Constitutional Problems With the Kentucky Proposal (Supported by Mitch McConnell) to Change the Way U.S. Senate Vacancies Are Filled

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

In this second of a series of columns, Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on the Kentucky proposal to change the way U.S. Senate vacancies are filled. Dean Amar argues that the Seventeenth Amendment precludes such a proposal, which would allow the state legislature to substantively constrain the governor’s choices in making a temporary appointment.

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United States v. De Jesus-Gomez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 17-1925

Opinion Date: March 18, 2021

Judge: Boudin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

In this civil forfeiture action against a 2008 33' Contender Model Tournament Vessel, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district judge striking Appellants' answer and claims and granted the government's motion for default judgment, holding that the district court did not err. The district court entered default judgment in favor of the government due to Appellants continually missing their discovery deadlines. After Appellants once again missed a discovery deadline, the district court denied their motion for an extension. The court then granted the government's motion to strike Appellants' answer and claims and the motion for default judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district judge was well within her discretion in striking Appellants' answer and claims and granting the government's motion for default judgment.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 15-1823

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Jose A. Cabranes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In this Fair Housing Act of 1968 case, plaintiff's claims stemmed from his neighbor's verbal attacks and attempted intimidation of plaintiff based on his race. The principal question presented to the en banc court is whether a plaintiff states a claim under the Act and parallel state statutes for intentional discrimination by alleging that his landlord failed to respond to reported race-based harassment by a fellow tenant. The en banc court concluded that landlords cannot be presumed to have the degree of control over tenants that would be necessary to impose liability under the FHA for tenant-on-tenant misconduct. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a claim that the KPM Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of the FHA, Sections 1981 and 1982, or the New York State Human Rights Law. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the KPM Defendants under New York law.

Green v. Mercy Housing, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-15134

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Marsha Siegel Berzon

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of costs to Mercy Housing in an action brought by a former tenant under the Fair Housing Act. The panel joined the the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, all of which have applied the Christiansburg standard, and held that a plaintiff bringing suit under the Fair Housing Act should not be assessed fees or costs unless the court determines that his claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition. The panel remanded for further proceedings.

Shoreline Shellfish, LLC v. Branford

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20392

Opinion Date: March 30, 2021

Judge: D’Auria

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this dispute over who had the authority to lease shellfishing beds on behalf of the Town of Branford, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town, holding that summary judgment was improper. Plaintiffs had been granted the right of first refusal by Branford's Shellfish Commission to lease certain shellfishing grounds located in the Town, but the Commission leased the grounds to Plaintiffs' competitor. Plaintiff brought this action alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel and that it enjoyed a right of first refusal. The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing that the right of first refusal was no a valid or enforceable contract because the Commission lacked authority to enter into it. The trial court agreed, holding that only the Town's Board of Selectmen had authority to lease the shellfishing beds on behalf of the Town. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.

Hoffman v. City of Boise

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47590

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

Appellants were five individuals and one Idaho limited liability company (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) who owned real property in the City of Boise (“City”) and paid ad valorem taxes to Ada County, Idaho. Plaintiffs brought an action in district court challenging ordinances the City passed that allocate tax increment financing (“TIF”) revenues to Capital City Development Corporation (“CCDC”), the City’s urban renewal agency. Specifically, the ordinances approved the allocation of TIF revenues for CCDC’s use in the Shoreline District Urban Renewal Project Area and Gateway East Economic Development District Project Area. Because Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were solely predicated upon their status as taxpayers, the district court dismissed their complaint for lack of standing. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Plaintiffs alleged they had standing under Koch v. Canyon County, 177 P.3d 372 (2008), in which the Supreme Court held that no particularized harm was necessary to establish taxpayer standing where a violation of article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution was alleged. Because the Supreme Court determined here that, as a matter of law, the ordinances Plaintiffs challenged did not violate article VIII, section 3, it affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Latvala v. Green Enterprises Inc.

