Latest 27 Cases This Week: Baum-Holland v. Hilton El Con Management, LLC (1st Cir.), Jeffords v. BP Corporation North America, Inc. (7th Cir.), ...

Reflections on the Movement in California to Repeal the State’s Ban on Affirmative Action

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar offers three observations on a measure recently approved by the California legislature that would, if approved by the voters, repeal Proposition 209, the voter initiative that has prohibited affirmative action by the state and its subdivisions since its passage in 1996. Amar praises the California legislature for seeking to repeal Prop 209 and for seeking to do so using the proper procedures, and he suggests that if Prop 209 is repealed, legal rationales for the use of race should be based not only on the value of diversity (as they have been for some time now), but also on the need to remedy past wrongs against Black Americans.

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Baum-Holland v. Hilton El Con Management, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-2061

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Torruella

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's tort action stemming from the death of Dr. George Holland while he was vacationing at a hotel located in Fajardo, Puerto Rico, holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish the causation element of Plaintiffs' tort claim. Plaintiffs, Dr. Holland's wife and their children, asserted a tort claim under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code against the hotel, its insurer and other entities stemming from Dr. Holland's death while he was snorkeling close to an island near the hotel. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellants did not point to evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could rule in their favor as to the causation element of their tort claim, and therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.

Jeffords v. BP Corporation North America, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-1533

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Jeffords, a crane operator on a construction project at an oil refinery, fell seven feet from the catwalk on the body of a crane and injured his feet and back. He sued the project owner and several of its contractors for negligence. While this lawsuit was pending, Jeffords died, apparently of unrelated causes.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. None of the defendants whom Jeffords sued owed him a duty of care. BP owns and operates the Whiting, Indiana oil refinery and contracted with Fluor to provide engineering, procurement, and construction management services. BP and Fluor each entered into separate contracts with MCI to provide construction services. BP also contracted with Central Rent‐a‐Crane, Jeffords’s employer. Central had no contractual relationship with Fluor or MCI; Central was not a defendant because the workers’ compensation system would apply to Jeffords’s injuries on the job. Each of the plaintiff’s arguments that the defendants assumed a duty of care is defeated by the undisputed material facts and contractual provisions, and by the limits of the relevant Indiana Supreme Court cases.

Zhao v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-3071

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

When Zhao gave birth to her son “S.,” he suffered an avoidable brachial plexus injury that severely and permanently impaired the function of his right arm. During her pregnancy and S.’s birth, Zhao was attended by an obstetrician employed by a federally supported grant clinic in southern Illinois, who is considered an employee of the U.S. Public Health Service under 42 U.S.C. 233(g), Zhao sued for medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court found that the obstetrician had been negligent and awarded Zhao, on behalf of S., $2.6 million in lost earnings and $5.5 million in noneconomic damages. S. was not five years old at the time of trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s argument that the calculation of S.’s future lost earnings was improperly speculative, given the uncertainties inherent in projecting a five‐year‐old’s career opportunities. The question may have been difficult, but there was no reversible error. The court took a reasonable approach to estimate the lost earnings award based on data provided in expert testimony. The government also challenged the award of non-economic damages as arbitrary and excessive in comparison to similar cases. The court could have provided a more detailed explanation of its comparative process, but its reasoning did not amount to reversible error.

DeRoy v. Carnival Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-12619

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Rosenbaum

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

After injuring her foot on a rug while onboard a Carnival ship, plaintiff filed suit against Carnival in both state and federal court, seeking damages for the injuries she allegedly suffered onboard the ship. In this case, plaintiff entered into a contract with Carnival that contained a forum-selection clause. Under the forum-selection clause's plain language, when jurisdiction for a claim could lie in federal district court, federal court is the only option for a plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff's claim for negligence at sea falls well within the walls of the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction. Even without explicitly invoking admiralty jurisdiction, the court held that plaintiff's complaint is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h)'s provision rendering her claim an admiralty or maritime claim.

