Can the Republicans Cancel the Elections, Even Though Trump Can’t?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan considers whether (and how) President Trump or his supporters in Congress could cancel the 2020 elections, citing public safety as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Buchanan points out that because states control the procedures for the election, Trump would need Republican governors of certain blue states to shut down their state’s elections—something Buchanan stops short of saying is likely or unlikely.

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The Lessons the Coronavirus Crisis Can Teach Us About the Religious Liberty that Serves the Public Good (aka the Framers’ Religious Liberty)

MARCI A. HAMILTON

Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars, describes some of the lessons the novel coronavirus pandemic can teach us about religious liberty. Hamilton points out that COVID-19 is nondenominational and nonpartisan, yet we are already seeing some groups claim to be exempt from the public-health prohibitions on large gatherings, on the basis of their religious beliefs.

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Commonwealth v. McGann

Docket: SJC-12742

Opinion Date: March 17, 2020

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for assault and battery on a family or household member and assault by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that that a trial judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third party in certain circumstances. On appeal, Defendant argued that her right to a fair trial was violated and that the trial judge erred in ordering her to pay restitution to the victim's mother, who was a third party and non victim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant received a fair trial; and (2) a trial judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third party, and the order in the instant case satisfied the causation requirement.

Commonwealth v. Norman

Docket: SJC-12744

Opinion Date: March 17, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the trial judge granting Defendant's motion to suppress certain GPS location data and its fruits, holding that the initial imposition of a GPS device as a condition of pretrial release violated article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In 2015, Defendant was charged with possession of a class B substance with the intent to distribute, as a subsequent offense, and motor vehicle violations. Defendant was ordered to wear a GPS monitoring device as a condition of release. Defendant was later arrested and indicted on charges of armed robbery while masked. Defendant moved to suppress the GPS location data used to identify him as being present at the scene of the crime. After finding that Defendant had consented to the use of GPS location data only for the purposes of enforcing conditions of release and not for general law enforcement purposes the judge concluded that the search was not supported by probable cause and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the search was impermissible because the GPS monitoring did not further any legitimate governmental interests.

In re a Minor

Docket: SJC-12747

Opinion Date: March 17, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Juvenile Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the juvenile court committing a juvenile for substance use disorder treatment pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 35, holding that the juvenile was committed on insufficient evidence. After a hearing, the juvenile court judge committed the juvenile for ninety days for treatment. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the commitment order, holding (1) appeals from an order of commitment pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 35 are not moot solely because the individual is no longer committed; (2) taking into account a juvenile's youth necessarily is required as part of the individualized assessment demanded by such petitions; (3) it was not clearly erroneous to find that the juvenile had a substance use disorder; (4) the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a finding of imminent and "very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury" as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 1; and (5) due process requires a judge to consider less restrictive alternatives in all commitment hearings for substance use disorder treatment.