Can a President Who Is Reelected After Being Acquitted in One Impeachment Case be Retried by a Subsequent Senate?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar considers whether a President who has been impeached and acquitted may, if reelected, be retried by a subsequent Senate. Amar acknowledges that it is unclear whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ criminal procedural protections apply to impeachment proceedings, but he offers two key reasons that re-litigation of impeachment allegations after presidential reelection would be improper.

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State v. Sheffield

Docket: SCAP-17-0000707

Opinion Date: January 2, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of kidnapping, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the "restraint" required to support a kidnapping conviction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-720(1)(d) is restraint in excess of any restraint incidental to the infliction or intended infliction of bodily injury or subjection or intended subjection of a person to a sexual offense. Defendant was charged with one count of kidnapping and one count of third degree assault in connection with a single incident. The third degree assault count was dismissed before trial, and, after a trial, Defendant was found guilty on the kidnapping count. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the circuit court plainly erred in not instructing the jury that Defendant's restraint of the complaining witness had to be restraint in excess of restraint incidental to any intended infliction of bodily injury or a sexual offense upon the complaining witness.

State v. Williams

Docket: SCWC-17-0000226

Opinion Date: January 3, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction on the charge of assault in the third degree, holding that the deputy prosecuting attorney's elicitation of evidence regarding Child Welfare Services' involvement in violation of a defense motion in limine was improper and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree against his minor son. A jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. On appeal, Defendant argued that the family court plainly erred by failing to strike certain improper opening statements made by the deputy prosecuting attorney and by admitting certain x-rays into evidence without the necessary foundation. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence, and the error affected Defendant's substantial rights and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was insufficient foundation for admission of the contested x-rays into evidence; and (3) the conviction of assault in the third degree was supported by substantial evidence.