Latest 14 Cases This Week: Geoffroy v. Town of Winchendon (1st Cir.), GGNSC Chestnut Hill LLC v. Schrader (1st Cir.), Marks v. Colorado Dept. of ...

What’s at Stake in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue? What the Equal Protection Clause Means in the Context of Classifications Based on Religiosity

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis emeritus professor Alan E. Brownstein comment on a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the question whether a religiously neutral student-aid program in Montana that affords students the choice of attending religious schools violates the religion clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Amar and Brownstein express no opinion as to whether the courts’ often-expressed concerns about striking down invidiously motivated laws can be effectively overcome, but they contend that jurists who reject invalidating invidiously motivated laws must explain why reasons sufficient in other contexts are not persuasive in this case.

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Geoffroy v. Town of Winchendon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1573

Opinion Date: May 13, 2020

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's age discrimination and Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) claims, holding that Plaintiff's OWBPA-compliant waiver and release were knowing and voluntary under federal common law. Plaintiff, a former Winchendon police officer, decided to resign with a pension after the Defendants determined that he had made several threats against his former girlfriend. Plaintiff resigned instead of facing termination and the possibility of losing his pension and being criminally charged. Plaintiff signed a separation agreement agreeing to waive and release any claims he had against Defendants up and through signing the agreement. Plaintiff later brought a complaint alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and defamation, alleging that the waiver and release in his separation agreement violated the OWBPA and were thus invalid. The district court granted summary judgment on the age discrimination and OWBPA claims for Defendants, and a jury found for Defendants on the retaliation and defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding (1) the waiver and release did not violate the OWBPA and were knowing and voluntary; and (2) Defendant's argument that the district court abused its discretion in withdrawing an exhibit at trial was meritless.

GGNSC Chestnut Hill LLC v. Schrader

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-1779

Opinion Date: May 11, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Health Law, Personal Injury

In this case concerning arbitration agreements, nursing homes, and wrongful death claims under Massachusetts law, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court compelling arbitration after first certifying two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), holding that the SJC's decision compelled the First Circuit to affirmed the judgment compelling arbitration. The personal representative of a deceased former nursing home resident brought a state wrongful death action against a set of organizations that oversaw the nursing home (collectively, nursing home). The nursing home sued to compel arbitration. The federal court compelled arbitration. On appeal, the personal representative argued that she was not bound by the decedent’s agreement to arbitrate with the nursing home because her wrongful death right of recovery was independent of the decedent’s wrongful death claim. The First Circuit certified questions of law to the SJC. After the SJC answered that claims of statutory beneficiaries under the state's wrongful death statute are derivative of the decedent's own cause of action, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the SJC's decision required this Court to affirm the judgment compelling arbitration.

Marks v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1114

Opinion Date: May 12, 2020

Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-appellant Nancy Marks was serving a prison term in Colorado when she obtained entry into a community corrections program operated by Intervention Community Corrections Services (Intervention). To stay in the program, plaintiff needed to remain employed. But while participating in the program, she aggravated a previous disability and Intervention deemed her unable to work. So Intervention terminated plaintiff from the program and returned her to prison. Plaintiff sued, blaming her regression on two Colorado agencies,: the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and the Colorado Department of Criminal Justice (CDCJ). In the suit, plaintiff sought damages and prospective relief based on: (1) a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act; and (2) a denial of equal protection. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief and granted summary judgment to the CDOC and CDCJ on the remaining claims, holding: (1) the Rehabilitation Act did not apply because Intervention had not received federal funding; (2) neither the CDOC nor the CDCJ could incur liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act for Intervention’s decision to regress plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff did not show the regression decision lacked a rational basis. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that (1) claims for prospective relief were moot and (2) neither the CDOC nor CDCJ violated plaintiff's right to equal protection. However, the Court reversed on the award of summary judgment on claims involving the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, finding the trial court mistakenly concluded the Rehabilitation Act did not apply because Intervention had not received federal funding, and mistakenly focused on whether the CDOC and CDCJ could incur liability under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act for a regression decision unilaterally made by Intervention, "This focus reflects a misunderstanding of Ms. Marks’s claim and the statutes." The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Troutman v. Seaboard Atlantic Ltd.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-10533

Opinion Date: May 13, 2020

Judge: Martin

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Personal Injury

After plaintiff was injured while working as a longshoreman, he filed suit against Seaboard, seeking to hold them liable under the Longshore Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff fell from a walkway on the upper deck of the ship where he was working and sustained serious injuries. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Seaboard on plaintiff's negligence claim, holding that the exposed walkway was an open and obvious hazard that plaintiff could have avoided with the exercise of reasonable care. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim.

