Latest 15 Cases This Week: Echeverry v. Jazz Casino Co., LLC (5th Cir.), Connell v. Lima Corporate (9th Cir.), Punches v. McCarrey Glenn ...

The Upside-Down Treatment of Religious Exceptions Cases in the Supreme Court

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week to reject an emergency application from the State of Alabama to lift a stay on the execution of Willie B. Smith III. Professor Dorf observes the Court’s unusual alignment of votes in the decision and argues that, particularly as reflected by the recent COVID-19 decisions, the liberal and conservative Justices have essentially swapped places from the seminal 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, which established that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to exceptions from neutral laws of general applicability.

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Echeverry v. Jazz Casino Co., LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-30038

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Leslie Southwick

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion. After plaintiff was injured when a manlift struck her outside Harrah's Casino in New Orleans, a jury found Jazz Casino negligent, assigning it 49% of the fault. Plaintiff was awarded, among other jury awards, $1,000,000 for future pain and suffering. The Casino appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of negligence under a negligent hiring theory, operational control theory, and authorization of unsafe work practices theory presented to jurors. The court also held that none of the objected-to evidence was erroneously admitted at trial. However, the court held that the jury's $1,000,000 award for future pain, suffering, mental anguish, disability, scarring, and disfigurement was excessive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Casino's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial, vacated the award for future pain and suffering, and remanded for further proceedings.

Connell v. Lima Corporate

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-35797

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Ryan D. Nelson

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lima Corporate in a diversity action brought by plaintiffs, alleging product liability and negligence claims relating to a hip implant. The panel held that in light of the statutory text, context, and stated purpose, Lima Corporate was a biomaterials supplier of its Hip Stem – a "component part" supplied "for use in the manufacture of an implant" pursuant to the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act (BAAA), 21 U.S.C. 1602(1)(A). In this case, Lima Corporate was immune from liability under the BAAA and, under the circumstances, could not be impleaded under section 1606.

Punches v. McCarrey Glenn Apartments LLC

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17465

Opinion Date: February 12, 2021

Judge: Carney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant, Personal Injury

In March 2014, Evvie Punches rented a one-bedroom apartment in the Conifer Groves complex in Anchorage; she renewed the lease in April 2015. The complex was owned by McCarrey Glen Apartments, LLC and managed by Weidner Property Management, LCC. Punches complained to the property manager since moving in regarding air quality in the apartment, and mold around the toilet. These issues continued despite a number of attempts by Weidner’s maintenance staff to fix them. Punches nonetheless renewed her lease in April 2015. When the property manager tried to arrange an inspection, Punches refused to allow maintenance staff into her apartment because she would not be home. Punches moved out of her apartment on March 2016 after delivering Weidner a “Notice of Defects in Essential Services.” Her notice listed issues with the front door, mold on the ceiling, mold on the carpet, damage from a previous fire, water damage, and “insufficient windows” that permitted “free flowing air throughout” the apartment. Punches moved to Minneapolis some time after she left her Alaska apartment, and sought care in Minnesota for various skin infections and reported that she had been exposed to mold for two years. She continued to pursue a connection between mold exposure and her recurring skin infections and other ailments. In 2017, she sued her former landlord and the property management company, claiming the companies negligently failed to eradicate mold in her apartment, thereby breaching the habitability provisions of the lease and causing her to suffer personal injury and property damage. After considerable delay involving discovery disputes, the superior court granted summary judgment dismissing Punches' personal injury claim. The parties went to trial on the tenant’s property damage and contract claims after the superior court precluded the tenant from introducing evidence relating to her personal injury claim. The jury rejected Punches' claims, and judgment was entered in favor of the companies. Punches appealed, contending that the court erred by ruling against her in discovery disputes, by denying her a further extension of time to oppose summary judgment, and by limiting the evidence she could present at trial. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion when making the challenged rulings, and therefore affirmed the judgment against the tenant.

Esterline Technologies Corp. v. Brownlee

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 Ark. 33

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Petitioners - Respondent's employer, its corporate parent, and a fellow employee - asking the court to dismiss Respondent's declaratory judgment action because declaratory judgment would be improper on the facts, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear this petition. Respondent was injured in a workplace accident and received workers' compensation benefits because of his injuries. Respondent brought this declaratory judgment action, arguing that the petition was necessary to establish the legal relations between the parties. Petitioners filed this petition for writ of prohibition arguing that the Workers' Compensation Commission held exclusive jurisdiction for any claims Respondent had against his employers. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Respondent's remedies against his employer were those outlined under the Workers' Compensation Act.

White v. Owen

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 Ark. 31

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this case stemming from a motor vehicle accident the Supreme Court affirmed as modified the circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' claims against against Defendant, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the claims but directed that the dismissal be without prejudice. In his motion to dismiss, Defendant alleged that he had not been properly or timely served and requested that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) and 12(b)(5). The circuit court found that the motion should be granted and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by concluding that service of the summons and complaint on Defendant was insufficient; but (2) because Plaintiffs' timely attempted service commenced the suit for purpose of the savings statute, the statute of limitations was tolled and provided Plaintiffs one year to refile their suit.

