Is Retribution Worth the Cost?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb discusses the four purported goals of the criminal justice system—deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation—and argues that retribution may preclude rehabilitation. Colb considers whether restorative justice—wherein a victim has a conversation with the offender and talks about what he did to her and why it was wrong—might better serve the rehabilitative purpose than long prison sentences do.

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The Other Epidemic

KATHRYN ROBB

Kathryn Robb, executive director of CHILD USAdvocacy, comments on a public-health crisis that is getting relatively less attention right now: the scourge of child sex abuse. To address this crisis, Robb calls for greater public awareness, stronger laws protecting children, and legislative action

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State ex rel. Davies v. Schroeder

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1045

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo against Ashtabula County Court Judge David A. Schroeder, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Appellant filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Schroeder to grant his motion to vacate a trial court's judgment denying his motion for the return of his fine and court costs and seeking a writ of procedendo compelling Judge Schroeder to provide the clerk of courts with proper certification of the total amount of money to be returned to Appellant. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law Appellant's request for extraordinary relief in mandamus and procedendo was barred.

State v. Bryant

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1041

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4549.02(A)(1) and vacated the conviction, holding that the "registered number" of a vehicle, as used in the statute, is the license plate number associated with the vehicle. The trial court convicted Defendant with the charge of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, concluding that Defendant failed to provide the registered number of his vehicle as required by section 4549.02(A)(1). The court of appeals affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that Defendant violated the statute by not providing the statutorily required identifying information to the police officer at the scene of the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a driver subject to section 4549.02(A)(1) gives the information specified in that statute to the required recipients under section 4549.02(A)(1)(a) and (b), the driver does not violate section 4549.02(A)(1) by not providing that information to a police officer if the driver leaves the scene without knowledge that the police have been alerted of the accident; and (2) the registered number of a motor vehicle is the license plate number associated with the vehicle.

Taylor v. Harris

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1046

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition because it did not comply with the statutory requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). Appellant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged offense, was convicted of three counts of murder and other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of forty-one years to life. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the juvenile court failed to make the required findings under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.12(A)(1)(a) before the transfer and challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory transfer procedures. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's constitutional claims on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition was fatally defective because he did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A).