Latest 25 Cases This Week: Hay Group Management Inc v. Schneider (3d Cir.), Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Service (3d Cir.), Acadian ...

The Future of Faithless Electors and the National Popular Vote Compact: Part Two in a Two-Part Series

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

In this second of a two-part series of columns about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in the “faithless elector cases, Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar describes some good news that we may glean from those cases. Specifically, Amar points out that states have many ways of reducing elector faithlessness, and he lists three ways in which the Court’s decision paves the way for advances in the National Popular Vote (NPV) Interstate Compact movement.

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Impoverishing Women: Supreme Court Upholds Trump Administration’s Religious and Moral Exemptions to Contraceptive Mandate

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding the Trump administration’s religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Grossman provides a brief history of the conflict over the growing politicization of contraception in the United States and argues that the exemptions at issue in this case should never have been promulgated in the first place because they have no support in science or public policy.

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Hay Group Management Inc v. Schneider

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 18-1473

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Roth

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, International Law

Schneider, a longtime Hay employee, was elevated to CEO in 2001. Hay terminated Schneider in 2003 for “good cause.” Schneider sued in the Labor Court of Germany and in the Netherlands. The Dutch courts found that under Dutch law there had been no valid resolution approving Schneider’s termination. In 2012, the German trial court dismissed Schneider’s claims. The German Higher Regional Court reversed in part in 2014, giving preclusive effect to the Dutch court’s findings concerning Schneider’s contract. The Hay entities were required to pay Schneider over $13 million. In 2004, Hay filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging nine causes of action with varying degrees of overlap with the German litigation. After the German proceedings became final, the district court lifted a stay and granted Schneider summary judgment, holding that Hay’s claims were precluded by the German judgment, assuming that the relevant inquiry was whether Hay could have brought its claims as counterclaims in the German litigation. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Under Pennsylvania preclusion law, the correct question is whether Hay was required to bring its claims as counterclaims in the German litigation. Under German law, Hay was not required to plead these claims as counterclaims in the German litigation. Since Hay’s contract assignment claim seeks to functionally undo the German litigation, however, the court affirmed summary judgment on that claim.

Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Service

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-3150

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Thomas L. Ambro

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure

The Union sought confirmation of an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 9. Section 9 provides that a district court “must grant” a confirmation order for an award upon application where the award has not been “vacated, modified, or corrected” under the Act. UPS, the loser in arbitration, opposed confirmation and filed a cross-motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution, given that UPS agreed to abide by the award and corrected any subsequent violations. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award even in the absence of a new dispute about it. The confirmation of an arbitration award is a summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of the court. Confirmation is the process through which a party to arbitration completes the award process under the Act, as the award becomes a final and enforceable judgment, 9 U.S.C. 13. The Act not only authorizes but mandates, that district courts confirm arbitration awards by converting them into enforceable judgments through a summary proceeding.

Acadian Diagnostic Laboratories, LLC v. Quality Toxicology, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30320

Opinion Date: July 13, 2020

Judge: Andrew S. Oldham

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

After Acadian entered into two contracts with QT to perform lab testing, Acadian filed suit alleging that QT breached both agreements. The jury ultimately awarded Acadian damages for QT's breach of both agreements and both parties appealed. In regard to QT's contentions, the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on QT's liability for breaching the agreements and the district court did not err by excluding evidence about Acadian's business dealings. The court also held that Acadian's request for the entry of judgment of a higher damages figure is meritless. The court explained that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide several ways for a federal litigant to seek a different damages figure than that which the jury awards, and Acadian chose exactly none of them. Therefore, by failing to file any motions in the district court, Acadian forfeited its ability to seek appellate review of the jury verdict.

