Latest 3 Cases: In re: Greg Abbott (Civil Rights), Baptist Memorial Hospital - Golden Triangle, Inc. v. Azar (Government & Administrative Law), ...

Even During a Pandemic, Fear-Mongering About the Debt Has Predictably Reared Its Ignorant Head

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why we should not be concerned about increasing the federal government’s debt, despite what some journalists are suggesting. Buchanan points out that sometimes—such as during a pandemic or other crisis—the federal government should borrow more to prevent a downward economic spiral.

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In re: Greg Abbott

Docket: 20-50296

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law

On April 7, 2020, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's temporary restraining order (TRO) that exempted abortions from GA-09, an emergency measure temporarily postponing non-essential medical procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 9, 2020, the district court entered a second TRO exempting various categories of abortion from GA-09. At issue in this mandamus petition is the April 9 TRO. The court held that the district court disregarded the court's mandate in Abbott II and failed to apply the framework governing emergency exercises of state authority during a public health crisis, established over 100 years ago in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Furthermore, the district court second-guessed the basic mitigation strategy underlying GA-09 (the concept of "flattening the curve"), and also acted without knowing critical facts such as whether, during this pandemic, abortion providers do (or should) wear masks or other protective equipment when meeting with patients. The court concluded that these errors resulted in an overbroad TRO that exceeds the district court's jurisdiction, reaches patently erroneous results, and usurps the state's authority to craft emergency public health measures "during the escalating COVID-19 pandemic." Therefore, the court granted the writ in part and directed the district court to vacate parts of the April 9 TRO.

Baptist Memorial Hospital - Golden Triangle, Inc. v. Azar

Docket: 18-60592

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In this case, the parties dispute the proper method for calculating the hospital specific limit for annual DSH payments. The Hospitals filed suit challenging the 2017 final rule clarifying that hospitals' "costs incurred" are net of payments from third parties, liked Medicare and private insurers. The Hospitals contend that the Secretary's definition of "costs incurred" conflicted with the Medicaid Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(C). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Hospitals, and joined three other circuits in holding that the 2017 rule was consistent with the Medicare Act. The court could not agree with the Hospitals that the ordinary meaning and dictionary definitions of "costs" and "payments" rendered the disputed language unambiguous; the court was unpersuaded by the Hospitals' argument that the statute draws a "clear line" between costs and payments; the court rejected the Hospitals' contention that Congress, by expressly excluding payments from Medicaid and the uninsured, meant to exclude only those payments and no others; the court rejected the Hospitals' argument that the express exclusion of third-party payments in a related Medicaid provision indicates that Congress chose not to deduct third-party payments in 42 U.S.C. 1396r-4(g)(1)(A); and the court saw no basis for the Hospitals' argument that the 2017 Rule conflicts with the statutory purpose of the hospital-specific limit. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc.

Docket: 19-20023

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

The Fifth Circuit held, consistent with the dissent in Faludi v. U.S. Shale Sols., 950 F.3d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 2020), that an employee who is paid a daily rate is not paid on a "salary basis" under 29 C.F.R. 541.602(a). In this case, plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Helix, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that Helix did not pay him on a "salary basis" because it calculated his pay based on a daily, rather than weekly, rate. Helix countered that plaintiff's daily rate was greater than the weekly salary requirement under Labor Department regulations. Helix argued that, so long as plaintiff worked at least a single day during any particular week, he would receive more than the weekly salary requirement, and was therefore paid on a "salary basis" under Labor Department regulations. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Helix and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that plaintiff was paid on a daily rate—so he was paid "with" (not "without") "regard to the number of days or hours worked," in direct conflict with the plain language of section 541.602(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff was not paid on a salary basis.