Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Valentine v. Collier

Docket: 20-20207

Opinion Date: April 22, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that TDCJ's adoption and implementation of measures guided by changing CDC recommendations in regards to the COVID-19 pandemic do not go far enough. Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, seeking a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit granted TDCJ's motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction, which regulates the cleaning intervals for common areas, the types of bleach-based disinfectants the prison must use, the alcohol content of hand sanitizer that inmates must receive, mask requirements for inmates, and inmates' access to tissues (amongst many other things). The court held that TDCJ is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal because: (1) after accounting for the protective measures TDCJ has taken, plaintiffs have not shown a "substantial risk of serious harm" that amounts to "cruel and unusual punishment"; and (2) the district court committed legal error in its application of Farmer v. Brennan, by treating inadequate measures as dispositive of defendants' mental state. In this case, even assuming that there is a substantial risk of serious harm, plaintiffs lack evidence of defendants' subjective deliberate indifference to that harm. The court also held that TDCJ has shown that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay, and that the balance of the harms and the public interest favor a stay. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies as required in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and the district court's injunction goes well beyond the limits of what the PLRA would allow even if plaintiffs had properly exhausted their claims.

Sanchez v. Young County

Docket: 19-10222

Opinion Date: April 22, 2020

Judge: Edith Brown Clement

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

After Diana Simpson died of a drug overdose while she was a pretrial detainee at the Young County Jail, her family filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, as well as a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The Fifth Circuit previously affirmed summary judgment for the County in part, and remanded in part for the district court to evaluate plaintiffs' conditions-of-confinement theory in the first instance. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment on that theory and plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims based on a failure to train based on the law-of-the-case doctrine. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims based on a failure to monitor because plaintiffs' evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to them, creates several disputes of material fact about whether the jail has a de facto policy of inadequately monitoring detainees. Furthermore, plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence to create fact issues over whether the County failed to assess pretrial detainees' medical needs and whether this caused plaintiff to be denied needed medical care. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part, remanding for further proceedings.