Collins v. County of San Diego

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D077063(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-Respondent David Collins suffered serious injuries following his arrest by San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies for public intoxication. After a three-week trial, a jury found in favor of Collins on his negligence claims against the two deputies involved in the arrest and two nurses employed by the County of San Diego (County) who attended to Collins while in jail. On appeal from the subsequent judgment and the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the County raised five claims of error: (1) the jury’s finding that the deputies had a reasonable basis to arrest Collins foreclosed his claim of negligence against the deputies; (2) the court erred by instructing the jury it could find the deputies liable for injuries caused by private physicians who treated Collins after he was released from custody; (3) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury it could not hold defendants liable for an injury Collins sustained while in jail; (4) governmental immunity requires reversal of the judgment against one of the nurse defendants; and (5) the court erred in its calculation of the amount of setoff the defendants were entitled to based on Collins’s prior settlement with the private physicians and their employer. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment.

Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B297393(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

After Norris Morgan was diagnosed with mesothelioma in December 2017, he and his wife filed suit against J-MM and others. The jury concluded that Morgan was exposed to asbestos from products that J-MM sold, and that J-MM was partly responsible for Morgan’s mesothelioma; awarded compensatory damages; and concluded that J-MM had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, and awarded an additional $15,000,000 as punitive damages. Based on the jury's apportionment of fault, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff and his wife against J-MM for $22,213,704.39. The trial court subsequently denied J-MM's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. The Court of Appeal concluded that the record contains evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that Morgan was exposed to asbestos from pipe supplied by J-MM; the trial court was not required to give J-MM's requested jury instruction that J-MM was not liable for the conduct of another company; and the jury's punitive damage award is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the award of punitive damages and affirmed in all other respects.

Ryser v. Shelter Mutual Insurance

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 CO 11

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether an injured passenger riding in a vehicle negligently driven by one co-worker and owned by another co-worker, when all three were acting within the course and scope of their employment, could recover UM/UIM benefits under the vehicle owner’s insurance policy. Although the parties disputed the meaning of the phrases “legally entitled to recover” and “legally entitled to collect” under section 10-4-609, C.R.S. (2020) the Court did not resolve that dispute here because, assuming without deciding that plaintiff Kent Ryser’s interpretation was correct, the Court concluded that he still could not prevail. Specifically, the Court found an injured co-worker was barred by operation of the Workers’ Compensation Act's (“WCA”) exclusivity and co-employee immunity principles from recovering UM/UIM benefits from a co-employee vehicle owner’s insurer for damages stemming from a work-related accident in which another co-employee negligently drove the owner’s vehicle and the injured party was an authorized passenger. Though the Court's reasoning differed from the appellate court's judgment, it affirmed the outcome: summary judgment was properly entered in favor of the insurance company.

Stanley v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47924

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

At issue in this appeal was whether claimant Curtis Stanley filed a timely complaint against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") when Stanley filed his complaint more than five years after his industrial accident and more than one year after receiving his last payment of income benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) held it did not have continuing jurisdiction to entertain Stanley’s complaint against ISIF for non-medical benefits. The Commission found Idaho Code section 72-706 barred Stanley’s complaint and dismissed it. Stanley appealed, arguing continuing jurisdiction over medical benefits alone was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over complaints against ISIF and that the Commission erred in determining section 72-706 barred his complaint. Finding the Commission erred in determining section 72-706 barred Stanley's complaint, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision.

Elder v. Kentucky Retirement Systems

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2017-SC-0258-DG

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming denial of disability retirement benefits by the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems, holding that the lower courts misinterpreted the holding in Kentucky Retirement Systems v. West, 413 S.W.3d 578 (Ky. 2013), leading to multiple errors. At issue was the proof required of a public employee with less than sixteen years' credit to establish that his genetic condition that was present at conception but dormant until after twelve years on the job was not a "pre-existing" condition disqualifying him from benefits under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.600(3)(d). Defendant was denied benefits, and the circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's reading of West and its denial of disability retirement benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple errors occurred, and each error was arbitrary, capricious,

Martin v. Warrior Coal LLC

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2020-SC-0055-WC

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Hughes

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decisions of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Workers' Compensation Board that the twelve percent interest on workers' compensation income benefits that were due but unpaid under the prior version of Ken. Rev. Stat. 342.040 applied in this case, holding that the six percent interest rate provided for in the 2017 amendment to the statute was applicable to all of Appellant's due but unpaid benefits. After the 2017 amendment, section 342.040 now provides for an interest rate of six percent on due but unpaid benefits. In 2016, Appellant experienced a compensable injury. Appellant filed a claim after the effective date of the amendment in 2017 and was awarded income benefits by an ALJ in 2018. Both the ALJ and the Board concluded that the twelve percent interest rate continued to apply to that portion of Appellant's benefit award that was attributable to the period before the 2017 effective date of the amendment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the General ASsembly's non-codified but express language regarding its intent with respect to the interest rate set forth in the 2017 amendment, the entirety of Appellant's benefit award was subject to the amended six percent interest rate.

