Latest 27 Cases This Week: Alvarado v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. (5th Cir.), Ermuraki v. Renaud (5th Cir.), Lefebure v. D'Aquilla (5th Cir.)

Why the Biden Administration Was Right Earlier This Week to Change Course in the Obamacare Challenge Pending Before the Court

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar comments on an unusual move by the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, sending a letter to the U.S. Supreme Court amending the position of the federal government in a case currently pending before the Court challenging the Affordable Care Act. Dean Amar explains why the arrival of a new administration should generally not trigger such position reversals, but he argues that the unusual circumstances—specifically the “exceptional implausibility” of the government’s prior filings—may justify the government’s action in this instance.

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Alvarado v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30440

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

In a case related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, four plaintiffs seek reversal of dismissals with prejudice for failure to comply with orders of the multidistrict litigation (MDL) judge to file particular information about their claims. Plaintiff Alvarado seeks reversal of his dismissal with prejudice for failure to timely opt out of the settlement class. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissals with prejudice of Plaintiffs Iames and Alvarado's claims where the record shows a clear record of delay by Iames, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Alvarado's failure to opt out was inexcusable. The court reversed and remanded the dismissals of Plaintiffs Dorgan, Gortney, and Valdivieso where plaintiffs ultimately complied with pretrial orders (PTO) 66. In this case, plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, and there are no existing aggravating factors counseling in favor of dismissal with prejudice.

Ermuraki v. Renaud

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-20370

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Immigration Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging USCIS's denial of their application to adjust their immigration status to lawful permanent residents under the diversity visa program. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and dismissed the case, holding that the case was moot prior to the entry of the district court's final judgment. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that a claim challenging the denial of a diversity visa status adjustment application becomes moot after the relevant fiscal year expires. In this case, plaintiffs' claim was moot at the time they filed their initial complaint.

Lefebure v. D'Aquilla

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30702

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Barrett Boeker, her cousin's husband, raped and sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at his home on the grounds of the Louisiana state prison where he serves as an assistant warden. Plaintiff also alleges that Samuel D'Aquilla, the district attorney, conspired with Boeker and others to prevent her from seeking justice for these crimes. The Fifth Circuit held that, under established precedent, it has no jurisdiction to reach plaintiff's claims against D’Aquilla, because she has no Article III standing. The court explained that Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), makes clear that "a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution." Accordingly, the court has no choice but to reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to D'Aquilla.

McGehee v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-1770

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiffs, Arkansas prisoners who are or were on death row for capital murder convictions, filed suit alleging that Arkansas's method of execution violated the Eighth Amendment. In an effort to obtain the necessary information about the existence of known and available alternatives that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain, they served subpoenas on several state correctional departments, including the NDCS. After the NDCS objected, the district court determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not categorically bar the subpoena. NDCS appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Arkansas district court dismissed the inmates' suit and the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered public disclosure of the documents. The Eighth Circuit held that this case has been rendered moot where there is no effective relief that the court could grant because the materials at issue are already public. The court explained that requiring the return or destruction of the subpoenaed documents would provide no effective relief, and the court declined to do either. Finally, no exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable here.

Smith v. Allbaugh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-6029

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-appellee Christina Smith was the mother of Joshua England. Her claims arose from the death of England from a ruptured appendix in May 2018, while England was housed at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center (JHCC), an Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) facility in Lexington, Oklahoma. England was a 21-year-old prisoner at JHCC who was a few months away from release when he submitted multiple sick call requests. At the fifth such request, England complained his stomach hurt and he was short of breath. Unable to bear the pain while waiting at the clinic, England died in his cell from a ruptured appendix with acute peritonitis. Defendants-Appellants Joe Allbaugh, the Director of the Department of Corrections at the time this claim arose, and Carl Bear, the Warden of Joseph Harp Correctional Center (collectively, Defendants) appealed the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss Smith's subsequent lawsuit relating to England's death on grounds of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding Smith alleged only that JHCC medical staff failed to follow procedure, not that Defendants failed to enforce those policies. Furthermore, the Court determined Smith failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to support deliberate indifference on the part of these defendants. Likewise, Smith failed to sufficiently plead Defendants improperly hired, supervised, and retained certain medical staff employees.

