Latest 21 Cases This Week: Lawes v. CSA Architects & Engineers LLP (1st Cir.), In Re: NFL Players' Concussion Injury Litigation (3d Cir.), LeDure ...

Hard Cases

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies uses the killing of Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta by police to explain some lessons for reform we might learn. Margulies calls upon us to use this case to reexamine the circumstances that should result in a custodial arrest and to shrink the function of police so as to use them only in the very few situations that truly require them.

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Lawes v. CSA Architects & Engineers LLP

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 16-2275

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

In this case where Plaintiff's negligence case collapsed halfway through trial due to the exclusion of his only expert witness pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and Fed. R. Evid. 702 the First Circuit reversed the rulings of the district court under Rule 26 and Rule 702, vacated the entry of judgment against Plaintiff, and remanded this matter for further proceedings, holding that the district court erred. Plaintiff was hit by a car while walking in a construction-affected area near Old San Juan, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit against several entities. Plaintiff then retained an expert witness to opine on the standard of care owed to pedestrians in construction-affected areas and to explain how Defendants' negligence caused his accident. After a twelve-day Daubert hearing, the trial court excluded Plaintiff's sole expert witness. The district court subsequently entered judgment as a matter of law for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the lawsuit's dismissal, holding (1) under Rule 26, preclusion was an overly harsh sanction for Plaintiff's discovery violations; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony under Rule 702.

In Re: NFL Players' Concussion Injury Litigation

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-2085

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Greenaway

Areas of Law: Class Action, Entertainment & Sports Law, Personal Injury

The Settlement Agreement between the NFL and eligible retired NFL players arose out of a class action based on findings that professional football players are at a significantly increased risk for serious brain injury. The Agreement is intended to provide monetary awards to former players who receive a qualifying diagnosis after following a specified protocol. The Agreement’s claims administrator and the district court created and adopted a set of clarifying, revised rules relating to how players can obtain a qualifying diagnosis. Several retired NFL players or their estates challenged those revised rules, arguing that they amended the Agreement, and alternatively, that the court abused its discretion by adopting the four revised rules. The Third Circuit upheld the rules, noting that the Agreement provided for the court’s continuing jurisdiction and specifies the duties of the claims administrator. The revised rules are permissible clarifications created for the Agreement’s successful administration—for example, to prevent fraud—and were not amendments. They were created, in part, because the claims administrator reviewed many claim submissions and noted that there were certain “clients of a law firm traveling thousands of miles to see the same physician rather than those available to them in their hometowns and excessively high numbers and rates of payable diagnoses from those doctors.”

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2164

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: William Joseph Bauer

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury, Transportation Law

At about 2:10 a.m., LeDure reported to a Salem, Illinois rail yard to assemble a train for a trip. While on the exterior walkway of a locomotive in order to tag it, LeDure slipped and fell down its steps. LeDure got up and proceeded to power down and tag the locomotive. He returned to where he fell and, using a flashlight, bent down to identify a “slick” substance. LeDure reported the incident to his supervisor. He gave a written statement. Union Pacific conducted an inspection and reported cleaning a “small amount of oil” on the walkway. LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence. He alleged violations of the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Locomotive Inspection Act is inapplicable since the locomotive was not “in use” during the incident. LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. There is no evidence that an earlier inspection would have cured the hazard.

Amy v. Carnival Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 18-14917, 19-10888

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Charles R. Wilson

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff filed a maritime negligence action against Carnival on her daughter's behalf after her daughter, three years old at the time, either fell over or through a guard rail on one of Carnival's cruise ships. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Carnival negligently created and maintained the guard rail, and failed to warn of the danger posed by the guard rail. The district court granted summary judgment to Carnival. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred when it concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Carnival's notice of the alleged risk-creating condition because it failed to view the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff and to draw reasonable inferences in her favor. In this case, a witness testified that Carnival warned passengers not to climb up rails, try to sit on them, or try to get selfies or lean over them because accidents can happen and passengers have fallen off. The court also held that the district court erred when it resolved the failure-to-warn claim on a basis that Carnival did not raise, without providing plaintiff notice or an opportunity to respond. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Traugott v ARCTEC Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17126

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Carney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Joseph Traugott suffered from with diabetes and a related foot condition, and developed an infection in his foot while working at a remote site. He required extensive medical treatment for his foot and did not work since developing the infection. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided the worker’s disability and need for medical treatment were compensable based on an expert opinion that work was the sole cause of the condition’s acceleration even if work was not the most significant cause of the worker’s overall condition. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed, because in its' view, the Board had asked the expert misleading questions. The Commission then concluded, based on a different opinion by the same expert, that the worker had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claim. Traugott appealed, raising issues about the interpretation of the new causation standard adopted in the 2005 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) and its application to his case. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for reinstatement of the Board’s award.

Verrazono v. Gehl Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152318(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Kathleen M. Banke

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

Verrazono was seriously injured when a rough terrain forklift he was operating tipped over. He sued the manufacturer. The jury returned a defense verdict, finding the forklift was not defective and the manufacturer was not negligent. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Verrazono’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the “consumer expectations” test for design defect and erred in giving a “dynamite instruction” when the jury became deadlocked. Verrazono presented no evidence as to the safety expectations of a “hypothetical reasonable” telehandler user under the circumstances that occurred. Rather, Verrazono’s engineering expert’s testimony bore on a risk-benefit analysis. This was not a case where evidence about the objective features of the product, alone, was sufficient for an evaluation of whether the forklift was defectively designed in the manner Verrazono claimed. Verrazono’s failure to set forth all material evidence forfeited his substantial evidence claims.

Garcia v. Colorado Cab Co.

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 55

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

A driver for Colorado Cab Company LLC (“Colorado Cab”) picked up an intoxicated Curt Glinton and one of Glinton’s friends. After stopping at their destination, the driver told Glinton the total fare. Glinton became upset, started yelling at the driver, and eventually grabbed and punched the driver from behind. Meanwhile, Jose Garcia had called a cab from a house nearby. When he saw the cab occupied by Glinton drive by, he thought that it might be the cab he had called, and he began to follow it. When he was roughly a block away from the cab, he heard the driver screaming for help. Garcia ran to the cab and, through the cab’s open driver’s-side door, told Glinton to stop. Glinton shifted his aggression to Garcia, telling him to “mind his own business.” This gave the driver the chance to exit the vehicle. Glinton also exited the vehicle, escalated his aggression toward Garcia, and began to throw punches at Garcia. Garcia was then hit over the head, causing him to fall to the ground. Glinton then entered the driver’s seat of the still-running cab and started driving. He hit the still-down Garcia once with the cab, then backed up and again ran Garcia over. As a result, Garcia suffered several severe injuries. Garcia filed a negligence action against Colorado Cab, arguing that Colorado Cab had knowledge of forty-four passenger attacks on its drivers in the previous three years but had failed to install partitions or security cameras in its cabs. In asserting his claim, Garcia relied on the rescue doctrine. Colorado Cab countered that it owed no duty to Garcia to prevent intentional criminal acts, and that even if it was negligent, Garcia was comparatively negligent because he “[made] a decision to get involved in the situation.” The jury found for Garcia and awarded him $1.6 million in total damages. It allocated 45% of the fault to Colorado Cab (for a sum of roughly $720,000), 55% to Glinton, and 0% to Garcia. The trial court denied Colorado Cab's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that for a person to qualify as a rescuer under the rescue doctrine, he must satisfy a three-pronged test: plaintiff must have (1) intended to aid or rescue a person whom he, (2) reasonably believed was in imminent peril, and (3) acted in such a way that could have reasonably succeeded or did succeed in preventing or alleviating such peril. The Supreme Court concluded that, on the facts of this case, Garcia satisfied this test at trial.

Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G0447

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Keith R. Blackwell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Rochelle Frett was injured when she slipped and fell at her place of employment during a scheduled lunch break. She filed a claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, but the State Board of Workers’ Compensation denied her claim. Frett appealed, and the superior court upheld the denial of her claim. Frett then appealed the decision of the superior court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Farr, 178 SE 728 (1935), the Court of Appeals held that Frett suffered no injury compensable under the Act because she sustained her injury during a scheduled break, and her injury, therefore, did not arise out of her employment. The Georgia Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to reconsider Farr and reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. The Supreme Court overruled Farr, and reversed the decision below.

S&S Towing & Recovery, Ltd. v. Charnota

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0161

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Carla Wong McMillian

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Personal Injury

In late 2015, Michael Charnota was walking his dog “Katie,” who was leashed, in front of his residence in Paulding County, Georgia when a dog later identified as “Tucker” attacked and killed Katie. When Charnota carried Katie into his home, Tucker followed and attacked Charnota, seriously injuring him. Prior to the attack, Tucker had been kept on the premises of S&S Towing & Recovery, Ltd., which is located approximately 1,000 feet from Charnota’s residence and owned by Timothy and Paula Seals. On the day of the attack, Tucker had apparently escaped from the S&S Towing lot and was not on a leash or under the control of a person as required by the Paulding County Code. Charnota filed a complaint for damages against the Sealses, individually, and S&S Towing (collectively “S&S Towing”). Charnota asserted several causes of action, including a claim for liability under OCGA 51-2-7. The Georgia Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal in this case, expressing particular concern about whether the second sentence of OCGA 51-2-7, which provided that an animal running at large in violation of a local “leash law” was considered a “vicious” animal, violated procedural due process. On the facts of this case, the Court concluded that it did not, and remanded this case for further proceedings.

Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 124610

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Anne M. Burke

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Emergency Medical Services Systems Act. 210 ILCS 50/3.150, provides immunity from liability to an ambulance owner and its driver who "provides emergency or non-emergency medical services during a Department-approved training course, in the normal course of conducting their duties, or in an emergency," for acts or omissions in providing such services unless such acts or omissions constitute willful and wanton misconduct. Hernandez suffered bodily injuries when an ambulance owned by Lifeline and driven by Nicholas ran a red light and collided with his vehicle. The ambulance was being used for the non-emergency transport of a patient that had undergone dialysis at a health care facility. The complaint alleged that, at the time of the collision, Nicholas was not operating with his lights and siren engaged and was not responding to an emergency and that nobody on board was in the process of providing emergency or nonemergency medical services. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the defendants were not protected from liability. Under the Act, '[n]on-emergency medical services” means: “medical care, clinical observation, or medical monitoring rendered to patients whose conditions do not meet this Act’s definition of emergency, before or during transportation of such patients to or from health care facilities visited for the purpose of obtaining medical or health care services which are not emergency in nature, using a vehicle regulated by this Act.” Nicholas’s actions in driving and running the red light were not integral or in any way related to providing non-emergency medical care.

Breese v. City of Burlington

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-0484

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the City of Burlington and dismissing Plaintiffs' claim that the City was negligent by giving a sewer box the appearance that it was part of the City's trail system, holding that the public-duty doctrine did not shield the City from its affirmative acts under the circumstances and that a genuine issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. Plaintiff was injured when she struck a tree branch while riding on a sewer box that was connected to a public pathway and fell ten feet to the ground. Plaintiffs alleged that the City was negligent in connecting the sewer box to the pathway without providing guardrails and warning signs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City based on the public-duty doctrine and the state-of-the-art defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the public-duty doctrine did not apply to the facts of this case; and (2) because a material fact existed as to whether the City's pathway connected to the sewer box met the recognized safety standards at the time of construction the district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment based on the state-of-the-art defense.