Kuykendall v. Accord Healthcare, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30640

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Drugs & Biotech, Products Liability

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging that she used defendants' prescription chemotherapy drug and now suffers from permanent hair loss. As a plaintiff in this multidistrict litigation (MDL), plaintiff was required to serve defendants with a completed fact sheet disclosing details of her personal and medical history soon after filing her short form complaint. She failed to do so in this case. The court applied the Deepwater Horizon two-factor test to the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's case and held that the district court was not required to make specific factual findings on each of the Deepwater Horizon prongs before dismissing plaintiff's case. The court explained that plaintiff exhibited a clear record of delay sufficient to meet the first prong in the Deepwater Horizon test, and lesser sanctions would not have served the best interests of justice. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

McRaney v. The North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-60293

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action against NAMB for intentional interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court cited the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and found that it would need to resolve ecclesiastical questions in order to resolve plaintiff's claims. The court held that, at this time, it is not certain that resolution of plaintiff's claims will require the district court to interfere with matters of church government, matters of faith, or matters of doctrine. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-3880

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Guy

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Malone was adjusting the blade on his Craftsman table saw when the guard came off, causing injury to his fingers. Malone was later notified of a safety recall on the saw. Malone filed suit in an Ohio state court, against several Sears and Craftsman entities and Rexon, a Taiwanese company. Rexon removed the case to a federal district court, citing diversity jurisdiction, then moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. Rexon admitted that it manufactured the saw in question and conceded, for the purpose of its motion, that it had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections offered by the State of Ohio. The district court dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court noted that the injury occurred in Ohio and that Rexon has a “high volume of business activity” in Ohio, so Malone “could plausibly show, with additional discovery, that Rexon derived 'substantial revenue’ from table saw sales in Ohio.” Jurisdictional discovery is necessary to determine whether Rexon had sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy due process.

Democratic Party of Wisconsin v. Vos

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-3138

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law

In 2018, Democrats were elected as the governor and attorney general of Wisconsin, replacing Republicans. Immediately after the election, the Republican-controlled legislature enacted Act 369 and Act 370, which strip the incoming governor and attorney general of various powers and vest legislative committees that remained under Republican control with formerly-executive authority. The changes include prohibiting the governor from re-nominating potential appointees who have been rejected once by the legislature; giving the legislature authority to suspend an administrative rule multiple times; removing the governor’s ability to appoint the CEO of the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation; adding legislative appointees to the Economic Development Corporation; requiring that the attorney general obtain legislative approval before withdrawing from a lawsuit filed by the state government or settling a lawsuit for injunctive relief; and granting the legislature unrestricted rights to intervene in litigation to defend the constitutionality or validity of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs have not pointed to any concrete harms they have suffered or will suffer because of the Acts and are not entitled to any remedy under the Constitution. Any judicial remedy for the alleged harms must come from the courts of Wisconsin.

Hinterberger v. Indianapolis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-3365

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

After his development plan fell through and he went into bankruptcy, Hinterberger sued the city for failure to provide promised financial support. Discovery proceeded for almost two years. The city moved for summary judgment. The Southern District of Indiana’s Local Rule 56‐1 requires that a party seeking summary judgment include a “Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute.” The opposing party must respond with a “Statement of Material Facts in Dispute” that “identifies the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment.” The Rule prohibits the inclusion of any argument and requires that all asserted material facts be supported by specific citations. The movant’s facts are admitted unless the non‐ movant “specifically controverts” them in its factual statement, shows them to be unsupported, or demonstrates that reasonable inferences can be drawn in its favor. The district court rejected Hinterberger’s statement in its entirety for failing to comply with Local Rule 56‐1, entered summary judgment for the city, and ordered Hinterberger’s attorneys to show cause why they should not be sanctioned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hinterberger’s statement misrepresented the evidence, contained inaccurate and misleading citations to the record, and presented improper arguments rather than materially disputed facts.

J.S.T. Corp. v. Foxconn Interconnect Technology, Ltd.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2465

Opinion Date: July 13, 2020

Judge: Barrett

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

Bosch, an engineering company, asked J.S.T. to design and manufacture a connector that Bosch could incorporate into a part that it builds for GM. For a time, Bosch retained J.S.T. as its sole supplier of those connectors. Then, according to J.S.T., Bosch wrongfully acquired J.S.T.’s proprietary designs and provided them to J.S.T.’s competitors, who used the stolen designs to build knockoff connectors and eventually to displace J.S.T. from its role as Bosch’s supplier. After filing various lawsuits against Bosch, J.S.T. filed suit in Illinois against the competitors, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The competitors’ only link to Illinois is that they sell their connectors to Bosch, knowing that the connectors will end up in GM cars and parts that are sold in Illinois. For personal jurisdiction to exist, though, there must be a causal relationship between the competitors’ dealings in Illinois and the claims that J.S.T. has asserted against them. No such causal relationship exists.

Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 17-11993, 19-11494

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

In this multidistrict litigation (MDL), plaintiffs contend that a Colombian paramilitary group killed their family members, and that Chiquita paid the paramilitary group over $1.7 million to quell labor unrest and drive other guerilla groups out of the banana-growing regions of Colombia. All plaintiffs obtained a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of "private facts" that could reveal their identities or personal information. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to revoke the privacy protections, holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it held that plaintiffs failed to meet their necessary burdens. In this case, the district court had ample comparator evidence to support its ruling; the evidence does not compel the finding that litigants pursuing tort claims against a paramilitary-affiliated entity in the United States face similar risks of harm; and the court rejected the idea that the district court's pseudonym ruling conflicts with its forum non conveniens ruling. Furthermore, the district court engaged in balancing sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), where it weighed plaintiffs' safety interests against Chiquita's interests in administrative feasibility.

Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-10474

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Plaintiffs, Charles and Myra Corley, filed suit in state court against dozens of companies that allegedly supplied products containing asbestos that caused Charles's malignant mesothelioma. After removal to federal court, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then transferred the suit to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which eventually returned it to the Northern District of Alabama. After the Northern District of Alabama granted plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss the last two companies in the suit, plaintiffs then sought review of an order entered by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying their motion to reconsider a partial summary judgment in favor of several companies. In the motion, plaintiffs argued for the first time that the district court should apply maritime law, not state law, to determine the merits of their claims. The Eleventh Circuit held that an order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a final order; the court has territorial jurisdiction to review an interlocutory decision by an out-of-circuit district court that merged into the final judgment of a district court in this circuit; and plaintiffs have standing to appeal from the final judgment accompanying an order granting the motion for a voluntary dismissal. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment against plaintiffs, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow plaintiffs to argue that a different substantive law governed their complaint at this late stage in the litigation.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. QBE Holdings, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-11759

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Martin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of standing of this action for damages under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The court held that the Addendum (but not the Nunc Pro Tunc Assignment) is impermissible parol evidence; although the Nunc Pro Tunc Assignment could create standing on the basis of retroactive assignment of claims, plaintiffs did not receive any rights under it; and the court declined to consider whether the Recovery Agreement by itself equitably assigned plaintiffs HFHP's rights under the Act because plaintiffs did not assert this argument before the district court.

Jeffries v. Barr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 17-5008

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the DOJ under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging discrimination on the basis of his race and his sex, as well as retaliation for protected activity. Plaintiff cited seven instances of being passed over for positions for which he believes he was qualified. The district court granted the DOJ's motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiff's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) motion requesting to be allowed to take discovery. The DC Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion in finding that plaintiff failed to make a showing as to each one of the disputed nonselections, with the notable exception of the handling of plaintiff's request for discovery on his first nonselection. The court stated that, in that respect, the district court's denial of plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion was premised on error and was thus an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's entry of judgment as to that nonselection and reversed its denial of the relevant portion of plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion. The court affirmed in part the district court's entry of judgment in DOJ's favor and its denial of plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion.

Strange v. Islamic Republic of Iran

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Dockets: 19-7083, 19-8004

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Karen LeCraft Henderson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for permission to appeal in No. 19-8004 and related appeal in No. 19-7083 for lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the district court certified an order for interlocutory appeal but no petition was filed by 28 U.S.C. 1292(b)'s deadline. The district court then granted a motion to recertify its order and the litigants filed both a petition for permission to appeal and a notice of appeal within ten days after recertification. The court held that a district court cannot restart the jurisdictional clock in this manner.

Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 18-7188

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Internet Law

After Strike 3's investigators recorded IP address 73.180.154.14 illegally distributing Strike 3's pornographic films via the BitTorrent network, the company filed a complaint against the IP address subscriber. However, because Internet service providers are the only entities that can link an IP address to its subscriber, Strike 3 could not serve its complaint without first subpoenaing the subscriber's ISP, Comcast, for information identifying the anonymous defendant. Strike 3 filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) motion seeking leave to subpoena Comcast for records identifying the John Doe IP address subscriber. The district court denied Strike 3's discovery motion. The DC Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion and held that the district court abused its discretion by assigning improper weight to what it viewed as the "aberrantly salacious nature" of Strike 3's films, by concluding that Strike 3 could not state a plausible claim for infringement against the IP address subscriber, and by drawing unsupported, negative inferences against Strike 3 regarding its litigation tactics. Because the court found that the district court abused its discretion in denying Strike 3's discovery motion, its dismissal for failure to state a claim is also reversed. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Valambhia v. United Republic of Tanzania

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-7040

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, International Law

Members of the Valambhia family filed an action to recognize the High Court of Tanzania's judgments in the District of Columbia. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Tanzania's motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court held that the Valambhias have not explained how even a loose construction of the third clause of the FSIA commercial activity exception could support the conclusion that Tanzania's previous and optional use of a New York bank account constitutes a direct effect or an immediate consequence in the United States of Tanzania's conduct abroad. Furthermore, the Valambhias' claim of a direct effect stemming from the family's citizenship and residence in the United States is insufficient. The court dismissed the remaining claims and affirmed the district court's judgment.

Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H045126(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure

Saldana resigned from his position at Veeco and went to work for a competitor, Aixtron. Veeco initiated arbitration proceedings against Saldana under an arbitration clause in his employee confidentiality agreement, alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, and conversion, including alleged data theft. Aixtron was not a party to the arbitration. The arbitrator granted Veeco’s application for a pre-hearing discovery subpoena for Aixtron’s business records, including a demand that Aixtron produce any computers that Saldana had used for forensic examination by “an agreed-upon third-party neutral expert.” Over Aixtron’s objections, the arbitrator granted Veeco’s motion to compel. Aixtron sought judicial review; Veeco filed a separate petition to enforce the arbitrator’s discovery order, which the court granted. The court of appeal reversed, after first finding the order appealable. The arbitrator did not have the authority to issue a discovery subpoena to Aixtron in these circumstances under either the Federal Arbitration Act or the California Arbitration Act. Federal precedent indicates that there is no right to pre-hearing discovery under the FAA. There is no such right under Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.61 since the parties to the arbitration did not provide for full discovery rights in their arbitration agreement.

Altizer v. Highsmith

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A157921(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: James A. Richman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 1995, 17 plaintiffs sued the Highsmiths on several promissory notes. The parties entered into a stipulation; a single judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in various amounts. In 2005, an attorney representing the plaintiffs renewed the judgment using the standard Judicial Council form. The attorney subsequently died. When the judgment was again due to be renewed in 2015, one of the plaintiffs (Bisordi) did so, again using the standard form. Defendants moved to vacate the 2015 renewal, arguing that it was void because to the extent one plaintiff purported to file it on behalf of the others, doing so constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The trial court agreed. The court of appeal reversed. Bisordi was acting in a “clerical” capacity, or as a “scrivener.” The statutory renewal of judgment is an automatic, ministerial act accomplished by the clerk of the court; entry of the renewal of judgment does not constitute a new or separate judgment. Bisordi did not hold himself out as any kind of attorney, offer the other creditors any legal advice, or resolve for them any “difficult or doubtful legal questions” that might “reasonably demand the application of a trained legal mind.”

Newsome v. Superior Court (Gallagher)

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C092070(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In May 2020, the chairs of the California Assembly and Senate committees that consider election-related matters prepared a formal letter to Governor Gavin Newsom indicating they were working on legislation to ensure Californians could vote by mail in light of the emergency occasioned by COVID-19. The Governor issued Executive Order No. N-64-20 on May 8, 2020, which required all voters to be provided vote-by-mail ballots. That order affirmed, however, that the administration continued to work “in partnership with the Secretary of State and the Legislature on requirements for in-person voting opportunities and how other details of the November election will be implemented” and “[n]othing in this Order is intended, or shall be construed, to limit the enactment of legislation on that subject.” The order was signed on June 3, 2020. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review concerned an order of the Sutter County Superior Court, entered on June 12, 2020, granting a temporary restraining order against the Executive Order, finding it constituted “an impermissible use of legislative powers in violation of the California Constitution and the laws of the State of California.” The Court of Appeal determined there was no basis for the superior court to grant real parties in interest relief using ex parte procedures prescribed by California law. "The hearing on the ex parte application, conducted only one day after the underlying action was filed in superior court, was held without proper notice to the Governor or his appearance. Apart from these procedural deficiencies, real parties in interest also failed to make the requisite substantive showing for use of an ex parte proceeding. In short, the real parties in interest failed to present competent evidence establishing imminent harm from the Governor’s executive order requiring immediate action."