Aitken v. US Stem Cell Clinic, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-13381

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Ginsburg

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Two groups of patients who deposited tissue in a stem-cell bank appealed the district court's denial of their respective motions to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in an action between the corporation running the bank and the FDA. The district court concluded that the motions were premature and denied them without prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's order was not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the patients' appeal.

Dimondstein v. Stidman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-7161

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Plaintiff, the President of the American Postal Workers Union, filed suit against two union members, Jerry Stidman and Jonathan Kelley, for defamation. Plaintiff is a District of Columbia resident, Stidman is an Indiana resident, and Kelley is a Wisconsin resident. Stidman and Kelley moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of Indiana or, in the alternative, dismiss it under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (b)(3). The district court dismissed the case for improper venue. The DC Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing the case and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court failed to provide a "sound prudential justification" for addressing venue before personal jurisdiction, nor is one easily ascertainable. In this case, the venue analysis involves issues that the court has yet to consider, including where publication occurs when allegedly defamatory material is published on both a public website and a limited access online social media page, as well as the significance of where the harm caused by defamation is felt. The court reasoned that dealing first with the venue question would neither provide "an easier resolution of the case," nor prevent the court from having to "decide a question of . . . law that it has not heretofore decided." The court stated that diving into the venue analysis required the district court to address previously undecided questions that it, and the court, might otherwise never have to face.

Fresno Community Hospital and Medical Center v. Cochran

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-5254

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Arthur Raymond Randolph

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Public Benefits

When Medicare overpays hospitals, it offsets that mistake by reducing future payments. By 2013, Medicare was out $11 billion because of new diagnostic codes and bookkeeping that did not keep up. Congress required that the Secretary of Health and Human Services recoup that amount by the end of fiscal year 2017 by reducing the base rate (standardized amount) paid for inpatient care and directed the Secretary to adjust the base rate by 0.5% each year through 2023, 129 Stat. 87, 163 (2015). Subsequently, while reviewing the 2017 budget, the Secretary realized that a -3.2% adjustment would leave the agency short of its $11 billion goal and announced a -3.9% adjustment. Congress then told the Secretary to increase the base rate by 0.4588% (not 0.5%) in 2018, 130 Stat. 1033, 1320 (2016). In 2017, the Secretary adjusted the base rate -3.9%. The agency met its goal. In 2018, the Secretary adjusted the base rate -3.4412%. Medicare providers sued, arguing that the Secretary should have reversed that expedient at the end of 2017 rather than carry it over into 2018, costing the hospitals $840 million in lost payments. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. While the hospitals felt a “significant financial impact” from the -0.7% adjustment, Section 7(b)(5) bars judicial review of adjustments made under the Act.

Wilcox v. Georgetown University

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-7065

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Judith Ann Wilson Rogers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, ERISA

Participants in Georgetown University retirement plans sued the University and individual plan fiduciaries, seeking to bring individual and representative class action claims for breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461. They alleged that the plans paid excessive fees for record-keeping services and included investment options that consistently underperformed their benchmarks. In January 2019, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, citing Article III standing as to some aspects of plan management, such as the inclusion of investment options neither plaintiff had selected. Regarding the duty of prudence, the court found that the excessive recordkeeping fees allegations provided no factual support for the assertion that the plans should pay only $35/year per participant. In May, the court denied as untimely their motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The D.C. Circuit vacated. Dismissal of a complaint without prejudice is generally not a final appealable order. Exceptions that apply where the record clearly indicates that the district court has separated itself from the case do not apply to this case. The January Order did not enter a final, appealable judgment; the district court erred when considering the motion to amend the complaint in refusing to apply the Rule 15(a)(2) standard, rather than the more restrictive standards under Rules 59(e) and 60(b).

