Latest 24 Cases This Week: Zepeda v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (5th Cir.), Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County ...

Not Letting Felons Vote Damages Democracy for All Citizens

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat— Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—argues that disenfranchising felons, as most American states do in some way, does substantial harm to everyone in our democracy. Sarat praises a recent decision by a federal district court in Florida striking down a state law requiring people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines and fees before they can register to vote, but he cautions that but much more needs to be done to ensure that those who commit serious crimes can exercise one of the essential rights of citizenship.

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Zepeda v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-20336

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

In a prior dispute between plaintiff and her lender, Feddie Mac, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Texas the following question: "Is a lender entitled to equitable subrogation, where it failed to correct a curable constitutional defect in the loan documents under section 50 of the Texas Constitution?" The Texas Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. In light of the Texas Supreme Court's answer, the court reversed the district court's holding to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings.

Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A156562(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Insalacos own property atop of a slope. At the bottom of the slope is Wilkie Creek. Hope Lutheran Church owns property on the other side of the creek. After a landslide made their house uninhabitable, the Insalacos sued the Church and adjoining landowners, including the Du/Wongs. They alleged that water runoff from the Church caused the creek to rise, which caused their backyard to flood. The flooding saturated the soil in their backyard, which caused the landslide. The Du/Wongs filed a cross-complaint, alleging tort causes of action related to the landslide and seeking indemnification. The court granted the Church summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed The trial court erred in denying a timely motion by the Insalacos for a continuance to take additional discovery (a site inspection) and oppose the summary judgment motion. They presented a detailed declaration from their attorney explaining the particular facts essential to opposing the motion that may exist but could not then be presented. As to the Du/Wongs, concededly material facts were disputed. The Church placed at issue how much rain fell on the date of the incident, whether there are “two ways in which water flow in a creek could destabilize a slope,” and whether the channel of Wilkie Creek is stable and shows no evidence of recent erosion.

Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E071287(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 26, 2020

Judge: Carol D. Codrington

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Plaintiffs-appellants James and Maria Mosley rented out a home they owned that defendant-respondent Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (PSIC) insured under a homeowners’ policy (the Property). The Mosleys’ tenant started growing marijuana in the Property. To support his marijuana-growing operation, the tenant re-routed the Property’s electrical system to steal power from a main utility line. The tenant’s re-routed electrical system caused a fuse to blow, which started a fire that damaged the Property. PSIC denied coverage, citing a provision in the Mosleys’ policy that excluded any loss associated with “[t]he growing of plants” or the “manufacture, production, operation or processing of . . . plant materials.” The Mosleys sued, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the Mosleys had control over their tenant's conduct. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, finding no evidence the Mosleys were aware of their tenant's marijuana growing operation, and because the record was silent as to what the Moseleys could or should have done to discover it. "[T]he Mosleys did not use the Property in a prescribed way that would have allowed PSIC to suspend their insurance and deny all coverage. More importantly, contrary to PSIC’s assertion and the trial court’s finding, there was no evidence Mosleys knowingly increased a risk of fire hazard. In addition, a fact issue remains as to whether [the Tenant's] hazard-increasing conduct was within their control. If it was, then PSIC properly denied coverage. But by denying the Mosleys coverage for Lopez’s conduct, regardless of the Mosleys’ control over or knowledge of it, the Policy did not provide 'substantially equivalent' coverage to that required under [Insurance Code] section 2071."

People v. Braum

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Dockets: B289603(Second Appellate District) , B289604(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 22, 2020

Judge: Kim

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, White Collar Crime

In two civil enforcement actions, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgments against the trustee and the trust (collectively, "defendants") and the imposition of civil fines in excess of $6 million. The court held that the trial court's judgments did not violate the double jeopardy clause, because the allegations and evidence before the trial court were insufficient to show that the earlier criminal complaint was based on the same offenses as the civil actions. The court also held that the $5,967,500 in civil penalties were not unconstitutionally excessive under the four-part Bajakajian test. The court rejected defendants' contention that neither the trial court nor the city had the authority to require the trustee to evict the dispensaries. Finally, the court held that the medical-marijuana regulations were not void for vagueness, and the trial court did not err in holding the trustee personally liable for the civil penalties and other relief imposed against him in each of the judgments.

SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port District

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D074958(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 22, 2020

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Plaintiffs SLPR, L.L.C. (SLPR), Ann Goodfellow, trustee of the survivor's trust of the Goodfellow Family Trust (Goodfellow), and Jerry Cannon and Michael Morris, trustees of the Sewall Family Trust (Sewall) (together Plaintiffs) appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant State of California (State) in their action against State and the San Diego Unified Port District (Port) (together Defendants) arising out of damage to their bayside properties in the City of Coronado (City) allegedly caused by dredging of the San Diego Bay (Bay). The United States Navy dredged an area of the Bay within the Naval Air Station North Island Turning Basin in 1998 and 2002 and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Army) dredged the central navigation channel of the Bay from 2004 to 2005. In a previous decision relating to this matter, the Court of Appeal concluded, inter alia, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' quiet title action because there were triable issues of material fact on the meaning of a facially ambiguous 1931 judgment in favor of City and against J.D. and A.B. Spreckels Investment Company (Spreckels), owner of real property along the Bay's shoreline and Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, and other defendants regarding whether that judgment fixed the bayside boundaries of Plaintiffs' properties or whether it located only the current position of the mean high tide line (MHTL) at that time and retained the ambulatory MHTL as the legal boundaries of their properties. On remand, Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, alleging causes of action for quiet title, inverse condemnation related to the quiet title cause of action (by SLPR and Arendsee), inverse condemnation (by Plaintiffs), nuisance, and removal of lateral support. The trial court sustained State's demurrer to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. The court subsequently conducted a bench trial on the first and second causes of action and, after admitting and considering extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of the Spreckels judgment, found that the judgment had fixed the boundaries between Plaintiffs' properties and the public tidelands. The court then entered judgment in favor of State and against Plaintiffs. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court.

Third Laguna Hills Mutual v. Joslin

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G057230(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 26, 2020

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Third Laguna Hills Mutual (a homeowner’s association, “the HOA”) filed a complaint alleging homeowner Jeff Joslin violated its covenants. Joslin filed a cross-complaint alleging the HOA unlawfully prevented him from renting out his home. The HOA filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint: “It is clear that Joslin is suing the [HOA] for suing him.” The court denied the motion. The HOA appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the HOA's anti0SLAPP motion. "The filing of a complaint is a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute (the right to petition). But to some degree, every party that files a cross-complaint is suing because it is being sued. Here, Joslin’s cross-complaint arises from the HOA’s alleged tortious acts, but not from the HOA’s protected act of filing a complaint."

Doyon v. Fantini

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 77

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering a declaratory judgment in favor of Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust, holding that the trial court erred in interpreting a 1941 deed that contained language restriction development of three lots in a subdivision. In 2012, Ingrid Doyon acquired the three lots - Lots 3, 5, and 72 - as trustee of her father's trust. Doyon subsequently conveyed two of the lots but retained her interest in Lot 72. In 2014, Doyon initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the restrictive covenant burdening Lot 72 permitted her to construct a single family home and garage on the property. The court issued a judgment in favor of Doyon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the 1941 deed unambiguously limited the construction that could take place on Lot 72 to a garage to be used with Lot 3, subject to certain setback specifications.

Gables Construction v. Red CoatsGables Construction, Inc. v. Red Coats, Inc.

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 23/19

Opinion Date: May 26, 2020

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

The Court of Appeals held that where a waiver of subrogation precludes liability to an injured party, a third-party defendant does not fall within the definition of a "joint tortfeasor" under the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Joint TortFeasors Act (UCATA), Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-1401, and there is no statutory right of contribution. After a fire damaged a building, the owner, Upper Rock II, LLC, sued Red Coats, Inc. Red Coats filed a third-party claim against Gables Construction, Inc. (GCI) seeking contribution under the UCATA. Prior to construction, Upper Rock and GCI entered into a contract, which included a waiver of subrogation, requiring Upper Rock to transfer all risk of loss for fire-related claims to the insurer rather than holding GCI liable. Upper Rock and Red Coats settled. GCI moved for summary judgment, arguing that because it was not liable to Upper Rock, it was not a joint tortfeasor under the UCATA. The motion was denied. A jury concluded that Red Coats was entitled to contribution from GCI. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that GCI could not be liable to Upper Rock because the waiver of subrogation prevented liability, and without liability to the injured party, the UCATA does not provide for a right to contribution.

