Reflections on the Pending Supreme Court Challenge to the Affordable Care Act in California v. Texas: Part One in a Series

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, EVAN CAMINKER, JASON MAZZONE

In this first of a series of columns on the latest prominent challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar, Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker, and Illinois law professor Jason Mazzone examine the stare decisis effects of the Supreme Court’s initial blockbuster decision involving the ACA. The authors demonstrate several, perhaps surprising, ways that the earlier decision should shape how the Court views the present challenge.

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In re Juvenile

Docket: SJC-12860

Opinion Date: October 1, 2020

Judge: Ralph D. Gants

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that due process does not permit a juvenile court judge to conduct a transfer hearing pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 72A where the defendant, now an adult, is incompetent to stand trial for a crime allegedly committed as a juvenile. Defendant was arraigned in the juvenile court on charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and indecent assault and battery on a mentally disabled person. Defendant was a twenty-year-old adult when the delinquency complaint was brought. The juvenile court declared Defendant legally incompetent to stand trial. Thereafter, the Commonwealth requested a section 72A transfer hearing. Defendant moved to stay the hearing, which the juvenile court denied. Defendant petitioned for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the juvenile court's order denying Defendant's motion to stay the section 72A hearing until Defendant is competent to stand trial, holding that due process does not permit a section 72A transfer hearing to proceed while the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.

In re Olchowski

Docket: SJC-12730

Opinion Date: October 1, 2020

Judge: Ralph D. Gants

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics

The Supreme Judicial Court held that trust funds on deposit in an Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA) do not fall within the statutory definition of "abandoned property," and therefore, the disposition of these funds is not governed by the abandoned property statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A. Attorney was temporarily suspended from the practice of law. Attorney's attorney later notified the Office of Bar Counsel that there were unidentified funds in Attorney's two IOLTA accounts and moved to order the transfer of the unidentified funds to the IOLTA committee. The Treasurer and Receiver General moved to intervene, requesting that the funds be remitted to the treasury as "abandoned property" under chapter 200A. The IOLA committee subsequently moved to intervene, requesting that the funds be remitted to it. The Supreme Judicial Court held that unidentified client funds on deposit in an IOTLA account do not fall within the statutory definition of "abandoned property" under chapter 200A and that such funds be transferred to the IOLTA committee for disposition under the conditions set forth in this opinion.