Taking Stock: A Review of Justice Stevens’s Last Book and an Appreciation of His Extraordinary Service on the Supreme Court

RODGER CITRON

Rodger D. Citron, the Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and a Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, comments on the late Justice John Paul Stevens’s last book, The Making of a Justice: Reflections on My First 94 Years. Citron laments that, in his view, the memoir is too long yet does not say enough, but he lauds the justice for his outstanding service on the Supreme Court.

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Crawford's Auto Center, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Dockets: 15-14160, 15-14162, 15-14178, 15-14179, 15-14180, 17-12583

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Martin

Areas of Law: Class Action, Insurance Law

Two auto body collision repair shops filed a class action against dozens of insurance defendants, alleging claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law fraud and unjust enrichment theories. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss each of plaintiffs' claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to allege at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity, fraud or extortion. The court also held that plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded their state law fraud and unjust enrichment claims; the district court did not err by excluding exhibits E1-E7; and the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

United States v. Vineyard

Docket: 18-11690

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Edward Earl Carnes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The court held that defendant's prior conviction for sexual battery under Tennessee law qualified as a sex offense under SORNA. The court held that the case law cited by defendant did not support his argument that Tennessee has expanded its definition of sexual contact to include contact with the back or abdomen; the term sexual contact as defined in Tennessee's sexual battery statute categorically matches the plain meaning of sexual contact as used in SORNA; and, although it was clear that the definition of sexual contact used in 18 U.S.C. 2246(3) was inapplicable here, it was equally clear that Tennessee's statutory definition of sexual contact categorically matches section 2246(3) as well.