Latest 2 Cases: State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd (Criminal Law), State v. Dangler (Criminal Law)

Should Anyone Care that Sexual Assault is “Out of Character” for Biden?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers what people mean when they say that a sexual assault allegation seems “out of character” for a particular person and explains why that reasoning is logically flawed. Focusing on differences between how people behave publicly and privately, Colb argues that the lack of an observed pattern of sexual misconduct is not evidence that a person did not engage in sexual misconduct on a specific occasion.

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State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2766

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: Maureen O'Connor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts to produce various court records and denying the clerk's request that Appellant be declared a vexatious litigator, holding that the court of appeals erred in denying Appellant's complaint on the grounds that he did not invoke the Rules of Superintendence as the basis for his request. Appellant sought copies of journal entries from his criminal case and a copy of the clerk of courts' records-retention schedule. The clerk largely denied the request. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied Appellant's request for mandamus relief, concluding that the clerk had no clear legal duty to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this action to compel the production of journal entries from a 1995 case was properly brought under the Public Records Act; and (2) this Court declines to impose sanctions on Appellant or to declare him a vexatious litigator.

State v. Dangler

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2765

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's conviction and sentence and reinstated the trial court's acceptance of Defendant's plea of no contest to sexual battery, holding that the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a), and there was nothing in the record to support a conclusion that Defendant would not have entered his plea had the trial court been more detailed in its explanation. On appeal, Defendant sought to vacate his plea of no contest, arguing that his plea was invalid because the trial court erred by not explaining more fully the obligations and restrictions that went with his status as a sex offender, in violation of Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court of appeals vacated the conviction without requiring Defendant to show prejudice, concluding that the trial court had completely failed to comply with Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not completely failed to comply with Crim R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s maximum-penalty-advisement requirement; and (2) because Defendant did not establish prejudice, he was not entitled to have his no-contest plea vacated for a failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C).