Arace v. Medico Investments, LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E071194(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 11, 2020

Judge: Art W. McKinster

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-respondent Melanie Arace, as personal representative and successor in interest for Grace R. Miller (Miller) and trustee of the Grace R. Miller Trust dated May 8, 2002, filed a complaint against Medico Investments, LLC (Medico), a residential care facility, and others. Plaintiff alleged that Medico, or its employee Elizabeth Colon (Colon), engaged in multiple acts of elder abuse of Miller. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, who was awarded damages, attorney fees, and costs. On appeal, Medico contended: (1) the trial court erred in denying its motion to continue the trial based on the unavailability of a material witness; (2) the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs; and (3) plaintiff was not entitled to economic damages under her claim for elder abuse (neglect) since the jury declined to award noneconomic damages. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment against Medico.

Shuler v. Capital Agricultural Property Services, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B289202(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiffs challenged the trial court's reduction of economic damages awarded by the jury in a negligence/trespass action where the jury returned a special verdict in plaintiffs' favor and against Capital Agriculture. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to vacate the 68 percent reduction of the economic damages award. The court held that the trial court erred by reducing Capital Agriculture's joint and several liability for economic damages, and agreed with plaintiffs that Capital Agriculture was jointly and severally liable for 100 percent of the economic damages, reduced by 2 percent for plaintiffs' contributory negligence and an offset for amounts paid by settling tortfeasors.

Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E071693(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 8, 2020

Judge: Raphael

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Health Law, Personal Injury

In June 2018, plaintiffs-respondents Suzanne Yang and Doc Yang Medical Corporation sued defendants-appellants Tenet Healthcare Inc. doing business as John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital (the hospital), its medical staff, and individual doctors, alleging defamation and nine other causes of action. Defendants filed a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) targeting only the defamation cause of action. Dr. Yang alleged that since March 2016, defendants conspired to drive her practice out of business in various ways, including by making defamatory statements. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion contended that the statements were protected activity because they were made in connection with the hospital’s peer review process, and because they were made in furtherance of the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Defendants also contended that Dr. Yang could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing because she consented to the peer review process that the statements were purportedly in connection with, and because the statements were privileged. Applying the California Supreme Court's recent opinion in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019), and concluded defendants’ conduct arose from protected activity because their allegedly defamatory statements were made in connection with an issue of public interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded Dr. Yang did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. The Court therefore reversed the trial court, which denied the anti-SLAPP motion.

Anctil v. Cassese

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 59

Opinion Date: May 12, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Family Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint for protection from harassment against Gladys Cassese, holding that Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4654(1) does not always preclude the court from adjudicating a protection from harassment complaint without first holding a hearing. On appeal, Appellant argued that the court was required to hold a hearing before adjudicating his complaint and that, alternatively, the court erred when it dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a court is not prohibited in all circumstances from dismissing a protection from harassment complaint without first holding a hearing; and (2) the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Kappel v. Prater

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC98010

Opinion Date: May 12, 2020

Judge: Paul C. Wilson

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Fredric Prater was liable for $20,000 in damages after a car accident with Denise Kappel, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the rental car Kappel was driving at the time of the accident. Denise was at a stop when Prater drove into her rental car from behind. Denise and her husband (the Kappels) sued Prater for negligence. At trial, the circuit court admitting into evidence, over the Kappels' objection, photographs showing the post-accident damage to the front of his car and the rear of the rental car Denise was driving. The jury found Prater liable for negligence and awarded $20,000 in damages, significantly less than the $650,000 the Kappels sought. The Kappels appealed, arguing that the photographs should not have been admitted because their quality was too low and because there was no expert evidence connecting the amount of damage to Denise's vehicle to the issue of whether the collision caused the injuries she claimed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.

Colon v. Martin

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 02681

Opinion Date: May 7, 2020

Judge: Feinman

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' personal injury action against, among other defendants, the City of New York, based on Plaintiffs' failure to submit to pre-action N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 50-h hearings, holding that a claimant does not have the right to observe a coclaimant's section 50-h oral examination over the municipality's objection. Plaintiffs served Defendants with a joint notice of claim, arguing that they suffered personal injuries and other damages due to Defendants' negligence. Defendants served separate notices of 50-h hearing, advising that Plaintiffs were required by law to be orally examined concerning their allegations before commencing an action. Plaintiffs appeared for their section 50-h hearings, but their attorney refused to let the hearings proceed unless each plaintiff could be present while the other testified. Defendants rejected Plaintiffs' requested procedure, and no section 50-h hearings occurred. Supreme Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs' failure to submit to the section 50-h hearings. Supreme Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 50-h does not provide a claimant the right to observe a coclaimant's section 50-h oral examination over the municipality's objection.