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ogletree

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180896

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") and its insured, Kaitlin Ogletree, disagreed about the extent of damages incurred in an automobile accident that Ogletree had with an underinsured motorist. During closing arguments, Ogletree's counsel made inaccurate statements unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. The jury returned a verdict for Ogletree, and Allstate appealed on account of the allegedly improper closing argument. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the incorrect statements were prejudicial and adequate grounds for a new trial. Allstate's objection to the argument was properly preserved, and the Court found those statement were not provoked by an improper statement from Allstate's counsel. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Doe v. Westmont College

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B303208(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Tangeman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

After plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate to overturn Westmont College's determination that he committed sexual assault, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, which the trial court denied. Westmont appealed from the judgment, but plaintiff did not appeal from the postjudgment order denying his attorney fee motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. After remittitur issued, plaintiff moved for attorney's fees based on the court's decision. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court applied the wrong standards when it denied plaintiff's attorney fee motion. In this case, the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff's post-appeal motion for attorney fees because his action against Westmont resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, and his action conferred significant benefits on a large group of people. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether public enforcement of plaintiff's fair hearing rights was available or adequate. The trial court also failed to consider whether the financial burden hoisted on plaintiff in prosecuting his case outweighed his own personal interests, focusing instead on the "punishment" that would be inflicted on Westmont for exercising its right to appeal. The court also agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred when it denied his attorney fee motion due to his failure to provide a basis for apportionment between the fees he incurred to advance his private interests and those that advanced the public interest. Therefore, the court vacated the denial order and remanded for further proceedings.

Early v. Bacerra

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C089943(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Xavier Becerra and his election committee (collectively, Becerra) successfully defended a petition for writ of mandate brought by Eric Early and his election committee (collectively, Early) seeking to remove Becerra as a candidate for California's Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition. Early alleged that Becerra was ineligible for the office of Attorney General because his state bar status was “inactive” during the five years preceding the election and therefore he was not “admitted to practice” in the state as required for that period under Government Code section 12503. We held that the phrase “admitted to practice” in the statute “refers to the event of admission to the bar and the status of being admitted, and does not require engagement in the 'actual’ or 'active’ practice of law.” Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which the trial court granted awarding Becerra $69,718 in attorney fees. "Becerra's successful defense of the petition enforced an important public right and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by subdivision (a) of section 1021.5. . . . Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining under subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 that the financial burden Becerra incurred in defending Early’s suit outweighed any pecuniary benefit in the form of the salary paid to the Attorney General or otherwise."

Guo v. Moorpark Recovery Service, LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A159195(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Needham

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Legal Ethics

Guo owned TVGC, which operated a Pleasanton spa. TVGC agreed to sell the business to Mazurova's corporation, LSI. The sale was partially financed through a promissory note. The sales agreement and promissory note contained provisions allowing a party prevailing in a legal action to recover attorney fees. After the sale, a dispute arose regarding Guo’s alleged nondisclosure of outstanding coupons for free spa services and Mazurova’s alleged failure to make payments. A judgment was entered for $161,085.58 against Guo and TVGC, which was affirmed. A subsequent order specifically stated that LSI and Mazurova were deemed the prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1032, “entitled to recover their costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees.” Mazurova and LSI assigned the judgment to Moorpark, which engaged in collection efforts and moved for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040. The court denied the motion because the underlying judgment did not include an award of attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The judgment awarded reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing parties, although it did not set a particular amount of fees and no costs bill including such fees was ever filed. The court’s failure to include a specific amount in the judgment does not defeat section 685.040.