Sharpe v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1951

Opinion Date: July 1, 2020

Judge: Jimmie V. Reyna

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Health Law, Personal Injury, Public Benefits

In July 2010, L.M. was born at full-term and developed normally for six months. In February 2011, L.M. received childhood vaccines, including the diphtheria-tetanus-acellular pertussis vaccination. By that evening, L.M. had a fever, was lethargic, had poor muscle tone, and would not eat., Any disturbance caused L.M. to scream. L.M. began to have several seizures a day. At seven years of age, L.M. could crawl and walk with the assistance of a walker. She had a poorly coordinated grasp, suffered cortical visual impairments, and was nonverbal, though she could use a few signs to express ideas such as “yes,” and “no.” Testing revealed that L.M. had a genetic mutation. In a claim under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, L.M. alleged that the vaccinations administered to L.M. in February 2011, significantly aggravated L.M.’s pre-existing condition under two alternative theories. The Special Master denied the petition, finding that L.M.’s genetic mutation was “the most compelling explanation for her predisposition to develop a seizure disorder.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of an “on-table” claim, finding no support for an argument that most encephalopathies do not become acute until after vaccination. The court vacated and remanded the denial of an “off-table” claim, which requires determining whether the child’s receipt of vaccinations significantly aggravated her seizure disorder in the face of an underlying genetic mutation.

Daniels v. Hawthorne-Midway Lily Flagg, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190208

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Michael F. Bolin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

In December 2016, Geraldine Daniels was residing at the Hawthorne at Lily-Flagg apartment complex, which was owned by Hawthorne-Midway Lily Flagg, LLC ("Hawthorne-Midway"), and managed by Hawthorne Residential Partners, LLC, and its community manager, Tracy Wiley. Daniels sued Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley for damages resulting from injuries she suffered when she fell while stepping off a sidewalk at the complex. Daniels appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed: Daniels did not demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact that prevented Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley from being entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Ex parte Doris Sanders.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190478

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Sellers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Doris Sanders petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its March 13, 2020, order transferring the underlying action to the Montgomery Circuit Court pursuant to section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, Alabama's forum non conveniens statute. In 2019, Sanders, a resident of Barbour County, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident on Interstate 85 in Macon County. Sanders sued the drivers of the other two vehicles, Sae Him Chung and Shawn Reaves, at the Macon Circuit Court, alleging negligence and wantonness and seeking damages for her accident-related injuries. Sanders also included a claim against her insurer, Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. Defendants requested the change of venue to Montgomery County, arguing: (1) that the accident occurred in Macon County and was investigated there; (2) that Sanders was employed by the State of Alabama Tourism Department, which is located in Montgomery County; (3) that Chung lived and worked in Montgomery County; and (4) that Kellie McElvaine, a witness to the accident, lived and worked in Montgomery County. Sanders opposed the motion, arguing defendants failed to carry their burden of showing a transfer to Montgomery County was required under the statute. Sanders stated that she did not work in Montgomery County; rather, she said, she worked in Macon County at the Macon County Rest Area. And she received medical treatment for her injuries in Lee County and Barbour County, both of which were closer to Macon County than to Montgomery County. Thus, she asserted that her health-care providers in Lee County and Barbour County would have to travel farther if the case were transferred to Montgomery County. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Macon Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in transferring this case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. The Court therefore granted the petition for mandamus relief, and directed the Macon Court to vacated its March 2020 transfer order.