Flathead Lakers v. Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 132

Opinion Date: May 26, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court voiding a permit issued by the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) allowing the Montana Artesian Water Company (MAWC) to appropriate water, holding that while the DNRC issued its preliminary determination granting MAWC the water use permit based on incomplete data, because the statutory deadline had passed, the application was deemed correct and complete as a matter of law, and DNRC could not require the missing information. DNRC failed to identify defects in the application before the statutory deadline. The district court concluded that DNRC failed to comply with its own rules to determine whether the application was correct and complete and voided the permit without addressing other issues raised on judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) with or without the missing information, MAWC's application became correct and complete as a matter of law after the statutory deadline had passed; and (2) Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-302(5) forecloses an argument regarding compliance with application requirements the agency imposed by rule.

Rock Springs Mesquite II Owners' Ass'n v. Raridan

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 28

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis of claim preclusion, holding that Appellant's action in Case 2 could not have been brought in Case 1, and therefore, Case 2 was not precluded. In Case 1, Appellant claimed that its neighbors' masonry wall and other property improvements were compromising Appellant's retaining wall. Appellant sought only monetary damages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the neighbors. The neighbors subsequently sold their property to Respondents. In Case 2, Appellant filed a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that it had a right to remove its own retaining wall, even if doing so would impact the structural integrity of Respondents' masonry wall. The district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's declaratory relief action in Case 2 was not brought in Case 1; (2) Appellant's action in Case 2 was not based on the same facts or alleged wrongful conduct as its claims in Case 1; and (3) therefore, Appellant's action in Case 2 was not precluded.

Balzotti Global Group, LLC v. Shepherds Hill Proponents, LLC

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0120

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

Plaintiffs Balzotti Global Group, LLC (the Global Group) and Caesar Balzotti, Sr., appealed a superior court order dismissing their claims against defendants Shepherds Hill Proponents, LLC (Proponents), Shepherds Hill Development Company, LLC (Development Company), Shepherds Hill Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association), Ralph Caruso, and Ernest J. Thibeault, III, on the ground that their claims were time-barred. At some point before 1999, the Development Company obtained approval to construct 400 condominium units. After work had begun on the project, the real estate market collapsed, and the Development Company filed for bankruptcy. Balzotti, Caruso, and Thibeault proposed to reorganize the Development Company so that the project could be completed and creditors could be paid. Their proposal included creating the Proponents, a limited liability company in which Caruso, Thibeault and Balzotti would have an interest. The bankruptcy court accepted the proposal as the reorganization plan in 2000. In 2003, the Development Company established the Shepherds Hill Condominium by recording a declaration of condominium with the county registry of deeds. The Development Company amended the declaration, setting a deadline for the conversion of Units located within the "convertible land." Between February 26, 2003, and July 6, 2009, the Development Company periodically exercised its right to build new condominium units on convertible land. However, by July 6, 2009, only 274 out of the possible 400 units had been constructed. Balzotti opened an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding on Development Company, the Proponents, and Thibeault when they missed payments on a promissory note issued as part of the original bankruptcy plan. By 2011, pursuant to the original condominium declaration, the Association was governed by a board elected by the condominium unit owners. The Development Company unsuccessfully attempted to amend the condominium declaration to obtain rights to develop the remaining land and unfinished units remaining prior to the association taking control. By 2018, plaintiffs sued the Development Company, Proponents, Caruso and Thibeault, asserting a number of claims arising out of the Development Company's loss of the Development Right. Defendants successfully argued plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because they were brought more than three years after the Development Right was lost. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in concluding plaintiffs' claims were time barred.

Favart v. Ouellette

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0197

Opinion Date: May 22, 2020

Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

Plaintiff Edward Favart appealed a superior court order ruling that land owned by defendants Steven and Kevin Ouellette, benefitted from an implied easement over plaintiff’s land along a fifteen-foot wide access road to the “beach area” of Sip Pond depicted on a 1992 subdivision plan. The court further ruled that installation and use of a dock was a reasonable use of the easement. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in relying upon “the evidence of the existence and use of prior docks in the area.” Plaintiff argued there was no evidence that a dock had ever been installed on the beach area of Lot 8, and thus defendants' dock was not within the scope of the implied easement. To this, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed that part of the trial court judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in all other respects.

State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3080

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by a property owner who was the subject of a board of revision foreclosure seeking to invalidate the foreclosure adjudication, holding that the board of revision did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction when it proceeded in the foreclosure action. The Cuyahoga Board of Revision (BOR) entered a judgment of foreclosure concerning real property owned by Elliott Feltner. More than a year later, Feltner filed this original action asserting multiple prohibition and mandamus claims against the BOR and others. The Supreme Court granted an alternative writ of prohibition as to two of the claims against the BOR and its members concerning whether the statutes under which the BOR proceeded violated the separation of powers doctrine or the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court then made a final determination denying the writ, holding (1) at the time of its judgment, the BOR acted with presumptively valid statutory authority and therefore did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed; and (2) this Court therefore has no authority to undo the BOR's final judgment and need not consider the merit of Feltner's constitutional challenge.