Knight v. South Orange Community College Dist.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G058644(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: William W. Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Saddleback College and Juan Avalos, vice-president of Saddleback’s student services and its Title IX officer, appealed the granting of a writ of mandamus in favor of a Saddleback student, Marcus Knight. Knight petitioned for relief after he was disciplined when two female students complained that he was following them, taking photos of one of them on his phone, and touching them. Knight had multiple disabilities, including cerebral palsy and autism, which have complicated his experience at Saddleback. In March 2018, Knight received a letter from Avalos stating that he was “suspended” – barred from classes and campus activities. It appeared, however, that he was allowed to attend classes anyway, while he contested the suspension. Eventually the potential suspension was dropped, and a written disciplinary reprimand was placed in his student record instead. At trial, Knight based his petition on the ground that the college did not afford him a hearing during which he or his counsel could confront and cross-examine witnesses. The trial court granted the writ petition on that basis. The Court of Appeal determined Knight was not entitled to that level of due process: requiring a trial-like hearing before Saddleback could issue a written reprimand placed too great a burden on the college when compared to the minor detriment to Knight. "He received notice of the charges against him, and he had an opportunity to respond – several opportunities, in fact. Had the suspension gone forward, he would have had the hearing he feels he was entitled to. But it did not go forward, and he received a much lower level of discipline." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment for Knight and directed the trial court to enter judgment for appellants.

Maldonado v. Fast Auto Loans

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G058645(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Kathleen E. O'Leary

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Contracts

In a putative class action, plaintiffs Joe Maldonado, Alfredo Mendez, J. Peter Tuma, Jonabette Michelle Tuma, and Roberto Mateos Salmeron (collectively referred to as “the Customers”), claimed Fast Auto Loans, Inc., (Lender) charged unconscionable interest rates on loans in violation of California Financial Code sections 22302 and 22303. Lender filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the action pursuant to an arbitration clause contained within the Customers’ loan agreements. The court denied the motion on the grounds the provision was invalid and unenforceable because it required consumers to waive their right to pursue public injunctive relief, a rule described in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal.5th 945 (2017). On appeal, Lender argued the “McGill Rule” did not apply, but even if it did, other claims were subject to arbitration. Alternatively, Lender contended the McGill Rule was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act . Finding Lender’s contentions on appeal lacked merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order.

Manderson-Saleh v. Regents of the University of California

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D076652(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Judith L. Haller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Trusts & Estates

Amira Manderson-Saleh was the daughter of an oncology nurse (Mother) who worked at the University of California at San Diego (UCSD) for about 12 years until she retired shortly before her death. Mother earned a pension under rules permitting the employee to designate a beneficiary to receive specified monthly pension benefits upon the employee’s death. When Manderson-Saleh claimed her rights as the designated beneficiary shortly after Mother’s death, The Regents of the University of California (Regents) denied her claim, finding Mother did not properly identify Manderson-Saleh as the contingent beneficiary before her death. Thus, none of the earned pension benefits were paid. Manderson-Saleh filed a complaint against the Regents, alleging breach of contract. Alternatively, she sought a writ of mandate to overturn the Regents’ decision. The Regents demurred only to the contract claim, and the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Proceedings on the mandate petition, the court found Manderson-Saleh was not entitled to relief because the Regents had the right to strictly apply its rule that contingent-annuitant pension benefits were conditioned on the Regents receiving a signed beneficiary-election form before the employee’s death, and the Regents received this form one week after Mother’s death. The court rejected Manderson-Saleh’s different interpretation of the rule and her arguments this rule was satisfied by the Regents receiving Mother’s election worksheet before her death. The court entered a final judgment sustaining the demurrer and denying the mandate petition. Manderson-Saleh challenged both rulings. Finding the trial court properly sustained the demurrer, the Court of Appeal affirmed in part. However, the trial court erred in denying the mandate petition. "The undisputed evidence establishes Mother substantially complied with the Regents’ pension rules and the Regents abused its discretion in failing to consider and apply the substantial compliance doctrine in evaluating Manderson-Saleh’s claim." The matter was remanded with directions for the trial court to grant mandamus relief, and to issue a a writ ordering the Regents to grant Manderson-Saleh's contingent-annuitant pension claim.

