Agency Guidance May Not Be Enough: Keeping Workers Safe and Avoiding Employer Workplace Liability During the COVID-19 Pandemic

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, ELISABETH CAMPBELL

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 2L Elisabeth H. Campbell describe the wide array of laws that will need to come into play to keep workers safe and avoid employer liability as workplaces consider reopening amid the COVID-19 pandemic, cautioning that compliance will not necessarily relieve employers of the risk of litigation and liability. Estreicher and Campbell discuss applicable recommendations, guidelines, and requirements set forth by such agencies as the U.S. Department of Labor, which is responsible for administering the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC).

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Medley v. Dish Network, LLC

Docket: 18-13841

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Royal

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Communications Law, Consumer Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that DISH violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) in its attempts to collect debt it knew had been discharged in bankruptcy and in its direct contacts with plaintiff knowing she was represented by counsel. Plaintiff also alleged that DISH violated the Telephone Consumer Practices Act (TCPA) by contacting plaintiff about the debt with an automated dialing system after she revoked her consent to receive such calls. The Eleventh Circuit first determined that DISH's claim for the Pause debt was discharged. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the FCCPA claims. In this case, DISH attempted to collect debt it had no legal right to collect because the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy, and DISH directly contacted plaintiff after having received notice that she was represented by counsel. Accordingly, the court remanded on the FCCPA claims for the district court to consider whether DISH actually knew that the Pause charges were invalid and that plaintiff was represented by counsel with regard to the debt it was attempting to collect, and if so, whether such errors were unintentional and the result of bona fide error. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the TCPA claim, holding that the TCPA does not allow unilateral revocation of consent given in a bargained-for contract. The court reasoned that, by permitting plaintiff to unilaterally revoke a mutually-agreed-upon term in a contract would run counter to black-letter contract law in effect at the time Congress enacted the TCPA.

Knight v. Florida Department of Corrections

Docket: 18-12488

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Newsom

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner alleged that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his capital-murder trial. The court held that, even assuming that counsel performed deficiently in failing to investigate and present the mitigation evidence that petitioner now raises—thus satisfying the first prong of the two-part Strickland standard that governs ineffective-assistance claims—petitioner failed to carry his burden of demonstrating resulting prejudice.

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Baisden

Docket: 18-13555

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Branch

Areas of Law: Insurance Law

This case arose when a truck driver driving a truck owned by FST collided with two vehicles. Grange, the insurer of the truck, filed suit against the driver of one of the impacted vehicles, FST, and T&G, asking the district court to declare its obligations under three insurance policies—two issued to FST and one issued to T&G. At issue was whether there was a change in the truck's legal status, such that FST could have "borrowed" its own truck back from T&G. The district court determined that coverage existed under the T&G policy but not the FST policies. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that defendants failed to introduce evidence showing that a written lease gave exclusive use rights to T&G. Therefore, the district court correctly held that no reasonable factfinder could have found in defendants' favor. Although defendants introduced new evidence purporting to establish that the lease granted T&G exclusive use rights in their motion for reconsideration, the court held that the district court properly denied that motion, because the evidence could have been produced earlier. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that, under the policies and under Georgia law, the events here constituted a single accident.