Latest 3 Cases: State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene (Communications Law), Sutton Bank v. Progressive Polymers, LLC (Contracts), In re A.M. (Family Law)

What Is a Seizure, and What Is a Holding? The Court Hears Argument in Torres v. Madrid

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on two particular aspects of a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument last month, Torres v. Madrid. First, Colb discusses the distinction, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between touching someone directly with one’s hands and touching someone indirectly using an inanimate object. Second, she explains the difference between holding and dicta in a court opinion. Using these two points as illustrations, Colb shows how flexible the Constitution can be, lending itself to very different interpretations.

Read More

State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5100

Opinion Date: November 3, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part Jerone McDougald's writ of mandamus to compel Larry Greene to provide documents in response to McDougald's public-records request, holding that McDougald was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Greene to allow him personally to inspect two of the three records he sought. McDougald, an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), sent a public-records request to Greene, the records custodian at SOCF, requesting to inspect three records. When Greene did not allow the inspection, McDougald filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus. Also pending was McDougald's motion to consider the exhibits attached to his complaint as substantive evidence and his two motions for leave to amend. The Supreme Court granted the motion to consider evidence, granted in part and denied in part the writ of mandamus, and denied McDougald's request for an award of statutory damages, holding (1) McDougald was entitled to a writ of mandamus with respect to his request for two of the three records he requested; and (2) McDougald was not entitled to statutory damages.

Sutton Bank v. Progressive Polymers, LLC

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5101

Opinion Date: November 3, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Contracts

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a cognovit promissory note signed by debtors was defective, holding that the contract, viewed as a whole, put the debtors on notice of the rights they were relinquishing by signing the note. Progressive Polymers, LLC and Darin Bay obtained a loan from Sutton Bank secured by a cognovit promissory note. The note included a confession-of-judgment clause containing a warrant of attorney by which Progressive Polymers and Bay agreed that if they defaulted on the note an attorney could confess judgment against them. Sutton Bank later filed a complaint for a cognovit judgment against Progressive Polymers and Bay, alleging default. The trial court ruled in favor of Sutton Bank and issued the cognovit judgment. The court of appeals vacated the cognovit judgment, concluding that the note did not meet the strict requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2323.13(D) and was therefore not a valid cognovit note upon which judgment could be entered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although cognovit clauses are construed strictly against those seeking to enforce them, courts must still give effect to the clear intent of the parties when interpreting them.

In re A.M.

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5102

Opinion Date: November 3, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas, juvenile division, which granted permanent custody of A.M. to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (Department), holding that the juvenile court complied with Ohio Rev. Code 2151.414(D)(1). At issue was the statutory requirement that juvenile courts consider the factors set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2151.414(D)(1) for determining a child's best interest before granting a motion filed by a private child-placing agency or a public children-services agency for permanent custody of that child. The magistrate in this case granted the Department permanent custody of A.M., finding that A.M. should not be placed with either parent and that an award of permanent custody to the Department was in A.M.'s best interest. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2151.414(D)(1) requires a juvenile court to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of a child in a permanent custody case; and (2) the record demonstrated that the magistrate and the juvenile court considered the statutory factors.