The Unacknowledged Clash Between the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis law professor emeritus Alan Brownstein comment on a largely unacknowledged clash between religious accommodations and exemptions on the one hand, and core free speech principles which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, on the other. Amar and Brownstein describe this apparent conflict and suggest that the Court begin to resolve the conflict when it decides two cases later this term presenting the question of the scope of the “ministerial exception.”

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Gaymon v. State

Docket: SC19-712

Opinion Date: January 23, 2020

Judge: Lawson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal vacating Defendant's sentence and remanding for resentencing under the prior version of Fla. Stat. 775.082(1), which could have resulted in reimposition of Defendant's sentence without any findings by a jury or the trial court, holding that the proper remedy for harmful error resulting from the court, not the jury finding the fact of dangerousness under section 775.082(1) is to remand for resentencing. In Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147, 150 (Fla. 2018), the Supreme Court held that the portion of section 775.082(10) requiring the court, not the jury, to find the fact of dangerousness to the public necessary to increase the statutory maximum nonstate prison sanction violated the Sixth Amendment. At issue in this case was the proper remedy for harmful error resulting from the court finding the fact of dangerousness under the statute. The First District held that statutory revival was the proper remedy. The Supreme Court quashed the First District's decision, holding that the proper remedy is to remand for resentencing with instructions to either impose a nonstate sanction of up to one year in county jail or empanel a jury to make the determination of dangerousness, if the State so requests.

State v. Poole

Docket: SC18-245

Opinion Date: January 23, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment ordering a new penalty phase proceeding after finding Defendant was entitled to relief under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and rejecting Defendant's guilt-phase claim, holding that this Court must partially recede from Hurst. The jury in Defendant's case recommended death by a vote of eleven to one after unanimously finding that, during the course of the first-degree murder, Defendant committed related crimes. Defendant later filed his postconviction motion alleging that counsel was ineffective for conceding that Defendant committed the nonhomicide offenses for which he was convicted and that Defendant was entitled to resentencing because the jury did not make the findings required by Hurst. The trial court denied Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim but vacated Defendant's death sentence pursuant to Hurst. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) this Court recedes from Hurst except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and (2) under a correct understanding of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the requirement that a jury unanimously find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt was satisfied in this case.

Kocaker v. State

Dockets: SC17-1975, SC18-878

Opinion Date: January 23, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing in part, denying in part, and granting in part Genghis Nicholas Kocaker's initial motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death and denied Kocaker's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err and that Kocaker was not entitled to habeas relief. Kocaker was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Kocaker later filed a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, asserting, among other things, entitlement to relief under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), because the jury's recommendation of death in his case was nonunanimougs. The State conceded that claim, vacated Kocaker's sentence, and summarily denied or dismissed Kocaker's remaining claims, either for mootness or on the merits. Kocaker appealed and also filed a petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding Kocaker competent to proceed in postconviction; (2) the circuit court correctly denied Kocaker's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and Brady claim; and (3) Kocaker was not entitled to habeas corpus relief.