Should Anyone Care that Sexual Assault is “Out of Character” for Biden?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers what people mean when they say that a sexual assault allegation seems “out of character” for a particular person and explains why that reasoning is logically flawed. Focusing on differences between how people behave publicly and privately, Colb argues that the lack of an observed pattern of sexual misconduct is not evidence that a person did not engage in sexual misconduct on a specific occasion.

Read More

Bryant v. Compass Group U.S.A., Inc.

Docket: 20-1443

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Personal Injury

Bryant's Illinois employer had a cafeteria, containing vending machines owned and operated by Compass. The machines did not accept cash; a user had to establish an account using her fingerprint. Fingerprints are “biometric identifiers” under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). In violation of BIPA, Compass never made publicly available a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying the biometric identifiers and information it was collecting; never informed Bryant in writing that her biometric identifier was being collected or stored, of the specific purpose and length of term for which her fingerprint was being collected, stored, and used; nor obtained Bryant’s written release to collect, store, and use her fingerprint. Bryant brought a putative class action in state court; BIPA provides a private right of action to persons “aggrieved” by a violation. Compass removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), on the basis of diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million. Bryant successfully moved to remand the action, claiming that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because she lacked the concrete injury-in-fact necessary for Article III standing. State law poses no such problem. The district court found that Compass’s alleged violations were bare procedural violations that caused no concrete harm to Bryant. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The failure to follow BIPA leads to an invasion of personal rights that is both concrete and particularized.

Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Docket: 19-2116

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Transportation Law

The Uber ride-sharing service does not own or select its drivers’ vehicles; its app presents riders with options, including sedans, premium cars, or SUVs. Customers restricted to motorized wheelchairs need wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs) equipped with ramps and lifts. Uber’s app offers that option. Access Living is a Chicago‐based nonprofit organization that advances the civil rights of people with disabilities; 14 percent of the organization’s staff and 20 percent of its board members are motorized wheelchair users. The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), alleging that Uber, as a travel service/public accommodation, discriminates against people with disabilities by failing to ensure equal access to WAVs because Uber fails to ensure the availability of enough drivers with WAVs, but outsources most requests for wheelchair accessible rides to local taxi companies. As a result, plaintiffs claimed, motorized wheelchair users experience longer wait times and higher prices than other Uber customers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The alleged harm to the Access Living organization comes only indirectly in the form of increased reimbursement costs. An individual plaintiff has never downloaded Uber’s app, attempted to request a ride, or learned about the response times he would personally experience.

H.A.L. NY Holdings, LLC v. Guinan

Docket: 19-1942

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

H.A.L., in the business of trading securities, set up a brokerage account with Advantage in Chicago. H.A.L.’s trading losses led Advantage to issue margin calls, which H.A.L. failed to meet. Advantage then liquidated H.A.L.’s account, leaving a negative balance of more than $75,000. When H.A.L. failed to pay, Advantage sued. H.A.L. responded with an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 for the entire amount, plus attorney fees and costs. Advantage accepted and judgment was entered. H.A.L. did not pay the judgment but instead filed suit against the CEO of Advantage claiming damages of more than $25 million arising from the same transactions. The Advantage CEO invoked the defense of res judicata. The district court agreed and dismissed this case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and imposed sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, calling the appeal “an exercise in unacceptable gamesmanship, without a reasonable and good-faith basis.” H.A.L.’s sole argument to the district court—that federal law applied and Rule 68 judgments could not support res judicata—was doomed by unanimous federal precedent. It was built on the flawed premise that state law was irrelevant. Illinois gives consent judgments claim-preclusive effect if preclusion otherwise applies.