Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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State v. Paquin

Citation: 2020 ME 53

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this appeal from Defendant's conviction for eleven counts of gross sexual misconduct, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of conviction on one count, vacated the dismissal of other counts and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal on those counts, and affirmed in all other respects, holding that Defendant's convictions on both Counts 5 and 30 violated his double jeopardy protections and that the court erred in allowing the State to dismiss Counts 27, 28, and 29 during trial without Defendant's consent. The indictment charged Defendant with fifteen counts (Counts 1-13, 30-31) of gross sexual misconduct against the victim and sixteen counts (Counts 14-29) of gross sexual misconduct against a second alleged victim. During trial, the court granted Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 10-13, and the State dismissed Counts 27-29. Defendant was found guilty of Counts 1-9 and 30-31 and not guilty on the remaining counts. The court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court erred in failing to rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred convictions on both Counts 5 and 30 and allowing the State to dismiss Counts 27, 28, and 29 rather than entering a judgment of acquittal on those counts.

State v. Catruch

Citation: 2020 ME 52

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court terminating Appellant's participation in the Co-Occurring Disorders and Veterans Court (Veterans Court), holding that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Appellant's participation in the Veterans Court. The Veterans Court is a criminal docket that provides judicial monitoring, specialized treatment, and other services for military veterans who have disorders often attributable to their military service. Appellant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident and three other offenses. Appellant was admitted to the Veterans Court. Agreeing to sentencing outcomes in a plea agreement and entering into a bail contract, Appellant pleaded guilty to all charges against him. The court later terminated Appellant's participation in the Veterans Court, finding that Appellant had violated the conditions of his bail contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) this matter was properly before the Court; and (2) given Appellant's failure to comply with the requirements for participation in the treatment court and his violations of the agreements, his termination from the Veterans Court was warranted.