Ex parte Freudenberger

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190159

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Sellers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Defendants Curt Freudenberger, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Surgery & Spine Center, P.C. petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Madison Circuit Court to vacate its October 10, 2019, protective order to the extent it imposes conditions upon ex parte interviews defense counsel intends to conduct with physicians who treated one of the plaintiffs, Rhonda Brewer, in connection with her injuries. In August 2019, Rhonda and her husband, Charlie, sued Dr. Freudenberger and Sportsmed Orthopedic (collectively, "defendants"), asserting claims of medical malpractice based on injuries Rhonda allegedly suffered during the course of a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Freudenberger. Charlie also asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Before discovery, defendants moved for the entry of a "qualified protective order," pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and filed a proposed order with their motion. The trial court entered a qualified protective order authorizing the disclosure of Rhonda's protected health information; the order, however, imposed conditions on defense counsel's contacts with her treating physicians. Defendants moved the trial court to reconsider its order, contending that Alabama law allowed ex parte interviews with treating physicians, that HIPAA did not prohibit ex parte interviews with treating physicians, and that the restrictions imposed effectively deprived them from conducting ex parte interviews. The trial court denied reconsideration. The Supreme Court determined the trial court exceeded its discretion by requiring the Brewers' counsel to receive notice of, and have an opportunity to attend, ex parte interviews that defense counsel intended to conduct with Rhonda's treating physicians. Accordingly, the additional conditions imposed by the trial court were not justified based on the Brewers' objection that ex parte communications would violate HIPAA and the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court granted defendants' petition and issued the writ. The trial court was directed to vacate its order to the extent it imposed conditions upon defense counsel's ex parte interviews with Rhonda's treating physicians.

Odom v. Helms et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180749

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Tom Parker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Bernadine Odom appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of several supervisory officers in the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol Division, in a lawsuit based on the misconduct of a state trooper. In 2015, Odom was involved in an automobile accident. State Trooper Samuel Houston McHenry II responded to the scene. Odom's vehicle was inoperable, so after McHenry investigated the accident, he gave her a ride, ostensibly to a safe location. At 12:12 a.m., he radioed his post dispatcher that he was en route with Odom to an exit about 10 miles from the accident scene. He did not mention his vehicle's mileage as of the time he left the accident scene. Instead of taking Odom directly to the exit, McHenry took her to a wooded area and sexually assaulted her. At 12:21 a.m., he radioed that he was dropping Odom off at the exit, and at 12:25 he radioed that he had completed the drop-off. Within two days, McHenry's employment was terminated based on his misconduct. McHenry was charged with first-degree rape, and he pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct. Odom then filed this civil lawsuit against McHenry and law enforcement officials alleging violations of various law-enforcement policies and procedures, and well as failing to properly train and supervise McHenry. Because Odom could not demonstrate the supervisory defendants were not entitled to State-agent immunity, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment in their favor.

Williams v. Barry

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180352

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Alisa Kelli Wise

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Angela Williams, as mother and next friend of Li'Jonas Earl Williams, a deceased minor, appealed a judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of the remaining defendants, Dr. Wesley H. Barry, Jr., and Advanced Surgical Associates, P.C. Li'Jonas Williams was a 17-year-old with sickle-cell disease. In June 2014, Li'Jonas went to the emergency room at Southern Regional Medical Center in Georgia ("the Georgia hospital") complaining of back and chest pain. A CT scan performed at the Georgia hospital showed that Li'Jonas had cholelithiasis, which is stones in the gallbladder. Li'Jonas and Williams saw Li'Jonas's pediatrician in Montgomery, Dr. Julius Sadarian. Dr. Sadarian referred Li'Jonas to Dr. Barry for gallbladder removal. Dr. Barry testified that Li'Jonas tolerated the procedure well; that Li'Jonas did not experience any complications during the surgery; and that Li'Jonas had only about 10ccs (two teaspoons) of blood loss during the surgery. Li'Jonas did not experience any problems when he was in the post-anesthesia-care unit or when he was in the outpatient recovery room. On the evening of August 4, 2014, Li'Jonas was found unresponsive at his home. He was transported by ambulance to the emergency; ultimately efforts to revive Li'Jonas were unsuccessful and he died a half hour after admission to the ER. In her fourth amended complaint, Williams asserted a wrongful-death claim based on allegations of medical malpractice pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act against defendants. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants, and Williams appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court found that when the evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Williams presented substantial evidence to create a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury as to the issue whether the surgery performed by Dr. Barry was the proximate cause of Li'Jonas's death. It therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Estes v. Eaton Corp.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152847(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Estes worked as an electrician in two Bay Area naval shipyards and was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured or supplied to the Navy by approximately 50 companies. Later, he developed asbestos-related mesothelioma. In Estes’ personal injury lawsuit, a jury returned a defense verdict for an electrical component manufacturer, Eaton. The trial court granted Estes a new trial. The court of appeal reversed that order; the explanation of reasons for granting a new trial was not sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. The court overturned the verdict because “plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that he worked with arc chutes manufactured and supplied by [Eaton’s predecessor]; the arc chutes contained asbestos; asbestos fibers from the arc chutes were released during plaintiff’s work with them; and the levels of fibers released posed a hazard to plaintiff, and may have been a substantial factor in causing injury to him” whereas “[t]he evidence submitted by Eaton was not sufficient to rebut this evidence submitted by plaintiff.” This reasoning is little more than a conclusion that the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the arc chutes released hazardous levels of asbestos during Estes’s encounter with them in the workplace. The explanation is too vague to enable meaningful review. The court also rejected Estes’s substantial evidence challenge to the verdict exonerating Eaton of liability.

