| Watley v. Department of Children and Families |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 20-277 Opinion Date: March 22, 2021 Judge: Pooler Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court determined that the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, collateral estoppel, the statute of limitations, qualified immunity, and lack of standing. The district court also dismissed some claims for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that, under both federal and Connecticut law, the issue at the core of the parties' dispute is whether DCF reasonably accommodated plaintiffs' actual or perceived disabilities in providing services and programs to assist their reunification with their children. The court explained that the issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined by Connecticut courts. Therefore, the district court correctly granted DCF's motion to dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds. The court did not reach the merits of the parties' arguments regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Connecticut's statute of limitations, or plaintiffs' standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. |
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| In re F.C. |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 121536 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication decision of the district court finding F.C. to be a child in need of care (CINC) under Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2202(d)(2), which focuses on whether the child lacks necessary care or control, and Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2202(d)(3), which focuses on whether the child has been abused or neglected, holding that the State proved F.C. was a CINC. On appeal, the court of appeals held that there was insufficient evidence that F.C.'s mother or stepfather inflicted emotional harm and that the State failed to establish that F.C. had been emotionally abused under section 38-2202. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 38-2202(d)(2) limits the trial court's focus only to the present circumstances at the time of the adjudication hearing; and (2) there was clear and convincing evidence to show that F.C. had been subjected to emotional abuse by her stepfather, as that term is defined under subsection (d)(3). |
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| A.G. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2020-SC-0273-DGE Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated the judgment of the family court terminating Father's parental rights to S.A.A., his now sixteen-year-old son, holding that the court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Much of the case against Father was based upon his failure successfully to complete an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment terminating Father's parental rights, holding (1) an ICPC home study shall not be required for a noncustodial parent who is not the subject of allegations or findings of child abuse or neglect pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 615.030; and (2) the trial court erred in terminating Father's parental rights. |
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| R.M. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2020-SC-0205-DGE Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order and judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their two boys, holding that the court of appeals did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) substantial evidence of abuse and neglect proved that termination was in the children's best interests; (2) the State's Cabinet for Health and Family Services proved it made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; and (3) admission and consideration of abuse of other children within the extended family did not unfairly prejudice Mother and Father. |
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| In the Matter of Michael & Anne Greenberg |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0734 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Gary E. Hicks Areas of Law: Family Law |
| Father, petitioner Michael Greenberg, appealed a circuit court order that modified his child support obligation pertaining to shares of vested restricted stock, and ordered him to pay child support arrearages of nearly $91,000 to mother, respondent Anne Greenberg. The shares of vested restricted stock were listed as “taxable benefits” on Father's paystub. Father testified that the restricted stock awards were “part of [his] total compensation,” and that the Internal Revenue Service treated his vested restricted stock as income. Since the parties’ December 2015 divorce, Father has netted $324,856.63 from the sale of vested restricted stock. Pertinent here, the parties’ final divorce decree awarded Father “any stock options he may have an interest in with [his current employer] free of any interest on the part of [Mother].” The uniform support order issued with the decree required Father to pay Mother “28% of any bonus he may receive within 3 days of receipt” as child support in addition to regular monthly child support. Neither the decree nor the uniform support order expressly referred to Father’s restricted stock awards. Father did not include the initial 5,000 shares of restricted stock he received on his financial affidavit submitted during the parties’ divorce proceedings; none of those shares had vested as of the time of the decree. Nor did he voluntarily disclose to Mother when he sold restricted stock. He also did not pay any portion of those proceeds as child support. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held Father's exercised stock options “must be included as income for the purposes of calculating child support” because “such options are analogous to a 'bonus’” and “are also included within the phrase 'all income from any source.’” To the extent that Father argued the trial court’s child support order impermissibly modified the parties’ divorce decree, the Supreme Court disagreed. "Even if we were to agree with him that the restricted stock awards were distributed to him in the divorce as property, doing so would not preclude the trial court from treating vested restricted stock as income for child support purposes." |
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| In re A.M.L. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 69A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Barringer Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her five minor children, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court's findings were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; (2) the findings supported the trial court's conclusion that grounds for termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2); and (3) where Mother did not challenge the court's determination that termination was in the children's best interests, the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights in her five children. |
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| In re A.R.P. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 308A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the issues identified by counsel in Father's no-merit brief as arguably supporting the appeal were meritless. Petitioner, the child's biological mother, filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7), alleging that Father had not seen the child in over two years and had not paid child support for that same period of time. The trial court determined that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights for abandonment. On appeal, counsel for Father filed a no-merit brief on Father's behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and was based on proper legal grounds. |
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| In re B.T.J. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 230A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor child, holding that the trial court properly adjudicated at least one ground for termination. The Rowan County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother's parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving her child in a placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to his removal. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights, concluding that DSS had proven both alleged grounds for termination and that termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that Mother's parental rights could be terminated based on neglect. |
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| In re C.R.L. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 196A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his two minor children, holding that Father missed his opportunity to remedy a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1109. On appeal, Father argued that the trial court violated section 7B-1109 by holding the termination hearing more than ninety days after the Department of Social Services filed its petitions to terminate his parental rights, thus committing reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order, holding that the issue raised by Father on appeal should have been addressed by filing a petition for writ of mandamus while the termination petitions were still pending. |
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| In re G.G.M. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Dockets: 248A20, 249A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willful abandonment, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on willful abandonment and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court's findings of fact supported its ultimately finding and conclusion that Father willfully abandoned the children, and therefore, the court did not err by concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7); and (2) the findings supported the trial court's conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. |
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| In re H.A.J. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 127A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court eliminating reunification as a permanent plan and terminating Mother's parental rights in her two children, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court entered an order determining that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights to her children due to neglect and concluding that it was in the children's best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by failing to grant Mother a continuance of a permanency planning review hearing; (2) properly concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1); and (3) did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. |