Sparks v. Old Republic Home Protection Co., Inc.

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 42

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: James E. Edmondson

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Contracts, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address first impression questions of: (1) whether a home warranty plan met the definition of an insurance contract; (2) and if it was insurance, whether a forced arbitration clause in such a contract was unenforceable under the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act; (3) whether 12 O.S. 2011 section 1855 of the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act was a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act; and (4) whether pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, did section 1855 preempted the application of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court answered all questions in the affirmative.

Federal Hill Capital, LLC v. City of Providence

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-114

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Francis X. Flaherty

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that an amendment to the City of Providence's zoning ordinance that restricted the number of college students who may live together in single-family homes in certain residential areas in Providence did not violate Plaintiffs' right to equal protection or due process under the Rhode Island Constitution. Plaintiffs, a real estate investment company, and four individuals who were college students and housemates leasing the real estate investment company's property, filed a declaratory judgment action against the City seeking to invalidate the amendment, arguing that the City had violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution. The hearing justice entered judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment was rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of preserving the residential character of certain neighborhoods and that there was no constitutional violation.

El Paso Education Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Properties, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-1167

Opinion Date: May 22, 2020

Judge: Bland

Areas of Law: Education Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court held that open-enrollment charter schools and their charter-holders have governmental immunity from suit and liability to the same extent as public schools and that, in this case, the open-enrollment charter school district had immunity from suit. The Burnham Wood Charter School District, which operates open-enrollment charter schools in El Paso, repudiated a lease with Amex Properties, LLC to lease certain property. Amex sued the district for anticipatory breach of the lease. The district filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that it was immune from suit to the same extent as public school districts and that no waiver of immunity existed for Amex's claim. The trial court denied the district's jurisdictional plea, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) open-enrollment charter schools have governmental immunity to the same extent as public schools; (2) Tex. Local Gov't Code 271 waives governmental immunity for breach of contract claims brought under the chapter; and (3) the lease in this case was not properly executed under section 271.151, and therefore, Amex's breach of contract claim was not waived under section 271.152.

Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0438

Opinion Date: May 22, 2020

Judge: Eva Guzman

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this dispute over which faction of a splintered Episcopal diocese is the "Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth" the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the withdrawing faction, holding that resolution this property dispute does not require consideration of an ecclesiastical question and that, under the diocese's governing documents, the withdrawing faction is the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth. After a disagreement about religious doctrine the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth and a majority of its congregations withdrew from The Episcopal Church. The church replaced the diocese's leaders. Subsequently, both the disaffiliating and replacement factions claimed ownership of property held in trust for the diocese and local congregations. The withdrawing faction argued that under the organizational documents, the unincorporated association's identity is determined by the majority. The church and its loyalists argued that the entity's identity is an ecclesiastic determination. The Supreme Court agreed with the withdrawing faction by applying neutral principles to the disputed facts, holding that the trial court property granted summary judgment in the withdrawing faction's favor.

Byrne v. City of Alexandria

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190449

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Charles S. Russell

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this land use case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer and dismissing a landowner's appeal from the decision of the city council, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting a motion craving oyer of the legislative record upon which the city council's decision was based and in thereafter sustaining a demurrer. Plaintiff, who owned a house in the historic district of the City of Alexandria, submitted a plan to install a Victorian metal "wicket and spear" fence pierced by two gates. The Board of Architectural Review (BAR) approved a certificate of appropriateness as to the materials and fence design but with the condition that the width of the double gate not exceed six feet. The City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. In response, the City filed a demurrer and a motion craving oyer of the legislative record that had been before the city council when it made its decision. The court granted the motion craving oyer and then sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the motion craving oyer of the legislative record in Plaintiff's appeal or in sustaining the demurrer.