Mize v. Mentor Worldwide LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B295829(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Tangeman

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Plaintiffs filed suit against Mentor, alleging causes of action for negligence and negligence per se based on Mentor's negligent failure to warn and negligent manufacturing of breast implants, strict products liability for failure to warn, and strict products liability for manufacturing defects. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and entered an order overruling the demurrer to the third amended complaint. The court held that the tort claims in this case survive preemption because they are premised on conduct that both violates the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and would give rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the MDA. The court also held that plaintiffs pleaded the requisite causal connection between their injuries and Mentor's tortious acts to survive a demurrer. Finally, the trial court erroneously sustained Mentor's demurrer to the loss of consortium claim because it was derivative of the other claims.

Reid v. Morris et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0107

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

In the Fall of 2016, Lakenin Morris was driving his older cousin Keith Stroud’s car when he collided with a car driven by 18-year-old Alonzo Reid, sending Reid to the hospital. Morris had been drinking with Stroud, and Stroud asked Morris to drive his car and gave him the keys even though Morris was obviously drunk and Stroud knew that Morris was drunk, did not have a valid driver’s license, and had a habit of recklessness. Morris later pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI). Reid sued Morris for negligence and Stroud for negligent entrustment, and both were found liable for Reid’s injuries (Morris by default and Stroud by summary judgment). In a bench trial, the court awarded Reid more than $23,000 in compensatory damages, which the court apportioned equally between the two defendants, pursuant to the then-current version of the Georgia apportionment statute. The trial court also found that Morris and Stroud acted while under the influence of alcohol and further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that they acted in a manner that showed willful misconduct, malice, wantonness, and that “entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” Reid challenged the amount of punitive damages he received. The Georgia Supreme Court found OCGA 51-12-5.1(f) did not categorically bar an award of punitive damages against Stroud, because the term “active tort-feasor,” as used in the statute, was not necessarily limited to drunk drivers. The trial court therefore erred in finding that it was categorically prohibited from considering whether Stroud was an “active tort-feasor” for purposes of analyzing the appropriateness of punitive damages under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated in part the trial court’s judgment, and remanded the case for the trial court: (1) to determine whether Stroud was intoxicated to the degree that his judgment was substantially impaired and whether he was an “active tort-feasor” within the meaning of OCGA 51-12-5.1(f); and (2) if so, to set the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against Stroud.

