Death Penalty Opponents Should Rethink Their Support for Life Without Parole Sentences

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—argues that life sentences without the possibility of parole (LWOP) are as problematic and damaging as the death penalty. For this reason, Professor Sarat calls upon death penalty opponents to reconsider their support for LWOP sentences.

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In re Kavanaugh

Docket: D076500(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016,” which amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. Petitioners Alexei Kavanaugh, Alberto Moreno, and Larry Smith were denied parole release under the procedures established by the parole regulations. In separate habeas corpus proceedings challenging the parole denials, the trial courts invalidated the parole regulations and ordered new parole consideration proceedings for the petitioners. The courts found the parole regulations were unconstitutional because they did not guarantee the assistance of legal counsel for potential parolees, they did not require in-person parole hearings, and they permitted individual hearing officers to make parole release decisions. According to the courts, the parole regulations conflict with section 32’s guarantee of parole consideration and violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights. The Court of Appeal concluded the parole regulations did not conflict with the constitutional guarantee of parole consideration or violate due process. "Section 32... vests CDCR with authority to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of parole consideration. CDCR acted within its mandate by enacting the parole regulations." Further, the Court concluded parole regulations required annual parole eligibility reviews, set forth sufficiently definite criteria governing parole release decisions, mandated a written statement of reasons for each parole release decision, and granted prisoners notice of the parole proceeding, an opportunity to submit a written statement to the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board), and the right to seek review of an adverse decision. "These features adequately safeguard against arbitrary and capricious parole release decisions." Orders granting the petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions were reversed.

In re Hoze

Docket: A158399(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Burns

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Hoze began serving an indeterminate life sentence in 1980 after being convicted of attempted kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, vehicle theft, oral copulation, kidnapping with intent to commit robbery, and battery by means of force and violence. While incarcerated, he was convicted of weapon possession in 1981 and in 1987. Hoze was sentenced to two additional, consecutive prison terms (Thompson terms) for the in-prison offenses, totaling four years. In 2018, the Board of Parole Hearings granted Hoze parole under the Elderly Parole Program, Penal Code 3055, reasoning that based on “the positive adjustments you’ve made over the last decade . . . you no longer pose a risk of danger to society.” While in prison, Hoze participated in vocational training and self-help programs including Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. He received positive work reports. The Board explained, “you have matured” and that “your current age of 67 does reduce your recidivism risk.” Although the parole decision became final in September 2018, Hoze was not released immediately. The Board concluded that his parole grant did not excuse him from serving his Thompson terms, citing Penal Code section 1170.1(c). The court of appeal held that Hoze is not required to serve his sentences for in-prison offenses because a grant of parole under section 3055 supersedes section 1170.1(c).