Latest 3 Cases: Biggs v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety (Civil Rights), Cantu-Guerrero v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc. (Class Action), ...

Can A City Refuse Land-Use Permits Because it Doesn’t Like the Federal Policies the Property Will be Used to Implement?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar explains why a local government cannot constitutionally create policy discriminating against entities that do business with the feds. Specifically, Amar discusses a situation in which the city of Farland, California, is trying to prevent a privately operated state prison facility located in that city from contracting with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

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Biggs v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety

Docket: 18-2437

Opinion Date: March 10, 2020

Judge: Albert Diaz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims related to the demotion he suffered in 2012. Plaintiff alleged that defendants racially discriminated against him and seeks reinstatement of his prior position, the removal of negative materials from his personnel file, and reimbursement for his legal expenses. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Fourth Circuit denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal as moot based on plaintiff's retirement, because plaintiff has sworn that he would promptly return to work if reinstated to his prior position. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department, because its removal of this case did not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Finally, the court vacated the district court's award of summary judgment to Defendant Hooks and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, plaintiff is seeking prospective, not retrospective, relief and thus his claim against Hooks falls under the sovereign-immunity exception articulated in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Cantu-Guerrero v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc.

Dockets: 18-2351, 18-2490, 19-1231

Opinion Date: March 10, 2020

Judge: Robert Bruce King

Areas of Law: Class Action

Objectors filed consolidated appeals from the district court's order approving a class action settlement and order awarding attorney's fees to class counsel. The settlement approval order arose from two MDL proceedings related to Lumber Liquidator's sale of allegedly dangerous and defective laminate flooring. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the settlement approval order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the settlement was fair and adequate and, at bottom, the order thoughtfully assessed what the class members would give up in the proposed settlement and then explained why the tradeoff embodied in the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. However, the court vacated the attorney's fee order, because the district court erred by failing to apply to the store vouchers the "coupon" settlement provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions.

United States v. Jackson

Docket: 19-6288

Opinion Date: March 10, 2020

Judge: Rushing

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

After the district court reduced defendant's sentence under the First Step Act, the district court denied defendant's request for a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, which would have allowed defendant to bank approximately 57 months toward a future sentence of incarceration if he violated his supervised release. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing defendant's sentence to time served and ordering his immediate release, but denying his request to bank time for credit against future supervised release violations. In this case, the district court considered defendant's ability to bank time against future supervised release revocations in its analysis of the need to protect the public and the need for deterrence, two factors a court considers under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) in imposing a sentence.