Don’t Blame the SCOTUS DACA Ruling for Difficulties Undoing Trump’s Damage

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf responds to claims that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last term invalidating the Trump administration’s effort to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program license President Trump to take actions that will be difficult for a future Democratic administration to undo. Dorf argues that characterizing the ruling as a win for Trump and his executive power is far-fetched, and we should instead be concerned with the long-lasting damage to the environment and our nation’s foreign policy caused by the Trump administration.

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Davis v. Kozak

Dockets: A156234(First Appellate District) , A156238(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 19, 2020

Judge: Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Labor & Employment Law

Davis filed sued individual Red Bull executives for age and sexual harassment and hostile work environment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Davis was 56 years old, had been employed by Red Bull for 15 years, and was in a mid-level managerial sales position until he was terminated. Red Bull filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. The individual defendants moved to compel Davis to submit his claims to arbitration. Davis filed a separate lawsuit against Red Bull seeking a declaratory judgment that his claims were not subject to the arbitration agreement. That agreement specifies it is “intended to cover all civil claims which involve or relate in any way to [Davis’s] employment (or termination of employment) with Red Bull, including, but not limited to, claims of employment discrimination or harassment on the basis of . . . sex, age, . . . claims for wrongful discharge, [and] claims for emotional distress.” The trial court concluded and the court of appeal affirmed that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The court noted the "adhesion" nature of the agreement, which is not mutual and the arbitral discovery process does not guarantee adequate discovery.

People v. Townsend

Docket: A158082(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 19, 2020

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2005, Townsend was placed on felony probation. After violating his probation, he was sentenced to three years in prison. Townsend was released in September 2009, subject to a three-year parole term. Townsend absconded from parole supervision on nine occasions and was jailed five times for parole violations, spending 896 days in the community on parole supervision, 2,309 days absconding from parole supervision, and 334 days in jail on parole violations. The Department of Corrections pushed his parole release date to December 23, 2019. After Townsend absconded for the ninth time, the Department petitioned the court to revoke Townsend’s parole. The trial court denied the petition, stating Townsend’s “parole may not be extended by the time he was in custody on the parole violation[s].” The court of appeal reversed. Penal Code section 3064 tolls the period of parole while an absconder is a “fugitive from justice,” until his return to custody. Section 3000(b)(6)(A)) reads, “Except as provided in Section 3064, in no case may a prisoner subject to three years on parole be retained under parole supervision or in custody for" longer than four years from his initial parole. Because Townsend’s 334 days in jail on probation violations is less than a full year, each day he spent in jail extended his parole term by a day, and his discharge date is extended by 2,309 plus 334 days; none of these suspensions and extensions violated any other statutory provision.

Fushan Li v. Department of Industrial Relations

Docket: B288104(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 19, 2020

Judge: Dennis M. Perluss

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff, the owner and operator of four massage parlors, received three citations from the Department for violations of California's wage and hour laws. The hearing officer issued findings and an order affirming all three citations, including a total of $198,576 in unpaid wages and liquidated damages for citation no. WA-102321. Plaintiff's subsequent petition for writ of mandate challenging the Commissioner's decision affirming the assessments in citation no. WA-102321 was dismissed by the superior court after his request that it waive the bond requirement under Labor Code section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3) was denied and he failed to post a bond. The Court of Appeal affirmed and explained that, although section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), now requires employers to post a bond as a condition to filing a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Labor Commissioner's citations, employers' substantive, preenactment obligations toward their employees under the Labor Code have not changed. All that changed is the addition of the procedural requirement that plaintiff post a bond to secure payment of the assessed amounts. Therefore, application of that requirement to a proceeding that had not yet been initiated prior to the effective date of section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), does not constitute a retroactive application of the statute. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to waive the bond requirement. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that he was not indigent was not supported by substantial evidence.