Should Animals Be Allowed to Sue?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on case in which Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) brought a civil damages suit on behalf of an abused horse, now named Justice, against the horse’s former owner. Colb dismantles three arguments critics raise in opposition to recognizing abused animals as plaintiffs in lawsuits such as this one.

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Morales v. Sherman

Docket: 17-56304

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of a habeas corpus petition as an unauthorized "second or successive" petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). The panel held that petitioner's successful effort to obtain relief under Proposition 47 resulted in the issuance of the amended abstract of judgment and thus represented the issuance of a new, intervening judgment for purposes of section 2244(b). Because petitioner's 2017 federal habeas petition was the first petition challenging that new judgment, the district court erred by holding that it was an unauthorized second or successive petition.

Karasek v. Regents of the University of California

Docket: 18-15841

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Jay S. Bybee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

Three plaintiffs filed suit against UC, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, alleging that UC violated Title IX by failing to adequately respond to their individual assaults and that UC violated Title IX by maintaining a general policy of deliberate indifference to reports of sexual misconduct, which heightened the risk that plaintiffs would be assaulted. The Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff alleging a Title IX claim against a school that arises from student-on-student or faculty-on-student sexual harassment or assault must establish five elements: (1) the school exercised substantial control over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; (2) the harassment was so severe that it deprived the plaintiff of educational opportunities; (3) a school official with authority to address the alleged discrimination had actual knowledge of it; (4) the school acted with deliberate indifference to the harassment, such that the school's response was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances; and (5) the school's deliberate indifference subjected the student to harassment. The panel affirmed the dismissal of two of the plaintiffs' individual claims and affirmed the district court's holding that the third plaintiff failed to establish triable issues. The panel vacated the district court's dismissal of the pre-assault claim, holding that allegations that UC had actual knowledge or acted with deliberate indifference to a particular incident of harassment are unnecessary to sustain this theory of liability. Rather, all plaintiffs needed to allege are facts demonstrating (1) a school maintained a policy of deliberate indifference to reports of sexual misconduct, (2) which created a heightened risk of sexual harassment, (3) in a context subject to the school’s control, and (4) the plaintiff was harassed as a result. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings.