Latest 23 Cases This Week: Diaz-Alarcon v. Flandez-Marcel (1st Cir.), Dapo v. Alaska, Office of Children's Services (Alaska), In re AB (Haw.)

Taking Stock: A Review of Justice Stevens’s Last Book and an Appreciation of His Extraordinary Service on the Supreme Court

RODGER CITRON

Rodger D. Citron, the Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and a Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, comments on the late Justice John Paul Stevens’s last book, The Making of a Justice: Reflections on My First 94 Years. Citron laments that, in his view, the memoir is too long yet does not say enough, but he lauds the justice for his outstanding service on the Supreme Court.

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Diaz-Alarcon v. Flandez-Marcel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1150

Opinion Date: December 16, 2019

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Father's petition brought under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act seeking return of his child from the United States to Chile on the basis that Mother had wrongfully retained the child in violation of his custody rights, holding that the district court did not err. In denying Father's petition the trial judge ruled, among other things, that clear and convincing evidence established that the child faced a grave risk of harm if sent back to Chile. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that where the district judge was in a unique position to gauge the child's credibility, none of Father's arguments left this Court with a firm conviction that the district judge made a mistake on the grave-risk issue.

Dapo v. Alaska, Office of Children's Services

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17139

Opinion Date: December 13, 2019

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Raymond Dapo was born in 1990. OCS took custody of him ten years later and, in April 2000, placed him in Taun Lucas’s foster home. Lucas and her husband David legally adopted Dapo in May 2002. According to Dapo, Lucas began sexually abusing him shortly thereafter; Lucas, however, alleged that she was sexually abused by Dapo, and Dapo, then 11 years old, was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges were eventually dropped, and Dapo was returned to the custody of the State as a dependent child. When he was 24 years old (in 2015), Dapo filed a complaint against Lucas, alleging that she had sexually abused him while he was a minor. In September 2015, Lucas filed a third-party claim against OCS for apportionment of fault, contending that OCS “had a duty to protect” Dapo and “negligently failed to protect” him. The superior court granted OCS’s motion to dismiss the apportionment claim, holding that it was barred by the ten-year statute of repose, AS 09.10.055(a). Dapo appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute of repose applied to the apportionment claim and was not unconstitutional as applied. However, the Court determined there were issues of fact regarding the applicability of two exceptions to the statute of repose: claims for gross negligence and claims for breaches of fiduciary duty. Therefore the superior court’s order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

In re AB

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-18-0000010

Opinion Date: December 13, 2019

Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the order of the family court in this case concerning the proper consideration and weight of a hānai relationship in the context of a child welfare proceeding, holding that a hānai relative who is a child's resource caregiver has an interest in that child's custody sufficient to allow intervention in such proceedings under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Hawai'i Family Court Rules. Child lived with Father and his girlfriend, KL. After Father moved out, Child remained in the same home as KL. The family court later changed Child's placement to her great aunt and uncle's home in New Hampshire. At the hearing changing Child's placement, KL sought to have to have interest in the proceeding recognized. The family court denied the request. The ICA ruled that because KL had filed a petition to adopt Child she had a sufficient interest in Child's custody to intervene. KL sought further review, arguing that her status as a hānai relative conferred a substantive interest in Child's placement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the family court erred by not allowing KL to intervene in the placement hearing based in part on her status as Child's hānai parent.

In re Interest of R Children

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-16-0000441

Opinion Date: December 13, 2019

Judge: Paula A. Nakayama

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) on appeal affirming the family court's termination of Father's parental rights, holding that the ICA erred in substituting a provision of the family court statutes, Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-61(b)(1)(E), for a provision of the Child Protective Act (CPA) as the basis for terminating Father's parental rights. The family court terminated Father's parental rights to his child pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 587A-33, a provision of the CPA. On appeal, the ICA held that the family court's termination of Father's parental rights was not permitted by the plain language of the CPA provision. However, the ICA affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights under the family court provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding that where the CPA provision contained a requirement not present in the family court provision the ICA erred by invoking the family court provision to affirm the family court's termination of Father's parental rights.

DHW v. Jane Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47190

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor son, A.V. The magistrate court concluded that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and John Doe (“Father”) neglected A.V. and that termination was in A.V.’s best interests (Father’s termination was the subject of a separate appeal (Dkt. No. 47200)). A.V. went into foster care in November 2017, when he was approximately two-and-a-half years old. The child was malnourished; health care providers testified the child was four to six months developmentally delayed. November 2017 was his second trip to foster care; social workers found A.V. weighed less than he had in his first trip a year before, "the size and weight of a twelve-month-old." In response to a question about why she thought A.V. was losing weight in the time period before he was placed into care in November of 2017, Mother testified that she was dealing with a very big loss—the death of her mother by suicide—and unfortunately she let it get in the way of her life and the lives of her children. She did not ask for help because she did not want people feeling sorry for her. However, after A.V. was placed in foster care, she realized that all of this could have been avoided if she had just reached out for help. A Department social worker developed a case plan for Mother and Father. Both parents were present at the case plan meeting in which the case plans were designed. The magistrate court determined, however, by clear and convincing evidence the Department had established statutory grounds for termination under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), neglect through failure to complete a case plan, and under section 16-1602(31), neglect through conduct or omission of the parents. The magistrate court also determined that termination was in A.V.’s best interests. A final judgment and a decree were entered, terminating both Mother’s and Father’s parental relationship with A.V. Mother’s main argument on appeal was that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights because her disabilities prevented her from completing her case plan. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s decree terminating Mother’s parental rights.

DHW v. Jane Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47132

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor children “B.L.S.”, “X.V.S.”, and “A.C.S.” Mother’s amniotic fluid had ruptured prematurely due to drug use. Tests confirmed that A.C.S. was prenatally exposed to methamphetamine. Shortly after her birth, A.C.S. was life-flighted to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington for treatment. Mother explained that she and Father had been in an on-and-off relationship for the past 20 years. At the time of the meeting, Mother and Father lived together in a camper on his family’s farm near Kendrick, Idaho. Mother disclosed that she actively used methamphetamine and had used methamphetamine while pregnant with A.C.S. She also explained that she and Father used methamphetamine together in their camper, sometimes with their children present. Mother described frequent incidents of domestic violence that occurred in the home: when the couple fought, it could become violent, where they would yell and throw appliances and other objects at each other. After an adjudicatory hearing where Father and Mother again stipulated to jurisdiction and custody, the Department worked with the parents to develop a case plan. At a review hearing in October 2018, the Department requested an early permanency hearing on the grounds that both parents had made little progress on their case plans. Agreeing that the parents had made very little progress up to that point, the magistrate court moved the permanency hearing up from December 2018, to November 26, 2018. At the permanency hearing, the magistrate court approved a permanency plan that sought termination of parental rights and relative adoption with the foster parents as the primary goal for each child. Mother argued on appeal that the magistrate court abused its discretion by holding the permanency hearing 11 months after the children were placed in the Department's custody, and that the decision to terminate was not supported by substantial, competent evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed termination of parental rights.

DHW v. John Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47130

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Father John Doe appealed a magistrate court's termination of his parental rights to his minor children “B.L.S.” and “A.C.S.” On Christmas Eve, 2017, the Department received a referral when A.C.S. was born prematurely. Mother’s amniotic fluid had ruptured prematurely due to drug use. Tests confirmed that A.C.S. was prenatally exposed to methamphetamine. Shortly after her birth, A.C.S. was life-flighted to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington for treatment. Mother explained that she and Father had been in an on-and-off relationship for the past 20 years. At the time of the meeting, Mother and Father lived together in a camper on his family’s farm near Kendrick, Idaho. Mother disclosed that she actively used methamphetamine and had used methamphetamine while pregnant with A.C.S. She also explained that she and Father used methamphetamine together in their camper, sometimes with their children present. Mother described frequent incidents of domestic violence that occurred in the home: when the couple fought, it could become violent, where they would yell and throw appliances and other objects at each other. After an adjudicatory hearing where Father and Mother again stipulated to jurisdiction and custody, the Department worked with the parents to develop a case plan. At a review hearing in October 2018, the Department requested an early permanency hearing on the grounds that both parents had made little progress on their case plans. Agreeing that the parents had made very little progress up to that point, the magistrate court moved the permanency hearing up from December 2018, to November 26, 2018. At the permanency hearing, the magistrate court approved a permanency plan that sought termination of parental rights and relative adoption with the foster parents as the primary goal for each child. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Father failed to preserve his argument that Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) caused the magistrate court to violate his right to due process by moving the date of the permanency hearing from December to November. Further, the Supreme Court determined the magistrate court's decision to termination Father's parental rights was supported by substantial, competent evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to B.L.S. and A.C.S.

DHW v. John Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47200

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Father John Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment granting the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“the Department”) petition to terminate his parental rights to his son, A.V. The magistrate court concluded the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father and Jane Doe (“Mother”) neglected A.V. and that termination was in A.V.’s best interests (Mother’s termination was the subject of a separate appeal (Dkt. No. 47190)). Father’s main argument on appeal was that the magistrate court erred in terminating his parental rights because it was not in A.V.’s best interests to be separated from his siblings. A.V., the child at issue in this case, went into foster care in November 2017, when he was approximately two-and-a-half years old. The child was malnourished; health care providers testified the child was four to six months developmentally delayed. November 2017 was his second trip to foster care; social workers found A.V. weighed less than he had in his first trip a year before, "the size and weight of a twelve-month-old." Father testified that he was aware that A.V. was malnourished and not developing as he should have been while he was in Father’s care, and that he did not obtain services to help A.V. with walking and talking. However, Father did not realize that A.V. had lost weight when he came back into their care. One Department social worker testified that Father feels that it is his responsibility to work and provide financially for the family, and it is Mother’s responsibility to ensure the children are getting their medical and emotional needs met and to feed and care for them during the day. She further testified that she had talked with Father about his observing A.V. being underweight or not gaining weight, and Father said that he told Mother she needed to take care of it. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the magistrate court did not err in concluding termination was in A.V.'s best interests, even though termination would result in A.V. being separated from his siblings. The Court determined it was not error for the magistrate court finding Father was also responsible for A.V.'s neglect. Accordingly, the magistrate court was affirmed.

Jane Doe I and John Doe I v. Jane Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47250

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Family Law

This case arose out of a private action by grandparents seeking to terminate the parental rights of a mother (their daughter) to her child (their grandchild). Grandparents sought termination of Mother’s rights to Child on the grounds Mother abandoned Child, Mother neglected Child, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. Following the trial, the magistrate court granted the Grandparents’ petition, ultimately concluding that Mother’s conduct met the definitions of abandonment and neglect set forth in sections 16-2002(5) and 16-1602(31) of the Idaho Code. The magistrate court further concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

Papin v. Papin

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 45277

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Family Law

The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review stems from the complex divorce between Jerry and Veronika Papin. Jerry appealed the district court’s decision, which affirmed in part the judgment of the magistrate court dividing the marital estate. On appeal, Jerry argued the district court erred in affirming several of the magistrate court’s rulings, including: (1) its holding that the marriage settlement agreement was invalid; (2) its holding that the community was entitled to reimbursement for the funds expended towards the mortgage and property taxes on Jerry’s separate property home; (3) its characterization of certain property as either separate or community; (4) its valuation of certain property; (5) its award of spousal maintenance to Veronika; and (6) its award of attorney fees to Veronika. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the marriage settlement agreement failed for lack of consideration, but on the alternate theory that there was no consideration as between Jerry and Veronika. Likewise, the Court affirmed the district court’s rulings concerning the characterization of the sale proceeds and the business as community property, the valuations of the business, the determination that the community was entitled to reimbursement for the funds expended towards the mortgage and property taxes on Jerry’s separate property home, the division of the remaining personal property, the grant of spousal maintenance, and the grounds for the divorce. However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision on attorney fees and remanded to the district court with instructions to reverse and remand to the magistrate court for further proceedings. No attorney fees or costs were awarded on appeal.

