Latest 3 Cases: Aerotek v. Johnson Group Staffing Co. (Antitrust & Trade Regulation), Mejia v. DACM Inc. (Arbitration & Mediation), People v. Cruz ...

GOP-Packed Appeals Court Splits Hairs to Give Florida GOP a Victory Over Florida Voters

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc, in which the court upheld Florida’s Section 0751, by which the Republican-controlled state legislature gutted a voter referendum that would have restored the right to vote to ex-felons in the state who had served their time. Dorf points out that the court’s vote was split based on the party of the President who appointed them and argues that the majority exhibited an attitude of “petty sticklerism,” invoking formalistic and reality-denying reasons to rule as it did.

Read More

Aerotek v. Johnson Group Staffing Co.

Docket: C078435(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 15, 2020

Judge: Cole Blease

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Contracts

Porter Scott, P.C. (hereafter, “Porter Scott”) defended The Johnson Group Staffing Company, Inc. (hereafter, “TJG” or “Johnson Group”) through two rounds of litigation with its chief competitor, Aerotek, Inc. (hereafter, “Aerotek”). Aerotek first sued TJG after TJG’s founder, Chris Johnson, left Aerotek to form TJG. In the lawsuit, Aerotek alleged that TJG and Johnson, among other things, misappropriated trade secrets by soliciting Aerotek’s customers. TJG and Johnson settled with Aerotek a little over a year later. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review concerned the ownership of fees awarded under Civil Code 3426.4, and whether the prevailing litigant (here, The Johnson Group Staffing Company, Inc.) or the prevailing litigant’s attorney (here, Porter Scott, P.C.) were entitled to the fees awarded to the “prevailing party.” The Court concluded that, absent an enforceable agreement to the contrary, these fees belonged to the attorney to the extent they exceeded the fees the litigant already paid. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, although the parties here entered into a fee agreement, that agreement did not alter the default disposition of fees in favor of the attorney. Because the trial court reached the same conclusion, the Court of Appeal affirmed its judgment.

Mejia v. DACM Inc.

Docket: G058112(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 15, 2020

Judge: Richard M. Aronson

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law

In May 2017, plaintiff Joseph Mejia bought a used motorcycle from Defendant DACM, Inc. (Del Amo) for $5,500. Mejia paid $500 cash and financed the remainder of the purchase price with a WebBank-issued Yamaha credit card he obtained through the dealership purchasing the motorcycle. In applying for the credit card, Mejia signed a credit application acknowledging he had received and read WebBank’s Yamaha Credit Card Account Customer Agreement (the credit card agreement), which contained an arbitration provision. Sometime after his purchase, Mejia filed a complaint against Del Amo on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers alleging Del Amo “has violated and continues to violate” the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act by failing to provide its customers with a single document setting forth all the financing terms for motor vehicle purchases made with a conditional sale contract. The trial court denied Del Amo’s petition to compel arbitration, finding the arbitration provision was unenforceable under McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal.5th 945 (2017) because it barred the customer from pursuing “in any forum” his claim for a public injunction to stop Del Amo’s allegedly illegal practices. Del Amo contended the trial court erred in ruling the arbitration provision was unenforceable under McGill, arguing: (1) McGill did not apply because, due to a choice-of-law provision in the contract, Utah law rather than California law governed the dispute; (2) if California law applied, the arbitration provision “does not run afoul of McGill” because Mejia did not seek a public injunction; (3) the arbitration clause was not unenforceable under McGill because the provision did not prevent a plaintiff from seeking public injunctive relief in all fora; and (4) if the arbitration provision was unenforceable under McGill, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted McGill and required enforcement of the clause. The Court of Appeal found no merit to any of Del Amo's contentions and affirmed the district court's order.

People v. Cruz

Docket: A157385(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 15, 2020

Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cruz, who had an outstanding felony warrant for taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, was found sitting in the driver's seat of a stolen car. Crue pled guilty under Vehicle Code 10851(a). The probation report explained that Cruz, 21 years old, was born in El Salvador, and he came to the U.S. when he was 16; it described his use of alcohol and drugs as “[m]oderate.” The proposed probation conditions included that Cruz “shall not use, consume, possess or transport alcohol . . . [or] marijuana ” and required Cruz to submit to chemical testing and complete a drug assessment. The court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Cruz on three years of probation. Defense counsel argued that alcohol and marijuana are legal substances and that Cruz’s offense was not related to drug use. Cruz had admitted that on the day of the arrest, he smoked marijuana. The trial court struck the no-alcohol condition but imposed a condition prohibiting Cruz from using or consuming marijuana. The court of appeal struck the marijuana-related conditions as having no relationship to the crime of conviction and not reasonably related to preventing Cruz’s future criminality. Cruz has never been accused of a drug-related offense and does not currently suffer from a substance abuse problem.