Latest 3 Cases: Funes v. State (Civil Rights), Aleman v. State (Criminal Law), Barclay v. Castruccio (Trusts & Estates)

Should Acquittals Require Unanimity?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the policy question of whether, since the Constitution requires jury unanimity to convict a defendant of a serious crime, states should require a unanimous verdict to acquit a defendant, as well. Colb describes the reasons behind jury unanimity convictions and assesses whether they apply similarly to acquittals.

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Funes v. State

Docket: 65/19

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Getty

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this criminal case in which Defendant was charged with various drunk driving offenses the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trail court denying Defendant's motions in limine to exclude field sobriety tests and a breath test from the evidence, holding that, in giving advice of rights, law enforcement officers must use methods that reasonably convey the warnings and rights in the implied consent statute. Police officers found Defendant asleep at the wheel of his truck and brought him to the station after he failed several field sobriety tests. An officer read in English an "Advice of Rights" form, commonly referred to as a DR-15 form, to Defendant, who spoke Spanish. Defendant signed the DR-15, agreeing to take a breath test, and failed the test. Defendant moved to exclude the tests, arguing that he did not understand the field sobriety test instructions or the advice of rights because he did not understand English. The trial court denied the motions, and Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial at which the breath test evidence must be suppressed, holding that the officer in this case did not use methods that reasonably conveyed the warnings and rights in the implied consent statute.

Aleman v. State

Docket: 60/19

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Robert N. McDonald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Maryland lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner to commit him to the Department of Health and that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) required Petitioner's return to Ohio to serve the remainder of his sentence there. After commencing a sentence in Ohio for felony assault, Petitioner requested a transfer under the IAD to Maryland where a murder charge was pending against him. Petitioner pled guilty in Maryland to second degree murder. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of "not criminally responsible." The State asserted that the IAD required that Petitioner first return to Ohio to finish his sentence. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to remain in Maryland, but the circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the the plain language of the IAD, Maryland had custody of Petitioner only for the purpose of resolving the pending murder charge and thus did not have jurisdiction to commit him to the Department; and (2) article VI(b) of the IAD did not prevent Petitioner's return to Ohio.

Barclay v. Castruccio

Docket: 30/19

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Sally D. Adkins

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Trusts & Estates

The Court of Appeals recognized the tort of intentional interference with a prospective gift or inheritance and adopted the standards set forth in Section 19 of the Third Restatement of Torts. Petitioner, the residuary beneficiary of the Estate of Peter A. Castruccio, alleged that Respondent, Peter's widow, maliciously depleted her inheritance by forcing the Estate's expenditure of attorneys' fees to defend against Respondent's groundless lawsuits and efforts to initiate criminal charges. Petitioner alleged, as relevant to this appeal, intentional interference with an expectancy. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, ruling that the cause of action for intentional interference with an inheritance is not a cause of action under Maryland law. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court recognizes the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance or gift; but (2) the allegations in Petitioner's complaint were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.