Wenger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 MT 37

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the jury's verdict that Travis Elbert was not negligent when he struck Diane Wenger with his vehicle as she was crossing Main Street in East Helena after dark, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling in limine to limit witness testimony on Montana statutes or on ultimate legal conclusions; (2) publication of Wenger's irrelevant, private health information to the jury was improperly allowed, but Defendant was not entitled to a trial trial on this basis; and (3) any potential error by the district court in prohibiting Wenger from arguing an approved jury instruction in closing was harmless.

Greene v. Esplanade Venture Partnership

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2021 NY Slip Op 01092

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Fahey

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this case disputing whether Plaintiff, who was in close proximity to her grandchild when he was involved in a fatal accident, may pursue a claim for bystander recovery under a "zone of danger" theory, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's grandchild was "immediately family" for the purpose of applying the zone of danger rule. Plaintiff was with her two-year-old granddaughter in front of a building when they were struck by falling debris from the facade of the building. The grandchild died from the accident. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting negligence and wrongful death. Plaintiff then sought leave to amend the complaint to assert an additional cause of action under the "zone of danger" doctrine. Supreme Court granted the motion to amend, concluding that Plaintiff should be considered an immediate family member and afforded a right to recover for her emotional injuries. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that leave to amend should have been denied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a grandchild is the "immediate family" of a grandparent for the purpose of applying the zone of danger rule.

Johnson v. Menard, Inc.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 19

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Menard, Inc. (“Menards”) appealed an order denying a motion for summary judgment, an order denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law, an order granting attorney’s fees, an order as to the amount of attorney’s fees recoverable and entry of judgment, and a judgment. In 2013, Darlene Johnson visited a Menards store in Minot to exchange an item. A Menards employee directed Johnson to find the exchange in the store and return to the service counter. Johnson turned toward her right and started walking away. Almost immediately, Johnson tripped over a flatbed cart. The cart was one Menards offers its customers to use while in the store. As a result of the trip and fall, Johnson cracked seven teeth. 2017, Johnson filed a negligence action against Menards in small claims court seeking damages in the amount of $14,818.00. Menards removed the case to district court. Johnson then amended her claim with the consent of Menards. In the amended complaint, Johnson sought a jury trial and “a reasonable amount but not less than $50,000” in damages. Before trial, Menards moved for summary judgment contesting whether sufficient facts created a duty of care it owed to Johnson. The court denied the motion. At trial, Menards moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Johnson’s case. Menards again claimed insufficient evidence existed to require a duty of care Menards owed Johnson. Alternatively, Menards argued it had met any duty it owed Johnson. The court denied the motion. Menards did not renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its case or after the jury returned the verdict. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, but remanded for consideration of Johnson's attorney's fees for this appeal.

Oden v. Minot Builders Supply, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 30

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Jon J. Jensen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Chris Oden appealed a district court order vacating a transcribed Missouri foreign judgment. Oden argued: (1) vacating the transcribed Missouri judgment violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) the court erred in relying on a decision issued between the parties in prior litigation because that decision was barred by administrative res judicata as the result of Oden’s Missouri workers compensation claim; and (3) the court erred by affording a prior judgment res judicata effect while that case was pending on appeal. In May 2010, Oden was injured in Missouri while employed by Minot Builders Supply. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) accepted the claim and awarded benefits for Oden’s injuries. In May 2013, Oden filed a claim for compensation in Missouri for the same work-related injury. In October 2013, WSI suspended payment of further benefits on Oden’s claim after Oden claimed benefits Missouri. Subsequent to Oden settling his Missouri workers compensation claim, WSI sent Oden notice that the prior North Dakota workers compensation award was being reversed because Oden’s receipt of benefits in Missouri. WSI provided notice to Oden his workers compensation benefits were being denied, informed Oden he would need to reimburse WSI, and informed Oden he had thirty days to request reconsideration. Oden did not request reconsideration of WSI’s decision. In July 2018, WSI commenced an action in North Dakota against Oden seeking reimbursement for previous payments made to Oden. The district court in the Burleigh County case granted summary judgment in favor of WSI and awarded WSI the full amount paid to Oden, plus accruing interest, costs, and disbursements. Oden argued in the North Dakota case that WSI was bound by the Missouri workers compensation settlement because the settlement agreement included a signature of an attorney purportedly acting on behalf of WSI. The court determined WSI could not be bound by the Missouri agreement because WSI was not a party to the settlement, and there was no evidence to support a finding that the attorney who purportedly signed on behalf of WSI had any authority to represent WSI or act as WSI’s agent. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court.