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47296

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

At issue was whether a prescriptive easement existed to provide road access and utilities to a land-locked parcel and mining claim on Lake Pend Oreille in northern Idaho. Matt and Bonnie Latvala purchased the land-locked parcel, known as “Sulphide South,” in 2015 and litigation soon followed. Following a four-day bench trial and site visit, the district court quieted a prescriptive easement to the Latvalas through and over what was known as South Camp Bay Road, as well as confirming and defining an express easement across another parcel known as “Sulphide North.” Some neighboring landowners appealed the district court’s judgment, arguing the court’s findings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence. These neighbors also argued the district court erroneously allowed the prescriptive easement to be unreasonably expanded. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the use of the road at issue by Latvala’s predecessors in interest during the active mining years (1946 to 1954) created a prescriptive easement; however, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment expanding the scope of the easement.The district court’s award of costs to Latvala as the prevailing party was vacated and the matter remanded so that the district court could consider Latvala’s remaining claims about whether South Camp Bay Road was a public road and whether he has an easement by necessity.

Radford v. Van Orden

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47364

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

Respondent Mark Radford sued Appellant Jay Van Orden for damages from trespass of lands and trespass of cattle, among other claims, and also sued Appellant Seven J Ranches, Inc. (“Seven J”) for reimbursement for the construction of a partition fence pursuant to Idaho Code section 35-103. The two cases were later consolidated. Upon Van Orden’s motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that Radford had standing to sue Van Orden for trespass, even though Radford was not the property owner when the trespass occurred, because the previous property owner executed an assignment of claims to him. After a five-day bench trial, the district court found Van Orden was liable for trespass and awarded damages to Radford, and required Seven J to reimburse Radford for one half of a constructed partition fence. The district court also found Van Orden was not liable for trespass of cattle and ordered Radford to construct a gate at the southern edge of his property to allow Van Orden to access an easement that runs across Radford’s property. The district court determined Radford to be the overall prevailing party and awarded attorney fees only against Seven J. Van Orden and Seven J appealed the district court’s standing determination on summary judgment, the damages awarded against Van Orden on Radford’s trespass claim, the reimbursement awarded on the partition fence claim against Seven J, and the prevailing party determination for purpose of awarding attorney fees. Radford cross-appealed the district court’s denial of his claim for trespass of cattle damages and the district court’s requirement that he construct a gate for Van Orden at the edge of his property. Concerning Radford and Seven J’s appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings that: (1) Radford had standing; (2) Radford proved the trespass damages with reasonable certainty; (3) Radford’s partition fence notice to Seven J was sufficient and required Seven J to reimburse Radford for the fence; (4) Radford was the prevailing party against Seven J and was entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees against Seven J. As to Radford’s cross-appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Radford was required to remove his fence across the prescriptive easement or install a gate for Van Orden’s ingress and egress. However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision denying Radford damages for trespass of cattle against Van Orden, and remanded with instructions to consider whether Van Orden was entitled to relief under his unjust enrichment theory.

Tech Landing LLC v. JLH Ventures LLC

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46949

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2013, Tech Landing, LLC leased a building to JLH Ventures, LLC (“JLH”) to operate a paintball business. After the building burned down in 2017, Tech Landing sued JLH, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. The breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims involved payment of rent after the building was destroyed and the failure to insure the building against fire loss. Those claims were dismissed by stipulation of the parties and were not at issue here. With respect to its negligence claim, Tech Landing alleged the fire was caused by the negligence of JLH. After ruling certain opinions of Tech Landing’s expert witnesses were inadmissible, the district court granted summary judgment to JLH. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling on the admissibility of the expert opinions, but reversed its grant of summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact that had to be decided by a jury.

Lewis v. Howard L. Allen Investments, Inc.