Organizacion Comunidad de Alviso v. City of San Jose

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H046458(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Grover

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law

Espinoza asked a San Jose city planner to place him on the public notice list for a proposed project which would rezone farmland for light industrial uses. He twice specifically requested a copy of the notice of determination (NOD) documenting the city’s certification of an environmental impact report and approval of the project. The city filed two NODs for the project: the first identified the wrong applicant but the second correctly listed Microsoft as the applicant. The city, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), failed to send Espinoza the legally operative second NOD. Based on the first NOD, which the city had emailed to Espinoza, the initial petition for writ of mandate named the wrong real party in interest. Plaintiff did not file an amended petition naming Microsoft until after the limitations period had run. The court determined that the initial petition was defective for failing to join Microsoft as a necessary and indispensable party and dismissed the CEQA claim in the amended petition as untimely. The court of appeal affirmed, noting its “uncomfortable conclusion" that the dismissal must be upheld. The city violated CEQA by failing to send Espinoza the second NOD but the second NOD was properly filed with the county clerk. It provided constructive notice of the correct parties to sue and Espinoza did not timely amend its petition to name Microsoft.

DNREC v. Food & Water Watch

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 558, 2019

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Montgomery-Reeves

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Appellant Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (“DNREC”), challenged the Superior Court’s holding that Appellee Food & Water Watch (“Watch”), had organizational standing to contest Order No. 2016-W-0008 (the “Secretary’s Order”), which established a system to regulate pollutants from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“Feeding Operations”). Specifically, DNREC argued Watch did not have organizational standing to challenge the Secretary’s Order because its representatives could not adequately establish injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Watch responded that this action was moot: since DNREC ultimately won on the merits and neither party appealed the merits decision, the issue of standing was no longer justiciable because the action was not adversarial. Further, even if this action was not moot, Watch argued that it had standing. Having reviewed the briefs, the supplemental memoranda, and the record on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for lack of standing to appeal. DNREC was the prevailing party below; the Superior Court granted DNREC all of the relief it requested; and the Superior Court’s standing decision did not meet the criteria for a collateral adverse ruling. Accordingly, the standing decision did not render DNREC an aggrieved party, and DNREC does not have standing to appeal.

Sherman v. Ellis

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 43, 2020

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Vaughn

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

Plaintiff-Appellant Dean Sherman appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Stephen P. Ellis, Esquire. The appeal presented two issues: (1) whether the traditional “but for” test for proximate cause applied in a “transactional” legal negligence case, or whether it is sufficient that the alleged negligence creates an increased risk of future damages; and (2) whether the evidence satisfied the summary judgment requirement that there be no genuine issue as to any material fact. As to the first issue, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the traditional “but for” test, not a risk of future damages test, was the appropriate test for determining proximate cause. As to the second issue, the Court concluded the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Sherman, raised a genuine issue of material fact, and that summary judgment should have been denied. This second conclusion required that the superior court's judgment be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Choice Feed Inc. v. Montierth

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46544

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts

Choice Feed, Inc. sued Ray and Susan Montierth, alleging that Ray breached an oral agreement to sell his feedlot property to Choice Feed once he arranged a 1031 tax deferred agreement. Although Ray collected money from Choice Feed that was to go toward the purchase of the feedlot property, he never arranged the 1031 exchange. Instead, without notice to Choice Feed, Ray sold the feedlot property to someone else while continuing to accept monthly payments from Choice Feed. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of Choice Feed on one count of fraud against Ray, awarded compensatory damages, and assessed $250,000 in punitive damages. Ray moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the district court granted in part, thereby reducing the jury’s awards of both the compensatory and punitive damages. Ray appealed the jury’s verdict, including the compensatory and punitive damages that were reduced by the district court. Choice Feed cross-appealed the district court’s decision granting Ray’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the resulting reduction in damages. After its review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all issues raised in Ray’s direct appeal: (1) to deny Ray’s motion to dismiss for Choice Feed’s failure to plead fraud with particularity; (2) to give jury instructions that conformed with the evidence presented at trial; (3) to allow Choice Feed to seek improvement expenses as damages at trial; (4) to allow the jury to consider punitive damages; and, (5) to consider punitive damages in its prevailing party analysis and its conclusion that Choice Feed was the prevailing party. The Supreme Court also rejected Ray’s argument that Choice Feed did not have standing to bring suit or that it was not the real party in interest and the Court declined to add a tenth element of a transfer or sale of property to common law fraud. On Choice Feed’s cross-appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to grant Ray’s JNOV motion and reduce the compensatory damage and punitive damage awards as raised in Choice Feed’s cross-appeal. However, the Court affirmed the district court on Choice Feed’s remaining issue raised in its cross-appeal concerning the award of prejudgment interest to Ray on his open account hay claim. Costs and attorney fees are awarded to Choice Feed as the overall prevailing party on appeal.

