Latest 2 Cases: Commonwealth v. Diaz Perez (Civil Rights), Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez (Civil Rights)

The Real Insidious Part of Dershowitz’s Impeachment Defense

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, EVAN CAMINKER

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker discuss Harvard Law professor Alan Dershowitz’s explanation of why he stands (virtually) alone in his views on impeachment—that all the scholars who disagree with him are biased partisans. Amar and Caminker explain why this claim is so insidious, with effects lasting well beyond the span of the current presidency.

Read More

Commonwealth v. Diaz Perez

Docket: SJC-10581

Opinion Date: February 3, 2020

Judge: Barbara A. Lenk

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions entered by the trial court after a second trial, at which Defendant had different counsel, holding the second trial judge did not err in granting Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis that Defendant's second attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree and related offenses. Then the jury was unable to reach a verdict Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial. The second trial resulted in Defendant being convicted. Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that successor counsel's failure to call or investigate an alibi witness constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The second trial judge allowed the motion, determining that the testimony necessarily would be important to the jury's deliberations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the judge was not unreasonable in finding successor counsel's performance ineffective, and the error was prejudicial.

Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez

Docket: SJC-12743

Opinion Date: February 3, 2020

Judge: Barbara A. Lenk

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court allowing Defendant's motions to suppress evidence seized during an inventory search of his vehicle and his subsequent statements to police, holding that, where officers are aware that a passenger lawfully could assume custody of a vehicle, it is improper to impound the vehicle without first offering this option to the driver. Defendant, the driver of the vehicle in this case, was properly stopped for a motor vehicle violation and then arrested on an outstanding warrant. The vehicle's sole passenger was a duly licensed and qualified driver. The officers arranged for the vehicle to be impounded without inquiring of Defendant as to whether he preferred to have the passenger take custody of and move the vehicle. After conducting an inventory search the officers discovered Defendant's gun. The motion judge suppressed the gun and Defendant's statements, finding the impoundment to be unreasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that suppression was appropriate under the circumstances of this case.