Ferguson v. Ferguson

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46731

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Michael D. Ferguson was initially excluded as a beneficiary from his parents’ marital trust (the Original Trust). Years later, Michael's mother, Sybil Ferguson, essentially reversed Michael's exclusion by exercising a power of appointment in her will, designating Michael Ferguson as a beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust - a sub-trust of the Original Trust. When Sybil died, Michael petitioned the magistrate court for financial records, including records from the Original Trust, to determine whether he would receive his full share of the Survivor’s Trust. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the magistrate court denied in part and granted in part. Both parties appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision in part and reversed in part. The district court held that the magistrate court erred in concluding that Michael did not become a beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust until his mother’s death, concluding that he became a beneficiary the moment his mother named him as a beneficiary more than one year before her death. Further, the district court held that the magistrate court erred in refusing to apply the Original Trust’s no-contest provision, removing Michael as a beneficiary. The issues this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on: the fiduciary duties of a trustee who had discretion to spend the trust’s principal, the scope of records available to a trust beneficiary under Idaho Code section 15-7-303, and the enforceability of a trust instrument’s no-contest provision. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred: (1) in holding Sybil Ferguson did not owe Michael a fiduciary duty under the Trust Agreement; (2) in failing to address whether Michael was entitled to Original Trust allocation records pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-7-303; (3) in enforcing the forfeiture provision before addressing whether the Successor Trustees breached their fiduciary duties in administering the Survivor’s Trust; and (4) in failing to address the magistrate court's ruling denying Michael's motion to compel discovery. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Williams v. St. Alphonsus Medical Center

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46741

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Health Law

Appellants-patients Nathaniel Valencia and Emily Williams were self-pay patients who received emergency medical services at Saint Alphonsus Medical Center—Nampa, Inc. (“Saint Alphonsus”) in 2015. During their respective visits, Patients agreed to pay for “all charges incurred” for services rendered to them. Patients were billed in accordance with Saint Alphonsus’ “chargemaster” rates. Patients sought declaratory relief requesting the district court to rule Saint Alphonsus was only entitled to bill and seek collection of the reasonable value of the treatment provided to self-pay patients. Saint Alphonsus moved the district court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(d). Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Saint Alphonsus, and Patients timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

In the Matter of Matthew & Robin Kamil

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2018-0700

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

Petitioner Matthew Kamil (Husband), appealed, and respondent Robin Kamil (Wife) cross-appealed various circuit court orders in their divorce action. The parties were married in September 2007 and had two children. Husband filed for divorce in 2015, and Wife cross-petitioned. Husband was awarded temporary primary residential responsibility for the children and Wife was awarded supervised visitation. The court also appointed a parenting coordinator. By March 31, 2017, “the parenting evidence was that [Wife] was not allowing the therapeutic reunification plan to succeed.” The court nevertheless continued to order supervised visitation for Wife at a visitation center, and, in January 2018, the court “appointed Tracey Tucker to serve in an evaluative, structured, scripted reunification capacity, focusing on the children’s needs to have safe and appropriate contact with their mother.” After only four sessions, Tucker cancelled the reunification work “when [Wife] made some impulsive and inappropriate comments to [her].” At that point, Wife’s supervised contact with the children ended. Meanwhile, the court held a series of hearings to determine the authenticity and enforceability of a prenuptial agreement executed by the parties approximately one month prior to their wedding. The court ultimately found the prenuptial agreement unenforceable. In October 2018, the circuit court issued a final divorce decree. After choosing a February 2015 asset valuation date, the court awarded Husband the marital residence, awarded Wife the entirety of her Roth IRA, and equitably divided the remaining assets between them. To effectuate the equitable division, Husband was ordered to pay Wife $1,011,359.88. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded Husband failed to meet his appellate burden of demonstrating reversible error with respect to all the issues he raised on appeal. The Court concurred with Wife that with respect to the supervised parenting time visits with Ms. Tucker: while the the trial court had already ordered a plan, it also gave Tucker the sole discretion to determine when and if the parties would resume following that plan. This constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority, and the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the final decree. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Arvidson v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S066746

