Latest 3 Cases: Jones v. Clark County (Civil Rights), Doe v. University of Kentucky (Civil Rights), Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr (Immigration Law)

Can Workers Tell Governors to Drop Dead? The Moral Authority to Defy Lockdowns

JOSEPH MARGULIES

In this second of a series of columns about the COVID-19 protests, Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies argues, with some caveats, that workers have the moral authority to reopen their businesses in order to sustain themselves. Margulies notes that while he is not advising anyone to disobey the law (and while he personally supports the lockdown orders), business owners facing the impossible decision whether to follow the law or sustain themselves and their families are morally justified in defying the stay-at-home orders.

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Paid Labor: Eleventh Circuit Protects Rights of Pregnant Worker

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT

Joanna L. Grossman, law professor SMU Dedman School of Law, and Cynthia Thomas Calvert, principal of Workforce 21C and a senior advisor for family responsibilities discrimination to the Center for WorkLife Law at UC Hastings, comment on a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals by the Eleventh Circuit protecting the rights of a pregnant worker. Grossman and Calvert describe the lower court’s ruling and the appellate court’s decision reversing it, calling the decision “a step forward for the rights of pregnant women.”

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Jones v. Clark County

Docket: 19-5143

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 2013, Lexington police tracked the source of a child pornography video to a Clark County IP address. Deputy Murray obtained a subpoena and identified Jones as the subscriber associated with the IP address. Murray secured a search warrant for Jones’ address, noting that Jones was not yet a “suspect” and did not necessarily have “possession” of devices connected to child pornography. Murray and others executed the warrant and seized devices. Jones was home alone; after completing the search, officers him to the Sheriff’s Office. Several officers later acknowledged that they knew an individual’s IP address could be hacked by a third party. After Jones was indicted, Murray received forensic testing results that failed to yield a copy of the pornographic video. It is unclear whether the prosecutors or Jones’ public defender were informed. The prosecution continued. In November 2014, the defense commissioned a forensic analysis of Jones’ phone and tablet that also found no evidence of child pornography. Unlike the first report, it reported no evidence that Jones ever used a peer-to-peer file-sharing program. After posting a reduced bond, Jones was released from jail 14 months after his arrest. In April 2015, the charges were dismissed without prejudice, on the Commonwealth’s motion. Jones sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to qualified immunity for Murray but otherwise affirmed. While there was probable cause for Jones' initial arrest. Murray knew by January 2014 that there was no evidence of child pornography on Jones’ devices. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether Murray informed the prosecutors of these results, a genuine issue exists as to whether Murray “knowingly or recklessly” withheld exculpatory evidence.

Doe v. University of Kentucky

Docket: 19-5156

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Batchelder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Education Law

UK freshman Doe reported two rapes. After the first report, UK’s Title IX Office issued a no-contact order to the male student (John) and investigated. Doe reported subsequent encounters with John. The Office investigated and determined that the no-contact order had not been violated. UK denied Doe's request to ban John from a certain library area. Before the Sexual Misconduct Hearing Panel, Kehrwald, UK’s Dean of Students presented evidence on Doe’s behalf. Doe alleges that Kerhwald failed to adequately represent her interests, failed to object when John’s attorneys actively participated by examining and cross-examining witnesses, and did not introduce evidence of a voicemail that she left on the night of the alleged rape. John’s attorneys successfully argued against its admission. The Sexual Misconduct Appeals Board upheld a finding in John's favor. In the investigation of Doe’s allegations against “James,” the Office also issued a no-contact order but James refused to comply with a request to change his class sections and failed to appear at a hearing. James was dismissed from UK. Doe brought Title IX claims, 20 U.S.C. 1681, arguing that UK’s response caused a hostile educational environment and vulnerability to further harassment and that UK demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to follow UK’s policies throughout the investigation and hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Doe failed to show that UK’s response subjected her to further actionable harassment that caused Title IX injuries.

Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr

Docket: 19-3417

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Immigration Law

Guzman crossed the border as a teenager in 1998 and has never returned to Mexico. In 2014, Guzman was served with notice of removal proceedings. Guzman applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Guzman testified that another family had murdered his father and grandfather; Guzman later suffered physical abuse by his stepfather. No one reported that abuse because of his political position. Guzman testified that he fears returning to Mexico because his stepfather, who still has police connections, would kill him and that the individuals who murdered his relatives would believe that he had come to avenge his father’s death and would try to kill him. The IJ found Guzman “generally credible,” but that his testimony alone was insufficient without corroboration and that Guzman could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA upheld the denials of relief, reasoning that Guzman did not adequately explain why he could not obtain affidavits from his aunt, sister, or mother “since he remains in contact” and that even with adequate corroboration, the persecution “was not based on his membership in [a particular social group].” The Sixth Circuit vacated. Substantial evidence does not support the determinations regarding the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claims. The BIA incorrectly required Guzman to demonstrate that his membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason” for his persecution.