Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Langlade County v. D.J.W.

Docket: 2018AP000145-FT

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley

Areas of Law: Health Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order extending Petitioner's involuntary commitment, holding that the evidence introduced at the recommitment hearing was insufficient to support a conclusion that Petitioner was "dangerous" pursuant to either Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am). On appeal, Petitioner argued that Langlade County did not present sufficient evidence of his dangerousness to sustain an extension of his involuntary commitment. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) going forward, circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are required to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of section 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based; and (2) the evidence in this case was insufficient to support the conclusion that Petitioner was "dangerous" under the relevant statutes.

Barney v. Mickelson

Docket: 2017AP001616

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Dallet

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, holding that the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury on the "alternative methods" paragraph of Wis JI-Civil 1023. London Barney was born with severe and permanent neurologic injuries. London and his mother, Raquel Barney, filed a medical malpractice action alleging that Dr. Julie Mickelson was negligent for failing accurately to trace London's fetal heart rate during Raquel's labor. The jury found that Dr. Mickelson was not negligent in her care and treatment of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the alternative methods instruction given to the jury likely misled the jury. This instruction generally informed the jury that Defendant was not negligent if she used reasonable care, skill and judgment in administering any one of the recognized reasonable treatment methods for monitoring London's heart rate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on all of the expert testimony introduced at trial, the jury was properly given the alternative methods instruction.