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Justia Weekly Opinion Summaries

Medical Malpractice
January 1, 2021

Table of Contents

Crowson v. Washington County State, Utah

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Health Law, Medical Malpractice

US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Ex parte Johnson & Johnson et al.

Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Medical Malpractice

Supreme Court of Alabama

McGill v. Szymela

Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice

Supreme Court of Alabama

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Legal Analysis and Commentary

American Law’s Worst Moment—2020

AUSTIN SARAT

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Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains why the police murder of George Floyd was the worst moment of 2020 in American law. Professor Sarat proposes that we remember the event and that date—May 25—as “infamous,” a word reserved for rare and atrocious events like the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in an attempt to capture the brutality and inhumanity of the act.

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Medical Malpractice Opinions

Crowson v. Washington County State, Utah

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-4118

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Health Law, Medical Malpractice

Martin Crowson was an inmate at the Washington County Purgatory Correctional Facility (the “Jail”) when he began suffering from symptoms of toxic metabolic encephalopathy. Nurse Michael Johnson and Dr. Judd LaRowe, two of the medical staff members responsible for Crowson’s care, wrongly concluded Crowson was experiencing drug or alcohol withdrawal. On the seventh day of medical observation, Crowson’s condition deteriorated and he was transported to the hospital, where he was accurately diagnosed. After Crowson recovered, he sued Johnson, LaRowe, and Washington County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied motions for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity by Johnson and LaRowe, concluding a reasonable jury could find both were deliberately indifferent to Crowson’s serious medical needs, and that it was clearly established their conduct amounted to a constitutional violation. The district court also denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding a reasonable jury could find the treatment failures were an obvious consequence of the County’s reliance on LaRowe’s infrequent visits to the Jail and the County’s lack of written protocols for monitoring, diagnosing, and treating inmates. Johnson, LaRowe, and the County filed consolidated interlocutory appeals, raising threshold questions of jurisdiction. Johnson and LaRowe challenged the denial of qualified immunity, while the County contended the Tenth Circuit should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of its summary judgment motion. The Tenth Circuit exercised limited jurisdiction over Johnson’s and LaRowe’s appeals pursuant to the exception to 28 U.S.C. 1291, carved out for purely legal issues of qualified immunity through the collateral order doctrine. The Court held Johnson’s conduct did not violate Crowson’s rights and, assuming without deciding LaRowe’s conduct did, the Court concluded LaRowe’s conduct did not violate any clearly established rights. The Court's holding was "inextricably intertwined with the County’s liability on a failure-to-train theory," so the Court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction to the extent Crowson’s claims against the County rested on that theory. However, under Tenth Circuit binding precedent, the Court's holdings on the individual defendants’ appeals were not inextricably intertwined with Crowson’s claims against the County to the extent he advanced a systemic failure theory. The district court's denial of summary judgment to Johnson, LaRowe, and the County on the failure-to-train theory was reversed, and the remainder of the County’s appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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Ex parte Johnson & Johnson et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190423

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Michael F. Bolin

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Medical Malpractice

Johnson & Johnson and other pharmaceutical defendants sought mandamus relief from an Alabama circuit court order that refused to transfer venue of the underlying lawsuit to the Jefferson County, Alabama circuit court, on grounds that venue in Conecuh County was not proper as to all plaintiffs, or alternatively, on the basis that convenience of the parties and/or the interest of justice required it. In 2019, the plaintiffs filed a complaint at the Conecuh Circuit Court against numerous defendants that, they averred, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or dispensed opioid medications throughout Alabama in a manner that was misleading, unsafe, and resulted in drug addiction, injury, and/or death to Alabama citizens. The complaint asserted claims of negligence, nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and deceit, wantonness, and civil conspiracy. The manufacturer defendants moved to transfer the case to Jefferson County, reasoning that because 8 of the 17 plaintiffs either had a place of business in Jefferson County or operated hospitals in Jefferson County or adjacent counties, logic dictated that a large percentage of the witnesses for those plaintiffs (i.e., prescribing doctors, hospital administrators, etc.) and their evidence were located in or around Jefferson County. After a review of the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court determined defendants did not demonstrate a clear, legal right to transfer the underlying case from Conecuh to Jefferson County. Therefore, the petition was denied.

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McGill v. Szymela

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190260

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Tom Parker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice

Janice and Timothy McGill appealed a circuit court judgment against them in their medical-malpractice lawsuit against Victor Szymela, M.D. The McGills alleged that Dr. Szymela failed to properly perform Janice's temporomandibular-joint total-replacement ("TJR") surgery. Janice sought treatment to relieve her temporomandibular-joint ("TMJ") disorder. Janice had been experiencing clicking and locking of her jaw and excruciating jaw and ear pain. Janice alleged that she experienced distinct, worse pain immediately after the surgery and that the new pain did not resolve with time. She continued to experience popping in her jaw. She alleged that her overbite was exacerbated by the surgery. She also alleged that she could not open her mouth as wide as previously and that she lost sensation in her lips, which diminished her ability to speak clearly. Janice sought treatment from Dr. Michael Koslin, who referred Janice to a pain-management specialist. Ultimately, Janice's providers determined that her pain was unresponsive to conservative treatment. In 2017, Dr. Koslin surgically removed the prosthesis. Several weeks later, Dr. Koslin implanted custom joints. Janice alleged Dr. Koslin's treatment relieved her pain. In March 2016, Janice sued Dr. Szymela, alleging that he breached the standard of care for an oral and maxillofacial surgeon by failing to properly assess the source of Janie's pain or install the prosthesis correctly. The McGills identified Dr. Louis G. Mercuri as one of their expert witnesses regarding oral and maxillofacial surgery. On Dr. Szymela's motion, the trial court ruled that Dr. Mercuri did not qualify as a "similarly situated health care provider" under § 6-5-548(c)(4), Ala. Code 1975, because he had not practiced in Dr. Szymela's specialty within the year preceding Dr. Szymela's alleged breach. Thus, the court excluded Dr. Mercuri as a witness. At the close of all evidence, on Dr. Szymela's motion, the trial court entered a partial judgment as a matter of law ("JML") in favor of Dr. Szymela. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court did not exceed its discretion by excluding the testimony of Dr. Mercuri on the basis that he was not statutorily qualified as an expert. And because the McGills did not present or point to substantial evidence of the standard of care for Dr. Szymela's performance of Janice's TJR surgery, the trial court properly entered a JML on the claims relating to the surgery. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed.

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