Cook v. Wiebe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46732

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Legal Ethics

Holly Cook appealed an administrative order entered by an Administrative District Judge (“ADJ”) declaring her to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59. The order prohibited Cook from filing any new litigation pro se in Idaho without first obtaining leave of the court where the litigation was proposed to be filed. Ms. Cook petitioned for a divorce from her husband (“Mr. Cook”) in 2015. During the lengthy and contentious divorce proceedings, Ms. Cook had assistance of counsel for portions of the proceedings, but represented herself pro se when she did not. Some aspects of the divorce proceedings were appealed to the district court. Mr. Cook filed a moved that Ms. Cook declared a vexatious litigant. Neither party requested a hearing on Mr. Cook’s motion. The district judge presiding over the appeal referred the matter to the ADJ. The ADJ found that Ms. Cook largely failed to appear at dates set in scheduling orders that she (with and without counsel) agreed to. She failed at obtaining continuances, at having the trial judge disqualified, and to move the court for reconsideration of many intermediate decisions. She attempted to collaterally attack the default judgment of divorce, and at some point, was held in contempt for failing to respond to court orders during the divorce proceedings. Separate from the divorce proceedings, the ADJ noted Ms. Cook had filed nine pro se civil protection orders, all of which had been dismissed in favor of the parties from whom she sought protection. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the ADJ abused its discretion in declaring Ms. Cook a vexatious litigant; the ADJ did not review the merits and reason for dismissal in the nine civil protection actions, causing the ADJ to conclude incorrectly the final determinations were adverse to her. Furthermore, with respect to the divorce proceedings, the Court determined the ADJ abused its discretion by failing to make factual findings that Ms. Cook repeatedly attempted to relitigate issues already finally decided by the magistrate court. The Supreme Court concluded the ADJ did not make sufficient findings to support the conclusion that Ms. Cook’s filings were frivolous, unmeritorious, or filed with the intent to cause unnecessary delay. Accordingly, the Court reversed the prefiling order and remanded to allow the ADJ the opportunity to reconsider this matter.

State ex rel. Dickey v. Besler

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-1598

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying a citizen's quo warranto action asserting that a district judge was holding his office unlawfully, holding that this case presented a nonjusticiable controversy. In 2018, two finalists were sent to the Governor for a district judge position. Iowa law provides that, if the Governor fails to make an appointment within thirty days after a list of nominees has been submitted, the appointment shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. On a Thursday, the thirtieth day, the Governor communicated to her chief of staff the her selected nominee's identity - Jason Besler. The following Monday the Governor told Besler that he had been selected. The Chief Justice accepted the Governor's view that the appointment was timely. Gary Dickey, a private citizen, filed an application for leave to file a petition for writ of quo warranto alleging that Besler was holding the office of district judge unlawfully because the Governor failed to appoint Besler by the deadline for making an appointment. The district court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because both the Governor and the Chief Justice deferred to and accepted the view that the appointment was timely, this quo warranto action was nonjusticiable.