Morton v. Belk

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-IA-00061-SCT

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

After an automobile accident in 2015, Reericka Belk and Tracey Crayton filed suit against Victoria Morton in the Lee County Court. The case was tried by jury in September 2017, and the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Morton. Belk and Crayton filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the jury disregarded the instructions of the court and rendered a verdict contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The court granted the motion for a new trial. Morton petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Supreme Court determined the jury was properly instructed on the law and was informed of all the relevant facts. The verdict returned by the jury was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Court found the trial judge abused his discretion by granting the motion for a new trial. Therefore, the Cout reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.

Parsons v. Walters

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-01272-SCT

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Vernon Walters was injured in a work-related incident in October 2006; the vehicle he was driving was struck by an oncoming train. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, he and his wife, Donyell Walters, filed a third-party claim against the company operating the train involved in the collision, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR). The Walterses hired the Parsons Law Firm to represent them in their suit, and Tadd Parsons took the case. The Walterses’ lawsuit against KCSR was ultimately dismissed with prejudice in September 2010 for, among other reasons, failure to prosecute, failure to comply with discovery obligations and fraud upon the court. Tadd never told the Walterses that their case had been dismissed and led them to believe their case was ongoing. Three years after the case had been dismissed, Tadd admitted he fabricated a settlement offer from KCSR in the amount of $104,000 and advised the Walterses to accept the offer, which they did. When eight months passed after Tadd informed the Walterses about the fabricated settlement, the Walterses demanded to meet with Jack Parsons, the other general partner at the Parsons Law Firm. Jack offered the Walterses $50,000 to settle any claims they may have had against Tadd based on his conduct in representing them in the KCSR lawsuit. The Walterses refused Jack’s offer and then filed a claim against Tadd, Jack and the Parsons Law Firm, alleging claims of fraud, defamation, negligent representation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the Walterses on the matter of liability, finding that Tadd and the Parsons Law Firm were liable for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court then held a jury trial on damages. The jury verdict awarded the Walterses $2,850,002 in compensatory damages, which exceeded what the Walterses had demanded in compensatory damages in their complaint and in their motion to set damages. Finding the jury’s verdict shocked the conscience, the court remitted the damages to $1,034,666.67 in a second amended final judgment. Parsons appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the Walterses cross-appealed. The Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding irrelevant evidence about the underlying KCSR lawsuit because the value of the lawsuit had no bearing on the damages the Walterses sustained due to Tadd Parsons’s and the Parsons Law Firm’s fraud and IIED. Further, the Court determined the remitted verdict’s award of damages was excessive and not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded for a new trial on damages.

Sofia v. Dodson

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC97854

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Laura Denvir Stith

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital Joplin due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Mercy Hospital. On appeal, Plaintiffs conceded that the statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of their claim against Mercy Hospital. Plaintiffs, however, argued that the one-year savings statute that applies to nonsuits applied in this case because they had taken nonsuit against Mercy Hospital less than one year before filing the instant action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not suffer a nonsuit against Mercy Hospital but, rather, substituted Mercy Clinic, LLC under Rule 55.33(c) in place of Mercy Hospital even though the limitations period had already expired; (2) Plaintiffs' substitution of Mercy Clinic in place of Mercy Hospital was not a nonsuit entitling them to the benefit of the one-year savings provision; and (3) therefore, the action against Mercy Hospital was time barred.

Droge v. AAAA Two Star Towing, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Bulla

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this case stemming from the self-help repossession of a vehicle, the Supreme Court considered what constitutes a breach of the peace such that the privilege to enter real property without judicial process and retake collateral no longer applies to those engaged in the repossession effort, holding that breach of the peace occurs when a secured party acts at a time or in a manner that is not reasonable during a self-help repossession. Plaintiffs sued those involved in the repossession, and the district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) In evaluating breach of the peace in the self-help repossession context, Nevada courts should follow the Second Restatement's reasonableness standard, and therefore, self-help repossessions must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner and that a breach of the peace occurs when a secured party fails to satisfy either or both of these obligations; (2) the district court erred when it concluded that the factual circumstances did not constitute a breach of the peace and trespass as a matter of law; (3) summary judgment was correctly granted against the Plaintiffs on four of their tort claims; and (4) as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims, genuine issues of material fact remained.