In re Child of Charlene F.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2019 ME 173

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that the court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit and that termination was in the child's best interest. Specifically, the Court found by clear and convincing evidence that even though Mother may be willing she was unable to protect the child from jeopardy and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs. Further, the court found that Mother was unable to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs and that its was in the best interest of the child that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no clear error or abuse of discretion in the court's findings or analysis.

In re Child of Nichole W.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2019 ME 167

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights. Mother left the hospital after giving birth to Child without taking Child with her. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not seen Child for more than a year. Despite having notice of a hearing for the termination of her parental rights, Mother did not appear. The district court terminated Mother's parental rights under Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (1)(B)(2)(A), (b)(i)-(iv). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support all four grounds of unfitness found by the district court; and (2) the record supported the court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the Child.

In re C.B.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 MT 294

Opinion Date: December 24, 2019

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to Child, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. Specifically, the Court held (1) Mother was afforded fundamentally fair procedures comporting with her constitutional due process rights when the district court terminated her parental rights; and (2) while the district court determined that Child was "abused or neglected" prior to terminating Mother's parental rights there was substantial and credible evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that Mother's circumstances remained unchanged following her prior terminations.

In re Estate of Cooney

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 MT 293

Opinion Date: December 24, 2019

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Daughters' motion to invalidate parts of Father's will in probate proceedings, holding that Daughters' claim was not properly brought in the probate proceedings. When Father died his property was devised by will to Son. In the probate proceedings, Daughters moved to invalidate parts of the will, claiming that the will contravened a prior marital property settlement agreement between Father and his ex-wife. The district court denied the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the separation agreement while sitting in probate.

Lessard v. Johnson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 ND 301

Opinion Date: December 17, 2019

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Family Law

Kevin Johnson appeals from an amended judgment granting Julie Lessard a divorce and from orders denying his motions for a new trial and for contempt. Johnson and Lessard were married in 2006, and had three minor children together. Johnson argued the court’s property division was not equitable and the court did not explain the disparity in the division, and the court did not properly apply the best interest factors in deciding primary residential responsibility for the children. Johnson also moved to amend the judgment and to hold Lessard in contempt. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson’s motion for contempt without holding an evidentiary hearing. The district court judgment was affirmed.

Tsonos v. Tsonos

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-150

Opinion Date: December 18, 2019

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying Father's motions to modify visitation placement, ordering Father's visitation to remain suspended, granting in part Mother's motion for a mental health examination of Father, and ordering the parties to engage a counselor for the purposes of Father's psychological evaluation as well as for a parent-child evaluation of Father and the minor children, holding that the family court did not err. The parties in this case were divorced and shared joint custody of their three minor children with physical possession granted to Mother and visitation to Father. After a few years, the family court suspended Father's visitation and ordered him to undergo a mental health examination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he issued the order.

In re Interest of B.C.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 19-0306

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights and remanding the case for a new trial, holding that Mother was not properly admonished about her rights as required by Tex. Fam. Code 263.0061. At every permanency hearing, Mother appeared without counsel but was not further admonished about her statutory right to legal representation. The trial court subsequently terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother then filed an affidavit of indigence and a notice of appeal. After a hearing, the trial court found Mother indigent and appointed counsel to represent her on appeal. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Mother was entitled to appointed counsel because there was sufficient indication in the record that she was indigent, such that the trial court should have conducted further inquiry into her status. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court was required to conduct a pre-trial inquiry into Mother's indigency status; but (2) a new termination trial was required because the trial court failed to give mandatory statutory admonishments regarding the right to appointed counsel.