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Christopher L. Garrett

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

After claimant Danny Arvidson received an award of permanent total disability, insurer Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the award. The ALJ dismissed insurer’s hearing request as time-barred. The question on review before the Oregon Supreme Court was whether that dismissal entitled claimant to attorney fees under ORS 656.382(2), which provided that, if an insurer initiates review of a compensation award and the reviewing body “finds that ... all or part of the compensation awarded ... should not be reduced or disallowed,” the insurer shall pay the claimant’s attorney a “reasonable attorney fee.” The ALJ determined that the statute applied to the dismissal of insurer’s claim and awarded fees to claimant. The Workers’ Compensation Board reached a different conclusion and reversed that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, finding the ALJ correctly determined that his dismissal of insurer’s request for hearing entitled claimant to attorney fees. The board erred in concluding otherwise.

Athens School District et al. v. Vermont State Board of Education et al.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 VT 52

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiffs, a number of independent school districts, school boards, parents, students, and citizens, challenged the implementation of Act 46, as amended by Act 49, regarding the involuntary merger of school districts. The Vermont Legislature enacted those laws in 2015 and 2017, respectively, to improve educational outcomes and equity by designing more efficient school governance structures in response to long-term declining student enrollment and balkanized educational governance and delivery systems. In separate decisions, the civil division dismissed several counts of plaintiffs’ amended complaint and then later granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts. In two consolidated appeals, plaintiffs argued that: (1) the State Board of Education and the Agency of Education failed to carry out the plain-language mandate of Act 46; and (2) the Board’s implementation of the law, as manifested in its final order, violated other statutes in Title 16 and several provisions of the Vermont Constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the Agency’s and Board’s implementation of the law was consistent with the challenged Acts and other statutes in Title 16, did not result from an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, and did not violate any other constitutional provisions. Accordingly, the civil division’s decisions were affirmed.

Huntington School District v. Vermont State Board of Education et al.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 VT 53

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiff Huntington School District appealed the civil division’s order dismissing its complaint on motion of the two state defendants and granting defendant Mount Mansfield Modified Unified Union School District's motion for judgment on the pleadings. This case was one of several lawsuits challenging the implementation of Act 46 (as amended by Act 49) regarding the involuntary merger of school districts. Plaintiff raised four issues on appeal; three of those were resolved by the Vermont Supreme Court in a contemporaneously issued opinion concerning another challenge to the implementation of Acts 46 and 49, Athens Sch. Dist. et al. v. State Board of Education, 2020 VT 52. In this opinion, the Supreme Court set forth only the law and procedural history relevant to plaintiff’s single claim of error not decided in Athens School District: that the State Board of Education exceeded its delegated authority under Act 46 “by designating Huntington as a member of Mount Mansfield and purporting to subdelegate to Mount Mansfield the power to merge Huntington.” In relevant part, plaintiff alleged in its complaint that because Mount Mansfield was a union school district receiving incentives under Acts 153 and 156, the Board could not order Huntington to merge or otherwise alter its governance structure pursuant to Act 46, section 10(b). Plaintiff also alleged that the Board acted beyond its authority by calling for Mount Mansfield to vote on merger pursuant to 16 V.S.A. 721, while at the same time not allowing plaintiff to veto the merger by its own vote under the same statute. The state defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a viable claim for relief, and Mount Mansfield moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court found "unavailing" plaintiff's argument that Act 46 as amended did not authorize the Board to order Huntington to merge with Mount Mansfield, conditioned upon the consent of coters in Mount Mansfield's member districts. Nor did the Court found any merit to plaintiff's argument that the Board's authority was unlawfully subdelegated. As we stated with respect to the plaintiffs in Athens School District, plaintiff in this case did not demonstrate the Board failed to apply any Title 16 provisions in circumstances in which they were applicable.