Cadiz v. QSI, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-14-0000594

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Michael D. Wilson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's injury-by-disease was compensable under Hawai'i's workers' compensation law because the employer failed to overcome the presumption in favor of compensability. Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for injury-by-disease. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) rejected the claim, concluding that the employer's Independent Medical Examinations (IME) reports provided sufficient substantial evidence to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of compensability. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and the LIRAB's decision, holding that the employer's IME reports failed to provide substantial evidence to meet its burden to produce evidence that, if true, would overcome the statutory presumption that the injury was work-related. The Court remanded the case to the LIRAB with the instruction that Plaintiff's injury-by-disease was compensable under Hawai'i's workers' compensation law.

Fell v. Fat Smitty's

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46993

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

This case arose out of a stabbing that took place outside of an Idaho Falls bar. Steven and Audra Fell were patrons of the First Street Saloon, owned and operated by Fat Smitty’s L.L.C. (Fat Smitty’s). Towards the end of the evening, an altercation took place that resulted in Steven Fell being stabbed by another patron, LaDonna Hall. The Fells filed a complaint against Fat Smitty’s, alleging Fat Smitty’s breached its duty to: (1) warn the Fells, as invitees, of any hidden or concealed dangers in the bar; (2) keep the bar in a reasonably safe condition; and (3) protect the Fells from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons at the bar. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fat Smitty’s, ruling that the Fells’ claims were barred by Idaho’s Dram Shop Act because the Fells failed to give Fat Smitty’s timely notice of their claims. The Fells appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

Hammond v. San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 118698

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this personal injury case arising from a bar fight at the San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515 in Clyde, Kansas (VFW) between Plaintiff and a third party patron of the bar the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the VFW, holding that there were still necessary questions of fact left unanswered, and therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that despite the injury occurring off VFW-owned premises, the VFW's duty to protect Plaintiff from the assault, and the breach of that duty, arose while Plaintiff and the third party were still inside the bar. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that negligence could have arisen when all parties were on the VFW's premises. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that questions of fact existed regarding the foreseeability of Plaintiff's injury and whether a breach of duty occurred, precluding summary judgment.

Montgomery v. Saleh

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 117518

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment for the State and Patrick Saleh, a highway patrol trooper, and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging negligence and vicarious liability, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. Plaintiffs, Shelby Montgomery and Scott Bennett, sustained injuries when a Toyota driven by Robert Horton ran a red light and collided with Bennett's truck. Horton was being pursued by Saleh at the time of the collision. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, claiming that Saleh was negligent in failing to cease his pursuit of Horton prior to when he did and that the State was vicariously liable. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding on proof of causation and remanded for trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Saleh breached the duty imposed by Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1506; and (2) a dispute existed as to whether Saleh's conduct was a cause in fact of Plaintiffs' injuries.

Barclay v. Castruccio

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 30/19

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Sally D. Adkins

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Trusts & Estates

The Court of Appeals recognized the tort of intentional interference with a prospective gift or inheritance and adopted the standards set forth in Section 19 of the Third Restatement of Torts. Petitioner, the residuary beneficiary of the Estate of Peter A. Castruccio, alleged that Respondent, Peter's widow, maliciously depleted her inheritance by forcing the Estate's expenditure of attorneys' fees to defend against Respondent's groundless lawsuits and efforts to initiate criminal charges. Petitioner alleged, as relevant to this appeal, intentional interference with an expectancy. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, ruling that the cause of action for intentional interference with an inheritance is not a cause of action under Maryland law. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court recognizes the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance or gift; but (2) the allegations in Petitioner's complaint were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

McLeod v. Millette

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CA-01001-SCT

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Lula McLeod and her husband, John McLeod, appeal the circuit court’s dismissal of their medical-negligence case on grounds that it was filed outside of the limit in the applicable statute of limitations. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that because the record reflected the case was timely filed, the circuit court’s judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Nolan v. Billings Clinic

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 167

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Billings Clinic on the negligence claim brought by Plaintiffs Nancy Nolan and her husband Thomas Garrity after Nolan slipped and fell on ice and snow near the Clinic's entrance, holding that there was no abuse of discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) did not impose further sanctions on the Clinic for its failure to preserve video evidence; (2) admitted a weather report through Garrity, who had no personal knowledge of the report; (3) refused to allow Plaintiffs to introduce evidence of other falls on the Clinic's premises; and (4) refused to give Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction on a Billings municipal ordinance regarding snow removal without evidence that the Clinic received a citation for violating the Municipal Code.