Battise v. Aucoin

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-IA-01775-SCT

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Legal Ethics

Linda Battise was the mother of Joseph Aucoin, deceased. Joseph and Sheila Aucoin were married and had two daughters. After Joseph’s death, Sheila began restricting Linda’s visitation with the children because Linda was not abiding by Sheila’s parental decisions. Through counsel, Linda petitioned for grandparent visitation. The chancellor encouraged the parties to confer because Sheila made some statements showing that they could come to a visitation agreement without court involvement. Linda and Sheila reached an agreement; however, the chancellor declined to sign the agreed order. The chancellor advised Sheila to retain an attorney because she did not believe that Sheila fully understood the implications of the agreement. Furthermore, the chancellor told Sheila that she was entitled to attorney’s fees. Shiela hired an attorney, and filed a motion to dismiss or stay proceedings until fees were paid in advance. The chancellor denied Linda’s motion to recuse, and ordered Linda to pay $3,500 to Sheila for attorney’s fees within thirty days or else she could not proceed with her case. Linda appealed, arguing that: (1) the chancellor erred by requiring her to prepay attorney’s fees to Sheila before Linda’s case could be heard; (2) the chancellor erred by not entering a final judgment; and (3) the chancellor erred by not recusing. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's denial of the motion to recuse. The Court reversed the prepayment order, and remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-48-19

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Faustino J. Fernandez-Vina

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Under New Jersey’s Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee injured during a social or recreational activity generally cannot receive compensation for those injuries unless a two-part exception is met. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the injuries sustained by claimant Kim Goulding at an event hosted by her employer were compensable. The workers’ compensation court dismissed Goulding’s claim, determining that "Family Fun Day" was a social or recreational event and that the two-part test of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was not satisfied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the injury Goulding sustained while volunteering at her employer-sponsored event was compensable because, as to Goulding, the event was not a social or recreational activity. Even if N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was applicable here, Goulding would still have satisfied the two-part exception set forth in that statute. Her role at the event, which was planned to be held annually, was the same as her role as an employee, and but for her employment at Friendship House, Goulding would not have been asked to volunteer and would not have been injured. Thus, Goulding’s injury was “a regular incident of employment.” Furthermore, the Court found Friendship House received a benefit from Family Fun Day “beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” The event was not a closed event for the Friendship House team. Rather, it was an outreach event to celebrate and benefit Friendship House’s clients, creating goodwill in the community.

Committee to Elect Dan Forest v. Employees Political Action Committee

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 231A18

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Robin E. Hudson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law

The Supreme Court held that the North Carolina Constitution does not limit the jurisdiction of the state's courts in the same manner as the standing requirements that U.S. Const. art III, section 2 imposes on federal courts, including the requirement that the complaining party must show she has suffered "injury in fact," even where N.C. Gen. Stat. 163-278.39A(f) (now repealed) expressly conferred standing to sue on a party. In 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the "Disclosure Statute," section 163-278.38Z et seq., providing specific requirements for television and radio ads placed by political action committees. Plaintiff's complaint alleged two violations of the Disclosure Statute by the Employees Political Action Committee (EMPAC). The trial court granted summary judgment to EMPAC, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to allege actual demonstrable damages. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that when a person alleges the infringement of a legal right directly under a cause of action at common law, a statute, or the North Carolina Constitution, the legal injury itself gives rise to standing.

South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28008

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run.

Beauregard v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 97249-4

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Sheryl Gordon McCloud

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) Board of Governors (BOG) terminated the WSBA executive director during a closed executive session. WSBA member Lincoln Beauregard sued the WSBA, alleging that the vote to fire the executive director violated the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA). He demanded that the executive director be reinstated. The trial court held that the OPMA applied to the WSBA and granted Beauregard a preliminary injunction, but not for the requested relief of reinstating the executive director. Instead, the injunction required the WSBA to comply with the OPMA. Because the OPMA did not apply to the WSBA and because the superior court ordered relief that Beauregard never requested, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the preliminary injunction.