Latest 3 Cases This Week: In re: Gregg Abbott (5th Cir.), Kirt v. Metzinger (La.), Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial ...

How Allen v. Cooper Breaks Important New (if Dubious) Ground on Stare Decisis

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on language in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Allen v. Cooperdiscussing constitutional stare decisis in the context of state sovereign immunity. Amar points out some of the problems with the Court’s jurisprudence on state sovereign immunity and Congress’s Section 5 power, and he questions the Allen majority’s embrace of a “special justification” requirement for constitutional stare decisis.

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In re: Gregg Abbott

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-50264

Opinion Date: April 7, 2020

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus directing vacatur of the district court's issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against executive order GA-09 as applied to abortion procedures. In order to preserve critical medical resources during the escalating COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Texas issued GA-09, which postpones non-essential surgeries and procedures until 11:59 p.m. on April 21, 2020. The court held that the drastic and extraordinary remedy of mandamus was warranted in this case because the district court ignored the framework governing emergency public health measures, like GA-09, in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); the district court wrongly declared GA-09 an "outright ban" on previability abortions and exempted all abortion procedures from its scope, rather than apply the Jacobson framework to decide whether GA-09 lacks a "real or substantial relation" to the public health crisis or whether it is "beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion" of the right to abortion; the district court failed to apply the undue-burden analysis in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992), and thus failed to balance GA-09's temporary burdens on abortion against its benefits in thwarting a public health crisis; and the district court usurped the state's authority to craft emergency health measures, substituting instead its own view of the efficacy of applying GA-09 to abortion. Therefore, the court found that the requirements for a writ of mandamus are satisfied in light of the extraordinary nature of these errors, the escalating spread of COVID-19, and the state's critical interest in protecting the public health.

Kirt v. Metzinger

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-C-01162

Opinion Date: April 3, 2020

Judge: Crain

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Medical Malpractice

Elaine Kirt died in 2010, due to complications that developed shortly after undergoing eye surgery. On September 23, 2011, her son, Neville Kirt, appearing in person and on behalf of his deceased mother and his two brothers, filed a request with the Division of Administration asking for a medical review panel to review the care provided to his mother by three defendants: Dr. Rebecca Metzinger, the attending surgeon; Dr. Theodore Strickland III, the anesthesiologist for the procedure; and Tulane Medical Center. In a reply letter to Neville, the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board (PCF) acknowledged receipt of the request; confirmed Dr. Metzinger, Dr. Strickland, and Tulane University Hospital & Clinic were qualified under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (Act); informed Kirt a filing fee of $100 per qualified defendant was due; and requested payment of $300. The notice stated the failure to pay would render the request invalid, without effect, and would not suspend the time to file suit. Days later, then appearing through counsel, the Kirts sent a second letter asking to amend its previous request, adding two additional nurses. The Kirts included a $500 check to cover filing fees. A medical review panel convened, reviewed the care provided by all named healthcare providers, and found no breach of the standard of care. The Kirts thereafter filed against the doctors and nurses. Claims against the doctors were dismissed by summary judgments because there was no proof they breached the standard of care while treating Elaine Kirt. Those judgments expressly barred allocating fault to the dismissed parties and prohibited introducing evidence at trial to establish their fault. The nurses then filed peremptory exceptions of prescription, claiming the request for a medical review panel was invalid because the Kirts failed to pay the final $100 filing fee, and prescription was not suspended for any claims. The trial court concurred with the nurses and granted an exception of prescription. The Supreme Court determined that because the Kirts paid filing fees for five of six named defendants, dismissal of one of the nurses was proper for lack of a filing fee. The Court determined the lower courts did not consider or decide the merits of the Kirts' argument that they could not have reasonable known about the claims against two of the nurse defendants until one was deposed. Because the lower courts did not consider or decide the merits of the Kirts' basis for the exception of prescription, which could have turned on factual findings, the Supreme Court pretermitted consideration of these arguments and remanded the matter to the trial court for further disposition of the exception.

Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial Court

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12926

Opinion Date: April 3, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that, due to the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, pretrial detainees who have not been charged with an excluded offense are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release on personal recognizance and a hearing within two business days of filing a motion for reconsideration of bail and release. To decrease exposure to COVID-19 within correctional institutions, Petitioners sought the release to the community of as many pretrial detainees and individuals who have been convicted and are serving a sentence of incarceration as possible. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the risks inherent in the COVID-19 pandemic constitute a changed circumstance within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, tenth paragraph, and the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 57; (2) any individual who is not being held without bail under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A and who has not been charged with an excluded offense as set forth in Appendix A to this opinion is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release; and (3) to afford relief to as many incarcerated individuals as possible, the parole board and Department of Corrections are urged to work with the special master to expedite parole hearings and the issuance of parole permits.