Death Penalty Opponents Should Rethink Their Support for Life Without Parole Sentences

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—argues that life sentences without the possibility of parole (LWOP) are as problematic and damaging as the death penalty. For this reason, Professor Sarat calls upon death penalty opponents to reconsider their support for LWOP sentences.

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Hammer v. United States

Docket: 19-5174

Opinion Date: February 26, 2021

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

After appellant filed a breach of contract claim against the Government in D.C. Superior Court, the Government removed to district court and subsequently dismissed the claim. Appellant appealed, arguing that under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), which provides that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded, " the district court should have remanded his claim. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) and the Tucker Act make clear that section 1447(c) does not require the district court to remand in this case. The court explained that to require the district court to remand appellant's claim here, where the government has waived sovereign immunity against appellant's claim only in the Court of Federal Claims, and where that court has already dismissed appellant's claim, would be to subject the government to lengthy and piecemeal litigation of the kind that Congress intended section 1442(a)(1) to allow it to avoid. Therefore, the court concluded that, in context, Congress did not intend the "shall be remanded" language in section 1447(c) to mean that the district court must force the Government to spend one more ounce of resources on the re-litigation of a case it has already won. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Springsteen-Abbott v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Docket: 20-1092

Opinion Date: February 26, 2021

Judge: Laurence Hirsch Silberman

Areas of Law: Professional Malpractice & Ethics, Securities Law

This appeal arose from petitioner's mismanagement of two related businesses, Commonwealth Capital and Commonwealth Securities. After FINRA determined that petitioner misused investor funds and tried to cover it up, FINRA barred petitioner from the securities industry, fined her, and ordered her to disgorge certain misused expenses. The SEC affirmed the industry bar and disgorgement order. The DC Circuit affirmed, concluding that petitioner's ambitious constitutional arguments are futile for a simple reason: Congress has prohibited the court from considering issues not raised before the SEC. Furthermore, petitioner has not provided any reasonable grounds that would excuse her failure to exhaust her constitutional claims before the Commission. Nor has there been an intervening change in law that might have excused her failure to press these contentions below. The court also concluded that Saad v. SEC, 980 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020), foreclosed petitioner's argument that her lifetime bar is impermissibly punitive. In this case, the SEC's remedial justification finds adequate support in the record. The court rejected petitioner's assertion that continuing education expenses misallocated to the funds—rather than to her companies—were not "net profit," and thus not appropriate for remedial disgorgement after Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020). Rather, by paying for continuing education expenses out of the funds, instead of her wholly-owned business, the court concluded that petitioner enriched herself by the amount of the savings.