Would Eliminating Qualified Immunity Substantially Deter Police Misconduct?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the proposal that eliminating or substantially reducing the qualified immunity currently enjoyed by police officers would address racism and police brutality. Although the idea has lately garnered some bipartisan support and could potentially have some benefit, Dorf describes two reasons to be skeptical of the suggestion. He concludes that for all of its flaws, qualified immunity may actually facilitate the progressive development of constitutional rights.

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O'Neal v. Reilly

Docket: 19-2981

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Barrett

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights

O’Neal was convicted of aggravated battery of a police officer after an altercation during a traffic stop. While incarcerated and while his appeal was pending, O’Neal filed a pro se lawsuit that asserted 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers. Under "Heck," O’Neal’s section 1983 suit was barred unless his conviction was reversed or expunged. Heck-barred suits are usually stayed or dismissed without prejudice, but after O’Neal failed to comply with briefing deadlines, the court ordered O’Neal to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. O’Neal didn’t respond. The court dismissed his claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Months later, O’Neal’s conviction was overturned on appeal. Ten months later, O’Neal returned to court, with counsel, with a “Motion to Reinstate the Case and for Leave to File an Amended Complaint" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. His motion nowhere mentioned Rule 60(b), the mechanism for obtaining relief from judgment. The defendants' response, maintained that O’Neal was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief. O’Neal’s reply brief attempted to articulate why Rule 60(b) relief was warranted. The court denied O’Neal’s Rule 15 motion, explaining that he could not file an amended complaint in a terminated case, and held that the Rule 60(b) argument was waived. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. O’Neal waived any argument under Rule 60(b) and, because the case was terminated on the merits, the court was right to deny his Rule 15 motion.

Johnson v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC

Dockets: 19-1210, 19‐1334

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Consumer Law

Johnson filed a putative class action against ERC, alleging that it sent her a misleading collection letter in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692‐1692p. The district court certified a class composed of all individuals in Indiana who had received a collection letter like Johnson’s from ERC in 2016-2017. The court later entered summary judgment for ERC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson failed to present any evidence beyond her own opinion that ERC’s letter was misleading, Johnson focused primarily on the sentence, “This letter serves as notification that your delinquent account may be reported to the national credit bureaus.” According to Johnson, “may be reported” implied future reporting, and by the time she received the letter her debt had already been reported. She also singled out a sentence stating, “Payment of the offered settlement amount will stop collection activity on this matter” as constituting a promise by ERC that if she took advantage of the first settlement offer and paid by May 26, then ERC would not report her debt to the national credit bureaus. Because Johnson chose instead to rely solely on her “speculation” to support her claim, summary judgment for ERC was appropriate.