Latest 2 Cases: Dixon v. Bowerman (Criminal Law), State v. Jones (Criminal Law)

Before She Died, “Jane Roe” Said She Was Never Really Pro-Life: Does It Matter?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the revelation that before she died, Norma McCorvey—the woman who was the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade and who had subsequently become a prominent spokesperson for overturning the decision—said she was never really pro-life after all. Using this example, Dorf explains why, in some ways, the individual plaintiff’s identity does not matter for the purpose of deciding an important legal issue, yet in other ways, the plaintiff’s underlying story can be very important for other reasons.

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Dixon v. Bowerman

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3049

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals dismissing Appellant's petition seeking habeas relief, holding that the Sixth District correctly dismissed the petition. Appellant was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twenty-one years. After his convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting several grounds for relief. The Sixth District dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The next year, Appellant filed a second petition seeking habeas relief. The Sixth District dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant's claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata and that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata barred Appellant's successive habeas corpus petition.

State v. Jones

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3051

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erred in allowing the state to strike a juror from the panel after the state had waived its final peremptory challenge, holding that while the appellate court incorrectly required Defendant to demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the trial, the appellate court's error was itself harmless. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's error in allowing the state to exercise a peremptory challenge out of sequence was structural in nature and therefore per se reversible. The First District held (1) the error was not a constitutional error and therefore could not amount to a structural error, and (2) the error was harmless because Defendant had failed to demonstrate that he had been prejudiced by it. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding (1) the First District correctly concluded that the error was not structural; (2) the First District erred in failing to require the state to demonstrate that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial court proceedings; and (3) because allowing the state to exercise an additional peremptory strike did not affect the outcome of Defendant's trial, the appellate court's error was harmless.