Picard v. P & C Group 1, Inc.

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 306 Neb. 252

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Michael G. Heavican

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the Nebraska Worker's Compensation Court's awards for injuries suffered by Halina Picard in two separate accidents, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the doctrine of apportionment did not apply but erred in affirming the award of benefits for Picard's 2015 accident and injury. In 2016, Picard filed claims against P & C Group 1, Inc. relating to industrial injuries she received in 2012 and 2015. The compensation court determined that Picard was entitled to an award for a whole body injury based on both injuries, that apportionment was not appropriate, and that Picard was entitled to attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed the awards for Picard's 2012 and 2015 injuries and reversed the attorney fees award. The Supreme Court reversed Picard's award of benefits for the 2015 injury, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in vacating Picard's attorney fees award; (2) did not err in finding that apportionment was inapplicable and determining that Picard's second injury award should not be apportioned with the first; and (3) erred in disregarding Picard's disability from the 2012 accident when assessing her lost earnings from the 2015 injury.

Franciere v. City of Mandan

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 143

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Susan Franciere appealed a district court judgment granting the City of Mandan’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service. In 2017, Franciere and her dog were attacked by a dog in Mandan. Days later, she went to the Mandan Police Department, asserted her rights under Article I, section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, and requested a copy of the police report on the incident under the open records law. Franciere called the police department and was informed the dog was undergoing a 10-day rabies quarantine. Thereafter, Franciere sent a letter to the chief of police requesting the police report. On August 22, 2017, she received a phone call from a police lieutenant who told her she would not receive the report because the case was still active and no information would be released until the case was closed. In September 2017, she contacted the city attorney about the incident. Then in October, Franciere filed this action against the City, alleging violations of the North Dakota Constitution and the open records law. Franciere received a redacted report of the incident from the police department on November 1, 2017. On January 13, 2018, she received an unredacted report from the police department. On November 14, 2018, Franciere filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court declared Franciere’s action moot and dismissed it with prejudice. It declined to rule on Mandan’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. The North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for determination of Mandan’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon reconsideration, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss with prejudice. Franciere argued Mandan waived its personal jurisdiction claims, the district court improperly dismissed the case with prejudice, the district court erred when it denied her motion to compel discovery, and the district court judge was biased against her. The Supreme Court modified the judgment for dismissal without prejudice, and affirmed as modified.

Lavallie v. Jay, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 147

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Native American Law, Personal Injury

Lawrence Lavallie brought this personal injury action against Lorne Jay and Michael Charette after the parties were involved in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred on the night of December 26, 2016, on County Road 43 in Rolette County, North Dakota. Lavallie was driving a snowmobile on the roadway followed by Charette who was driving a GMC Yukon automobile. It was dark with blowing snow and poor visibility. Jay was operating a tractor, and in the process of blowing snow from his driveway. When Lavallie came upon Jay operating the tractor, the tractor was located in the middle of the roadway and did not have any lights or reflectors. Concerned that Charette would not be able to see the tractor in the roadway because it was dark and snowing and because the tractor did not have any lights or reflectors, Lavallie stopped the snowmobile alongside the tractor and tried to get Jay’s attention for him to move the tractor off of the road. While Lavallie was on the parked snowmobile trying to get Jay’s attention, Charette struck the snowmobile. First responders transported Lavallie to the Rolla hospital. Lavallie was transferred to Grand Forks where part of his leg was amputated. Jay appealed when the district court judgment ordered him to pay Lavallie $946,421.76, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jay conceded the district court was correct in finding the accident involving the parties in this case occurred outside the external boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Reservation. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the evidence in the record indicated the accident occurred on a county road located on land held in trust for the Tribe. "The question becomes whether district courts maintain subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving conduct between enrolled members of a tribe occurring on county roads located on Indian trust land." The Supreme Court found the district court did not determine whether the accident occurred on land held in trust for the Tribe. The district court also did not determine whether the parties to this action were enrolled members of the Tribe. Without such findings, the Supreme Court was unable to adequately consider whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Lavallie’s claims. Therefore, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Polanco v. Lombardi