Erie Insurance Exchange v. Alba

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190389

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Chafin

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding that a condominium association's insurance provider waived subrogation against the tenant of an individual unit owner where the tenant was not a named or additional insured, holding that the circuit court erred. As a result of losses sustained from a fire to property managed by Chimney Hill Condominium Association, and consistent with its coverage obligations, Erie Insurance Exchange made payments for the benefit of the Association. Standing in the shoes of the Association, Erie then brought suit against Naomi Alba to recover the payments it made, alleging that Alba negligently caused the fire. Alba, who lived in the unit where the fire originated under a residential lease agreement, filed a third-party complaint against John Sailsman, the unit's owner, for indemnification. The circuit court granted Alba's motion for declaratory judgment, holding that Erie could not pursue subrogation against Alba. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Alba was not an implied insured of the Association because no contractual relationship or agreement existed between the two parties to allocate risks and responsibilities and because the surrounding circumstances reflected the contrary intention of not absolving non-unit owners of responsibility for harm caused by their negligent acts.

Fairfax Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 191128

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) holding that short-term rentals were not authorized by Fairfax County zoning ordinances, holding that this case was moot. The Ratcliffs owned a home in Fairfax County that they made available as a short-term rental. After the decisions of the BZA and circuit court, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court. The Ratcliffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because they had sold the home. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because there was no live controversy. The Court then ordered that the circuit court's judgment be vacated, holding that vacatur of the lower court judgment was appropriate.

Fernandez v. Commissioner of Highways

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 191056

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court sustaining the Virginia Department of Transportation's (VDOT) demurrer as to Plaintiff's action seeking a declaratory judgment ordering the Commissioner of Highways to provide relocation benefits under Va. Code 25.1-406 of the Virginia Relocation Assistance Act (VRAA), holding that no private cause of action for payment of relocation expenses can be implied under section 25.1-406. The VDOT sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that he would be required to relocate his dental office to accommodate an interstate road project. When Plaintiff failed timely to vacate his dental office VDOT initiated eviction proceedings. After moving his practice, Plaintiff submitted a claim to VDOT for $567,278 in relocation assistance payments. VDOT ultimately approved $35,346 in reimbursements and notified Plaintiff that it could not make a decision about the balance of his claim until he submitted additional documentation detailing his expenses. Plaintiff neither submitted the requested documentation, nor did he appeal VDOT's decision. Instead, he brought this suit. The circuit court sustained VDOT's demurrer, finding that there is no private cause of action under the VRAA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the VRAA does not provide a private cause of action.

Hooked Group, LLC v. City of Chesapeake

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190764

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: McCullough

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the demurrer filed by the City of Chesapeake and dismissing this declaratory judgment action brought by Landowner claiming that the closure of one of two roads from which Landowner accessed its property constituted a taking that entitled it to compensation, holding that where Landowner was not deprived of reasonable access to its property, the trial court did not err. Previously, Landowner's property was accessible from two roads. In 2017, the City closed one road to all but emergency vehicles. Landowner sought a declaration that the City's elimination of direct access from the property from the closed road constituted a taking of its property without just compensation. The City filed a demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer, concluding that Landowner failed to plead that its property right of access was taken or damaged because access to the property still existed from the other road. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer.

Rowland v. Town Council of Warrenton

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190580

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the town council's approval of the developers' conditional zoning application, holding that a local government may accept a conditional proffer from a property owner as part of a rezoning application that alters a minimum mixed-use requirement of a zoning district below that specified in the local zoning ordinance. Ten property owners filed an application with the Warrenton Planning Commission to rezone thirty-one acres of land within Warrenton from industrial to industrial planned unit development (I-PUD). The developers' proffer statement included mixed land use percentages that did not comport with the target of the town's zoning ordinance percentages. The town council approved the rezoning. Several residents jointly filed a complaint challenging the approval of the rezoning. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the town council and the developers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly interpreted the language of the ordinance to be in accord with the authorizing statutes and the definitional section of Va. Code 15.2-2201.

Gomez v. Smith

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 18-0426

Opinion Date: May 26, 2020

Judge: Margaret L. Workman

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in a conversion case granting motions to dismiss on the ground that all pleadings filed on behalf of the Estate of A. Rafael Gomez by a non-attorney executor and all arguments made by him in court proceedings constituted the unlawful practice of law, and (2) found that the appeal in a companion case, a will contest, was improvidently granted. The Estate sought reversal of a circuit court dismissing its lawsuit on the ground that Mark Gomez, as a non-attorney executor, was not authorized to file pleadings or otherwise represent the Estate in judicial proceedings. Mark, together with his brothers, also filed a will contest in which Mark filed pleadings and argued on both his own behalf and on behalf of the Estate. The Supreme Court held (1) as to the conversion case, Mark, a non-attorney executor, was engaged in the unlawful practice of law, and therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the case; and (2) as to the will contest, the court did not make any rulings that conclusively determined any issue in the case, and therefore, the appeal was improvidently granted.