Should Anyone Care that Sexual Assault is “Out of Character” for Biden?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers what people mean when they say that a sexual assault allegation seems “out of character” for a particular person and explains why that reasoning is logically flawed. Focusing on differences between how people behave publicly and privately, Colb argues that the lack of an observed pattern of sexual misconduct is not evidence that a person did not engage in sexual misconduct on a specific occasion.

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In re Motors Liquidation Co. (Pillars)

Docket: 18-1954

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Contracts, Personal Injury

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision vacating the bankruptcy court's determination concerning whether General Motors assumed liability, through a judicial admission, for claims like appellant's. Appellant filed a wrongful death lawsuit against New GM after his wife was involved in an accident that left her incapacitated. She was driving a 2004 Pontiac Grand Am, a vehicle manufactured by Old GM, which allegedly had a faulty ignition switch. The Second Circuit held that for a statement to constitute a judicial admission, it must be intentional, clear, and unambiguous. In this case, the court held that the inadvertent inclusion of language from an outdated, non-operative version of a sale agreement was not intentional, clear, and unambiguous, and thus was not a judicial admission. Therefore, General Motors was not bound by the language.

United States v. Mladen

Docket: 18-0616

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Amalya Lyle Kearse

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Trusts & Estates

After defendant died while his appeal was pending, counsel moved for abatement of all incidents of the prosecution, requesting that the appeal be dismissed without a decision on the merits, that defendant's conviction be vacated, and that the matter be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment and order repayment to defendant's estate of the $20,000 fine and $100 special assessment. Because defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty, and he neither did nor was permitted to challenge on appeal the merits of his conviction, the Second Circuit denied as without merit so much of the motion as seeks (1) vacatur of his conviction, (2) dismissal of the count of the indictment on which he was convicted, and (3) repayment of the mandatory $100 special assessment. The court granted so much of the motion as requests dismissal of this appeal and a remand to the district court for vacatur of the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release and for an order requiring that the paid fine of $20,000 be repaid to defendant's estate.