How Allen v. Cooper Breaks Important New (if Dubious) Ground on Stare Decisis

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on language in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Allen v. Cooperdiscussing constitutional stare decisis in the context of state sovereign immunity. Amar points out some of the problems with the Court’s jurisprudence on state sovereign immunity and Congress’s Section 5 power, and he questions the Allen majority’s embrace of a “special justification” requirement for constitutional stare decisis.

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In re: John Moore

Docket: 19-2076

Opinion Date: April 9, 2020

Judge: Pamela Harris

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for writ of mandamus relief seeking to direct Judge Robert J. Conrad to recuse himself from presiding over petitioner's criminal trial. Judge Conrad had prosecuted petitioner successfully for bank robbery in 1989. Although the court shared petitioner's concern that there could come a point at which recusal might be required, and certainly would be appropriate, the court held that the extraordinary relief of mandamus is not warranted now. In this case, petitioner failed to show a clear and indisputable right to immediate recusal based on grounds that involve a future sentencing and may never materialize.

United States v. Keene

Docket: 19-4609

Opinion Date: April 9, 2020

Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. 1959, which imposes criminal penalties for committing "violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity" (the VICAR statute), in three counts with the enumerated federal offense of committing assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of the Virginia prohibition against brandishing a firearm set forth in Virginia Code 18.2-282. The Fourth Circuit held that the portion of the VICAR statute under which defendants were charged is not subject to analysis under the categorical approach. The court explained that, unlike the numerous other statutory provisions, nothing in the statutory language at issue suggests that Congress intended an element-by-element comparison of the enumerated federal offense with the specified state offense. The court held that the statutory language at issue requires only that a defendant's conduct, presently before the court, constitute one of the enumerated federal offenses as well as the charged state crime. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to reinstate the dismissed VICAR charges alleging Virginia brandishing.