Payne v. Kerns

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 31

Opinion Date: May 12, 2020

Judge: Douglas L. Combs

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In 2010, plaintiff-appellant James Payne pled nolo contendere to stalking in Case No. CF-2010-27 in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma. He received a five-year deferment with special rules and conditions of probation. He was required to have no contact with the stalking victim. In addition, Payne pled guilty to violating a protective order in many other cases filed in Pittsburg County related to the same victim and was sentenced to six months in the county jail. The sentences were to run concurrently. He received extra credits and was released from custody on May 5, 2010. A month later, on June 10, 2010, the district attorney filed a motion to accelerate the deferred judgment for probation violations, alleging Payne had been contacting and harassing the victim. The district court issued a felony warrant and Payne was arrested and booked into jail by the Pittsburg County Sheriff's Office on June 11, 2010. Payne did not post bail and remained in the county jail. The district court ultimately executed a minute order finding Payne guilty of violating the terms of his deferred sentence, for which he received a five year sentence: four suspended and one year to serve in the Department of Corrections. Payne received credit for time served in the county jail since his June 10 arrest. The Judgment and Sentence ordered Payne into DOC custody and directed the Pittsburg Sheriff's office to transfer Payne to the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center to begin serving his time in DOC custody. The Sheriff's Office of Pittsburg County did not transfer Payne to the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC) until September 6, 2011, almost three months past the end of his sentence. Payne was released that same day without serving any of his time in DOC custody. Payne sue various Pittsburg county corrections and governmental officials, arguing his constitutional rights had been violated because he remained in custody beyond his sentence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari on the remaining issue preserved for review, i.e., whether a private right of action under Article 2 Section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution existed under the facts of this case. The Court held a private right of action existed at the time Payne was detained past his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings.

Taylor v. University of Utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 UT 21

Opinion Date: May 8, 2020

Judge: Himonas

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court excluding Plaintiffs' proximate cause expert's testimony, holding that the district court did not err. Plaintiffs brought suit against the University of Utah Hospital alleging that the Hospital's treatment of their daughter's baclofen withdrawal caused the daughter's permanent injuries. The Hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' causation expert, arguing that the testimony should be barred under Utah R. Evid. 702 because the expert's opinion was not based upon sufficient facts or data. The district court agreed and excluded the testimony. At issue on appeal was whether the threshold showing that the principles or methods underlying in the expert's testimony were based upon sufficient facts or data where the method - logical deduction - was based upon broad and attenuated facts. The Supreme Court held that the showing was not present in this case, and therefore, the district court properly excluded the expert testimony on proximate cause.

Padula-Wilson v. Landry

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190107

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: McCullough

Areas of Law: Family Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' demurrers to Plaintiff's claims alleging that various professionals who participated in custody and visitation proceedings tortiously interfered with her parental rights, holding that the tort of interference with parental rights did not extend to the facts alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff, the mother of three children, challenged the proceedings resulting an order awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children to their father. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged tortious interference with parental rights and defamation. Plaintiff alleged that professionals such as the children's guardian ad litem, counselors, and therapists conspired, lied, and acted maliciously to deprive her of the rightful custody of her children. Plaintiff further alleged that one of the therapists defamed her. The circuit court granted the defendants' demurrers to the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the allegations made in the complaint did not give rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with parental rights; and (2) the circuit court properly dismissed the defamation claims against the therapist.

Viers v. Baker

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190222

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: William C. Mims

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this action in which Plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the Commonwealth's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the conduct alleged was insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but reversed the circuit court's ruling that Defendant was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claim. After she was fired, Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant in the Commonwealth's attorney's office, filed this complaint against Chadwick Seth Baker, the Commonwealth's attorney for Dickenson County, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Baker filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss. The circuit court sustained Baker's demurrer, ruling that termination of at-will employment did not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity regarding the defamation claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) absolute immunity does not apply to a Commonwealth's attorney's allegedly defamatory statements about why he made the decision to fire an employee; and (2) Plaintiff did not adequately plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.