In re R.R.K.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0273

Opinion Date: December 13, 2019

Judge: Bland

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding that a memorandum order modifying possession and child support final and appealable, rendering the trial court's later order void and Mother's appeal untimely, holding that the trial court's later "Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship," and not the memorandum order, was the appealable order and that Mother's notice of appeal was timely filed. Child's parents obtained a court order establishing possession and support obligations for Child. One year later, Father moved to modify the order. The trial court issued a "memorandum" modifying some aspects of the parties' possession and support obligations and removing others. Father later moved for entry of a final order. The trial court then entered an "Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship." Mother appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, holding that the trial court's memorandum constituted a final order. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the memorandum order lacked "clear and unequivocal" indicia of finality, requiring an examination of the record to determine the trial court's intent; and (2) the record demonstrated that the trial court's later order was the final order.

Castro v. Lemus

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 UT 71

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's action seeking to establish his paternity of a child born to Mother, who was married to Husband, holding that section 78B-15-602 of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA), Utah Code 78B-15-101 to -902, grants standing to Plaintiff and that subsection 607(1) does not revoke that standing when the child has a presumed father. During Mother's relationship with Plaintiff they conceived a child. Mother and Husband remained married. Plaintiff filed a petition in the district court to challenge Husband's presumed paternity and assert his own parentage. Mother filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that subsection 78B-15-607(1) of the UUPA denied Plaintiff standing. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 78B-15-602 grants standing to alleged fathers seeking to adjudicate their paternity, and nothing in subsection 607(1) revokes that standing.

Hinkle v. Jacobsen

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 UT 72

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal challenging the district court's determination that he did not have standing to establish paternity of his biological daughter under the Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA), holding that Plaintiff did not preserve his arguments that the UUPA is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. During her marriage with Husband Mother engaged in a relationship with Plaintiff during which a child was conceived and born. After Mother and Husband began divorce proceedings Plaintiff intervened in the proceedings, alleging that he was the biological father of the child. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to assert his parentage claim and further concluded that Plaintiff had abandoned his paternity claim entirely. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, holding Plaintiff waived any claim to challenge Husband's presumed paternity because he did not challenge the district court's finding that he abandoned his paternity claim.

Mackley v. Openshaw

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 UT 74

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment permitting Husband to rescind his voluntary denial of paternity of a child on the basis of mutual and unilateral mistake of fact and later granting Husband's petition declaring him to be the child's legal father, which ultimately resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff's paternity petition, holding that the district court erred in allowing rescission of the denial. During her marriage to Husband, Mother had a sexual relationship with Plaintiff and became pregnant. Before the child's birth, Plaintiff filed a paternity petition in the district court. After the child's birth, genetic testing established that the child was Plaintiff's biological daughter. Husband signed a voluntary denial of paternity renouncing his paternity of the child. Mother moved to dismiss Plaintiff's petition, arguing that he lacked standing under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to challenge Husband's presumed paternity. Simultaneously, Husband petitioned the district court to declare him to be the child's legal father. The district court allowed rescission of the denial and granted Husband's petition for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the mistake was not a mistake of fact but, rather, a mistake regarding the legal consequences of signing the declaration and denial, Husband should not have been permitted to rescind the denial.

Olguin v. Anderton

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 UT 73

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition to adjudicate his paternity of a child he conceived with Mother while she was married to Father, holding that the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA) granted standing to Plaintiff to adjudicate his paternity of the child. In her motion to dismiss Mother argued that Plaintiff lacked standing under the UUPA to bring his petition because the child was born within a marriage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that to deny Plaintiff standing would violate his procedural due process right under the federal constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on alternative grounds, holding that the UUPA grants standing to Plaintiff, and this standing is not altered when the child was conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed father.

Ellis v. State, Department of Family Services

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 WY 127

Opinion Date: December 18, 2019

Judge: Michael K. Davis

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating the parental rights of Mother to her three minor daughters, holding that the district court erred in allocating peremptory challenges, but the improper allocation was not reversible error, and the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the children's sexual abuse allegations. Specifically, the Court held that the district court (1) erred when it failed to equalize peremptory challenges by either giving Mother additional challenges or requiring the Department of Family Services and guardian ad litem to share challenges, but the error was not reversible; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the children's sexual abuse allegations and by excluding evidence of whether the allegations had been substantiated or were under investigation.