Can a Misdemeanor Count as an “Emergency” for Purposes of Skipping the Warrant?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court that presents the question whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when the suspect may have committed a misdemeanor, as opposed to a more serious crime. Colb argues that if the Court believes that a misdemeanor (or a particular misdemeanor) is not important enough to justify the invasion of a person’s home, then it ought perhaps to hold that the police officer in the present should not have entered the suspect’s home, period, with or without a warrant.

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Custom Hair Designs by Sandy v. Central Payment Co.

Docket: 20-1677

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: William Duane Benton

Areas of Law: Class Action

Plaintiffs filed a class action against CPAY, alleging breach of contract, state-law fraudulent concealment, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Plaintiffs, a class of over 160,000 small retailers using CPAY for credit card processing, allege that CPAY misrepresented a number of fees, added fees with no value to retailers, and inflated fees without prior approval from issuing banks. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of the proposed class, holding that the district court engaged in a sufficiently rigorous analysis of Federal Rule 23 certification and made specific findings of fact. The court also held that the district court did not err in determining that common questions predominate; that plaintiffs' claims are typical of class members; and that plaintiffs will represent class interests adequately. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a class action is the superior mechanism to try this case.

Holbein v. TAW Enterprises, Inc.

Docket: 18-2892

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

After plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, TAW, in Nebraska state court, TAW removed to federal district court where the action was dismissed with prejudice. On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal and ordered the action remanded to state court, concluding that a removal defect left the district court without subject-matter jurisdiction. TAW Enterprises petitioned for rehearing en banc and the Eighth Circuit vacated the panel opinion, granting rehearing en banc. The en banc court now overrules prior circuit precedents, Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2005), and Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 1992), to the extent they hold that a violation of 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2), the so-called forum-defendant rule, is an unwaivable jurisdictional defect in removal. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of plaintiff's appeal. On the merits, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim as a matter of law for retaliatory demotion and discharge in contravention of public policy under Nebraska law.

Reinard v. Crown Equipment Corporation

Docket: 18-3440

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's admission of evidence over plaintiffs' objection and denial of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in a products liability action brought against Crown, a forklift manufacturer. The court applied Huff v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co., 991 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1993), and concluded that plaintiffs waived their challenge to the admission of the video simulations where they preemptively introduced the simulations into evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.