taken appropriate care to avoid injury while using it; and (2) Plaintiff did not take the care that an ordinary person would have taken while carrying the casket up the set of stairs and so was contributorily negligent.

W&T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-1134

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Blacklock

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this labor dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), holding that Defendant did not carry its burden to establish that Plaintiff was its borrowed employee. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence after he was injured while working on an offshore drilling rig owned by Defendant. Although Plaintiff was not Defendant's employee, Defendant claimed that workers' compensation benefits were Plaintiff's sole remedy because Plaintiff was acting as its "borrowed employee" under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The jury found that Plaintiff was not Defendant's borrowed employee and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant's JNOV motion, finding that the submission of the borrowed-employee question to the jury was improper and that the evidence supported Defendant's borrowed-employee defense. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the borrowed-employee inquiry can be a fact question for the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that the borrowed-employee inquiry was a legal question for the court, not a fact question for the jury; but (2) Defendant did not establish that Plaintiff was its borrowed employee.

Craft v. State ex rel. Wyo. Department of Health

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 70

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Peasley

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit against the Wyoming State Hospital and its staff for medical malpractice, negligence, and wrongful death, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and that the Hospital and Dr. Sarah Rogers were not immune from suit. Robert Anderson died while in the custody of the Hospital. Prior to his death, Anderson had been adopted by his paternal grandmother, who had since died. Robert Craft, Anderson's biological father and his adoptive brother, and Sabrina Craft, Anderson's appointed personal representative and Robert's wife, brought this action. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the Crafts lacked standing and had failed to state a claim under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); (2) the Crafts were not qualified death beneficiaries because of Anderson's adoption; and (3) Dr. Rogers and the Hospital were immune from suit under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as Anderson's adoptive brother, Craft was a qualified wrongful death beneficiary; (2) Plaintiffs' allegations of medical malpractice, negligence, and medical malpractice were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss; and (3) Dr. Rogers and the Hospital were not immune from suit.

McMillan v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 68

Opinion Date: June 5, 2020

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Medical Commission upholding that decision of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division denying workers' compensation benefits because Appellant failed to establish a causal connection between his injury and employment, holding that the Commission's decision was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Division denied benefits because Appellant did not submit evidence establishing a causal connection between his injury and employment as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-603(a). The Commission upheld the denial of benefits after rejecting the opinions of Appellant's medical experts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's determination that Appellant failed to meet his burden under section 27-14-603(a) for an injury occurring over a substantial period of time was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.