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| In re I.R.M.B. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 91A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Barringer Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Father to his daughter, holding that the trial court's findings of fact supported the court's conclusion to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7). After a hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to his children pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(7) and that it was in the child's best interests that Father's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that those findings were sufficient to support the court's conclusion that Father willfully abandoned his daughter pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(7). |
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| In re J.S. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 186A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court adjudicating the existence of grounds for termination and concluding that it was in the best interests of Father's three children to terminate Father's parental rights, holding that the trial court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights in all three children. Orange County Department of Social Services alleged as grounds for termination neglect and willfully leaving the children in a placement outside the home for more than twelve months without a showing of reasonable progress. The trial court adjudicated the existence of both grounds alleged in the motions and terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that Father neglected his children and that there was a likelihood of the repetition of neglect, thus supporting the termination of Father's parental rights on the grounds of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1). |
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| In re L.N.G. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 252A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her three minor children, holding that the trial court properly adjudicated the existence of at least one ground for termination. DHHS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to the children, alleging the grounds of neglect contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3). The trial court found that grounds existed for termination pursuant to sections 7B-1111(a)(1)-(2) but dismissed the third ground alleged under section 7B-1111(a)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that Mother's parental rights could be terminated pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(2). |
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| In re M.C.T.B. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 275A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the issues identified by Mother's counsel in a no-merit brief as arguably supporting an appeal were meritless. Petitioner, Mother's material grandmother, filed a private action to terminate Mother's parental rights alleging grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3). After a hearing, the trial court terminated that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights due to neglect and her failure to pay a reasonable portion of costs of the child's care and that it was in the best interests of the child that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's order was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was based on proper legal grounds. |
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| In re R.D.M. |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 193A20 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the mother of the four minor children in this case and the father of the two youngest children, holding that the order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and was based on proper legal grounds. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights due to neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress and Father's parental rights due to neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's case. Both parents appealed. Counsel for the parents filed no-merit briefs on their clients' behalf explaining why the issues arguably supporting an appeal lacked merit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. |
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| Gerving v. Gerving |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 50 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Family Law |
| Ben Gerving appealed an amended divorce judgment and parenting plan. He argued the district court’s distribution of marital assets and debts was clearly erroneous. Janet Gerving argued the appeal was frivolous and she was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the amended divorce judgment and parenting plan, and determined Ben Gerving's arguments on appeal were "not so groundless or devoid of merit that they were frivolous." Janet's request for fees was thus denied. |
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| North Dakota v. Bee |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 61 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Dakota Bee appealed a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal a district court order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Burleigh County Social Services (BCSS) contacted the Bismarck Police Department requesting assistance in removing a child from Bee’s care. Officers accompanied BCSS social workers to Bee’s residence and informed her that they were there to remove her child. Bee refused, backing up into the home, picking up the child, and then running towards the rear of the home. Officers pursued Bee through the home and out the back door. Fleeing out the back, Bee fell while holding the child, and officers separated her from the child. After Bee had been detained outside the residence, a social worker entered the residence to obtain personal belongings for the child, and an officer followed. Once the officer was inside, the social worker pointed out a glass smoking pipe. Bee was subsequently charged with Child Neglect; Possession of Methamphetamine; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Refusal to Halt. The district court found that the officers entered “the residence with BCSS to retrieve personal belongings for the child” after Bee had been detained and the child was in BCSS’s custody. The court further found that the officers observed the glass smoking device on a shelf in plain view. The court concluded the officers’ actions did not violate Bee’s Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Bee argued the court erred in concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the officers entered her home. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that during the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee sought to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, the Court concluded Bee was entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Bee to withdraw her guilty plea. |
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| In Re: P.G.F. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 7 WAP 2020 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd Areas of Law: Family Law, Legal Ethics |
| In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether, under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, an attorney could act as both guardian ad litem and legal counsel for a minor child, in the context of a petition for termination of parental rights, where counsel did not expressly inquire into the child’s preferred outcome of the termination proceedings. In these unique circumstances, the Court found the attorney was able to fulfill her professional duties and act in both roles. Thus, the Court affirmed the Superior Court order, which affirmed the termination of parental rights in this case. |
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| Pennsylvania v. H.D. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 33 MAP 2020 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Thomas G. Saylor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law |
| In the pendency of divorce proceedings, Appellee and her husband entered into agreement governing the shared custody of their five-year-old child. Appellee repeatedly and intentionally violated this custody agreement, eventually absconding with the child ultimately to Florida, where the child remained for forty-seven days separated from her father. Appellee claimed the father was abusive, her attempts to secure assistance from the local children and youth agency had been rebuffed, and she had no option but to remove the child from the father’s care. Appellee was apprehended and charged with interference with custody of children. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the father, a clinical psychologist, a social worker, and a detective to the effect that Appellee’s allegations were false and/or unfounded. Appellee said she had been advised by a nanny the child had disclosed an incident of offensive touching by the father, and that subsequently the child repeatedly made statements to Appellee personally which were indicative of abuse. Appellee also presented the nanny’s corroborative testimony, and her cousin attested the child had apprised her of inappropriate touching too. The Pennsylvania Legislature prescribed that a defendant was innocent of the crime of “interference with custody of children” when he or she believed that intrusive actions were necessary to spare the subject child from danger. Appellee was convicted as charged and sentenced; in post-conviction proceedings, the Superior Court reversed sentence and ordered a new trial. The Commonwealth contended that the belief element of the offense should have been construed to encompass only beliefs that were held reasonably. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Commonwealth’s arguments "are too tenuous to be credited." The Superior Court judgment was affirmed. |
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