Can a President Who Is Reelected After Being Acquitted in One Impeachment Case be Retried by a Subsequent Senate?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar considers whether a President who has been impeached and acquitted may, if reelected, be retried by a subsequent Senate. Amar acknowledges that it is unclear whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ criminal procedural protections apply to impeachment proceedings, but he offers two key reasons that re-litigation of impeachment allegations after presidential reelection would be improper.

Read More

City of Billings v. Billings Gazette

Citation: 2019 MT 299

Opinion Date: December 31, 2019

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Communications Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding attorney's fees to two media organizations after they secured for public release the names of three Billings police officers who were disciplined for having sexual relations with a city clerk, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making a statutory award of fees. The Billings Gazette ran a story reporting that three City police officers had been suspended without pay for having sex on City property. Each of the three officers filed a separate motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking protection of his identity. The district court issued the TROs. The media companies sought a declaration that the public's right to know clearly outweighed the alleged privacy interests the officers asserted and requested attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 2-3-221. The district court ordered release of the officers' identities and granted the media companies' request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, holding that the district court properly exercised its discretion in awarding fees and costs.

Independent Living v. State, Department of Transportation

Citation: 2019 MT 298

Opinion Date: December 31, 2019

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Transportation Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Montana Independent Living Project (MILP) and granting the Montana Department of Transportation's (MDOT) motion for summary judgment in this case concerning the disbursement of Transportation Assistance for the Elderly and Disabled (TransADE) funds, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to MDOT. The TransADE program provides operating assistance for bus transportation to state agencies serving elderly and disabled persons. MDOT was authorized to administer the TransADE program and award special revenue grants using guidelines established in the State Management Plan (Plan). MILP, a nonprofit organization that provides transportation services for the elderly and disabled, submitted a proposal to offer weekend transportation services for elderly and disabled citizens in the Helena area. MDOT, however, awarded the general 2018 TransADE grant to the City of Helena. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mont. Code Ann. 7-14-112 constitutionally delegates legislative authority to MDOT by authorizing the funds consistent with the Plan; (2) the Plan's policies and procedures are not subject to rulemaking procedures; (3) in adopting the Plan, MDOT met its constitutional requirements; and (4) the Legislature's authorization of disbursement of TransADE funds does not violate Mont. Const. art. VII, 12.

High Country Paving v. United Fire & Casualty Co.

Citation: 2019 MT 297

Opinion Date: December 31, 2019

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a question certified to it by a federal district court regarding tension in case law between an insurer's duty to a third-party claimant and its duty to its insured. As a result of an accident caused by High County Paving, Inc., one person died and another was critically injured. United Fire & Casualty Co., High County's insurer, advance-paid the medical expenses of the injured parties prior to a final settlement. High County argued that any further payments to the injured parties without obtaining a release for High County would violate United Fire's duties to High Country, as general damages are not a type of damages that are required to be advance-paid to an injured third party. United Fire argued it was required to tender a payment of policy limits to the injured parties without a release for High Country because total damages exceeded policy limits. The Supreme Court held that an insurer does not breach its duty to its insured when it pays policy limits to an injured third party, without a release for its insured, after a motor vehicle accident when both liability for the accident is reasonably clear and it is reasonably clear that total damages caused by the insured exceed policy limits.