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-1640

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: McDermott

Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment dismissing Kristina Lewis's negligence claims against Howard L. Allen Investments, Inc. (Allen Investments), holding that Allen Investments did not owe a duty to protect Lewis from the harm she suffered. Allen Investments sold a house under a contract of sale that required the buyers to make monthly payments for ten years. Five years into the payment period the buyers leased the house to Lewis and her fiancé. The house subsequently caught fire, causing Lewis to suffer serious injuries. Lewis brought this negligence action against the buyers and Allen Investments. The district court granted summary judgment for Allen Investments, concluding that the company, as a contract seller, owed no duty to Lewis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Allen Investments was not the landlord of the property under Iowa's Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Iowa Code chapter 562A; and (2) Allen Investments owed no duty of care to Lewis to maintain the property.

H&B Realty, LLC v. JJ Cars, LLC

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2021 ME 14

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Ellen A. Gorman

Areas of Law: Contracts, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Business and Consumer Docket in favor of JJ Cars, LLC and John Mokarzel on H&B Realty, LLC's complaint for breach of contract, holding that there was no error in the court's judgment. The lower court determined that H&B breached the lease in this case by unreasonably withholding consent to a proposed sublease. On appeal, H&B argued that the court erred in applying the affirmative defenses, as pleaded by JJ Cars and Mokarzel, of breach of contract and failure to mitigate damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was competent record evidence to support the court's finding that H&B materially breached the lease by refusing to consent to sublet the property.

Moyant v. Petit

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2021 ME 13

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Joseph Jabar

Areas of Law: Native American Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the superior court did not err in determining that Appellant's dispute with Regina Petit and the Passamaquoddy Tribe was an "internal tribal matter." After Appellant contacted the Chief of Police for the Passamaquoddy Tribe and caused Appellant to be served with a no-trespass notice, Appellant filed a complaint against Petit and the Tribe. The superior court granted Petit and the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the dispute involved an "internal tribal matter." The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the most appropriate forum for this case was the tribal court.

Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. Aaland, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citations: 2020 ND 196, 2021 ND 57

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Landowners Cash Aaland, Larry Bakko, and Penny Cirks, appealed orders granting the Cass County Joint Water Resource District (the “District”) a right of entry onto their properties to conduct surveys and examinations related to the Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion Project. The Landowners argued these surveys and examinations are beyond the scope of N.D.C.C. 32-15-06. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the District’s right of entry exceeded the limited testing permitted under the statute. The matter was remanded for a determination on attorney’s fees and costs.

Martin v. Wilson

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-339

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court entered in favor of Plaintiffs, Charles and Nicole Martin, on their claim for injunctive relief allowing them to access a common driveway for the purpose of entering and existing their property and enjoining Defendants, Glenn and Valerie Wilson, from interfering with such use, holding that the trial justice did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice (1) did not err by allowing parol evidence to be admitted; (2) neither overlooked nor misconceived material evidence in finding that Plaintiffs established an implied easement over the disputed section of the common driveway; and (3) did not err by finding that Defendants' counterclaims for declaratory judgment, trespass, and equitable relief were moot.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Medina

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 19-241

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Long

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court confirming the judicial foreclosure of Defendant's home in favor of Plaintiff, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, holding that the superior court did not err. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred by confirming the foreclosure sale because she had not been provided a copy of a notice of foreclosure counseling at least forty-five days prior to receiving the certified letter and that Plaintiff foreclosed the property without holding the note or the mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in confirming the judicial foreclosure sale; and (2) because Plaintiff had been assigned the mortgage prior to the foreclosure sale it did not need to hold the note in order to foreclose on the property.

Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0983

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Debra Lehrmann

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this second action arising out of a joint effort by TRO-X, L.P. and Eagle Oil & Gas Co. to acquire and sell oil-and-gas the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Eagle, holding that Eagle did not conclusively establish the affirmative defenses that were the basis of its summary judgment motion. In its first suit, TRO-X alleged that Eagle deprived TRO-X of its right to acquire its share of mineral leases that Eagle retained as part of the leases' sale. The court of appeals determined that TRO-X had not been deprived of equitable title to those interests because TRO-X had always held them. In this second suit, TRO-X claimed that Eagle failed to remit its share of income generated from production on the interests that commenced after the first trial's conclusion. The trial court granted summary judgment for Eagle, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle did not conclusively establish the affirmative defenses of res judicata, statute of limitations, or waiver.