Dominguez v. Otero

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-343

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of Defendant, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant's negligence caused an automobile collision and that Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in finding that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Defendant was liable and that the trial justice correctly performed his role when ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

Henning v. Avera McKennan Hospital

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 S.D. 34

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Contracts, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Hospital on Nurse's claims for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and defamation, holding that summary judgment was proper. Hospital terminated Nurse after it discovered errors in Nurse's documentation of controlled substances and Nurse's inability to account for controlled substances revamped from the dispensing system. Nurse brought suit against Hospital alleging several claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Hospital on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Hospital.

Jackson v. Burrell

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: W2018-00057-SC-R11-CV

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's award of summary judgment to Defendant in this health care liability case, holding that Plaintiff did not have to present expert proof to establish her negligence claim, and therefore, Plaintiff had no reason to file a certificate of good faith under section 29-26-122 of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, and Plaintiff's claim was not subject to dismissal for noncompliance with this section. Plaintiff alleged that a massage therapist working for Defendant, a salon, sexually assaulted her during a massage. In support of her claims for negligent training, supervision, and retention, Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant had previously received complaints that the massage therapist had acted inappropriately toward customers. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff had not filed a certificate of good faith. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not waive the common knowledge exception; (2) Plaintiff's claims were within the common knowledge of laypersons and therefore did not require expert testimony about the standard of care in the massage industry; and (3) therefore, Plaintiff did not have to present expert proof to establish her negligence claim and thus did not have to file a certificate of good faith.

Mo-Vac Service Co., Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0852

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Nathan L. Hecht

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on Plaintiff's survival action and rendered judgment for Defendant, holding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act because her evidence did not raise a fact issue under the intentional-injury exception to the Act's exclusive remedy. Plaintiff's husband, an employee of Defendant, a trucking and warehousing company, died when his rig ran off the highway and rolled over. Plaintiff filed suit, arguing that her husband fell asleep at the wheel due to the fatigue of being overworked. At issue was whether there was any evidence that Defendant believed the accident was substantially certain to result from Plaintiff's being overworked. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to raise a fact issue on the applicability of the intentional-injury exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act.

Waak v. Rodriguez

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 19-0167

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Nathan L. Hecht

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Animal / Dog Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the Texas Farm Animal Activity Act (the Act), Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 87.001-87.005, does not apply to ranchers and ranch hands, holding that the court of appeals did not err. The Act limits liability for injury to "a participant in a farm animal activity or livestock show" that results from an "inherent risk" of those activities. Raul Zuniga worked full-time for Conway and Marlene Waak to work cattle on a ranch, landscape, and cut hay. Zuniga died after being trampled. Plaintiffs, Zuniga's family, sued the Waaks, on wrongful death and survival claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Waaks, concluding that the Act barred Plaintiffs' claims. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Zuniga was not "a participant in a farm animal activity" for whose injuries and death the Act limits liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act does not cover ranchers and ranch hands and, therefore, did not shield the Waaks from liability for their negligence resulting in Zuniga's death.

Mitchell v. Roberts

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 UT 34

Opinion Date: June 11, 2020

Judge: Thomas R. Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

In this case brought by an alleged victim of child-sex abuse years after the alleged abuse occurred, the Supreme Court held that the Utah Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from retroactively reviving a time-barred claim in a manner depriving a defendant of a vested statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff, who alleged that Defendant sexually abused her in 1981, conceded that each of her claims had expired under the original statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, argued that (1) her claims were revived when the legislature, in 2016, enacted Utah Code 78B-2-308(7), and (2) her claims against Defendant were timely filed under this statue. The federal court certified this case to the Supreme Court asking the Court to clarify whether the legislature had the authority to expressly revive time-barred claims through a statute. The Supreme Court held (1) the legislature lacks the power to retroactively vitiate a ripened statute of limitations defense under the Utah Constitution; and (2) therefore, section 78B-2-308(7) is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.