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-198

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this negligence case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for Defendants on all counts in Plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were filed after the three-year statute of limitations had run and were not tolled by the discovery rule, the holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the exoneration rule, R.I. Gen. Law 9-1-20, or the doctrine of equitable tolling. Polanco was convicted of assaulting a bar patron with a pool cue. The responding police officer, Michael Camardo, filed no report. After Polanco was convicted, two witnesses swore in affidavits that Polanco was not the assailant. The trial justice granted a new trial, and the State dismissed the case against Polanco, who had been incarcerated for thirty-two months. Polanco and his wife later sued the City of Providence and Camardo, alleging negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the complaint was time-barred. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that the discovery rule or equitable tolling should apply. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint was untimely and Plaintiffs' claims were not tolled.

Innovative Block of South Texas, Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-1211

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: John P. Devine

Areas of Law: Business Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's award of compensatory damages for Plaintiff on its defamation claim, holding that this was not a case of defamation but, rather, of business disparagement and that there was no evidence for either the award of general damages for Plaintiffs' reputation or the award of special damages connected to one of the allegedly defamatory statements. Plaintiff Valley Builders Supply, inc., sued its former business competitor, Defendant Innovative Block of South Texas, Ltd., alleging that Innovative's disparaging remarks about Valley's products contributed to its demise. Plaintiff submitted only its defamation claims to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor. The jury awarded general damages for Plaintiff's reputation injury and special damages for lost profits. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) disparaging the quality or condition of a business's product or service is not, standing alone, defamation per se; (2) no evidence existed to support an award of general damages for harm to Valley's reputation; and (3) the pecuniary loss for which special damages were sought were not cognizable as defamation.

Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. PHI Air Medical, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0216

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Busby

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this dispute over the amount that air ambulance providers may recover from workers' compensation insurers, the Supreme Court held that Texas law requiring that private insurance companies reimburse the fair and reasonable medical expenses of injured workers is not preempted by a federal law deregulating aviation and that federal law does not require Texas to mandate reimbursement of more than a fair and reasonable amount for air ambulance services. PHI Air Medical, LLC, an air ambulance provider, argued that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's (TWCA) fee schedules and reimbursement standards. An administrative law judge held that PHI was entitled to reimbursement under the TWCA's standards. On judicial review, the trial court declared that the ADA did not preempt the TWCA's reimbursement provisions. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the price of PHI's service to injured workers is not significantly affected by a reasonableness standard for third-party reimbursement of those services, the ADA does not preempt that standard; and (2) the ADA does not require that Texas compel private insurers to reimburse the full charges billed for those services.

Via Metropolitan Transit v. Meck

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0458

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Jeffrey S. Boyd

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that VIA Metropolitan Transit, a governmental entity, breached its duty to act as a "very cautious, competent, and prudent person" would act under similar circumstances to a passenger who was injured while riding a VIA bus, holding that VIA was liable for the passenger's injuries in this case. Curtis Meck was injured while riding a VIA bus. Meck sued VIA, alleging that VIA was a common carrier and thus owed a duty to exercise a high degree of care. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Meck. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, VIA argued (1) the high-degree-of-care duty did not apply in this case, and even if it did, the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive governmental immunity against suits for breach of that duty; and (2) there was no evidence showing that VIA breached the high-degree-of-care duty to Meck. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) VIA is a common carrier; (2) the Tort Claims Act waived VIA's governmental immunity against Meck's claim; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that VIA breached that duty.